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Abstract
Characterizing major transformations in Indian state and society during the twilight of the Mughal Empire
(1707-1793), the emergence of regional successor polities (1721-1818), and the consolidation of British
colonial rule (1757-1858) has engaged historians of South Asia since Irfan Habib’s landmark study The
Agrarian System of Mughal India in 1963. Habib argued that the Mughal state extorted surplus produced
by peasants, effectively reducing them to low levels of subsistence. As a response, peasants revolted and
their shifting allegiances contributed to the growth of regional polities across the subcontinent. Over the
years, various scholars have responded to Habib’s contention. Historians of Mughal India have offered
new theories of imperial crises or have rejected the decline thesis altogether, while scholars of the early
colonial period have shown how mercantilist regimes like the British East India Company infiltrated South
Asian political economy and paved the way for colonial rule. While empirically rich, these studies are
inadequate in their portrayal of local life during political unrest. Simply put, most scholars rely too heavily
on documentation produced by mature state bureaucracies. As a result, historical work on how locals
experienced a deteriorating Mughal administration and the mechanisms by which provincial warlords
became significant nodes of public authority remains long overdue. Focusing on eighteenth-century
Gujarat, I investigate how the Mughals lost control of Empire and how an upwardly mobile, tribute-seeking
lineage called the Gaekwads became a prominent state in its wake. I rely on manuscript sources in
Persian and Gujarati, and archival materials in Sanskrit, French, Marathi, and English to understand the
merchant-bankers who supplied finance to a Mughal administration in distress, and on newer financiers
who were becoming the lynchpin of various reorganizational schemes of its successors. Finance was
becoming a prized commodity, and analyzing how different groups positioned themselves around
maneuvering capital is essential for understanding statecraft and local power relations. By analyzing how
the regional apparatus of an early modern empire waned, and how roving bandits became legitimate
nodes of authority in its place, this dissertation contributes to the literature on state formation, land rights
in late-precolonial South Asia, and Indian business history.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
South Asia Regional Studies

First Advisor
Ramya Sreenivasan

Keywords
Eighteenth Century, Financiers, Gujarat, Land Rights, Mughal Empire, State Formation

Subject Categories
Finance and Financial Management | History

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3184

BUSINESS HOUSEHOLDS, FINANCIAL CAPITAL,
AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN INDIA, 1650-1818
Sudev J. Sheth
A DISSERTATION
in
South Asia Regional Studies
and
History
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2018
Supervisor of Dissertation

Dr. Ramya Sreenivasan, Associate Professor of South Asia Studies
Graduate Group Chairperson, South Asia Regional Studies

Dr. Davesh Soneji, Associate Professor of South Asia Studies
Graduate Group Chairperson, History

Dr. Peter Holquist, Ronald S. Lauder Endowed Term Associate Professor of History
Dissertation Committee
Dr. Lisa Mitchell, Associate Professor of South Asia Studies
Dr. Daud Ali, Associate Professor of South Asia Studies
Dr. Devesh Kapur, Professor of Political Science, Madan Lal Sobti Professor for the Study of
Contemporary India, Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of India

BUSINESS HOUSEHOLDS, FINANCIAL CAPITAL,
AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN INDIA, 1650-1818
COPYRIGHT
2018
Sudev J. Sheth

For my sisters and parents

iii

Acknowledgements
A dissertation is a hundred hands in the making, and I am fortunate to have had so many
wonderful teachers, mentors, and colleagues who have supported my learning and discovery over
the years. At the University of Pennsylvania, my primary advisor Ramya Sreenivasan taught me
how to combine multilingual archival work and the close reading of regional literary texts to
develop an original perspective on early modern political economy. She always supported my
own vision for graduate school, and enhanced it by channeling my thoughts, inklings, and one-off
ideas into scholarly form. I am privileged to have worked with a supervisor whose classic
monograph The Many Lives of a Rajput Queen inspired me to pursue historical inquiry some ten
years ago. Lisa Mitchell has been a co-advisor in many ways, and has taught me how to situate
my work in conversations across the disciplines of anthropology, history, and South Asia studies.
She consistently found ways to catalyze my research, by commenting on my writing and
encouraging me to present my work in front of diverse audiences at Penn and beyond. I also
thank her for instilling in me the importance of thoughtful pedagogy through her own example of
undergraduate teaching. Daud Ali is one of the most creative historians in our field, and his
seminar Making Medieval India lured me into developing a research agenda on Mughal India. If
imagination is the secret ingredient for good scholarship, then Daud certainly helped cultivate it
through lively discussions about the materials at hand. Devesh Kapur taught me how to analyze
historical evidence through foundational concepts in the social sciences. Theoretical literature on
state formation and banditry, Bayesian probabilities, and the principal–agent problem allowed me
to develop arguments about late-Mughal society that might find appeal to a wider group of
scholars. Devesh has influenced my thinking about business families and capitalist development
in the longue durée, and always asks some of the most difficult questions in the room. I could not
have completed my dissertation without his practical push and affectionate mentorship. At Penn, I
also benefited immensely from courses with, and inputs from, Roger Chartier, Faisal Chaudhry,
Jamal Elias, Renata Holod, and Deven Patel. Long conversations with Faisal during the initial
years of graduate school were especially meaningful for testing ideas, floating hypotheses, and
establishing the lay of the land. Thank you, Faisal, for helping me formulate a research agenda
that I strongly believe in. Finally, my gratitude to Zoe Beckerman for helping navigate the
bureaucracy of university life with efficiency and great humor.
I had the good fortune of teaching my own course at the University of Pennsylvania in Spring
2017. To the members of East & West: A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Cultural History of the
Modern World, thank you for exploring so many different viewpoints on the development of our
society with me. Teaching is one of the greatest privileges of the academy, and I will cherish this
initial experience for years to come.
At Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, I remember with deep gratitude and nostalgia the
foundational teachings of Neeladri Bhattacharya, Najaf Haider, and Janaki Nair. During my
Masters between 2009-11, they taught me elements of critical thinking, methods of historical
inquiry, and techniques of persuasion that became essential arsenal during the demanding years of
graduate work at Penn. Their own examples as fine lecturers and inspiring teachers reminds me of
all that is beautiful about the classroom. A special thanks to Najaf Haider for introducing me to
Mirat-ul Haqaiq, an essential unpublished source that helped me formulate the key argument of
this dissertation. His willingness to discuss minute details with patience, and his help with
translating some of the more difficult passages in the text reminds me that scholarly process is as
important as eventual output.
iv

During my undergraduate days at the University of California, Berkeley, and subsequent work at
the Institute for South Asia Studies, I was encouraged to pursue my love for Indian music, culture,
and history by Lawrence Cohen, Vasudha Dalmia, Munis Faruqui, Robert and Sally Goldman,
Matthew Rahaim, Raka Ray, Sanchita Saxena, and Bonnie Wade. I thank them for their teachings
and guidance during an impressionable time in my life.
Generous research grants from the Social Science Research Council, the American Institute for
Indian Studies, and the University of Pennsylvania allowed me to conduct archival research and
historical fieldwork in Baroda, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bombay, Pune, New Delhi, London, and
Oxford. In Baroda, I must thank the Department of History at the M.S. University for hosting me,
and allowing me to freely consult old materials in the Haribhakti Collection. Adhya Saxena, Dilip
Kataria, and Keshorjit Singh made my research and long-term stay at the university especially
productive. I am also grateful to Gopal and Swati Haribhakti for access to their personal
collection of eighteenth century documents produced by their ancestors. Finally, to Samira Sheikh
for initially pointing me towards Baroda, and suggesting that I explore materials related to the
Haribhakti family firm. In Ahmedabad, Ramji Savaliya, Preeti Pancholi, and Chetan Bhojak of
the B.J. Institute of Indology helped me access rare materials across the city, and provided an
invaluable service by reading difficult medieval Gujarati texts with me. Jayshree Lalbhai assisted
with accessing old records pertaining to the Jhaveri family at the L.D. Institute of Indology and
the Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi. At these repositories, I thank Karsan Rathod, Shripal Jhaveri, and
Bhadrabahu Vijay for helping identify key materials emanating from the Jain literary and
documentary traditions. In New Delhi, I thank Dr. Faizan Ahmed for his help accessing Mughal
records held by the Oriental Records Room at the National Archives of India. Finally, I thank all
the staff members at the various libraries, archives, and institutes in the United States, England,
and India where I completed research over several years for this project.
From their writings and in various conversations, I have learned something substantial about our
intellectual heritage from Siddharth Chandra, Indrani Chatterjee, John Deyell, Munis Faruqui,
Sumit Guha, Douglas Haynes, Balvant Jani, Sudipta Kaviraj, Sunil Khilnani, Sunil Kumar, Karen
Leonard, Allyn Miner, Francesca Orsini, Anastasia Piliavsky, Tirthankar Roy, Adhya Saxena,
A.M. Shah, Sunil Sharma, Samira Sheikh, Pushkar Sohoni, Babu Suthar, and Francesca
Trivellato.
My colleagues and friends at the University of Pennsylvania deserve special mention. Thank you
to Brian Cannon, Michael Collins, Ishani Dasgupta, Samana Gururaja, Marc Kelley, Timothy
Lorndale, Christopher Muenzen, Kenneth Sharp, Jawan Shir, and Guo Xiao for being companions
in the journey that is graduate school. To Jawan, Manizha, and little Insan, for your unwavering
friendship and love, and for reminding me that the world is indeed a big place during moments of
doubt. To Samana and Ishani, for being housemates, classmates, and closest of friends, for
making me laugh, for hearing me out, and for making Philly my home. My years in Philadelphia
would not have been as beautiful without the friendship and support of Ali Abadi, Sumitra
Badrinathan, Manashree Damle, Aniruddha Jairam, Vineet Kulkarni, Valerie Lang, Ananth
Padmanabhan, Nazneen Patel, Aardra Rajendran, Nimit Singhania, Neelanjan Sircar, and the
Walkers on Larchwood Avenue.
To my friends, David Boyk, Shivang Dave, Sameer Deen, Lynna Dhanani, Arthur Dudney, Ani
Gupta, Priyakshi Hazarika, Shantanu and Abhimanyu Herlekar, Sweta and Nalin Jha, Naimat
Ullah Khan, Surbhi Mahendru, Misha Mintz-Roth, Raghavan Narasimhan, Vikas Phondni, Zoya
Puri, and Neha, Netrisha, and Abhijit Sahai, for your love, support, and timely humor.
v

To my gurus Aneesh Pradhan and Shubha Mudgal, for showing me all that is beautiful about life
through music, traveling, and writing. Since I was in high school, your own exemplary art and
scholarship has inspired me to create, communicate, and persuade in as many ways as possible.
To Prafullkaka, Ranjankaki, and Leelavatiba, for being guardians in Delhi, and for showing me
how to live my family’s legacy through my work. The support of my sisters Manali and Sonali,
and my brother-in-law Jayant, has meant the world to me. Theo chocolates and gifts of listening
have given me the strength to live on my own, so far away, so often. To Juni, for taking risks
across continents, and for accepting us without promises. And finally, to my parents, Jigisha and
Jay Sheth, for allowing me to pursue my dreams of study, travel, and music ever since I can
remember. Your love is the greatest blessing in my life, and this dissertation is one of its many
outcomes.

vi

ABSTRACT
BUSINESS HOUSEHOLDS, FINANCIAL CAPITAL,
AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY IN INDIA, 1650-1818
Sudev J. Sheth
Ramya Sreenivasan
Characterizing major transformations in Indian state and society during the twilight of the
Mughal Empire (1707-1793), the emergence of regional successor polities (1721-1818), and the
consolidation of British colonial rule (1757-1858) has engaged historians of South Asia since
Irfan Habib’s landmark study The Agrarian System of Mughal India in 1963. Habib argued that
the Mughal state extorted surplus produced by peasants, effectively reducing them to low levels
of subsistence. As a response, peasants revolted and their shifting allegiances contributed to the
growth of regional polities across the subcontinent. Over the years, various scholars have
responded to Habib’s contention. Historians of Mughal India have offered new theories of
imperial crises or have rejected the decline thesis altogether, while scholars of the early colonial
period have shown how mercantilist regimes like the British East India Company infiltrated
South Asian political economy and paved the way for colonial rule. While empirically rich, these
studies are inadequate in their portrayal of local life during political unrest. Simply put, most
scholars rely too heavily on documentation produced by mature state bureaucracies. As a result,
historical work on how locals experienced a deteriorating Mughal administration and the
mechanisms by which provincial warlords became significant nodes of public authority remains
long overdue. Focusing on eighteenth-century Gujarat, I investigate how the Mughals lost control
of Empire and how an upwardly mobile, tribute-seeking lineage called the Gaekwads became a
prominent state in its wake. I rely on manuscript sources in Persian and Gujarati, and archival
materials in Sanskrit, French, Marathi, and English to understand the merchant-bankers who
supplied finance to a Mughal administration in distress, and on newer financiers who were
vii

becoming the lynchpin of various reorganizational schemes of its successors. Finance was
becoming a prized commodity, and analyzing how different groups positioned themselves around
maneuvering capital is essential for understanding statecraft and local power relations. By
analyzing how the regional apparatus of an early modern empire waned, and how roving bandits
became legitimate nodes of authority in its place, this dissertation contributes to the literature on
state formation, land rights in late-precolonial South Asia, and Indian business history.
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Transliteration and Dates
Transliteration
Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this dissertation are mine. I have used diacritics
and italics only the first time a non-standard term appears. A complete glossary has been
provided at the end of this dissertation. Non-standard spellings of original sources in
quotations have been maintained as is. Diacritics for Persian terms are based on the
International Journal of Middle East Studies transliteration guide. Transliteration for Sanskrit
words are based on the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration. Finally, diacritics
for Gujarati, Marathi, and Hindustani are based on simple Romanization with modifications
below:
ā = long vowel “a” as in “latte”
ī = long vowel “e” as in “peel”
ū = long vowel “u” as in “loose”
Dates
I rely on www.islamicity.org/hijri-gregorian-converter to convert Islamic-Hijri dates to the
Gregorian.
To convert dates from the Hindu Vikram-Samvat to the Gregorian, I rely on a simple formula
of subtracting 57 years from the V.S. date. (e.g. 1697 V.S. = 1640 C.E.)

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction
Business Households, Financial Capital, and Public Authority in India, 1650-1818
This dissertation investigates connections between banking households, financial capital, and
political authority in Gujarat during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It seeks to further
our understanding of the processes behind the local disintegration of Mughal sovereignty between
1680 and 1750, and the mechanisms by which provincial militarized peasant-elites, and later the
early British colonial state, consolidated public authority in its wake between 1721 and 1818.
These processes are difficult to disaggregate because temporal boundaries overlap, spheres of
sovereignty are unclear, and evidence is multiple in terms of language, script, and form. As such,
this work offers neither a seamless narrative of intrigue, nor a foolproof explanation of a
subcontinent-wide historical phenomena that was the fall of the Mughal Empire. Rather, it is an
exploratory study that relies on new materials in fashioning a perspective of political and
administrative change for one prominent region in India. By focusing on the material realities of
Gujarat in western India, and the experiences of financial agents, representatives of political
authority, and local residents, I pay due attention to the overall dynamics of the Mughal state as
dictated by imperial decree and its bureaucratic momentum on the one hand, and its actual
fashioning by the dynamics of local social organization and new forms of political ascendancies
on the other. My analysis is based on the premise that although structural transformations in state
and society are often catalyzed by new challenges and social contexts, eventual outcomes are
disproportionately conditioned by practices already entrenched within existing political and
economic structures. What remains to be explored, then, are the key factors at the macro and
micro levels that enabled the precipitation of one set of trajectories and historical outcomes over
others. While this investigation is partial and conjectural by design, it represents an effort to
expand our understanding of historical change through the amalgamation of new research and
analyses on western India between 1650 and 1818.

Historical Problem
Characterizing major transformations in Indian state and society during the twilight of the
Mughal Empire (1707-1750), the emergence of regional successor polities (1721-1818), and the
consolidation of British colonial rule (1757-1858) has engaged historians of South Asia since the
publication of Irfan Habib’s landmark study The Agrarian System of Mughal India in 1963.1
1

Habib, Irfan. 1999 (1963). The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
1

Drawing on official chronicles, royal orders, and revenue documents, Habib argued that the
Mughal state extorted the entire surplus produced by peasants, effectively reducing them to low
levels of subsistence. This surplus was harnessed by the ruling classes, especially local landed
chiefs, the nobility, and members of the imperial household for sustaining royal habits and
running the extensive administrative-cum-military apparatus of empire. As a response to
overbearing taxation from what was ostensibly the protective arm of the state, peasants revolted,
and their shifting allegiances contributed to the growth of regional nodes of authority and
organization. Over the past fifty years, various scholars have responded to Habib’s contention.
Historians of Mughal India, for example, have offered new theories of imperial crises or have
rejected the decline thesis altogether, while scholars of the early colonial period have drawn
attention to how mercantilist regimes like the British East India Company infiltrated South Asian
political economy and paved the way for colonial rule. These studies are invaluable and shed light
on certain broad features of the era, but remain inadequate in their analyses of provincial society
during a period of political upheaval. Simply put, most scholars rely too heavily on
documentation produced by mature state bureaucracies in formulating perspectives on public
authority, administrative efficacy, and the dynamics of premodern social change more broadly.
As a result, historical work on how localities experienced a deteriorating Mughal administration,
and on the processes by which provincial warlords started becoming significant nodes of public
authority in eighteenth-century India remains long overdue.
This dissertation addresses this problem by investigating why the Mughal Empire in India
dissipated, and how an upwardly mobile peasant-soldiering lineage called the Gaekwads
established one of the largest and richest successor states in its wake. My research suggests that
by 1707, expansionist military campaigns in the Deccan by Emperor Aurangzeb bankrupted the
Mughal treasury. These wars were elongated beyond initial expectations, and its cost quickly
outpaced the overall income from land revenue. This generated an acute financial crisis during
which desperate princes and governors began extorting local bankers and merchants for money to
pay their armed forces and military retainers. 2 This shortage of finance was exacerbated by the
ongoing costs of maintaining royal habits, local infrastructure, and other performative aspects of
imperial sovereignty that could not be easily done away with. By the 1720s, Mughal officials in
Gujarat not only fought to retain rights to control the province, but also competed for access to
loans and to the wider financial networks of local specialists in specie. Since salaries from
2

In Renaissance France, rival governors and provincial warlords also grabbed royal mints in desperate
search for funds during periods of war. See Wolfe, Martin. 1972. The Fiscal System of Renaissance France.
Yale University Press, pp. 185-213.
2

Mughal redistributive networks were not forthcoming, these officials eventually defaulted on
loans and lost access to essential financial services provided by Hindu and Jain specialists. 3 In
addition, unpaid soldiers, especially Arab, Persian, Sidi, and other predominantly Muslim military
laborers were no longer willing to aid in extorting money for Empire. Mughal legitimacy
continued to erode into the 1730s, and new roving bandits started seeking tribute from local
landlords.4 In western India, these peasant-soldiering warlords belonged to a group coalescing
around the label ‘Maratha’, and the Gaekwads operating in the Baroda zone became one of four
prominent military-household lineages of this confederacy. 5 By the 1750s, the Marathas had
made inroads into central and northern India, and began to dominate the political landscape
through a series of alliances and tribute sharing agreements with local landed elites.
Initially, the Gaekwads relied on the dual strategy of sharing Gujarat’s revenues with
disaffected Mughal governors who were consolidating their own fiefdoms, and with the Peshwa
authority at Pune to whom they owed their initial allegiance to. In addition, they continued tactics
of banditry and irregular revenue-seeking expeditions to villages and towns in the Gujarat
mainland and the Kathiawar peninsula that were purported to have wealth. They soon realized
that a regular stream of income was necessary to maintain authority, and for this, a bureaucraticfiscal apparatus had to be organized so that resources from the disparate territories falling under
the fledgling Gaekwad dominion could be properly harnessed. Like many premodern polities in
Central, South, and Southeast Asia, the Gaekwads initially consolidated power through land
revenue farming. In this system, the collecting of agricultural revenue was farmed out to the
highest bidder of the locality. This was a major departure from the Mughal land revenue system
in which imperial officials were assigned revenue rights known as jāgīr. To secure a bid from the

3

Mughals relied on independent financial firms and specialists for transferring funds, trading currency,
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fledgling Gaekwad polity, successful renters had to pay the state half of the estimated yearly
revenues in advance. These were large sums, and aspiring revenue farmers began borrowing this
money from a growing and increasingly powerful class of financiers. This was in line with the
deepening of cash economies and the extensive use of financial instruments and book money in
eighteenth-century western India.6 The Gaekwad rulers also took regular loans at nine to twenty
percent interest from these prominent persons to pay their military, build stately infrastructure,
and fund their social lives.
This work pays close attention to merchant-bankers who supplied finance to a Mughal
administration in distress between 1707-1730, and to newer financial intermediaries who were
becoming the lynchpin of various reorganization schemes of its successors from the 1740s
onward. A monopoly on violence was no longer the foolproof strategy for maintaining public
authority. Ready money was becoming the most prized commodity, and analyzing how different
groups organized themselves around maneuvering capital is essential for understanding state,
locality, and early-modern power relations in India. As such, the central question of this
dissertation is what factors led to the increasing importance of private capital and local banking
personnel for state-building projects in South Asia between 1650 and 1818?

Setting
Gujarat in western India has a long history of trade across the Indian Ocean littoral. Its
coastline stretches over 1,000 miles and maritime networks have connected mercantile
communities across the Indian Ocean for over a millennium. Starting in 1200, medieval polities
in Gujarat combined the effects of an “expanding agrarian frontier with the vital presence of
merchants and martial pastoralists”.7 The modern nation state of Gujarat, which was established
in 1960, belies three ecologically and historically distinct regions of the area. The first is the
relatively fertile and prosperous mainland of eastern Gujarat stretching from south of Surat near
Bombay all the way north to Patan and east into central India. The second is the Kathiawar
peninsula, having pockets of productive lands but historically inhabited by martial pastoralists.
And the third is Kacch, seasonal wetlands and salt fields located north of the Kathiawar
peninsula, and home to chieftains that shared tributary relations with major ruling powers
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controlling Gujarat’s mainland in earlier times. Critiquing Indian ocean historiography which
tends to view mercantile activity as independent from political power, historian Samira Sheikh
has effectively demonstrated the ways in which these three regions became connected through the
politics of trade and the settling of pastoralists by 1500.
By the late-sixteenth century, Gujarat was incorporated into the Mughal Empire and yielded
large revenues to the state. 8 Banking and commercial activities at various port-cities also enriched
local merchants from at least the second millennium of the common era.9 Towards the mideighteenth century, the Mughals began losing control of the area as an upwardly mobile warlord
lineage from the Deccan began regularly raiding Gujarati cities. These peasant-soldiering elites
belonged to the larger Maratha confederacy. By 1818, after nearly twenty-five years of repeated
military conflicts and financial finagling, the British East India Company defeated the Marathas
and their lands were divided between the East India Company, the Maratha Gaekwad family, and
other smaller estates across the Kathiawar and Kacch regions. The Gaekwad’s share of 13,140
square kilometers (8,164 square miles) became the Princely State of Baroda while 16,100 square
kilometers (10,000 square miles) came under colonial jurisdiction. 10 This negotiation was based
on the British East India Company’s calculation of land revenue and income from various levies,
not ease of territorial administration. 11 As a result, Baroda’s new political geography resembled a
jigsaw in which its four major districts of Kadi, Baroda, Amreli, and Navsari were not
contiguous. The arbitrary borders of these four regions cut across distinct ecological, cultural, and
linguistic zones in western India, and were only completely reintegrated with surrounding
territories with the abolishing of princely authority in 1949, two years after India’s independence
from British colonial rule.
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Argument
This dissertation argues that the downfall of the Mughal Empire is best explained by
understanding its sudden and insatiable need for moveable money. For the better part of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mughal agrarian apparatus was robust in that revenues
outweighed expenses, and early emperors forged relatively well-functioning bureaucracies across
vast territories. Various royal chronicles, land revenue documents, and even visual evidence in
the form of miniature paintings and imperial architecture attest to this high tide of Mughal rule. 12
The tail end of Emperor Aurangzeb’s reign from 1658 to 1707 was marked by a serious monetary
crisis. Expansionist campaigns in the Deccan drained resources beyond capacity, and desperate
Mughal governors and officials began extorting merchant-bankers who frequented royal
assemblies for money. The chief purpose for raising loans was to pay soldiers who were not loyal
to any one person, cause, or authority, but were willing to work for anyone willing to offer
regular and timely salaries. Despite strong efforts made by the imperial court in Delhi to
coordinate administration in the Gujarat province, the factionalism playing out at the Mughal
court was too divisive and undermined any efforts at sustained rule. The incessant violence and
scare tactics by imperial officials in the locality engendered two major shifts. The first was the
contraction of merchant-banking wealth from the realm of politics, and the second was the
growing prominence of new ‘roving bandits’ who aspired control of territory and land revenue.
As a bankrupt imperial order began losing control of key territories, provincial warlords began
seeking power in this volatile political vacuum and started becoming new nodes of authority.
They hired soldiers and made alliances with renegade Mughal governors who were defecting
from their allegiance to the Mughal Emperor.
I suggest that during this period of political uncertainty, the need to propagate fiscally solvent
relationships led to new ways of managing land revenues and enabled the growth of an altogether
new class of financial specialists. These local financiers began earning profits by implicating
themselves in the changing politics of land. These groups shifted their attention away from trade
12
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and started lending money to upwardly mobile warlords like the Gaekwads. In return, they
received repayments with interest and more significantly, perpetual tax-free land grants. For these
small-town financiers who were trying to consolidate wealth and influence, these assets were
strategic acquisitions in a political economy where land, and not just the revenues from it, was
becoming a prized commodity. While peasant oppression, religious intolerance, and colonialism
continue to be posited as major reasons for why the Mughal Empire did not survive beyond the
late-seventeenth century, my own analysis suggests that a more complete answer lies in the
changing politics of finance and entitlements to land revenue. Money was implicated in the
changing political order of this period through its central importance in funding military salaries
and financing revenue-farming contracts purchased by intermediary speculators that have been
stylistically characterized as premodern ‘portfolio-capitalists’.13 I believe that the changing face
of state and society during the long eighteenth century is best understood by tracing the social
networks of the various producers and consumers of finance. In studying the relationship between
financial communities and sources of political authority in early-modern South Asia, my
argument is based on the premise that the waxing and waning of empires is intimately tied to
cycles of the availability of credit and bullion.
My argument suggests that fiscally strong empires, or those whose revenues exceed
disbursements and whose administrative apparatuses are primary organizers of social life, are
marked by a balance in the use of bullion and the availability of credit. As such, the high tide of
the Mughal Empire as indexed by Akbar’s rule was characterized by relatively strong
administrative systems backed by its own creditworthiness. In the quest to expand the territorial
domains of the empire in the Deccan, Aurangzeb required much of the treasury’s resources in the
form of bullion. In fact, historical epochs of relative peace and prosperity are marked by strong
credit systems whereas decades of civil strife and war are marked by a grab for bullion. In the
immediate aftermath of Aurangzeb’s death, we get a very real glimpse into how state and locality
functioned between Delhi, Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Surat. In the evidence examined in the
individual chapters of this dissertation, we will see that moneyed friends of the court became the
first to be harassed and extorted for confiscatory sums. Merchants, bankers, and other ‘precarious
courtiers’ who were part and parcel of the court’s politics became the prime targets of cash
grabbing campaigns. An empire starved of cash shows little mercy, and the individual governors
and agents of the state ended up extorting and harassing local moneyed individuals in the name of
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the state when, in fact, the Mughal state as the primary source of public authority was already
enervated and being hollowed from within. For provincial governors in desperate need of funds,
the apparatus of the local state, including their own political positions, became the justificatory
basis for extortion campaigns. In such a system of chaos, the eighteenth century should not be
viewed as an autonomous deepening of the cash economy. Rather, it was a frantic grab and
systematic outing of bullion from the moneyed classes. My research suggests that moneyed
groups in early modern India needed the institutional support and good will of political
authorities, and during relatively peaceful times, they could accumulate and maneuver wealth.
However, during moments of crises, these very same groups became primary sources of money
and were subject to violent extortion.
During the period under review, the possession of metallic money was very important to
controlling combative resources, especially paying a standing military, and when required,
recruiting militias during times of labor shortage. The sources examined for the eighteenth
century suggest widespread social crises emerging because of arrears due to free-agent military
men. Dirk Kolff’s study of the military labor market has left a lasting impact on South Asian
historiography by demonstrating how such a market functioned. 14 The sword has no allegiance
except to its paymaster, especially in a market where the services of professional mercenaries
were in constant demand. Although some forms of loyalty to war bands existed, this was severely
undermined by the inability of leaders of military militias and retinues to pay their staff on time.
It is in this context that ready cash became so central to social control, especially during moments
of political uncertainty. In the case of the Mughal Empire, the evidence suggests a multi-pronged
process. On the one hand, Aurangzeb’s Deccan wars shifted the epicenter of the Mughal Empire
further south. The drain on the imperial treasury was immense, and expansionist campaigns
became a source of the Empire’s misery and eventual downfall. Second, administrative attention
away from other core regions of the empire such as from Punjab, Gujarat, Awadh, and Bengal
enabled local officials of these areas to make transgressions and deviate from formal duties
without fear of reprimand. Provincial governors in these areas began using existing administrative
channels to extort urban notables and those living in the countryside. Such unchecked tendencies
formed the bedrock of future dissent. Third, after Aurangzeb’s death, the haphazard scramble for
the royal throne by ill-prepared successors undermined any normative vision of the empire and
cast a shadow of doubt on the very authority of Mughal kingship. Metaphorically speaking, the
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emperor was dead, and his tattered clothes were bequeathed to less than able princes. The effects
of this were deeply felt in the locality. For example, in Gujarat, we not only witness rival
governors vying for authority, but we also see various skirmishes between Mughal officials and
local warlords fighting from beyond the Mughal imperial idiom. Money was desperately needed
to sustain civil unrest in uncertain times, and it was unceremoniously raised, especially after the
1720s, by extorting financial agents and through the sale of temporary land revenue farming
rights known as ijārah.15
Building on various strands of evidence and synthesizing secondary scholarship on earlymodern India, this dissertation also offers a new theory of historical change based on the longterm effects of a sovereign’s system of entitlements in land, and the consequences of a severe
financial crunch on the local apparatus of empire. As the Mughal Empire evolved into a
contractually robust and bureaucratically complex institution in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, it had to necessarily layer its revenue collecting mechanisms. This led to various forms
of revenue farming and decentralized control. Overtime, financial agents became central to this
dispensation, leading to their growing importance in local political economies. While many of
these financial agents were merchant-courtiers during the apex of Mughal rule, their descendants
became subject to shakedown campaigns by officials desperate for money. As the territorial
influence of the Mughal Empire over key districts in western India waned, peasant-soldiering
groups from the Deccan began seeking regular tribute from Gujarat. These roving bandits made a
series of agreements with renegade Mughal governors for sharing tribute, and started relying on
an altogether new class of local financiers to both fund their military and serve as personnel in
their own fledging system of tenurial entitlements and larger government organization. Taking
the Gaekwads of Baroda as my primary example, I demonstrate how local bankers quickly
evolved into official treasurers and financiers of the entire state, thereby marking the beginning of
an era of Indian public authority backed by private capital.
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Sources and Methodology
This project is located at the interstices of three sovereign systems: a Mughal Empire in
decline, regional polities on the rise, and the early phase of British colonial rule. Associated
processes are difficult to disaggregate because temporal boundaries overlap, geographical
frontiers are unclear, and evidence is multiple. To overcome these challenges, my research draws
on methods developed in the fields of history and South Asia studies. First, my work is based on
new empirical evidence. One way of thinking through unresolved scholarly questions is
discovering new research materials and contextualizing their significance. Therefore, I rely
especially on unpublished sources in Persian and Gujarati, along with untapped evidence in
Sanskrit and French that have remained untranslated until now. Second, my project is based on
comparative work across colonial, regional, and private archives, including a reliance on
neglected published materials in Marathi and English. Comparing data from different repositories
is a distinctive feature of historical research, and this dissertation draws on sources from archives
in Baroda, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bombay, Pune, New Delhi, London, and Oxford.
In addition to reading primary sources from the Mughal, colonial, and Gaekwad archives, this
project focuses on unearthing details from several unique sources. For example, in Chapter 3, I
translate selected verses from Śrī Bībīpuramaṇḍanaśrīcintāmaṇi Pārśvanāthacaitanyapraśastiḥ,
or simply the Chintamani Prasasti, a seventeenth-century Sanskrit praise poem dedicated to the
prominent Mughal jeweler, banker, and revenue farmer Shantidas Jhaveri. Written in poetic verse
by a Jain monk, this text is composed of eighty-six verses and sheds critical light on the
relationship that Jain elites imagined themselves having with figures of political authority such as
successive Mughal emperors and their provincial governors in seventeenth-century Gujarat. The
second major source of this dissertation is the unpublished private diary of Itimad Ali Khan, a
Mughal bureaucrat traveling and occupying various posts in Delhi, Ahmedabad, Baroda, and
Surat between 1717 and 1727. Examined in detail in Chapter 4, his elaborate journal titled Miratul Haqaiq, or Mirror of Events, captures intrigues that transpired in Gujarat between Mughal
administrators, petty officials, local bankers, and residents of the area. In particular, it contains
detailed episodes of Khushalchand Jhaveri (1680-1748), a prominent third-generation jeweler,
banker, and financier who supplied cash to the Mughals, and about whom we know very little
outside of oral traditions. Khushalchand was also the grandson of Shantidas Jhaveri, allowing us
to track the changing status of financial agents by examining members of the same family lineage
across generations. The manuscript comprises 489 folios, and is held at the Bodleian Library at
Oxford University.
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In Chapter 4, I also examine a third set of unique sources emerging out of vernacular Gujarati
literary traditions. These include the poems Ganim no Pavado (1706) by Vishwanath Jani and
Rustam no Saloko (1725) by Shamal Bhatt. 16 I have translated substantial sections from both texts
to bolster my observations that during the early eighteenth century, locals in Gujarat preferred the
relative stability and security provided by Mughal political administration. As both poems
indicate, the growing prominence of the Marathas in the region marks substantial shifts in the
nature and significance of local power relations in Gujarat. A fourth major source base taken up
in the final chapter comprises the private papers of an influential banking organization in Gujarat
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Established in Baroda by brothers Hari and Bhakti
in 1762, this family firm called Haribhakti ni Pedhi became indispensable to the fledgling
Gaekwad state. I rely on hitherto unexamined documents such as internal firm correspondence,
account books, loan agreements, property deeds, and financial instruments to understand the
establishment, daily operation, and growing influence of this family business specializing in the
movement and management of money. 17 These materials were found in the go down of the old
mansion of the Haribhakti Family in Baroda, and were not meant to form a part of any formal
archive or family repository. They were simply sacred trash kept in the basement for eventual
disposal. In the 1980s, the resident patriarch of one branch of the family, Mr. Arvind Haribhakti,
was performing a thorough cleaning of his ancestral home and came across several hundred
bundles of these old papers and records of the firm. Instead of disposing the materials, he donated
them to the Department of History at the University of Baroda where I consulted them for this
project. In tracing the social networks of the various producers and consumers of money available
for rent, I argue that the need to manage land revenue and finance its futures led to the demise of
traditional banking classes represented by the likes of Shantidas and Khushalchand Jhaveri, and
enabled the growth of an altogether new class of financial specialists like the brothers Hari and
Bhakti. These local financiers began earning profits by implicating themselves in the changing
politics of land by lending money to aspiring groups like the Gaekwads. In return, these financial
agents received repayments with interest, land grants, and entire villages as gifts. These assets

16

Bhatt, Shamal. (1725) 1946. Rustam no Saloko, ed. Harivallabh Bhayani. Bombay: Gujarati Forbes
Sabha and Jani, Vishwanath. (1706) 1946. Ganim no Pavado, ed. Harivallabh Bhayani. Bombay: Gujarati
Forbes Sabha.
17
Haribhakti Collection, c. 1762−1908. S.C. Misra Archives, Department of History, Maharaja Sayajirao
University of Baroda (MS University). Abbreviation “HBC” for in text citations, and Haribhakti Private
Papers, c. 1762-1908. Private Collection of Gopal Haribhakti and Swati Haribhakti, Baroda. Abbreviation
“HPP” for in text citations.
11

were strategic acquisitions in a political economy where land, and not just land revenues, was
becoming a valuable standalone commodity.
In the current historiography, which I analyze in greater detail in the subsequent section, the
study of the Mughal Empire has focused largely on analyzing records produced by the
administrative apparatus of the imperial bureaucracy. These include royal chronicles, executive
orders, revenue crop estimates, and figures produced by administrators working for the
government’s central organization. Even revisionist scholars, while offering new theoretical
insights, still rely heavily on source languages and genres that have emanated from high-levels of
bureaucratic organization. This includes local evidence such as legal disputes determined by
provincial courts. As such, the perspective of “local” in these works deals with imperial power in
its decentralized manifestation. For example, revisionist scholars Muzaffar Alam and Farhat
Hasan have demonstrated the state’s incorporation of local groups into the imperial idiom either
as a byproduct of its long-term success, or as a strategy for legitimation. 18 In contrast, I am not
exclusively relying on normative texts of the Mughal Empire like court chronicles and imperial
orders to understand the texture of Mughal rule in Gujarat. Instead, I analyze imperial power and
the changing dynamics of political authority in the locality by uncovering new sources found in
local archives. These include bureaucratic records, annalistic histories, religious texts, foreign
travelogues, and vernacular literary works. In doing so, I am building on insights put forth by
regionalists such as Nandita Prasad Sahai and Farhat Hasan who have juggled multiple archival
viewpoints in their scholarship.19
The gains as understanding state as process through the local archives and allied sources is
fundamentally empirical. Simply put, we are in want of research that is multi-lingual, diachronic,
and not prefigured by ideological commitments to salvage reputations of some socio-historical
groups over others. This kind of research also build on important observations made by senior
scholars such as Richard Eaton, who in a recent essay demonstrates that vernacular literary
sources, bi-lingual records produced by local bureaucratic archives, and colloquial forms of
communication were intimately tied to the rise and fall of states, state capacity, and the formation
of regional-linguistic communities.20 He notes that scholars have not been paying attention to the
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range of vocabulary that has been used to describe organizational practices in various vernacular
languages. This lack is especially felt in English-language scholarship that dominates historical
understanding. I take Eaton’s criticism seriously by organizing various source genre and language
materials into conversation with one another, and although such an effort does not necessarily
yield a seamless narrative, it represents a sincere effort to understand historical change in
eighteenth-century India in all its complexity and minute detail.

Theoretical Background & Relevance
The study of state and society has advanced considerably since the structural-functionalist
paradigms of early twentieth-century social sciences.21 Debates in the rich historiography of
South Asia studies have moved from questions of how monarchy emerged in the ancient world to
whether medieval societies even had political institutions akin to state. Anthropological work
from the 1960s shifted our attention to processual elements of the state in which strategies of
political agents were prioritized over government structures. 22 Ethnographic studies from the
1990s demonstrated the discursive production of the state through bureaucratic practices, media
representations, and even the ambiguities of its own apparatus. 23 While these anthropological
works have significantly influenced how scholars of South Asia theorize sovereignty, 24 many
social historians still portray a homeostatic model of ‘State’ because their synchronic analyses
tend to privilege primary sources produced by highly evolved state bureaucracies. 25 One way to
overcome this problem is using a different source base to study state formation as more layered
diachronically, and as a series of nodes where power is concentrated as well as contested. Rather
than assessing public institutions or analyzing their discursive reproduction, this dissertation
analyzes how powerful regional polities came into existence from the viewpoint of non-state
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actors like influential merchants turned bankers. What were the social relationships between
political rulers and financial specialists in an era when commodity money reigned supreme?
In the three subsections below, I analyze the major strands of scholarship that this dissertation
is in conversation with. These debates are wide-ranging and necessarily overlap, but for sake of
readability and convenience, I have organized them under three broad categories: state capacity
and public authority, merchants and the early modern economy, business and financial history.
State Capacity and Public Authority
In 1973, the English publication of Karl Marx’s Grundrisse on pre-capitalist forms of socioeconomic organization prompted scholars in India to ask: in Marxian terms, how should relations
of production in pre-colonial, non-European societies be categorized? Harbans Mukhia took up
the challenge and suggested that Indian feudalism did not exist because unlike Europe, India had
a free-labor peasantry.26 He argued against an older generation of Marxist historians, namely D.D.
Kosambi and R.S. Sharma, who believed land grants were essential to feudal relations of
production and regional state-formation. Mukhia’s idea of ‘free’ did not refer to the peasantry’s
legal status, since no distinct market for land or wage labor existed. Rather, free meant that
laborers subsisted on their own labor. In medieval Europe, land use was hereditary, and noneconomic coercion was structured. Peasants negotiated the time they would work on the
seigneur’s property. In contrast, India’s rich soil and low subsistence levels made Indian peasants
free. Even though they could not move or alienate land, they were able to preserve their labor.
Unlike Europe, economic conflicts in Indian history were over the collection and redistribution of
surplus, not typically the peasantry’s means of production.
The notion of feudalism as created by the Gupta state (ca. 320-475) through land grants, and
subsequent regional state formation as a byproduct of this process became axiomatic in the 1960s
in books by D.D. Kosambi and R.S. Sharma. 27 Sharma later joined Mukhia’s feudalism debate
and reaffirmed his earlier position of feudalism from above as the mover of history. 28 For Sharma
and Yadava, Indian peasants were dependent on intermediaries who were granted land by the
Guptas as repayment for services. 29 Peasant control over their labor was purely operational. The
26
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‘free exercise’ of agrarian rights was illusory and was geared towards making revenue units
efficient, and various terminology for forced labor such as hari, begari, and sarvavisti in the
Gangetic basin from the fifth to twelfth centuries suggests the prevalence of serfdom. In terms of
state capacity and public authority, R.S. Sharma makes the controversial argument that between
the seventh and tenth centuries, the Guptas were forced to convert land and land revenue into
modes of payment for administrative and religious services. Epigraphic records indicate land
sales and transfers, while legal texts prescribe rules on inheritance. This fragmentation enabled
regional landlords to consolidate support and form smaller states and nodes of public authority.
Focusing on the early medieval period from the sixth to the thirteenth centuries, R.S.
Sharma’s feudalism from above thesis was challenged by B.D. Chattopadhyaya. Chattopadhyaya
observes that medieval societies are defined unfairly in opposition to early historical formations,
especially the Mauryan state (321-185 BCE).30 Arguing against evolutionary views, he suggests
that early medieval India saw expansion of state society via autonomous local state formation31,
the peasantization of tribes and caste formation32, and finally cult appropriation and integration33.
Sub-regional state formation did not necessarily emerge out of an epicenter fragmenting, but
rather came about through local structures and developments. Citing examples from southern
Maharashtra and Orissa, he demonstrates that the terminology of normative texts like the
dharmaśāstra do not adequately reflect regional social life. For example, local typologies of labor
existed, but are not captured by varṇa classification. While Sharma sees diverse terminology for
labor as proof of its bonded nature across India, Chattopadhyaya argues for heterogeneity of form
as divorced from Gupta relations of production. Pushing the revisionist perspective even further,
Chattopadhyaya suggests that the development of regions through local state formation, land
grants, Brahmin quarters, and temple complexes were essentially from within, explaining their
long-term stability. The subtle argument rests on the idea of continuity across historical epochs.
30
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Earlier histories enabled the proliferation of regional states and courtly cultures. This is not an
epicenter diffusion or feudalism from above theory, but an account of change which suggests
assimilation of ideas, symbols, and rituals that had wider territorial spread and acceptability.
In a recent work, Nandini Kapur provides a revisionist account of public authority and state
formation by offering a perspective from Rajasthan. 34 She is indebted to Hermann Kulke’s
processual model of integrative state formation. In this formulation, imperial unification is based
on large core region with hierarchies of socio-economic order and cultural identity that transform
neighboring areas into administrative provinces. 35 Kapur traces the gradual evolution of richer
peasants called Guhilas in the Mewar region from local to sub-regional to regional status.
Territorial acquisition and political integration made this possible. Mewar was not part of the
Gupta empire. Three ruling lineages held sway in the Nagda-Ahada, Kiskhinda, and Dhavagarta
regions. These households were sustained by agrarian surplus and commercial activity, and
started patronizing local cults to increase influence. Between the tenth and twelfth centuries, local
Rajasthani evidence suggests that the Guhila families grew, and the Nagda-Ahada lineage
dominated rivals. They integrated hill tribes of bhīl-s into their emerging power structure. The
Guhilas began patronizing the Pasupata deity Ekalinga, and distributed ranks within the samanta
hierarchy. They harnessed natural resources and sponsored irrigational works. In the process, they
became a feudatory of the imperial Gurjara-Pratiharas and soon proclaimed sovereignty over the
region.
State formation in the eighteenth century has also seen significant debate from scholars,
especially since the publication of Irfan Habib’s magnum opus The Agrarian System of Mughal
India in 1963. Habib relied on state documents and Persian chronicles to assess ideologies and
methods underpinning revenue extraction. Characteristic of structural-functionalist models, he
argued that the Mughals over-taxed local peasants who then rebelled and overthrew the state. 36
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This picture of a centralized, all-imperial polity dominated Mughal historiography until the
1980s.37 According to this perspective, regional state formation, echoing feudalism from above,
took place within conditions established by the Mughal administrative apparatus and conformed
to regional boundaries established by the Mughal state.
The initial revisionist approach to eighteenth-century India came indirectly from C.A.
Bayly.38 He criticized the earlier scholarship for not paying enough attention to corporate groups
which constituted and were implicated in late-Mughal socio-political life. Bayly saw post-1707
‘decline’ as a positive period during which corporate groups and intermediaries participated in the
greater commercialization and decentralization of India’s political economy. In extending
agriculture and intensifying communications and commerce, these ‘portfolio capitalists’ enabled
the growth of regional powers in Punjab, northern India, Bengal, and the Deccan. 39 This thesis
was supported by Muzaffar Alam, S.P. Gupta, and Andre Wink. 40 Concerned with regional
polities, these works can be classified as continuity thesis. I shall elaborate on this perspective in
the following chapter, but in short, they all suggest that Mughal revenue farming enabled political
transition by creating provincial elites who aspired political autonomy, and view revenue farming
as a strategy employed by independent zamīndār-s to increase their sphere of influence. 41 Another
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strand of related revisionist writing is best represented by Bayly and Subrahmanyam, who argue
that state formation was made possible by a deepening of the cash economy that entrepreneurial
agents like merchants and military free-agents capitalized on.42
Muzaffar Alam, for example, notes that revenue farming was a defining feature of the
eighteenth century but was not symptomatic of imperial weakness or administrative aberration.
As an alternative, he suggests tax-farming became prevalent due to high levels of monetization
which the Mughals were responsible for.43 In this political-economy, “everything including
government office came to be regarded as a saleable commodity”.44 Contrary to Habib, who
argues that monetization had no practical significance beyond helping transfer surplus up the
imperial pyramid, Alam suggests monetization proves that peasants had access to markets and
engaged in commodity production. Urban growth was an innate feature of this period. The
sophisticated economic links created and sustained beyond the empire’s core could withstand
Mughal collapse. These features became the political basis of successor states since zamindar-s
took advantage of growth and resisted the imperial order. One major ambiguity in Alam’s work is
direction of causality. Did regional growth challenge Mughal authority, or did regions prosper
despite fissures in Mughal governance?
Relying on Marathi materials from the eighteenth century, Andre Wink, Frank Perlin, and
Stewart Gordon have their own revisionist theories of public authority and state capacity.45 For
Wink, a universal Islamic theory of sovereignty animated the Mughal Empire but actual power
lay with zamindar-s. The two sides were held in tense opposition by a process called fitna, or
sedition. Peasant-soldiering elites coalescing around the label ‘Maratha’ could capitalize on this
weakness in carving out their own svarājya. For Perlin, watan was the basic factor behind stateformation. He critiques existing historiography for being obsessed with functionalist descriptions
of the state. He focuses on the distinction between the role and career of individuals, suggesting
this definition, although he tends to see the category as much more expansive than Habib. Alam believes
that overtime, many different classes and castes aspired to, and could claim zamindari status (not the right).
42
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people have lives outside of the historical roles they are attributed with (e.g. banker, revenue
farmer, peasant, etc.). Perlin suggests focusing on periods when political authority is being
consolidated or is spiraling out of control. He accomplishes this by analyzing the intersection
between family organization and politics. Regarding Shahaji Bhosle who possessed village
headman-ships close to Aurangabad and Pune, his first prebend (delegated office and rights) and
patrimony (hereditary rights often connected with ‘office’, also called watan) from the Adilshahi
Sultanate of Bijapur were closely intertwined. It is on this basis that his grandson Shivaji Bhonsle
(d. 1680) lay the foundation of a new ideologically robust and materially substantial state. Both
Perlin and Stewart Gordon rely on monetary history to demonstrate how the peasantry, free agent
military men, and local state formation were mutually implicated. 46 These accounts favor regional
language sources, and do not necessarily read local evidence in conjunction with the massive
documentation produced by the Mughal state.47
The lack of consensus on the nature of Mughal state capacity and public authority continues
to inspire scholarship. A survey of the literature indicates two major strands of thought. In an
older view, put forth largely by historians from Aligarh, the Mughal Empire was a highly central,
bureaucratic leviathan that permeated every corner of state and society. Irfan Habib, M. Athar
Ali, and John Richards are among the most well-known scholars of this school and define Mughal
territorial expansion, institutional innovations in land revenue, imperial coinage, and military
organization as indicating an autocratic state. 48 Other scholars, such as R.P. Tripathi, P. Saran,
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and Stephen Blake posit a patrimonial-bureaucratic empire that straddles a pure patrimonial polity
and the modern bureaucratic nation-state.49 A critique of both approaches comes from Alam and
Subrahmanyam in their introduction to a collection of revisionist essays. 50 They argue that within
notional boundaries of state, there was a diversity of territories and communities with
autonomous spheres of control that need to be analyzed. They stress that the Mughal state came
to be ‘fashioned and refashioned’ between 1530-1750 and was not perfected at any given point,
and that the incorporation of new regions into the Mughal domain called for constant adjustments
to local conditions. As a result, the state resembled a ‘patchwork quilt’ rather than a ‘wall-to-wall
carpet’.
The most recent revisionist account of Mughal state typology comes from Farhat Hasan.
Drawing on both the theoretical work of Foucault and local evidence from Surat and Cambay, he
depicts Mughal power as an interaction between the imperial and local, a daily plebiscite between
Mughal officials and the local elite. 51 He concedes that political institutions constrained behavior,
but these need to be contextualized within local conflicts. Hasan focuses on the imprint of power
and legitimacy in property transactions. He illustrates that the purchase and sale of property took
place in three stages: approval by two imminent persons of the locality, sanctioning by important
residents of the locality, and officially binding the transaction by the qazi’s seal. For example, in
1660, when Mohanbai sold her house at Kothibarah in Cambay, it was witnessed by twenty-eight
locals before it was officially approved by the qazi. The qāẓī represented state authority and
imperial validation. However, what legitimized the state’s authority was that approvals were
given only after the network of local power brokers was consulted. The state also derived
legitimacy from the sacred classes. The establishment of the Eidrusia Sufi order in Surat around
1563-4 is illustrative. The process by which the Sufi order accumulated and exercised power
included maintaining and controlling a religious site (Masjid-i-Eidrus, est. 1563-5), participation
in the modes of communication such as diffusion of rumors, gossip, and hagiographies about the
spiritual power of the saint, relations with the state like allotment of state monies for sacred
activities, and involvement with the local power brokers such as the local merchant communities
Century in Economic History.” In On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History (1998),
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that extended support to the silsilah. According to Hasan, this suggests that Mughal authority was
not the unilateral imposition of a central bureaucracy.
Alam, Subrahmanyam, and Hasan exemplify the strengths of revisionist historiography in
their reliance on new sources and regional perspectives. However, significant weaknesses must
also be acknowledged. After a masterful critique of the dominant tradition, Alam and
Subrahmanyam are ambivalent and conclude by saying “it is safe to say that the Mughals came to
be seen in the subcontinent as the only true source of sovereignty, the only ‘sovereign idea’ as it
were”.52 We are left wanting of the details of this sovereignty. What do we make of the planning
and infrastructure required for state-finance (Richards) 53, vast fiscal-bureaucratic apparatuses
(Habib, Moosvi, Athar Ali, Haider)54, and foreign writers who observe a strong Mughal state
(Bernier, Tavernier, Monserrate)?55 These questions are left unanswered. For his part, Hasan
relies on thin evidence from a locality to make big claims about the Mughal State. The chief
problem with his work is anachronism, believing that the Mughals sought legitimacy. Defining
legitimacy is problematic. If confined to whether government actions fit the laws and regulations
they create, we fall in to circular reasoning. On the other hand, if legitimacy is limited to how
widespread public belief is that a society’s governing institutions and political authorities are
deserving of support, premodern societies are excluded because they were not democracies. In
adopting Foucault’s idea of power as strategy, and not property, and projecting his observations
from two commercial port-cities onto an entire empire, Hasan’s revision is discursive. He
pluralizes the object of inquiry and diversifies the parameters of the debate. However, he does not
squarely address the stronger empirical observations made earlier scholars. Vast amounts of
textual evidence including royal edicts and farmāns, revenue documents, coinage, architecture,
and other state-produced materials cannot be dismissed as mere relics. Their immutable,
unrelenting, and resolute attributes need to be accounted for.
Recent work on courtly aesthetics, secretary-poets, royal households, environment and
landscape, monetary history, commerce, religion, and other forms of connected histories have
nuanced our understanding of state power and capacity. 56 Perspectives from art and architectural
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history have reminded us that monumental buildings, pleasure gardens, and public infrastructure
required vast amounts of planning, capital, and directed labor. 57 Yet, there are physical spaces and
spheres of activity where state power may not be so obvious. Traditional scholarship argues that
Islamic kingship developed during the Delhi Sultanate when, starting with Illtutmish (d. 1236),
administrative land grants called iqṭā‘ were used to pay military and bring new areas into
cultivation.58 Sunil Kumar’s work espouses the broad contours of these studies, but draws our
attention to other factors related to state power. 59 In an earlier essay, he focuses on the earlythirteenth century to discuss the system of “slave-nobles”.60 In short, slaves were bought and
nurtured until they could be deployed in military and administrative service. Natal alienation and
social anonymity made them dependable and trustworthy. Kumar criticizes Habib for misreading
the iqta system as evidence of a strong state capacity,61 and Jackson for relying too heavily on
comparisons with developments during the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. Kumar suggests that
free-will and mobility characterized the system in Delhi, and possessing the quality of virtue was
crucial to its functioning. Military slaves were bought and trained before Illtutmish became sultan
in 1210. These slaves developed bonds of affection with soon to be Sultans. He shows how
political power of the early Sultanate was based on a system of non-rustic slavery where loyalty
was cultivated and highly prized.
Kumar’s later work demonstrates the possibilities and pitfalls of relying on Persian chronicles
to understand state capacity and public authority, and that our reading techniques should account
for this.62 He alerts us that chroniclers used various strategies to propagate particular visions of
state power. Kumar shows how Turkish/Mongol frontiersmen were assimilated as ‘Sultan’s of
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Delhi’ through an ethnic cleansing by their royal chroniclers. Beginning in the 1250s-1320s,
successive Sultanate regimes employed frontiersmen to guard Punjab border areas from Mongol
invasions. Turkic and Mongol groups knew of this, and came searching for patronage with
growing factions of competing sultans after the death of Illtutmish. These new arrivals had intact
lineage networks and were linked to their retinues by shared natal, ethnic, and/or past service
relationships. Kumar argues that fourteenth-century chroniclers carry their author’s vision of an
idealized public order and state power tempered by class, cultural, and ethnic prejudices.
Therefore, the new lords of Delhi could not be written about as frontiersmen or ex-servants of the
hated Chinggis-lineage. Frontier commanders like Ghiasuddin Tughluq were creatively reinvented as paradigms of virtue and saviors of Islam. He also demonstrates how fictive kinship
ties were created around the label khān in the process of ethnic cleansing. Kumar’s revisionist
work suggests that reintegrating immigrant communities into the history of the Sultanate means
charting new genealogies for the state and the composition of its power.
The nature of Sultanate power and state capacity comes into greater focus with Simon
Digby’s study of military supplies. In War-horse and Elephant, he suggests that initial military
success and endurance of the Delhi Sultanate can be explained by its strategic sourcing of battle
horses to mount the army when horse exports from Mongol-controlled central Asia were cut off. 63
In addition, war elephants used in battle to cross rivers, break forts, and give commanders a
vantage point was an advantage that the Mongols did not possess. By focusing on strategies of
sourcing military supplies, Digby moves away from excessive attention to standard technologies
such the Persian wheel and cotton carder as examined by Irfan Habib. Digby argues that the
weaponry of the Delhi Sultans was not superior to the Mongols or the local Hindu rulers but that
they were strategic in controlling the horse trade and taking elephants as spoils of victory along
with trapping them from the wild. The downfall of the Delhi Sultanate can also be attributed to
succession wars that centered around control of elephant stables and winning loyalty of the
attendants. During the final years before Timur’s attack on Delhi in 1398, the Sultan did not
control or command enough war elephants and therefore Timur’s armies were able to easily sack
Delhi and undermine the Sultanate’s power. This study reminds us that in premodern India, the
control of military labor and arsenal was an essential precondition for establishing any normative
vision of state power and public authority.
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The historiography of the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire suggests that state power is
relative to the kinds of sources used. Formal readings of royally commissioned histories like
Minhaj Juzjani’s Tabqat-i Nasiri (1260), Barani’s Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi (1357), Abu’l Fazl’s Ain-i
Akbari (late sixteenth century) will indicate a powerful state with sophisticated notions of Islamic
kingship, royal genealogies, and visions for the future. However, creative readings of these same
texts, like Sunil Kumar’s analysis of Juzjani to demonstrate the discursive strategies of royal
chroniclers, may not be verifiable by other independent sources. Similarly, scholarship that sets
aside these sources for thematic studies like Barry Flood’s analysis of material texts do so at the
risk of understating power relations and the territorial nature of sovereignty. 64 In the case of
Mughal history, revisionist approaches do a fine job telling life stories of individual merchants,
secretaries, or intellectuals who traversed various landscapes and were not inhibited by any state
leviathan. But, how representative are these examples of the majority population occupying the
subcontinent? Did people pay taxes out of allegiance, or were they subjected to harsh revenue
demands? It is significant that some recognized Mughal power and others had no clue of its
existence. Revisionist accounts may elevate exceptional cases to universal, but a more nuanced
understanding would ask what was the nature of Mughal power, how far did it reach at any given
time, and according to whom? By bringing together a range of Indian and foreign sources from
across imperial and local archives, this dissertation investigates the changing contours of both
Mughal power and state capacity in local Gujarat, and the mechanisms by which new nodes of
authority were being consolidated when fissures in its administrative apparatus were becoming
visible.
Merchants and the Early Modern Economy
A major theme in the historiography on merchant economies is the relationship between
commercial agents and the state. Some writers have argued that merchants have little to do with
statecraft, while others emphasize how commercial agents have always been implicated in the
politics of public authority. An overview of the field indicates that commercial agents are not
homogenous. There are variations according to geography and period under question. Individual
merchants, professional guilds, family enterprise, and caste based commercial networks
demonstrate the variability of the category itself. The state as a revenue extracting social
organization with spectrums of public authority and territorial influence also moves between
phases of formation, relative stability, and dissolution. To make it more complicated, states may
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have overlapping spheres of influence. So, the category of state is as variable as that of
commercial agents. One solution to bringing these two moving targets under single purview is to
shift analytical focus. Rather than mapping social relations as pure economics or politics, a more
balanced approach would analyze how economic realities shape social life and what role longterm trends like increased monetization, commercialization of power, and demographic growth
play in reorienting the relationship between financial agents, state power, and society more
broadly.
Historians of South Asian merchant economies were peripheral figures well into the 1980s.
This is partly because structural-functionalist models of state and society dominated land-centric
historiographies. Anthropological work on societies in Africa and India starting in the 1960s
began drawing attention to strategies of people along with analysis of social structures. 65 These
ethnographies prompted historians to ask if groups in modern nation-states are not always
controlled by its apparatus, there must also be important historical agents who have been
eclipsed by histories of mighty kings and events. This blending of anthropological and historical
approaches created the necessary space for work on specialist groups. 66 It is in this context that
V.K. Jain made a pioneering study of traders in medieval western India. 67 Citing his interest in
Marx’s ‘sphere of circulation’ between production and consumption, Jain argues that merchants
and bankers were essential in converting agrarian surplus and artisanal products into money
during Chalukya rule. Better agricultural knowledge and irrigational facilities sponsored by local
rulers led to greater cultivation of cereals and cash-crops. These products commanded wider
markets, and exchanges between towns and villages resulted in regional prosperity. As trade in
luxury goods and new everyday commodities became profitable, merchants began seeking
permission from local rulers to sell in their respective sub-territories. The sources suggest two
types of traders. A caravan under a knowledgeable merchant who maintained relations with
distant centers of trade, and the local trader who supplied capital to producing classes and
collected goods for local commerce. Jain notes that Arabs dominated the seas and Gujaratis
harnessed inland trade. Indian kings were content with guarding harbors and collecting duty on
goods. Since Arabs did not bring farriers, Indians had to constantly buy Arab horses, keeping
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trade networks alive. Still, the balance of trade favored India since it exported high value
commodities. Merchants forged new trading routes, while the king maintained a monopoly on
salt, taxes, the supply of camels, mules, and bullocks needed by traders.
Focusing on the later Gujarat Sultanate in the same region, Samira Sheikh argues that
medieval politics combined the effects of expanding agrarian frontiers through the critical
services of merchants and martial pastoralists.68 Pushing back against Indian ocean historiography
which tends to view mercantile activity as independent from political power, Sheikh shows the
ways in which the historically distinct regions of eastern Gujarat, Saurashtra, and Kutch got
connected through the politics of both inland and coastal trade and the settling of pastoralists.
Water structures, rest houses, temples, and other architectural marvels were usually built by
merchants and courtiers, not sultans. The mints were run by Jain families. Regarding the nature of
medieval polity, the earlier Solanki dynasty of the eleventh-twelfth centuries patronized royal
temples and cultivated courtly aesthetics according to Hindu kingship. In contrast, the Gujarat
Sultanate was a trading polity ruling a civic world. The Sultans were the source of singular
sovereignty maintained by administrative hierarchies and dynamics of trade economy. They
retained monopoly on force, made administrative divisions, harnessed tolls and taxes, and
patronized the arts. In the process, the state incorporated new regions into its domain.
In a more microscopic study from the Deccan during the twelfth century, Daud Ali shows
how ambitious men could move between commercial and courtly realms. 69 Relying on Kannada
inscriptions, Ali discusses the life and career of Chattisetti, a mint master, Hoysala courtier, and
trader. His success as a trader brought personal wealth, fame, and recognition in the royal court.
Ali demonstrates that merchants organized themselves within “a single supra-local, trans-regional
merchant organization with a number of different branches and related affiliates”. 70 Below these
big merchants were local traders defined by role, merchandise, size, and reach. The significant
overlap and mutually inclusive nature of merchant and courtly life is evidenced by modes of selfrepresentation. Ali suggests that merchant eulogies or praśasti-s resembled those of kings and
courtiers, creating a kind of commensurability between the realm of business and that of politics.
These texts also highlight local merchant’s knowledge of courtly protocol. Second, merchant
eulogies used terminology derived from Chola inscriptions to rank its own members. In this
period, merchants, to be distinguished from petty traders, were implicated in the politics of public
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authority. Beyond seeking protection from military elites to effect trade, they were subjects of
public eulogies and actively present in royal assemblies.
From European historiography, Henri Pirenne’s Medieval Cities is the classic thesis on
commercial activity as the foundation for all other forms of social organization. 71 The Dark Ages
in western Europe between 500-900 happened because Islam’s growing influence ruptured
trading networks in the Mediterranean. As a result, society was reduced to subsistence. Two
pressures led to the redevelopment of trade: growth of Venice due to its independent trading
networks with Constantinople, and Scandinavian adventurers who established sea trade with
Muslims. Growing trade created a middle class requiring cities for congregation, manufacturing
of goods, and to facilitate more trade. Eleventh-century society comprised of clergy, nobles, and
rural serfs. However, increasingly wealthy traders forced clergy and nobles to share their power.
Jessica Goldberg’s criticizes Pirenne for excluding the role played by states in mercantile
activities and not acknowledging the deep connections Mediterranean merchants had with
hinterland economies.72 She suggests that during this period, states ruled through both
bureaucracy and patronage. Rulers were not interested in merchants as sources of revenue, but
like traders, they were interested in agrarian economies, rural tax regimes, and maintaining their
own estates. Merchants were suppliers of imported goods, and shared a symbiotic but
independent relationship with political elites. Merchants established partnerships called suhba
based on regional identities and face-to-face meetings, and partook in supra-regional networks
known as ashabuna. There was a system in which members would monitor reciprocal relations
and create reputations that served as the foundation of new principal-agent relations. Merchants
had their own trans-regional networks for shipping goods and information which bypassed
official registration and state-led inspections.
A landmark study in the older historiography pertaining to South Asia is M.N. Pearson’s
Merchants and rulers in Gujarat.73 He argues that arrival of Portuguese followed by the Dutch
and English, along with Mughal emperor Akbar’s conquest of Gujarat in 1572, did not
significantly impact merchants in the region. Merchants were an autonomous group during this
period, and whatever links between merchants and rulers was limited to the loans and capital that
the former provided to nobles and elites. Merchant control of the money market gave them
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individual and collective political clout. Portuguese and Persian records demonstrate that bankers,
a subset of merchant classes, were autonomous and regulated production standards, interest rates,
holidays, and their own rules for membership. They even adjudicated disputes between members
of their own communities. Overall, merchants and rulers were separate, affirming his larger
conclusion that social life during this period was characterized by little contact and poor
communication. As the subsequent empirical chapters of this dissertation demonstrate, the
merchant-ruler nexus was not as autonomous as Pearson has suggested.
Focusing on Gujarat, Ashin Das Gupta’s scholarship made significant strides in the study of
merchants and politics.74 Relying primarily on Dutch and English company records including
shipping lists, letters, and diaries, Gupta proved in a series of work that Asian merchants were not
mere ‘peddlers’ but commanded significant resources up until 1750. 75 Unlike other port cities in
India where nobles and port officials dominated ship-owning, in Surat it was a group of Asian
merchants who owned and operated their own vessels. These medium size ships were built by
locals with some European influences. Various communities existed in Surat at its peak in 1700,
including Bohra, Arab, Turkish, Iranian Muslims, Jain, Hindu Banias, Armenians, and Jews.
Ship-owning was dominated by Muslims, and the most famous was Mulla Abdul Ghaffur.
Organizations such as Jain mahajan, Bohra jamat, and Parsi anjuman made community
membership and identity apparent, although this fact nor the state ever hindered commerce. For
Gupta, the Mughal state was more concerned with procuring revenue from agrarian economies of
the hinterland, and left oceanic trade for enterprising merchants of all kinds. The relationship
between commercial agents and the Mughals was of mutual recognition and relative noninterference.
Some historians suggest that even traders in the Mughal heartland were autonomous agents.
The story of Banarasidas who wrote Ardh-Kathanak in 1641 is telling. Born in 1586 at Jaunpur,
he studied various subjects including astrology, Sanskrit, and religion until 1610 when the elders
of his community convinced him to ply a trade. With support from his father and a loan obtained
against a hundī or bill of exchange, he travelled to various Mughal provinces including Delhi,
Agra, Allahabad, Awadh, and Bihar buying and selling goods. His account reveals the relative
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mobility and free choice that characterized itinerant merchants of the empire, and reveals the
nature of the Mughal state. 76 According to Habib, “Banarasidas accepts, without approval or
disapproval, the political system under which he lived. In commercial matters and social life
Banarasidas seems to have mainly mixed with persons of his own caste, and occasionally with
Brahmins. Men of other castes or Muslims do not appear among his circles of friends. And yet
there is no remark hostile to Muslims in the whole work, or even a reference to any act of
religious persecution.”77
Regarding the eighteenth century, Ashin Das Gupta’s earlier work demonstrated that many
former trading centers fell into decline after 1750 because expansionist Mughal successor states
began monopolizing the trade of key commodities. One key example is Martanda Varma’s
military backed monopoly on Indonesian pepper at Travancore. 78 This line of argumentation is
taken to its logical conclusions by his pupil Lakshmi Subramanian who argues that foreign
trading companies like the East India Company in Gujarat depended on merchants and their
capital for sustaining commercial aspirations and their eventual political ascendancy. 79 When
indigenous emerging states began subordinating merchant groups in the eighteenth century, the
latter shifted their allegiance to the Europeans. This ‘Anglo-Bania order’ thesis found severe
critics in M. Torri, J. Gommans, and J. Kuiper who argued that the traditional and poly-ethnic
network of financial intermediaries gave way because of the militarily superior colonial order. 80
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In short, merchants are dominated by politics and seek to influence outcomes only when a winner
appears on the horizon. 81
In the early modern economy, there were many types of financial agents. One specialist
group that has received sustained attention from Karen Leonard is bankers. In a seminal article
published in 1979, she suggested that when large, autonomous banking firms across the Indian
subcontinent began withdrawing essential financial services from imperial officials and noblemen
in the late-seventeenth century, the Mughal agrarian economy and fiscal apparatus collapsed. 82
The imperial edifice gave way to fledgling groups like the Marathas in the Deccan, Sikhs in
Punjab, and European mercantile companies in Bengal and Gujarat. These regional groups relied
on the financial resources and services of the very same ‘Great Firms’ that used to service the
Mughals.83 This view was challenged most forcefully by John Richards who argued that the
Empire was financially secure, and nobles obtained money from the official mints based in the
localities.84 Royal orders from Akbar’s court in Agra conferred titles on individual
moneychangers, assayers, minters, and other financial professionals. For Richards, this suggests
that the rulers knew and controlled the activities of financial specialists. Therefore, no
autonomous ‘Great Firms’ could have existed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Leonard replied to Richards by flagging some of his key assumptions. 85 First, his ‘state
finance’ theory overstated Mughal accumulation of capital without paying attention to the very
important credit system developed and controlled by bankers and other commercial agents.
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Second, by repeating the idealized version of a strong empire as outlined in royal chronicles,
Richards’s reveals little about how money was valued, circulated, and deployed. Even prominent
scholars who agree with Richards’s position that the Mughal Empire was highly centralized and
self-sufficient acknowledge the crucial role that financial intermediaries and bankers played in
everyday activities.86 Finally, the state as controlling all commercial activities model advocated
by Richards did not integrate the detailed workings of the economy and administration. As such,
he could not provide a diachronically robust alternative to why the Mughal Empire faded. One
way to reconcile both perspectives is relying on Makrand Mehta’s work. Mehta demonstrates that
the Ahmedabad based financier-firm of Shantidas Jhaveri was implicated in Mughal wars of
succession, advancing money to claimant Shah Jahan in 1627, while the firm’s descendants
continued to run the organization and influence statecraft well into the colonial and post-colonial
periods.87 According to Mehta, the size, function, and organizational capacity of financial agents
determines whether they remain insignificant to politics or whether they become deeply invested
and implicated in the complexities of public authority across time.88
Drawing on European sources, the work on politics and trade in medieval Surat by Indian
Ocean historian Ashin Das Gupta suggests that the state controlled currency, revenue, military,
and territory while taking “little or no interest in trade” although it was concerned about
“revenues of the port of Surat and the welfare of the pilgrim traffic to Mecca”. 89 Gupta’s work
shows that the daily banking and trade activities of Surat operated within the decentralized
political and economic structures of the state, but were largely autonomous and spatially removed
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enough to develop in their own ways. According to this historiography, highly regional elements
like banking and trade, religiosity, literature, and the socio-political ethos of the Mughal ports
developed freely. As long as the imperial government received revenues, they were not bothered
with the day-to-day activities of locals. The localities, in turn, recognized the imperial center as
ideologically and structurally essential to their own welfare since it provided a framework by
which goods and pilgrims travelled to and from much of northern India. Their allegiance to the
state was verified largely by paying revenues to local representatives of the emperor.
How do developments in South Asian history stack-up against contexts in early modern
Europe? Perspectives from Florence suggest that starting in the fourteenth-century, the
organization of business activities around the ‘firm’ changed the relationship between
commercial agents and state power. In addition to new forms of commercial organization, a
deepening of the cash economy through international trade gave birth to what Marx later called
“merchant’s capital”.90 Florentines engaged in single-venture enterprises but quickly developed
foreign partners and agents, communicating via writing technologies from home. 91 A hub and
spoke organization on ethnic and cultural grounds is advocated by Aslanian’s study of Armenian
merchants in New Julfa. 92 Unlike Goldberg’s Geniza merchants or Goldthwaite’s Italians who
became embedded in foreign trade networks, Armenian networks across the Indian Ocean and
Mediterranean resemble those of the Sindhis. 93 The “circulation societies” comprised of dispersed
nodes connected to the center at New Julfa and each other across seas. These networks were
closed, but not because of religious conservatism. Rather, the Armenian merchants had strict
norms of conduct that made or broke reputations, resembling a kind of social ethics that the
Geniza merchants also espoused. What made the network robust was that merchants, credit,
goods, and information passed through the entire network but was concentrated at New Julfa.
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Widely cited and discussed, Chris Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars marked a
watershed in modern Indian historiography. 94 He argued that with the decentralization of the
Mughal Empire in the late-eighteenth century, an intermediate class between agrarian labor and
the state was emerging. This corporate class, made up of traders, merchants, and the service
gentry from various castes and clans would later coagulate as the Indian middle class. Mughal
farming of revenue rights after 1700 encouraged growth of a rooted service gentry, mainly
Muslim-sufi, and a homogenous merchant class, mainly Hindu and Jain. These groups enabled
economic growth by moving resources from the agrarian rich hinterland to emerging urban
centers through largely autonomous credit and information networks. 95 Money became a crucial
component of this new political economy, and entrepreneurial Indians had considerable say in
backing rival political groups. Rather than seeing mercantile activity and statecraft as separate
domains, Bayly prefers focusing on “portfolio capitalists”, or enterprising folks who participated
in various ways in both. 96 Perlin, Stein, Alam, Gordon, Washbrook and Marshall agree with and
build on Bayly’s work to show that the East India Company was brought into this unstable
regionally inflected world of Indian commerce and politics before establishing rule of law, hence
control over commercial agents, in the nineteenth century.97 Europeans as private entrepreneurs
also participated in this economy, often marrying locally and building great wealth. 98 Maratha
sources from the Deccan in the eighteenth century also suggest the role of new gentry groups in
state formation, economic production, financial activities, and the commercialization of state
apparatus.99 From this literature, Guha provides the most nuanced account suggesting that an
autonomous market for credit persisted until colonial land surveys in the 1860s established
peasant security of tenure. This created a new market in land, reorienting the relationship between
state apparatus and commercial activity. Seizure and sale of debtor’s land became the new
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security for the money market.100 Alavi, Habib, Parthasarathi, and Cohn largely disagree with
Bayly’s thesis and demonstrate that military might, economic organization, and political
apparatus of early colonial agents exercised complete control over Indian commerce and
politics.101 Commercial agents were not independent, and the logic of their capital circulated and
acquired meaning within the confines of the hegemonic colonial order.
Ritu Birla’s recent revisionist work offers a more detailed picture of how the independent
world of early modern economy came under the legislating logic of the colonial state. In a study
of the ethnically homogenous entrepreneur class of Marwaris, Birla argues that colonial law was
instrumental in translating local market cultures into a “universalizing logic of capital, into a
market ethic structured by the economy/culture distinction”. 102 The rule of law challenged
authority of kinship-based commerce which had flexible conventions subject to jurisdiction of
merchant guilds called mahājan-s, and caste and community based councils of informal
arbitration. First, colonial law made Marwaris subject to personal law, and fetishized their
“characteristic negotiability of social and material capital as ancient ritual”. Second, it imposed
contractual models on practices not easily relegated to personal law. As a result, “the law as a
systematized logic, either civil, criminal, or personal, increasingly commanded mercantile
conventions, customs, and practices”.103 Vernacular market practices were tolerated as
alternatives to the real stuff of modern market ethics, or they were criminalized, such as
speculation and rain gambling. Birla’s work is the first to demonstrate how law becomes the
prism through which most of our stereotypes of native commerce have been constructed. She
makes two critical observations. First, the “public” in colonial India was both an arrangement of
economic men as it was a site of political performance, and the “law’s re-presentation of the
public as the market must be examined alongside the devolution of political representation”.
Second, “law on economy installed the public by privatizing indigenous forms of corporate life, a
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process that in turn produced hegemonic public assertions of community”. 104 It was the salience
of these assertions that, in turn, induced new forms of behavior like charitable gifting. 105
Colonial law made indigenous capitalist classes like the Marwaris representatives of native
commerce more broadly. This had significant implications for the relationship between Indian
business, the nationalist movement, and early-twentieth century commerce. The work of Helen
Lamb, Thomas Timberg, Dwijendra Tripathi, and Claude Markovits demonstrates that success of
large industrial firms like Tata and Birla can be linked to their niche in the larger politicoeconomic structure outlined by Birla.106 In these studies, commercial agents are defined by and
operate within state apparatus of law. Without making an explicit argument about indigenous
capitalist classes, legal apparatus or commercial activity, Coleman’s study of the Courtauld
family’s textile business (1794-1990) parallels the Indian case. 107 The family firm grew via cash
and credit supplied by network of family friends, and the Unitarian Church was central to the
social outlook of founding partners, cousins George Courtauld and Peter Taylor.108 Social
endogamy and marriage endogamy repeated social alliances that enabled the growth of business
activities. George’s son Samuel (1793-1881) used his influence to finance political campaigns
and special interest groups. Like the Tatas and Birlas, the Courtaulds helped create and were also
implicated in trans-national political and economic networks by the early-twentieth century. The
histories of these modern firms demonstrate that commercial activities and the politics of public
authority are intertwined. Developments in one sphere impact the other, and it is often unclear
where the boundaries lay and which side, if any, is the primary driver.
Rather than focusing on social actors, monetary history examines the role money and markets
play in political, economic, and social life. Approaches from this subfield have the potential to
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revitalize the study of early modern economy in South Asia by asking what materials were used
as money, and over what areas did it circulate? What did a deepening of the cash-nexus mean?
Did the state control money supply, limit its circulation, and force subject populations to act
accordingly?109 John Deyell’s Living Without Silver demonstrates the value of numismatics for
elucidating socio-political relationships. 110 To illustrate, between 750-1000, four major regional
currencies circulated: billon drammas of Gurjara-Pratiharas, Arab-Sindhi coins, bimetallic coins
of Turk and Hindushahi dynasties, and cooper coins of Kashmir. In all four cases, the issuing
authority remained unknown. By 1200, Rajput dynasties ruled northern India and Turkish
monarchies controlled north-western regions. Of the three dominant currencies of Rajput era
(Lakshmi-type gold coins, bull and horseman billon coins, and gadhaiya billon coins), only first
two were specific to issuer and only later maintained tradition of anonymity. In this period,
limitations on precious metal supply did not result in lack of currency or under-monetization.
Available supply was made to serve needs by issue of mixed metal coinage. This was not a case
of expanding pool of coinage metals by debasement, since net silver or gold content of coins was
still determinant of value. Rather, dearth of precious metals caused general deflation of prices, to
the point that modest quantities of gold and silver had considerable purchasing power. The
Ghurids were reliant on Indian loot, tribute and taxes for fighting wars in central Asia. Coin
hoards from Afghanistan contain mixture of Rajput and Ghurid Lakshmi-type based gold coins
near Ghazni. Deyell argues that continuous character of trade in various regions of northern India
can be reconciled with under-monetization. Moreover, the various typologies of coins circulating
across geographies indicates that rulers could never fully control money supply and its circulation
via autonomous traders.111
Historians of Mughal India have also produced significant works on the subject. John
Richards, Om Prakash, and Najaf Haider have demonstrated the nature of state finance, role of
credit networks, and the ways new regions were incorporated into monetary systems. 112 Prakash
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observes that Akbar demanding revenues in cash rather than kind is the mark of a new era in
Indian monetary policy. This shift gave increasing powers to ṣarrāf-s, or bankers who controlled
the issuing of coins, currency conversions, and assessing wear and tear. Even though small value
transactions were possible with cowrie shells, bitter almonds, pieces of led and tin, and credit
instruments constituting near money, money in coins was central to new order and it was around
sarrafs that money and credit markets were organized. Most of these bankers were Hindus, and
the Portuguese and Dutch trading companies also raised loans from these creditors. The major
question that Om Prakash asks is how did the bankers finance themselves? The evidence is skim,
but he suggests that it was accumulated through family wealth and public deposits. While this
thesis needs to be verified, his observation that bankers remitted funds throughout the empire
stands. Virji Vohra in seventeenth-century Surat and Jagat Seth are prominent examples. Jagat
Seth handled remittance of central revenues from Bengal to Delhi amounting to over 10 million
rupees per annum, suggesting that they were implicated in statecraft by providing loans, minting
and assessing coins, and moving money on the state’s behalf through their own networks.
Historians of monetary practices have demonstrated that over the second millennium, markets
became more sophisticated because of increasing monetization that was fueled by demographic
growth, new commercial linkages, and the spread of urbanization. This was certainly neither
linear or uniform, nor can a single cause be isolated. The broad trends demonstrate, however, that
money played a critical role in structuring society much earlier than the Mughal Empire.
How has monetary history revitalized the study of states? Historians of the Mughal Empire,
scholars of early-modern world trade, and numismatists studying Mughal and Islamic coinage
more broadly have advanced our understanding of the administrative and monetary history of
precolonial empires. These varying but overlapping competencies rely on a range of sources
including Persian documents, land records, court chronicles, and coins in charting out long-term
trends in monetary systems and the nature of hyperlocal engagement with currencies. The
writings of John F. Richards, Irfan Habib, John S. Deyell, Om Prakash, Stephen Blake, and Frank
Perlin can be synthesized to not only support the idea that a robust and centrally organized
Mughal monetary system existed from the mid-sixteenth century until the early decades of the
eighteenth century, but that during this period, international developments in the form of new
world silver supply and the domestic apparatuses conceived to produce and manage money also
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impacted the longevity and qualitative nature of Mughal money. 113 The historiography as it
currently stands emphasizes the uniformity, standardized size and value, centralized control,
strong and growing issuing of coins, and widespread acceptance and usage of metallic money that
was set up and propagated by Akbar in the sixteenth century. In addition, there is broad consensus
that the steady influx of New World silver reduced its price relative to copper and gold,
engendering an important shift in the seventeenth century whereby copper and gold were
increasingly replaced by an imperial currency focused on silver. The role played by northern
European trading companies, especially the Dutch and the British, in supplying bullion to the
Indian mints cannot be overemphasized, and these firms must also be recognized as important
internal players in the dissemination and monetization of local India towards the late seventeenth
century. Finally, the conquest of Bijapur, Golconda, and the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatiks in
the late 1680s brings into focus the penetration of silver in the Mughal context into the South, an
area which remained oriented towards gold specie in the decades and centuries prior.
Drawing on evidence from the western Deccan province of Khandesh, John F. Richards has
emphasized that the Mughals were able to implement robust systems of land revenue collection
and distribution that were resilient to political and military troubles brewing by the turn of the
eighteenth century. The growing regularity and intensity of Maratha assaults on the people and
property of the area could not succeed in halting the flow of revenue and other “officially inspired
monetary exchange within Khandesh” because the state provided the region with plenty of
reliable supply of coin and processes for moving and reproducing that coin in both administrative
operations and market based exchanges. 114
In describing the salary arrangements of Mughal officials expected to raise revenues and
manage its transfer across imperial territories, Richard's highlights that collections were taken
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primarily by the various agents appointed by imperial officials who did not necessarily reside in
the locality of their assignment. Accordingly, an elaborate and initially efficient system emerged
whereby the Mughal Empire paid official salaries to administrators from proceeds gathered by
imperial taxes in the locality. If the principal resided elsewhere, the modes of revenue collection
and transfer of these funds to the concerned official were left to local networks and
infrastructures. As Richards notes, the monetary consequences of such an administrative set-up
actually increased the number and complexity of individual financial transactions. This, in turn,
contributed to the increasing monetization and financially transaction oriented nature of locality
by the 1700s. Since the Mughal Empire perfected, albeit for a short while, the management and
collection of land revenue in the form of taxes on surplus, they did not require capital loans or
other advances from the mercantile classes. Ashin Das Gupta and others have convincingly
shown that the sphere of mercantile activity was relatively autonomous from Mughal control, and
the state administration did not benefit directly from any continued relationship with merchants.
State operations were financed through a robust fiscal policy in which state revenues outweighed
disbursements. However, the decentralized collection and distribution of imperial revenues led to
more long-term and perhaps unintended consequences such as monetization beyond what was
ideal for the empire, and the growth of private monetary transactions that the state was aware of
but did not necessarily regulate or monitor. Specialists such as bankers sought opportunity and
profit in the movement of resources. In a world that prized expediency, cost-effectiveness, and
reliability, their services became increasingly valuable.
The work of Frank Perlin and Stewart Gordon suggests that the unintended consequences of
local monetization spurred by the Mughal administrative apparatus enabled their successors such
as the Marathas to consolidate resources and see real potential in not only the decentralized
control of circulating issues, but also in drawing on those very same financial agents as resources
for moving money and as reliable bodies to staff and manage new bureaucracies that were
lightweight and dependent on local conditions in generating and managing resources. While this
was perhaps more intricate and convoluted than ideas of normative governance laid out by
Mughal texts, an era marked by new demographic, monetary, and spatial concerns was better
suited for tribute seeking authorities that were content with fixed amounts at periodic intervals
rather than a bureaucratically complex, ritually dense, and contractually robust empire with high
overhead costs.
And so, the overall observations made by the stalwart monetary historians of the Mughal
Empire hold true, namely that political and military conflicts characteristic of the late-seventeenth
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century did not significantly disrupt sources of revenue. However, that they created new channels
and destinations for money, resources, and personnel is significant and suggests that a focus on
the state finance model does not allow us to account for changes in economy and administrative
practice that were critical to the growth of post-Mughal successor states. How did the increasing
importance of private financial groups enable those fringe groups to build and staff their own
institutions, and how did local allegiances contribute to the pace at which this happened? What
were the long-term effects of these shifts on land rights, monetization, political authority, and
social life more broadly? If, as John F. Richards states, that “in the 17th century imperial coins
and private bills of exchange moved in greater quantities, at a higher velocity, over a more
complex pattern of transactions, than pre-Mughal coins and bills”, we must assess what the
longer-term consequences of such movement were. 115 My contention, which I elaborate on in
subsequent chapters, is that Mughal state finance could no longer sustain the functioning of
empire, and those autonomous groups that developed an increasing specialization in the business
of money became the primary targets for cash starved, money hungry deputies who were torn
between maintaining allegiance to the ever-weakening emperor, and carving out their own
independent domains as the nature and significance of their primary jobs became obsolete and
insecure.116
I would like to conclude this discussion of the early modern economy by noting that the
literature on Mughal and early colonial India tends to homogenize all professional economic
agents as ‘merchants and bankers’. While the idea of a unified class of mercantile agents makes
for evocative narration, it is analytically imprecise. Within the sphere of financial services,
evidence from Mughal India down into the early colonial period suggests that there were major
differences between the status and function of moneychangers (ṣarrāf), moneylenders (mahājan,
dhīrnār), financiers (poṭṭdār), bankers (pārekh, mahājan), banking agents (marfatya), and so
on.117 We also need to make empirical and analytical distinctions between the establishment and
functioning of smaller and larger firms, the role that family organization played in business
activities including consolidating credit networks and managing information flows, and the nature
of material objects that facilitated complex relationships between commercial agents and other
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social actors of the time. In the chapters that follow, my analysis of the Jhaveri and Haribhakti
families across the long-eighteenth century attempts to nuance our understanding of financial
agents by identifying their business activities, and how they related to nodes of political power in
both times of relative stability and during moments of social upheaval.
Business and Financial History
In September 2017, the Credit Suisse Research Institute published CS Family 1000, a
comprehensive report on family-owned companies around the world. 118 The main findings were
that family businesses in both emerging and developed markets outperform traditional corporate
organizations in the long run. In addition to outperforming equity markets by an annual average
of 4.5% between 2006 and 2015, family businesses tend to pay special attention to preserving
capital, which translates to more conservative growth targets, and invest significantly more in
research and development compared to non-family owned businesses. Culling data on the 1,000
largest family businesses from around the world, CS Family 1000 notes that the highest
percentage of family-firms are found in China (167), the United States (121), and India (108).
Zooming in on China and India, the analysis demonstrates that Indian companies tend to be more
mature, meaning that 60% of the Indian family businesses in the survey were in their third
generation or more of business, compared to just 30% in the Chinese case. This suggests that the
field of business history would certainly benefit from research and analysis that focuses on
business families from around the world, especially those based in India which have longer
continuous histories than their counterparts elsewhere.
Bolstering this view from the historiographical angle is a very recent essay published by
Oscar Gelderblom and Francesca Trivellato quantifying the kind of ideological, geographical, and
temporal orientation that tends to pre-configure scholarly analysis in the top five business and
economic history journals in the United States and the United Kingdom. 119 The authors
convincingly demonstrate that between 2000 and 2016, only 20% of articles published pertained
to the period prior to 1800, and of these, the majority disproportionately focused on Europe, and
England in particular. They rightly point out that premodern societies, including those of the nonwestern world, have rich data that needs to be harnessed for true comparative business histories of
preindustrial worlds. Of the four areas of enquiry that they chalk out for scholarly dialogue, their
insistence on the family firm is particularly useful. They insist that we pay greater attention to
small-scale family firms, and I believe my study of the Jhaveri and Haribhakti materials works in
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this direction. Both family businesses were limited to western India, and operated within
relatively delimited spheres of circulation and influence. Second, these families have survived
several generations, making the various kinds of documentary evidence about their activities
especially relevant for understanding how they have navigated the rise and fall of political
formations, and how they have been tied to nodes of public authority to varying degrees
depending on context. Third, this initial foray into the Jhaveri and Haribhakti materials might lay
the empirical groundwork for the kind of collaborative and synthesized scholarship that the
authors envision for undertaking comparative histories of preindustrial societies, especially
beyond the usual focus of nineteenth-century England.
It is in this vein that I suggest economies of social life as one way to be more sensitive to the
historical particularities of family firms, commercial activity, and political authority. 120 In recent
years, one fruitful analytical unit for understanding economies of social life has been the
household. I understand the term in two ways. First, it is spatial, referring to the embodied nature
of day-to-day activities organized around ‘domestic’ social reproduction as envisioned by Marx
and Engels. Second, it can be disaggregated to ascertain the specific work its constituent parts do
and on what grounds.121 Households can be compared within geographies over time, across
geographies in the same period, or across both geographies and time. For example, household
size has been used to understand whether pre-industrial and pre-capitalistic societies were based
on joint-households or whether they were nuclear. Evidence from South Asia and Europe
demonstrates that nuclear households have historically prevailed. 122 In most cases, variations in
household size have more to do with temporary domestic arrangements including having kinfolk,
servants, lodgers, and other attached persons.
A third way of understanding the implications of household size and household structure is
what I am calling here household interest. This refers to the goals, beyond the obvious ones of
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sustaining and perpetuating the self and the unit, that a nuclear, joint, or extended household
works towards. This is a difficult category to work, not least because individual interests may
vary. Despite this, household interests can range from material priorities such as the accumulation
of capital, building spheres of influence (e.g. marriage, attaching non-kin to the household), and
performing religious duties (e.g. Jain and Vallabha community organizations verify the continued
importance of ideology in dialectically framing the goal of the household). Household interest
captures the fact that action are not limited by household size or structure. In fact, analysis of size
and structure alone may obfuscate the extent to which households are involved in pursuing
complex goals that extend beyond its literal and conceptual boundaries. 123 We must look for how
interests are manufactured, pursued, and communicated between members of the household and
the outside world. Information and its flows become the critical element of sociological and
historical inquiry in both disaggregating the household and seeing the work that such a unit
accomplishes in the world, often successfully across generations. Household interest allows us to
account for diversity found in localities without resorting to generalizations such as ‘Florentine’,
‘Jewish’, or ‘Hindu’ households. Also, household size and structure change within units. Elders
pass away, couples bear or adopt children, and changing social and political contexts also impact
the kind of decisions and values households can pursue. In bringing the Jhaveri and Haribhakti
families under analysis in the subsequent chapters, we get a sense of how resources, reputation,
and expertise get further refined and transmitted across generations, and even withstand the rise
and fall of empires.
In the case of business history, studies of the merchant households in Renaissance Italy have
demonstrated how marriage, economic, and patronage networks enabled individuals and families
to achieve aims like fortune, guarding tradition, and protecting allies. 124 The most well-known
example is that of fifteenth-century entrepreneur Cosimo de’Medici. Relying on division of labor,
rule by patriarchy and gerontocracy, and cohesion and discipline in interlocking business and
family interests, Medici went from being an obscure trader to the center of a powerful and longlasting banking firm with kinship based branches throughout Europe. In Florence, he was de facto

123

In reviewing the scholarship women, households, and political action, Anna Clark ends by noting that
“Notions of public and private had a powerful ideological hold, even as they did not exactly correspond to
lived experience.” See 1998. “Gender and Politics in the Long Eighteenth Century.” History Workshop
Journal 48: 252-257.
124
Herlihy, David. 1995. “The Florentine Merchant Family of the Middle Ages.” In Women, Family, and
Society in Medieval Europe: Historical Essays, 1978-1991. Providence: Berghahn Books, pp. 193-214.
43

ruler and members of his progeny went on to become Popes of the Catholic Church. 125 In an
earlier work on Sephardic Jews based in the Italian port city of Livorno, Francesca Trivellato
demonstrates that “group discipline, contractual obligations, customary norms, political
protection, and discursive conventions” were at the heart of long-term and long-distance trading
relations in early modern Europe. 126 These groups relied on strategies of marriage and kinship not
to build some kind of natural affective order, but rather to create foundations for the exchange of
information about reputation and abilities of unknown trading partners. Participants had “mutual
agency with full liability” in forging partnerships which had “no expiration date”.127 Echoing the
work of Goldberg discussed earlier, Trivellato argues that in the absence of recourse to formal
law, adjudicating courts, and strict control by the state, Sephardic Jews built autonomous spheres
of influence and established their own norms of conduct through kinship networks. While the
research presented in this dissertation is not about merchants trading across vast networks, it
certainly builds on insights of both Trivellato and Goldberg in which both scholars demonstrate
the immense value of writing broader social histories based on the private archives of specialist
groups. I believe my focus on business history as the hunt for new sources, often preserved
beyond traditional documentary archives, paves a significant path for understanding both
historical and contemporary Indian business families that have proved their might and mettle by
surviving in various forms across several generations.
The field of Business History has advanced considerably since its founding in the 1920s. In
the initial years, the growing literature focused on company histories and business biographies.
Economic success and leadership were central concerns in these works, and they were often
commissioned by corporations and individual businesspersons for cultivating a positive images of
business worlds and personalities. This was especially relevant in the early twentieth century
when the idea of robber barons had permeated American society and sustained the image of big
business as a fundamentally ruthless pursuit of profits. In Europe, the impetus for business history
came from historical economics, especially those interested in finding new explanations beyond
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classic liberalism for economic growth. 128 At the Graduate School of Business at Harvard
University, the inaugural chair in Business History was established in 1927 and held by Norman
Gras. Gras established himself as a formidable scholar in the nascent field of business history
with the publication of Business and Capitalism in 1939, in which he divided the economic
history of American into petty, mercantile, industrial, financial, and national capitalism types.129
Arriving at Harvard Business School in 1970, it was Alfred Chandler who left a lasting impact on
business history as it is commonly understood. In his first major work Strategy and Structure
published in 1962, Chandler took a classical historical approach to demonstrate that technological
changes, such as the railway in his example, are key for understanding how companies organize
and adapt in the long run. His second text was the Pulitzer-winning The Visible Hand published
in 1977. In this work, Chandler enchanted readers by demonstrating that salaried entrepreneurs,
commonly understood as managers, were key to economic performance in comparison to owneroperators. This work sparked an entire generation of American, and later global, business ethics
focused on the merits and successful application of managerial capitalism to various industries as
a foolproof strategy for success. This thesis was further elaborated in his Scale and Scope in
1990.130
Chandler’s writings have found wide appreciation for their historical rigor, scale of analysis,
and broad theoretical vision. They have also catalyzed criticism and have helped to move the field
forward. At the level of empirical bias, the critique is quite simple: Chandler glorifies the
American model of big industry as the most prevalent and desirable form for economic
organization, and therefore, for the study of business history. Linked to this perspective is the
undue focus on mass production when other paradigms of industrial capitalism exist around the
world. As the CS Family 1000 report at the outset reminds us, perhaps the managerial revolution
and the impersonal joint-stock company is only one form of business organization that might very
well be an historical outlier when business types and organizational forms are compared in the
longue durée. A recent issue of Business History Review analyzes the possibilities and limits of
the Chandlerian model of analysis, and various articles debate emerging methodologies for the
study of business history in the twenty-first century. The Editors emphasis the continued
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For a good, albeit slightly outdated, overview of the development of business history as a field, see
Berghoff, H. 2001. “Business History.” In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences,
pp. 1421-26.
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A representative collection of Alfred Chandler’s writings can be found in Chandler, Alfred Dupont, and
Thomas K. McCraw. 1988. The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays toward a Historical Theory of Big
Business. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.
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importance of Chandler’s insistence on a historical perspective that focuses on identifying change
over time, but also identify emergent methodologies that are especially relevant for undertaking
this task in changing contexts and geographies. 131 This thread is insightfully taken up by Austin,
Dávila, and Jones who argue that the field of business history grew around concerns unique to
corporations in developed economies. As such, an alternative business history of emerging
markets necessarily requires different research materials and approaches, especially because
many of these areas have been influenced by long histories of colonial rule, periodic and
transformative state interventions, institutional voids, and other forms of discontinuous economic
development.132 It is to such an alternative business history that my study of banking families in
precolonial India hopes to make. In doing so, I hope to make a substantial contribution to a
growing body of literature on Indian business history that explores questions of historical
transition, materials from untapped private archives, and new theoretical perspectives in
understanding Indian state and society across the centuries.133 Business history allows me to
follow trails of money, capital, and economic organization without necessarily being governed by
strict chronology or political boundaries that an earlier generation of historians of South Asia
have been.

Plan of Progression
In addition to this first introductory chapter, this dissertation has four core empirical chapters
followed by a short conclusion.
In Chapter 2, I suggest that the precise meaning and significance of ‘revenue farming’ in
precolonial agrarian economies has eluded scholars. Some have viewed it as an administrative
aberration indicating weak state control, while others have seen it as the mode by which fledgling
polities consolidated authority. I begin by reviewing the concept in Islamic legal thought along
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Jones, Geoffrey & Walter Friedman. 2017. “Debating Methodology in Business History.” Business
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A recent anthology brings together forty-one key authors who have contributed to the subfield of Indian
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law in disciplining indigenous business practices, and the role of private capital in creating the Indian
national economy.
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with what it signified for early political formations in Central and South Asia. I accomplish this
by focusing on the historical development of iqṭāʻ and ijārah, the two Perso-Arabic terms most
frequently translated from the sources as ‘revenue farm’. This historiographical review serves as
the backdrop for a more sustained engagement with how historians of Mughal India and the
eighteenth century more broadly have understood the subject. My contention is that revenue
farming has become an imprecise catchall for two very different practices related to land revenue
administration. The first is the subinfeudation of more regularized land rights assigned under a
sovereign’s allodial title, and the second being the subletting of less regularized land rights for
rent in advance. To understand the difference between subinfeudation and subletting, I break
down various entitlements in land according to how regulated the right was, how long it was
meant to last, and the degree to which the right holder was bound by duty. In the Indian context,
the four major tenurial categories by the early modern period were BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT,
REVENUE FARM, HEREDITARY OCCUPATION or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT,
CHIEFTAINCY.

and TRIBUTARY or

In this formulation, the REVENUE FARM refers to rights secured by contractual

agreement in which a sovereign transferred the temporary exploitation of a holding to a tenant in
exchange for an advance payment akin to rent. It was one type of land tenure under which various
kinds of rights fell, and it served to bring fallow lands under cultivation and raise capital for the
state. I suggest that such techniques were especially prevalent in pre-capitalist economies where
credit was less developed, bureaucratic and communication networks were poor, and means of
seeking additional finance were limited. Central to my theorization of entitlements to land
revenue in early modern India is the increasing importance of financial agents as local agents of
Mughal officials and as reliable specialists of maintaining and moving money. I argue that the
growing practice and significance of revenue farming in eighteenth-century India needs to be
rethought not only as a strategy for raising finances for states desperate for income, but also as a
way for states to overcome agency problems that plagued their bureaucracies at various stages.
Chapter 3 takes up elite banking households and Mughal sovereignty in seventeenth-century
Gujarat. I argue that the Mughal Empire evolved into a contractually robust, bureaucratically
complex, and fiscally sound polity by the mid-seventeenth century. During this period of Mughal
rule, state income outweighed payments, and the rank and file military system kept the
administrative apparatus intact. My narrative is especially concerned with the kinds of
relationships that the Mughal state, its officials, and partakers in its ritual-practical bureaucracy
had with financial agents and people of money. As a central case study, I investigate the life and
activities of Shantidas Jhaveri (1580-1659), a major banker, jeweler, and revenue farmer allied to
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the Mughal court and known to several emperors. In its most basic form, I argue that the Mughal
state did not depend on financial agents or moneyed persons like Shantidas Jhaveri for
bankrolling the state, at least for the better part of its existence (1500-1680). The little that we can
glean from the sources suggests that those in the business of money shared a symbiotic
relationship with the state, providing the imperial court luxury commodities such as horses,
spices, tea, and jewelry. These merchant-bankers regularly visited the court, and several royal
orders, Persian chronicles, and various Indian and European sources confirm that these financial
agents shared a familial relationship with the court. By the 1680s, however, expansionist wars
into southern India led by the last great Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) depleted
Mughal financial resources, and radically transformed the state’s need for ready capital. I argue
that this severe financial crunch engendered a radical shift in Mughal behavior towards financial
specialists like Shantidas Jhaveri, and especially his descendants who continued the family
business of converting, accumulating, and reinvesting capital.
Chapter 4 addresses how financial crises in late-Mughal Gujarat led to violent rivalries
between provincial governors in which local bankers were gradually and arguably unwillingly
implicated in. By the early 1700s, the Mughal state was bankrupt and provincial governors began
extorting local merchants and bankers for money to raise militias. Mughal officials seizing of
private wealth alienated financial agents from government, and in doing so, undermined the very
political authority that their own bureaucratic positions represented. In the process, the Mughal
state lost access to private credit networks, routes of exchange, and most significantly, the
friendship and support of merchants, bankers, and other commercial groups. As the recent
writings of Farhat Hasan and Muzaffar Alam have demonstrated, Mughal authority in the locality
was a daily plebiscite, a constant negotiation between power brokers, elites, those with regular
access to critical information about the area. Once the Mughals resorted to violence to fundraise,
the accumulating classes responded by withdrawing their support and seeking protection
elsewhere. Starting in the 1720s, roving bandits coalescing around the label ‘Maratha’ (the
Mughal sources use the term ghanīm, or “plunders”) saw great opportunity in Gujarat. Its fertile
lands produced valuable crops such as indigo, cotton, and tobacco, and there was much wealth to
be taken from the prosperous region. Drawing on unpublished Persian and Gujarati sources, this
chapter focuses on disaffected Mughal nobles, local financial intermediaries, and merchantbankers who were expected to provide loans on unfavorable terms. As a series of focused
episodes, I examine in particular the story of two rival Mughal governors, Sarbuland Khan and
Hamid Khan, and their efforts at raising loans from Khushalchand Jhaveri (Shantidas Jhaveri’s
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grandson), and other merchants, bankers, and jewelers in Ahmedabad during the 1720s. I
demonstrate that these relations went from amicable to antagonistic in a relatively short period of
time, and this had a profound impact on political authority and public life in the shrinking
shadows of Mughal rule.
Chapter 5 explores how fissures within the Mughal administrative apparatus provided a group
of roving bandits emerging out of the Maratha confederacy in the Deccan an opportunity to
consolidate influence over key districts in Gujarat. By the mid-eighteenth century, Mughal
sovereignty remained but a silhouette of its former glory. Visual evidence, literary texts, and nonMughal sources confirm that new nodes of power were being consolidated in the provinces. The
peculiar feature of these little polities is that their fledging organization was not based on the kind
of robust military fiscalism that the Mughals were so known for, especially during the
seventeenth century. Some of these little kingdoms emerged from within the Mughal nobility,
like the Nizam of Hyderabad (1724-1948), while others, like the Gaekwads of Baroda (17211948), were provincial roving bandits who relied on run and gun tactics of periodic tribute
seeking in areas that were not protected by stronger militaries. Empires have courts, providing
elite groups such as merchant-courtiers an opportunity to partake in rules and regulations of selffashioning and norms of comportment. In contrast, such tribute-seeking bandits did not cultivate
courtly culture to the same extent. In fact, their rule was based on growing alliances and
professional dependencies on local bankers, financiers, and other specialist groups. In the
eighteenth century, the Marathas and their confederates like the Gaekwads forged a series of
alliances with financial agents, especially for the explicit purpose of raising capital and collecting
periodic land revenue from their often dis-contiguous territories scattered across Gujarat. The
historiography has been reticent on who these financial specialists exactly were. Where did they
come from, and what emergent cultures of finance enabled them to acquire and lend wealth to
fledgling states? In this chapter, I focus on the establishment and evolution of the most prominent
banking family business known as Haribhakti ni Pedhi. Established around 1762 by brothers Hari
and Bhakti, this financier firm became the top moneylender to the Gaekwads of Baroda. I
examine new evidence that sheds critical light on the role that the Haribhakti Firm played in
helping Gaekwads transition from a peasant chieftaincy to an organization that historians,
colonial commentators, and Indians after British Independence have recognized as indigenous
native or princely states.
The final chapter revisits the overall argument of the dissertation and its implications for our
understanding financial agents across the early modern centuries. How can we read an evolution
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of form, function, and role of financial agents across the early modern/modern divide? How can
we account for simultaneous changes in political forms and social conditions (e.g. demographic
shifts, growth of paper documentation, monetization of rural economies) across South Asia
during the same period? Is it possible to analyze these complex and related changes without
relying on ideologically inflected language of ‘progress’ or ‘decline’ as an earlier generation of
scholars have? Combining evidence about the Jhaveri family with data on the Haribhakti group, I
argue that businesspersons before 1700 were key participants in politics of the royal court but
were not central to financing their bureaucracies and military contingents. This changed between
1730-1780 when bankers like the Haribhaktis became central to the consolidation and
propagation of newer forms of political authority, land revenue administration, and state building
organized around the regular borrowing of money and speculative practices around land revenue
administration. A key argument in this chapter is the role that the early colonial government out
of Bombay played in not only settling debts between indigenous bankers and the Gaekwad
authority, but also procuring key revenue-generating districts as their self-awarded gifts for
brokering financial and diplomatic deals between bankers, financiers, aspirants to princely
authority, and increasingly dissatisfied military contractors who were a major source of conflict
and social unrest in the closing decades of the eighteenth century.
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Chapter 2: Towards a Theory of Historical Change
Revenue Farming, Land Rights, and Financial Agents in Early Modern and Modern India
Students of historical societies inherit the axiom that the appropriation of agrarian surplus is a
distinguishing feature of great polities. In the case of South Asia, scholars have spilled
considerable ink assessing ideologies and methods underpinning revenue collection during the
precolonial period (Moreland 1923; Sastri 1955; Habib 1963; Siddiqi 1970; Day 1972). This is
especially true of monographs influenced by structural-functionalist paradigms of early twentiethcentury social sciences.134 A striking feature of this scholarship has been the ambiguous nature of
terminology used to describe systems of land revenue and the nature of rights over land. Part of
the problem is that societies are idiosyncratic and ought to be studied on their own terms.
However, too myopic a view, no matter how detailed and sophisticated the analysis, risks
isolating phenomena and removing them from the purview of productive comparison and broader
trends. A further complication is that historians adopt the terminology of land revenue from the
primary sources of their case studies without necessarily reflecting on the longer genealogies of
this vocabulary, or even how it may relate to practices in other historical contexts. The imperfect
translation of words and concepts into English has also made inconsistent terminology a feature
of historical writings.
One idea that has received considerable attention over the years is the revenue farm. Serving
as the generic translation for various Perso-Arabic terminologies, especially iqṭāʻ and ijārah, the
revenue farm has eluded any consensus in meaning and significance. A review of the scholarship
suggests that revenue farming has come to signify two very different practices. The first is the
subinfeudation of regularized land rights assigned to officials under a sovereign’s allodial title,
and the second is the subletting of less regularized land rights for rent in advance. Regularization
refers to the degree to which a right was recognized by a sovereign administration, and this
usually corresponded to territories falling more securely under their influence. The differences
between subinfeudation and subletting become clear once entitlements to land revenue are
schematized according to how regularized the right was, whether it was permanent, and how
duty-bound the right holder was. These variables, respectively labeled tenurial rights, tenurial
term, and tenurial duties, are located on a grid as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Taken together,
all three determine what I am marking out as the tenurial category. The four major tenurial
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categories, or types of land rights, in early modern South Asia were BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT
(Quadrant 1), REVENUE FARM (Q2), HEREDITARY OCCUPATION or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT
(Q3), and TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY (Q4). In this formulation, REVENUE FARM refers to rights
secured by contractual agreement in which a sovereign transferred the temporary exploitation of a
holding to a tenant in exchange for rent in advance. It was just one of four categories under which
various kinds of land rights or land holdings fell. By viewing REVENUE FARM as such, we can
dispel some confusion in the scholarship that tends to confound iqṭāʻ, ijārah, revenue farm,
revenue farming, subinfeudation, and subletting.
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Figure 1: Tenurial Rights
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Figure 2: Tenurial Duties
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Ahead of presenting a more comprehensive description of both graphs in section four, let me
provide the reader with a more compact initial key to the schema in expository form. Figure 1
organizes major tenurial rights according to how regularized they were (horizontal axis), and
whether they were temporary or permanent (vertical axis). The degree to which a right was
regularized shared an inverse relationship with the financial and political risks associated with
possessing it. For example, rights comprising the revenue farm category in Q2 were less
regularized, carried greater risk, and were temporary vis-à-vis rights situated in Q3. Figure 2 is
meant to be read alongside Figure 1, and maps the corresponding range of duties (written in
italics) that right holders were expected to perform. This graph of tenurial duties suggests that
highly regularized rights carried a greater degree of duty-boundedness, whereas less regularized
rights carried relatively fewer formal obligations. For example, holders of Q1 rights were
expected to provide military contingents, take on bureaucratic responsibilities, and help collect
taxes on agricultural produce. From the sovereign’s point of view, rights falling in this quadrant
were allocated as a way of paying salaries, as a strategy for forging an administration, and for
maintaining a hierarchy of privileges among government officials. Financial agents are located at
the center of both visualizations because their relatively independent services as assayers,
bankers, mint masters, moneychangers, and financiers were essential to the overall functioning of
early-modern tenurial entitlements.
In the second section below, I begin by tracing a genealogy of the revenue farm concept to
early Islamic polities in Central and South Asia. In the third section, I assess the three different
ways in which scholars of early modern India have understood the subject. These positions
emphasize revenue farming as an administrative aberration undermining statecraft, as facilitating
historical transfer by enabling the growth of regional centers, or as an opportunity for
enterprising individuals to partake in the politics of land. 135 Notwithstanding relevant differences
in perspectives and what they exactly mean by revenue farming, this scholarship has failed to
capture the broader structure and significance of entitlements to land revenue. In the fourth
section, I argue that the revenue farm is best analyzed as one of four possible tenurial categories.
Each is determined by the degree to which a state-sovereign regularized the right, whether the

135

Those who view revenue farming as an aberration argue that it weakened the long-term revenue-paying
capacity of an area by ruining the peasantry. Advocates of the transfer perspective suggest that the growing
practice of revenue farming can be explained by rural monetization, and that provincial elites harnessed its
potential for carving out their own political domains. And finally, scholars who argue that the gradual
commodification of land rights was responsible for the spread of revenue farming mark it out as an
opportunity for speculators to make capital gains from investing in land revenue administration. Each of
these perspectives is further analyzed and critiqued in the sections below.
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term was permanent, and to what extent a right holder was duty-bound. While scholars have
correctly identified various kinds of land rights in precolonial India, they have not analyzed the
specificity of corresponding duties that right holders were obligated to perform. This is a serious
omission, and prevents us from fully grasping the meaning of revenue systems, land rights, and
associated practices like subinfeudation and subletting.
The purpose of this essay is to better understand terminologies and concepts related to the
distribution of premodern revenue entitlements by sources of political authority. This is a
worthwhile endeavor because it brings us one step closer to recovering the nature and
significance of Mughal credit systems and the monetization of the agrarian economy, which the
stalwarts in the field have seen as a top-down process (Habib 1960, 1964, 1969; Richards 1981,
1987; Haider 1996, 1999). A detailed study of revenue farming as an evolving idea and growing
practice reveals that the Mughal economy was a highly capitalized one from bottom-up, and that
credit systems, the role of financial agents in facilitating land rights, and access to money
remained strong in the locality. As such, the view that the Mughal state was perpetually strong
and centralized needs to be balanced by suggesting that monetization and the deepening of rural
credit necessitated the layering of revenue collection mechanisms. The complex materiality of
process and perpetually developing nature of land revenue administration and private finance
surely contributed to the waning of the Mughal state’s reach, but also enabled the growth of new
nodes of public authority in the provinces. This, of course, has implications for theories of early
capital accumulation, the development of the market in land, the rise of regional successor states,
economic change, and more broadly, the role of the Mughal Empire in the early modern global
political economy. And while these important issues are beyond the scope of this essay, my
analysis will most clearly demonstrate that the evolution of land rights and associated practices of
managing them cannot be isolated from the increasing need to raise and manage capital. Focusing
on Mughal India, the overall questions motivating this chapter are as follows. First, what were the
major tenurial rights under which lands were held, maintained, extended, and made productive?
Second, what broader tenurial categories or types did they fall under? Third, what duties did
individuals and groups have while holding a particular kind of right? And finally, what were the
desired effects and unanticipated consequences of a state-sovereign’s system of entitlements to
land revenue?

Iqṭāʻ and Ijārah
In the Central Asian context, the idea of the “revenue farm” can be traced back to discussions
by early Islamic jurists around land grants called qaṭāye‘. “These were hereditary grants of crown
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lands with full rights of disposal by sale, gift, or inheritance made by the caliphs to their
supporters” (Lambton 1998:521). Qaṭāye‘ grants were distinguished from private property held
by non-Muslims on the basis of land tax. While qaṭāye‘ grants were subject to a tithe called ʻushr,
private property, also known as malk, was subject to a different land tax called kharāj. In Islamic
legal thought, both kharāj and ʻushr were similar in that they were paid “as a requital for the fact
that [they lay] within the cultivator’s power to put the land to use” (Johansen 1988:10). During
the caliphate, Muslims began acquiring malk lands through purchase, and non-Muslims were
converted to Islam. While the categories of kharāj and ʻushr continued to correspond to specific
plots of land, the initial distinction between kharāj and ʻushr lands based on the faith of the
proprietor was no longer tenable. 136 Fiscal pressures and the desire to bring new areas under the
caliphate’s influence gave birth to a new kind of tenurial arrangement called iqṭāʻ.137 Under iqṭāʻ,
the fiscal rights of the state over kharāj lands were conveyed to a grantee while the property right
remained with the kharāj payer. The grantee was obligated to collect tax on land revenue and then
pay a portion of it to the state. The remaining difference was kept as their earning. This practice
of alienating land revenue rights to individuals became widespread in the ninth century due to
fiscal crises in the Abbasid caliphate. Distributing iqṭāʻ rights became the chief strategy for
raising money in order to finance state operations and pay administrative-military salaries.138
It is important to see that the precise form of iqṭāʻ quickly became liable to subtle mutations.
In addition to selling crown lands and confiscating private property, for example, the Abbasids
began the outright auctioning of the right to collect land revenue as well. In this modified system,
which resembled iqṭāʻ in that fiscal rights were conveyed to an individual, potential grantees
offered the state money in advance to secure the right to collect land revenue. In its basic form,
this advance was akin to a rent, although its exact amount was ultimately subject to the vagaries
of the bidding contest. Generally, the person offering the largest advance was awarded a
temporary right to collect revenues from cultivator-proprietors at regular intervals. The practice
of auctioning revenue rights set in motion the commodification of the productive use of land. The
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According to Johansen (1988: 12), ownership of landed property could be acquired by the primordial
rights of cultivators at the time of conquest, through channels of commodity exchange (sale, donation,
inheritance), through the Imam’s assignment of waste lands to private persons for rehabilitation, or through
assignment of arable lands to private proprietors by the Imam.
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For this to work, the state propagated the legal fiction that lands under caliphal authority belonged to the
umma. The meaning of the word aqṭāʻ is ‘assignments of land’, and in its verbal noun form iqṭāʻ means
‘cutting, dividing, severing; assigning land to a subject on the part of a prince; a tract of land thus
assigned.’ See Steingass 1892: 87.
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Until now, A.K.S. Lambton’s studies on the development of the iqṭāʻ system in Central Asia have been
the most exhaustive. See Lambton 1965, 1969, 1988, and 1998.
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chronicles use żamān139, qabāla140, and ijārah141 to characterize this kind of temporary
exploitation of a holding. According to the Islamic theory of contract tenancy termed ijārah, the
bidder pays a so-called ‘rent amount’ for a commodity that is the “transfer of property rights with
regard to the usufruct of specified lands through the growing of specified crops during a specified
period of time” (Johansen 1988:27). The temporariness of contract and the calculation of time as
an important factor in determining the amount of advance rent due thus entered Islamic legal
thought through discussions of the contractual category of ijārah more than they did through
discussion of iqṭāʻ, per se.142
The Iranian dynasty of the Buyids (932-1055) began using iqṭāʻ to remunerate its nobles and
soldiers. In this context, the iqṭāʻ right was a temporary assignment of the usufruct of the land.
The holders of this right-cum-office, the muqṭiʻ-s, were expected to sustain themselves and their
military entourage on revenues derived from the land tax before remitting any surplus to the
central treasury. According to the terminology I elaborate through Figure 1, the tenurial category
of this right is BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT because it was aimed at forging an administration,
with the sovereign regularly assessing potential and actual revenue yields in order to audit the
muqṭiʻ. However, “the tendency for the functions of the provincial military commander, the tax
collector, the tax farmer, and the [grantee] to be united in one person led to the emergence of
large properties virtually independent of the central government” (Lambton 1998:522), and
eventually to the creation of new nodes of public authority in the provinces. Under the Turkish
Seljuks (1037-1194), a polity that contributed to establishing what historians now identify as the
Turko-Mongol theory of kingship, iqṭāʻ as payment for military service was broadened into a
strategy by which new areas were brought under cultivation. 143 Lambton labels this particular use
“administrative iqṭāʻ”. In theory, holders of this tenurial right had no jurisdiction over persons
living on the land. The sultan remained the ultimate authority and nominal owner of the land
based on divine right.

139

‘Suretyship, guaranteeship, security, bail.’ See Steingass 1892: 803.
‘Being surety for another; management of an affair; deputyship, suretyship; any contract, especially of
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141
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letting to a tenant. See Steingass 1892: 17.
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alliances with Sufi orders, and courtly aesthetics. See Grousset 1970: 161, Tripathi 1998: 115-25, and
Lieberman 2009: 712.
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In practice, however, Seljuk iqṭāʻ holders usually had full jurisdiction over the areas assigned
to them. This meant that some of the sultan’s authority was delegated, or even parceled out, to the
grantee.144 This type of iqṭāʻ allowed the state to harness revenues, create new sources of income,
and pay provincial officials without maintaining a thick bureaucracy or dealing with the physical
movement of large sums of money. Since connectivity between the center of authority and more
distant lands was limited during this period, collecting land revenue and enabling a portion of it to
be automatically redistributed as payment to officials at the point of collection was more efficient
than a salary conveyed from the imperial hub. The increasing prevalence of iqṭāʻ as a strategy for
bringing new areas into cultivation, in some cases by securing rent in advance from the muqṭiʻ,
contributed to the gradual expansion of the iqṭāʻ right from one adhering to Figure 1’s
BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT type to that

of its REVENUE FARM type. This method of bringing

new areas under cultivation by investing greater authority and autonomy in the office of the
muqṭiʻ enabled the growth of a subject peasantry. Iqṭāʻ holders exercised political control and
maintained security on their lands since “self-interest demanded that [they] should exercise a
modicum of good government and good husbandry, and this was so even when the control of the
central government declined” (Lambton 1998:524). In principle, peasants could demand redress
from the sultan against abuse from the muqṭiʻ. However, this was often impractical because of the
long distances involved. Often, more than one individual was granted the same iqṭāʻ, and
claimants were expected to fight for possession (Lambton 1969:61, 1998:524). A long-term
consequence was the growth of private armies and the gradual formation of new centers of
authority tied to the position and personality of the muqṭiʻ. Ultimately, the iqṭāʻ system created
tension between holders of the right and the sultan, since the muqṭiʻ was able to consolidate
resources that could be directed towards undermining the sovereign’s authority. In this scenario,
the muqṭiʻ could convert their temporary iqṭāʻ right into a permanent tenure corresponding to
Figure 1’s Quadrant 3 or Quadrant 4 types.
A distinctive feature of the iqṭāʻ right during this early period was its transferability and
durability. Chronicles attest that under new sovereigns who adhered to the Turko-Mongol idiom
of kingship, military men and officials from previous political formations retained iqṭāʻ rights
over specific territories and often transformed these temporary rights into permanent, hereditary
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“The muqṭiʻ [grantee] was not normally required to remit surplus revenue to the central government, as
it had been the duty of provincial governors in earlier times. He was expected to join the sultan on military
campaigns when called upon to do so, and sometimes to support him with material resources. He was
probably expected to make a payment to the sultan in the event of his making fresh conquests, but in
practice this was difficult to enforce. He could not, except by abuse, transmit his iqṭāʻ by inheritance, sale
or gift” (Lambton 1998: 524).
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ones. The administrative iqṭāʻ enabled an aspiring sovereign to absorb new military gentry in
conquered lands by recognizing and allowing existing iqṭāʻ-s to be maintained. In this system, the
muqṭiʻ could preserve their position even though sovereigns came and went. By recognizing iqṭāʻ
as a kind of tenurial right corresponding to a preexisting administrative division, aspiring
sovereigns were able to account for and more easily incorporate existing land rights into their
own fledgling regimes of tenurial entitlements. 145 From the standpoint of Figure 1, there appears
to have taken place a fairly straightforward progression in the developmental history of the iqṭāʻ.
What initially emerged as a right falling under the category of BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT, and
later expanded toward the category of REVENUE FARM as the need to raise money and bring new
areas into cultivation intensified, in some places subsequently started to further resemble a
hereditary vested right attached to a particular piece of land. As the distinction between kharāj
and ʻushr broke down—partly due to Muslims buying kharāj lands and non-Muslims converting
to Islam, but also because of how iqṭāʻ developed differently according to precise historical
settings—rights falling under the categories demarcated in Figure 1 as BUREAUCRATIC
ASSIGNMENT, REVENUE FARM, HEREDITARY OCCUPATION or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT,
TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY

and

(Quadrants 1-4, respectively) were not easily distinguishable from

one another. This long-term development of iqṭāʻ from a BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT to the
REVENUE FARM

and HEREDITARY OCCUPATION types was made possible by the singular and

mutually intelligible language of Islamic political administration. A wide range of Arabic and
Persian juridical texts and historical chronicles confirm this early progression of iqṭāʻ and ijārah
in theory and practice. 146
145

The schema of land rights proposed in this chapter should be understood as one in constant flux, where
certain kinds of rights, especially those in Figure 1’s Q3, were more robust and could withstand changes in
political authority. While sovereigns and dynasties were replaced, established practices in revenue
administration could not be altered as easily. The theory and practice of land tenure as developed by the
Seljuks firmly established a kind of recognizable continuity in land revenue administration, including
terminologies, from Central to South Asia.
146
For a representative list of the sources available for studying the historical development of iqṭāʻ, see
Lambton 1998: 531-3. Juzjani’s Ṭabaḳāt-i Nāṣirī, a general history in Persian that chronicles early Islamic
conquests into Central and South Asia, also contains several episodes that shed light on the transferability
and durability of iqṭā rights in the thirteenth century. For example, Muhammad Mahmud Khalji was
awarded the iqṭā of Kushmandi in Lakhnauti around 1192 through the authority of Muhammad Ghori.
Upon his death, the entitlement was transferred to his nephew Muhammad Bhakhtiyar Khalji, and remained
valid under the reign of Qutubuddin Aibak as the first ruler of the Mamluk dynasty in the Indian
subcontinent (Juzjani 1260: 548-54). In 1236, Kabir Khan-i Ayaz was granted the iqṭā of Multan, and after
his death in 1241, his son Malik Tajuddin not only inherited and maintained the initial grant, but also used
it as a resource base to incorporate the surrounding areas of Uchchah and Sindh as new entitlements.
During the same period, Sultan Iltutmish died, and his various successors recognized the iqṭā rights of
Khan-i Ayaz and Tajuddin (Juzjani 1260: 655-69). Similarly, Mughal emperors absorbed new military
gentry in conquered areas by acknowledging and maintaining existing entitlements to land revenue. For
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While I have tried to clarify the developmental path in a more orderly way above, the
historiography on iqṭāʻ during the early Islamic period in South Asia corresponding to the Delhi
Sultanate demonstrates the lack of consensus that has long afflicted the subject.147 For example,
the great historian of the Mughal era Irfan Habib has argued that the iqṭāʻ was a territorially
specific military assignment with a long-established history in Islamic political science. To
paraphrase his perspective, the iqṭāʻ institution was the main instrument for transferring agrarian
surplus to the ruling military elite, and it was the muqṭiʻ who was responsible for maintaining a
reserve of troops at the beck and call of the sultan (Habib 1982:68-75). According to Habib,
Alauddin Khalji (1250-1316) radically transformed iqṭāʻ by paying soldiers cash salaries and
earmarking revenue from the iqṭāʻ as the personal maintenance of army commanders (muqṭiʻ-s).
Firuz Shah Tughluq (1309-1388) further transformed the iqṭāʻ by making the right-cum-office
hereditary.148 In a revisionist voice, Sunil Kumar makes two important observations regarding
iqṭāʻ. First, he notes that the development of iqṭāʻ is not continuous, and the term and concept was
much more encompassing until the Buyid and Seljuqid regimes in Iran and Iraq during the tenth
and eleventh centuries relatively stabilized its meaning as a revenue-cum-military assignment.
Second, even under these regimes, the meaning of iqṭāʻ was adaptable, for its idealized
prescription did not necessarily coincide with political practice (Kumar 2007:25). Apart from
Kumar’s corrective, the default position on iqṭāʻ in Indian historiography is that it is the direct
precursor of the Mughal jāgīr-manṣab system.

Revenue Farming in Early Modern South Asia
Turning to the early modern period, the scholarship on revenue farming in South Asia can be
divided into three groups, one conventional and two revisionists.149 The conventional view is
represented by W.H. Moreland (1923:233-67), N.A. Siddiqi (1970:60-101), and to a lesser extent,
Irfan Habib (1963:230-97). Advocates of structural-functionalist models of the state, these
example, Hamid Bukhari was a third-generation courtier of the Gujarat Sultans who inherited Dholka and
Dhandhuka near Ahmedabad as his military prebend. In 1573, Akbar conquered Gujarat and incorporated
Bukhari into the Mughal administrative apparatus by recognizing and renewing his entitlements to these
districts. Eventually, Bukhari was granted additional resources and rose to the governorship of Delhi under
Jahangir (Vol. 1, Khan 1780: 608-10).
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The Delhi Sultanate refers to various Islamic kingdoms established in northern India by central Asian
Turkish warlords from 1192 onwards. These rulers established authority drawing on traditional ideas of
Persian kingship. See Hambly and Asher 1994: 242-50 and Kumar 2007: 46-128.
148
See Jackson 1999: 86-102
149
At present, a claim suggesting an alternative non-Islamic genealogy of the revenue farm concept in
western and northern India cannot be readily sustained. Even in the early modern administrative documents
in Marathi and Gujarati languages, the word ijārah is used, suggesting that the idea was inherited from the
successive Islamic polities that ruled over India in the second millennium.
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historians understand revenue farming as an administrative aberration. It was apparently
inefficient, undermined the long-term revenue paying capacity of an area, and indicated weak
state control. We can thus label this conventional view of revenue farming in early modern India
the aberration thesis. Revisionists, on the other hand, fall into two groups. Muzaffar Alam
(1986:39-42, 199-200), S.P. Gupta (1986:223-32), and André Wink (1986:339-75) represent a
first subset. Concerned with historical transition, Mughal decline, and the growth of regional
successor polities, their works can be broadly identified as elaborating an alternative transfer
thesis to account for early modern revenue farming. In short, they suggest that the growth of the
revenue farm tenurial type during the Mughal Empire enabled political transition by creating
provincial elites who aspired political autonomy. Wink also views revenue farming as a strategy
employed by existing chiefdoms in the provinces, especially the Marathas in the Deccan, to
increase their sphere of influence and consolidate public authority in times of political crisis. The
second subset of revisionist scholarship on revenue farming is represented by historians Sanjay
Subrahmanyam and C.A. Bayly (1988:408-18), and to some extent Tirthankar Roy (2013:13-38,
50-72). For these scholars, revenue farming provided an opportunity for intermediary groups like
merchants, bankers, and free-agent military men to vie for profits and status as political elites by
implicating themselves in the politics of land revenue administration. This version of revisionism
can thus be labeled the opportunity thesis. Each valid in their own ways, the aberration, transfer,
and opportunity theses diverge based on evidence and the intellectual proclivities of the scholars
writing. In the next several subsections, therefore, I shall elaborate on the key ideas of each
perspective.
Aberration Thesis
For Moreland, revenue farming refers to the buying of public office for a fixed sum, and the
retaining of subsequent profits as the office holder’s salary. It presented obstacles in the way of
control and emphasized the financial as opposed to the ameliorative side of administration. “The
practice of annual auctions of the farms of the revenue...may be described as on the whole the
most oppressive method of administration which has hitherto been devised…[and] we are bound
to recognize that oppression was a real danger wherever the farming system prevailed”
(1923:236-7). Siddiqi views ijārah in stark contrast to iqṭāʻ, and harshly critiques its practice and
significance. For him, ijārah refers to a private intermediary’s right to collect land-revenue on
behalf of the state or one of its officials. The holder had no proprietary right in the land. It is
important to note here that while iqṭāʻ conveys the idea of cutting up land and either selling it or
granting it as an administrative assignment, the etymologically unrelated ijārah conveys only the
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concept of receiving reward for one’s work. According to Siddiqi, the ijārah right was won
through auction and should be considered a less regularized right. The practice was common
under the Delhi Sultanate, but was restricted in official rhetoric during the reign of Sher Shah Sur
and Akbar in the sixteenth century. Ijārah resumed its prominence under Jahangir, and became
widespread during Aurangzeb’s reign in the seventeenth century. Drawing on chronicles from
Akbar’s period and those of subsequent rulers, Siddiqi suggests ijārah was an aberration from
good governance because of its long-term consequences. Ijārah meant a loss of employment for
those previously engaged in the work of land revenue administration (e.g. iqṭāʻ holders, jāgīrdārs), signaled the breakdown of the administrative machinery built up by Akbar, resulted in the loss
of public revenues, and led to the increased exploitation of the peasantry. Most significantly, the
system gave rise to a new class of bankers and speculators, “who invested their money in the
business of revenue farming and thus emerged as a class of intermediaries distinct from the
hereditary zamindars” (Siddiqi 1970:98). This class of people had no “interest in the soil nor were
fit or capable of making any contribution to the administrative system of the country...[and]
brought ruin to those who had some interest in land,” ultimately “result[ing] in the progressive
loss of revenue to the public treasury” (Siddiqi 1970:101). This class of speculators involved in
buying revenue farms is one among several such groups that proponents of the opportunity thesis
applaud.
In his landmark study The Agrarian System of Mughal India, Irfan Habib uses official
chronicles and state revenue documents to analyze an overall regime of rule that is seen as being
built on the appropriation of peasant surplus. Habib argues that the Mughal Empire engineered its
own downfall by demanding too much revenue from peasants by the turn of the eighteenth
century. He describes in detail the land revenue system and administration of the imperial order,
and argues that ijārah was officially disapproved of on both crown land (khāliṣa) and land granted
as military assignment (jāgīr).150 In practice, however, he notes that officials did farm out the
revenues of individual villages on ijārah leases. Habib cites royal orders stating that only ruined
villages and fallow lands were treated as exceptions, and could be farmed out to locals on
condition that they restore them to prosperity. “In no case was any revenue official, or chaudhurī
or qānūngo or muqaddam or a person in league with any of them, to be permitted to take any
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“Over the larger portion of the Empire, [the Emperor] transferred his right to the land revenue and other
taxes within definite territorial limits to certain of his subjects. The areas whose revenues were thus
assigned by the emperor were known in the Mughal Empire as jāgīrs. Iqṭāʻ and tuyūl were established
synonyms of jāgīr, but not commonly used. The assignees were known as jāgīrdārs (“holders of jāgīrs”),
occasionally also as tuyūldārs and iqṭāʻdārs” (Habib 1963:298-9).
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village on farm” (Habib 1963:275).151 Habib does make a further distinction between open and
clandestine ijārah, and contrasts ijārah encountered at higher levels of administration, like on the
khāliṣa and jāgīr lands, with a variety that was practiced at the peripheries and in the localities of
the Mughal Empire. At the outskirts, the administration was more or less unaware of how
revenues were collected. At the higher levels, including the zabtī152 provinces and the khāliṣa and
jāgīr lands, the Emperor’s personnel kept a closer eye on modes of revenue collection. To return
to the terminology set up in Figure 1, the tenurial category that the Mughal revenue right-cummilitary office called jāgīr-manṣab fell under was BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT, with further
subinfeudation or subletting of the right explicitly prohibited. Some confusion arises because
foreign observers like the seventeenth-century traveler François Bernier have written about
revenue farmers holding khāliṣa lands.
The King, as proprietor of the land, makes over a certain quantity to military men, as
equivalent for their pay; and this grant is called jahghir, or, as in Turkey, timar; the word
jahghir signifying the spot from which to draw, or the place of salary. Similar grants are
made to governors, in lieu of their salary, and also for the support of their troops, on
condition that they pay a certain sum annually to the King out of any surplus revenue that
the land may yield. The lands not so granted are retained by the King as the peculiar
domains of his house, and are seldom, if ever, given in way of jahghir; and upon these
domains he keeps contractors (Fermiers in the French original; translated as farmers in
English), who are also bound to pay him an annual rent (Bernier 1891:224).

According to Habib, the idea of revenue farmers bidding for and winning the right to collect
rent from crown lands is incorrect, and Bernier’s “[mischaracterization] is probably due to the
general impression derived from the system of ta‘ahhud, which meant a pledge given by a
prospective official about the amount he would assess or collect” (1963:375). As such, this pledge
was ceremonial and should not be confused with the practice of ijārah of the auctioning type. In
the language of Mughal administration found in Persian chronicles, revenue appropriation was to
be undertaken by officials of the Mughal imperial bureaucracy alone. As part of official duty,
revenue assignments were expected to be carried out faithfully by assignees according to
protocol.153 In theory, Habib insists that all Mughal land rights fell under typologies labeled in
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The chaudhurī was a semi-hereditary official concerned with revenue collection. The qānūngo was
responsible for registering and expounding the laws of empire. And the muqaddam was a village headman
appointed to go between revenue officials and local inhabitants. All three operated at the pargana or district
level.
152
These were the core areas of Delhi, Allahabad, Awadh, Agra, Lahore and Multan. In these regions, land
was accurately measured, cash revenues called dastūr were fixed, and the local officials had little room to
practice fraud.
153
Documenting ideal principles of Mughal statecraft, this perspective has been articulated most vividly by
Abu’l Fazl in Ā’īn-i Akbarī (see Vol. 1, Allami 1602: 1-15). A set of official orders for imperial
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Figure 1 as BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT, HEREDITARY OCCUPATION or POSSESSION BY
GRANT/GIFT,

or TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY.

Insofar as he acknowledges that the story was different in practice, Habib demonstrates that
the jāgīrdār selected and employed his own staff to carry out his duty of appropriating land
revenue. Drawing on Persian chronicles from Gujarat and Kashmir along with imperial orders,
for example, he allows that the revenue collector was often called the ‘āmil and that due to the
office’s high turnover, the jāgīrdār could extract an oath from its holder regarding future
collections. This oath was sealed by the ‘āmil advancing a certain amount called qabż. Habib
grants that over time, an informal bidding system developed where ‘āmil-s would displace one
another by offering more qabż. He insists, however, that such qabż was always less than the
estimated revenue of an area so that such advance payments made financial sense. To buttress the
point, qabż means taking or seizing in Persian, but conveys the sense of a ceremonial offering or
token to seal a promise (Steingass 1892:952). This contrasts with the rasad required to secure an
ijārah right. Rasad means share or ratio, and conveys the sense of a rent portion or cash advance
necessary to win an ijārah revenue right (Steingass 1892:575).154 According to Habib, it was
difficult for the jāgīrdār to prevent embezzlement by the ‘āmil and his staff, especially if the
jāgīrdār himself was posted in a different region. As such, jāgīrdār-s found it more efficient to
informally sublease their assignments, a practice I am specifying as subinfeudation. 155 Even
though the evidence is thin because subleasing was officially prohibited and bids of the qabż type
were likely made surreptitiously, subinfeudation as part and parcel of carrying out the
bureaucratic assignment of the jāgīr began to resemble features of revenue farming or ijārah.

appointments in the Mughal Empire also details the strict behavior expected from revenue collectors and
other local administrators (Unknown 1712: 219a).
154
While in the later Mughal context rasad took on the meaning of grain supplies to the army and the court,
two eighteenth-century Persian glossaries confirm the earlier usage of the term as “proportionate share”.
See rasad and ḥiṣṣaʼi rasad in Sirajuddin Ali Khan Arzu’s Chirāgh-i Hidāyat p. 1120 and rasad-afzūd in
Khwaja Yasin’s Dastūr-i Mālguẕārī, p. 212. Yasin defines qabż as receipt or acknowledgement, p. 251. A
better contextual reading of qabż is found in Bhimsen Saksena’s historical memoirs in which he analyzes
how peasants came to be oppressed and why they joined the Marathas. Writing in the year 1700, he
observes “the jāgīrdār, who sends a revenue collector (‘āmil), owing to his own difficult circumstances,
first takes something from him as deposit (qabż); and the latter, reaching the jāgīr, keeps thinking, perhaps
another ‘āmil is coming behind him, who has paid a larger qabż, and, so proceeding tyrannically, is
unrelenting in his exactions” (Tārīkh-i Dilkashā as translated by Habib 1963: 400. Also see Saksena 1707:
230).
155
In Mughal administrative terminology, no Persian equivalent exists for the English concept of
‘assignment’ or ‘subinfeudation’. Assignments are written about in the context of what is assigned, e.g.
jāgīr dādan (to give a jāgīr). Since subinfeudation was officially prohibited, the chronicles are silent on the
issue.
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While Habib concedes subinfeudation, he maintains that it was an aberration in light of Mughal
administrative philosophy.
The subtle differences in meaning between qabż and rasad, along with how they have been
similarly described in chronicles, have shaped the modern misconception that subinfeudation and
subletting were the same thing. For example, the role of the ‘āmil, also known as karorī,
gradually took on the veneer of being an ijārahdār or mustā’jir (holder of revenue farm), and this
was largely a byproduct of the administrative functioning of the jāgīr and the discretion that the
jāgīrdār wielded. What makes matters more complex is that the jāgīrdār could officially allocate
or sublease a part of his jāgīr to any one of his officials or troops. Even though the term of this
‘sub-jāgīr’ was theoretically supposed to lapse with the imperial transfer of the main jāgīrdār,
there are cases where land tenures of the sub-jāgīr kind were allowed to remain intact.156 Habib
also notes that when a jāgīrdār created new and unofficial tenures by subleasing a part or all of his
right to collect land revenue from a territory, the holders of the sublease comprised local men
who were not part of the Mughal bureaucracy. Mughal policy was that officials assigned a jāgīr
should not have any local interests. However, the ‘āmil usually came from the locality or made
new ties during the course of his tenure, and sometimes even colluded with the zamīndār against
the interests of the jāgīrdār. So prevalent was this practice that when Jahangir came to power in
1605, he issued a royal order preventing the ‘āmil from forming marriage alliances with the locals
(Habib 1963:330, fn. 83).
Based on the overall analysis that Habib provides, we get the impression that even though
holding a revenue farm was officially prohibited, except under rare conditions of bringing new
areas into cultivation, the day-to-day affairs and expectations of the jāgīrdār necessitated the
clandestine subleasing of their revenue right-cum-office. However, to equate this kind of
subinfeudation of revenue rights with the practice of ijārah, as so many other historians have
done, seems misleading. This is why I am suggesting that subinfeudation be used solely to
describe the unofficial subleasing of a BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT right, and subletting be used
exclusively to refer to REVENUE FARM rights conferred for rent in advance. Of course, the
financial components underpinning subleasing—including the advancing of capital required to
pay qabż—required transferring money across territories in ways that resembled those used for
subletting. This, moreover, has contributed to the imprecise way in which historians have equated
subinfeudation, a byproduct of administrative practice, with ijārah, an officially prohibited but
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For example, Man Singh in Ajmer argued that he be allowed to keep his jāgīr because many of the
villages on that land were assigned to his men. Should his jāgīr be transferred, it would cause great distress
among them. See Habib 1963: 329.
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widely existing right of the REVENUE FARM type. This is neither to deny that subinfeudation in
Mughal times may have been an unanticipated consequence of the jāgīrdārī system, nor that it
was a loophole which may have eventually destroyed the very revenue machinery that the
Mughals perfected.157 Yet, whether ijārah can be saddled with the same political outcomes and
long-term consequences as subinfeudation is up for debate. Also a matter of debate is how and to
what degree subinfeudation, in some regions, transformed into subletting. For our purpose,
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that if ijārah is understood as belonging to the REVENUE FARM category,
the degree of regularization and range of concomitant duties of the entitlement were in stark
contrast to those of the jāgīr-manṣab right of the BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT type. Even though
subinfeudation and subletting shared features in practice, they signified very different kinds of
socio-political relationships. Therefore, referring to both practices as simply revenue farming is
inaccurate and imprecise.
Transfer Thesis
In a revisionist account of north India between the Mughal and British empires, Muzaffar
Alam notes that ijārah was a defining feature of the eighteenth century but cannot be seen as a
symptom of imperial weakness or administrative aberration. As an alternative, he suggests that
land rights of the REVENUE FARM type became prevalent due to high levels of monetization
fostered by the Mughals.158 In such a political economy, even government offices came to be
regarded as commodities for purchase (Alam 1986:40). Contrary to Habib, who argues that
monetization had no practical significance beyond serving the need to transfer surplus to towns,
and eventually up the imperial pyramid, Alam suggests that monetization proves that peasants
had access to various markets in the countryside, and also engaged in commodity production of
their own. Urban growth was a feature of this period, and new alliances between merchants,
peasants, and other producers upended the Mughal imperial system. The sophisticated economic
links created and sustained beyond the Empire’s core areas were not only able to withstand the
collapse of the Mughal empire, but also formed the political basis of new regional successor
states. Rather than seeing ijārah as a long-term consequence of subinfeudation, or as a less
formalized tenure used to bring fallow lands under cultivation, Alam suggests that the growth of
ijārah proves that decentralized, private investment in land was not only profitable, but also
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One implication of this is that the Mughal agrarian system was disastrous for the precolonial economy.
The accumulation of primitive capital was not possible because money could not develop any independent
base outside of transferring surplus to the ruling elite. See Habib 1969: 32-78.
158
This was by virtue of minting coins, paying salaries in cash, and also allowing mercantile activity in
famous port-cities like Surat and Cambay. See Richards 1981, 1987, and Haider 1996, 1999.
67

increasingly desirable for peasants and zamīndār-s.159 His perspective epitomizes the transfer
thesis position, and I shall elaborate it below.
Alam concedes that the jāgīrdārī system was imperfect, and that the job often required
deviating from imperial protocol. However, the real consequence of this imperfection was that it
generated continuous questioning in local areas about the rightful distribution of revenue and
surplus. When land grew in profitability, it was thus asked in the locality, why should the lion’s
share of the surplus continue up to the imperial apex? In a particularly trenchant passage, Alam
observes that
Ijārah was to form part of a broader process of localization in the distribution and
organization of power. In a large measure, therefore, the state could have possibly met
the challenges, as it happened in Awadh, by institutionalizing the ijārah practice and by
accepting the ijārahdār-s as an official category of revenue collectors…. The challenges
to the Mughal state ‑zamīndārī revolts and increasing practice of ijārah‑ probably
indicated the beginning of a trend towards a transition in political power. These
challenges could not be solved militarily” (Alam 1986:42, my emphasis).

He makes an additional point that revenue farming in the court carried a negative connotation,
with older nobles accusing ijārahdār-s of reducing statecraft into shopkeeping. Mughal imperial
rhetoric did not recognize REVENUE FARM rights in the locality, nor did it acknowledge that rights
of the BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT type were often subject to subinfeudation.
In his discussion of Awadh during the years of Aurangzeb’s rule until 1722, Alam suggests
that revenue farming was especially prevalent in the rural areas. Since these rights were not
officially sanctioned or regulated, ijārah-s could transform into hereditary rights over time. In the
case of Punjab, there developed animosity between aspirants to zamīndārī status, usually
comprising Khatri moneylenders and merchants, and Mughal jāgīrdār-s. Relying on their social
connections and immense wealth, many Khatris became prominent ijārahdār-s. In this period, the
waning Mughal Empire was in need of money, and jāgīrdār-s abandoned the more subtle practice
of subinfeudation. Instead, they began setting high rates for what was now being openly marked
out as an ijārah right available for purchase. As Mughal jāgīrdār-s faded from the rural economy,
ijārahdār-s and peasants shifted their allegiances from the Mughals to local sources of authority
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Multiple definitions for zamīndār can be extrapolated from various works on the Mughals. Here, I am
using the most accepted one established by Irfan Habib, according to which a zamīndār was the holder of a
right and belonged to a rural class other than, and standing above, the peasantry. Generally, zamīndārī is
associated with a village or a part of a village, and rarely over larger units of area. See Habib 1963: 169-74.
Alam adopts this definition, although he views the category as much more elastic than Habib. Alam
suggests that many different classes and castes would aspire to and could claim zamīndārī status but did not
necessarily hold the right.
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such as the Sikhs.160 In short, Alam suggests that zamīndār-s took advantage of regional
economic growth. Relying on their ties with peasants and other increasingly dissatisfied officials,
they were able to resist the very imperial order that legitimized their share of the surplus.
Zamīndār-s mobilized people, raised armies, and rose up in arms against the Mughal imperial
order. Other dissenting groups, including the Sikhs and influential moneylenders and traders of
various backgrounds, also began acquiring farming rights that they tried converting into
hereditary investitures through rebellion. These practices undermined the essence of Mughal
revenue administration and its trappings of sovereignty, ultimately leading to the transfer of
political power to regional centers.
An analysis of developments in Rajasthan brings into focus another regional perspective. In
his Agrarian System of Eastern Rajasthan, S.P. Gupta delineates two major categories of ijārah
prevalent in Amber (Jaipur). In the first order, we have temporary revenue rights taken by the
local rājā or ruler of Amber from Mughal jāgīrdār-s. In the second order, we have ijārah rights
procured by local individuals in land the rājā himself administered as a bona fide Mughal
jāgīrdār, or in the lands he managed as a temporary revenue right holder of the first order. In
ijārah of the first kind, the rājā gained the right to collect revenues from districts outside of
Amber when Mughal jāgīrdār-s found it inconvenient to collect it themselves. While Gupta uses
the term ijārah or revenue farm to describe this, a more accurate characterization would be
subinfeudation. That is to say, a Mughal jāgīrdār’s need to efficiently fulfill administrative duties
led to the subleasing of their assigned revenue districts to local rājā-s.
Ijārah rights proper fall within the purview of Gupta’s second category. These were either
temporary farming rights over individual villages of the Mughal khāliṣa or specific jāgīr-s that the
rājā procured, or were rights falling within the rājā’s hereditary investitures that were auctioned to
locals for greater efficiency. 161 In Amber, practices of subinfeudation and ijārah began to increase
after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, and became even more prevalent in the reign of Farrukh
Siyar. Between 1707-1712, the rājā of Amber made significant efforts to take many Mughal
districts on sublease. Prior to 1712, leases were short-term, limited to one year or less.
Subsequently, they acquired many revenue farms on permanent lease, indicating an agrarian crisis
of sorts from the Mughal point of view. These lands were further subletted, or leased for rent in
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Recent scholarship attests that parallel revenue systems and new nodes of power in Mughal localities
were both a byproduct of and consolidated through revenue farming. See Alam 1986: 134-203, Grewal
1990: 84, Singh 1993: 19-56, and Dhavan 2011: 99-123.
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Perhaps this temporary right over individual villages of the Mughal khāliṣa is the kind of revenue
farming that Bernier noticed during his travels, and that Habib dismisses as a simple mischaracterization of
a courtly ritual.
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advance, to locals who used the opportunity to become hereditary right holders in relation to the
rājā-s of Amber.
The parameters of subinfeudation, corresponding to Gupta’s first category, were negotiated
between the local rājā and Mughal jāgīrdār-s. The former tended to negotiate for entire districts
(dar-o-bast), or for partial villages closer to lands already belonging to them, i.e. within their
waṭan. In turn, the rājā would assign partial villages to his own officials, or sublet them to the
highest bidder in an open auction. The subinfeudation of Mughal jāgīrdārī rights to regional rulers
required qabż, and gradually this advance transformed into the rasad type. The subsequent
farming out of these and other lands by the regional rulers to private individuals required surety
(māl-zamīnī or rasad). Ijārahdār-s of the local rājā at Amber required the surety of bankers
(mahājan-s or sahūkār-s). The initial amount, qabż or rasad, for which revenue rights were
secured from either Mughal jāgīrdār-s or local rulers was always lower than the estimated
revenue yield of an area. Ijārahdār-s could be granted a reduction in the initial qabż or rasad
amount, or the final amount due at the end of the season, based on convincing arguments like
scarcity of rain, bad crop yields, or other unforeseen calamities. The terms of the revenue farm
could be renegotiated. There were very few instances of ijārah istamrārī, or permanent revenue
farms, during the 1650-1750 period. However, from the mid-eighteenth century, the rulers at
Amber gave entire districts away on a permanent basis. In this process, many temporary farming
rights were converted into permanent rights of the zamīndārī kind, and the rulers were beginning
to form their own independent power base. Gupta suggests that the instability caused by Maratha
marauders from this period forced the rājā to farm out areas on longer leases and for higher rents.
This reduced risk and provided guaranteed income for a polity in need of funds. From the
standpoint of Figure 1, it is also possible to see that the converting of temporary farming rights
situated in the REVENUE FARM category into more permanent ones of the HEREDITARY
OCCUPATION

category was an important strategy for an ambitious sovereign like the rājā of

Amber to forge his own administration. There was no better way to propagate and sustain a new
scheme of tenurial entitlements than to permanently alienate land to individuals who would have
to invest in the very administration that gave their rights any meaning.
In his study of the agriculturally rich Harouti region in southeastern Rajasthan, N.S. Rao
argues that revenue farming was a novel feature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.162
Heavy expenditures for administrative and military affairs engendered a financial crisis that was
met by ensuring fixed revenues at regular intervals. This system was called muqatā, and the
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This area comprises of Kota, Bundi, and Jhalawar and is the most fertile region of Rajasthan.
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holder of the right was called muqatī.163 There were two types of muqatā, upati muqatā and
muqatā. For upati muqatā, more information was available regarding potential agrarian revenues
including fertility data, irrigation facilities, previous yield records, and accurate measurement of
cultivated areas.164 The right holder could also ask for reductions in the payable amount based on
losses due to natural calamities. Since it was a highly regularized right, it was a lower risk
proposition. The second category of simple muqatā corresponded to lands where information
about the soil and other data was cursory. These were fallow lands, and the right holder bore all
risks associated with its cultivation. If the yields were high, the muqatī was entitled to keep any
extra profits. Through this, the state was able to increase productivity, extend its sphere of
influence, and add new areas to its revenue domain. Despite Rao’s characterization of all muqatā
rights in the Harouti region as revenue farming, it would be more accurate to classify upati
muqatā as tending towards Figure 1’s BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT type, and simple muqatā as
leaning towards the REVENUE FARM type.
It is important to note that during this period, the rājā took regular loans from moneylenders.
Muqatā rights were used as currency to repay financiers. In addition, Mughal jāgīrdār-s in the
Harouti region could be reposted elsewhere. Since they could not directly manage their
assignments, they subleased their jāgīr-s to the rājā of Kota.165 The rājā ensured that jāgīrdār-s
received their income through hundī-s, or bills of exchange issued by prominent bankers,
underscoring the importance of financial agents in facilitating land rights.166 Revenue contracts in
Harouti were managed through the paṭṭa document. It contained details about modes of payment,
installment amounts and their frequency, area under cultivation, and soil quality.167 The muqatī
also had to convey a letter of acceptance, or qabūliyat.168 These details are worth noting because
the muqatī was not always required to produce a security against the paṭṭa, indicating that muqatā
rights were moderately regularized. In this sense, muqatā rights should be viewed not as a means
for speculation, but as an ad hoc mechanism for creating a lightweight bureaucracy. These rights
were propagated so that money could be secured more easily. Rather than signifying the
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Muqatā in the local dialect is derived from the Perso-Arabic muqāṭa‘ah. See Steingass 1892: 1298.
Upati is related to the Hindi utpatti, meaning ‘produced, created, or birthed’. Bahri 1989: 64.
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Local rulers wielding authority at places like Amber and Kota based claims to local sovereignty within
the Mughal imperial idiom. They retained the right to rule and appropriate revenues from land as waṭan
jāgīrdār-s.
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For detailed analyses of money lending, banking, and the importance of financial instruments, see Habib
1971, 1960, 1964, 1969; Qaisar 1974; and Leonard 1979.
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These are the same specifications required for a contract of tenancy, or ijārah, in Islamic Law.
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A sample qabūliyat document in Persian is provided in Yasin’s Dastūr-i Mālguẕārī, p. 250.
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deepening of crisis, as it is seen in the aberration thesis, muqatā rights appear more like an
administrative mechanism for minimizing risk during uncertainty.
Above all, it is André Wink who has most carefully weighed in on the definitional issues I
have been discussing here in his studies of Maratha polity in the eighteenth century.169 In Wink’s
reading, ijārah was a strategy employed by fledgling chiefdoms to widen their sphere of
influence. It was a response to crisis, enabling the collection of revenue from territories where
multiple sovereigns existed. It was also the chief organizational tactic to restore and expand
internal and external agrarian frontiers. 170 Wink observes that various kinds of land revenue
farming were adopted in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that these had different
characteristics. In the case of the Marathas, constant warfare with the Mughals meant that rights
in land were perpetually in flux. Despite this, the ultimate aim of often overlapping agrarian
systems was to increase cultivation, harness greater surplus, and stabilize collections. As a result,
for Wink, land rights in early modern northern and western India are best contextualized
according to the authority under which they fell and where on a spectrum of ‘risk-taking’ and
‘governmental interference’ they were situated.
My own summary graph in Figure 1, which suggests that land rights be situated on a
spectrum of regularization and risk, is indebted to Wink’s insights. However, my formulation
seeks to address two shortcomings in his discussion. The first concerns the growth of financial
agents, like bankers and financiers, who were much more actively beginning to invest in rights of
the REVENUE FARM type during the eighteenth century, and in many cases, becoming holders of
those very rights themselves. The second deficiency is that Wink does not account for the various
kinds of duties that different right holders were obligated to perform. This prevents him from
developing a complete theory of what a system of entitlements in land accomplished from the
sovereign’s point of view. From the Martha perspective, propagating a new system of rights in
land was a strategy by which finances required for military conquest, payment of salaries, and
general maintenance of royal lifestyles were secured. Fiscal crisis was part and parcel of Maratha
polity from its inception, and recognizing rights of the REVENUE FARM type was the chief
mechanism for state building in the ordinary course of events.171 For the Marathas, raising capital
was always a pressing need, and distributing REVENUE FARM rights became the strategy by which
fallow lands were brought into cultivation and money was secured. While the Mughals were also
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See 1983. “Maratha Revenue Farming.” Modern Asian Studies 17(4): 591-628. Reproduced with minor
revisions in Land and Sovereignty in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 339-75.
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Dilbagh Singh (1990: 149) makes an analogous argument about eighteenth-century Jaipur.
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For an elaborate discussion of the fiscal crisis and the development of the chauth and sardeshmukhi
tribute-tax types, see Sen 1928: 30-43.
72

interested in raising capital, they were more committed to preserving and perpetuating long-term
sovereignty through, inter alia, a system of highly regularized tenurial rights.
Opportunity Thesis
In an influential article on mercantile activity and political participation in early modern
India, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C.A. Bayly suggest that revenue farming rights were one
among many assets that a range of individuals held in an increasingly commercialized and
monetized political economy. These assets allowed these “portfolio capitalists” to straddle the
multiple worlds of commerce and politics, with the ultimate goal of upward social mobility. The
authors focus on the ṣarrāf-s, bankers and financiers who served as moneylenders, currency
changers, issuers of credit and bills of exchange, and intermediaries increasingly integrated as
landed gentry into the fiscal-administrative apparatus of emerging polities. In rights of the
REVENUE FARM

type, these portfolio capitalists saw an opportunity to partake in the increasing

commercialization of the state and political power by helping to push back “agrarian frontiers and
organize commercial production” (Subrahmanyam and Bayly 1988:412). Portfolio capitalists
were unlike the great merchant corporations of the eighteenth century, such as the Jagat Seths of
Bengal, who could reproduce capital spatially across the subcontinent through elaborate cultures
of bookkeeping, moneylending, and kinship-credit networks (Little 1967:40-135). Instead, they
were “more dependent on political favors...and in so far as they persisted, it was through buying
or fighting their way into land rights” (Subrahmanyam and Bayly 1988:416). In fact, great
merchants became financiers by providing capital to portfolio capitalists so that they could win
revenue farm auctions. All this was possible in the wake of eighteenth-century “political flux,
peasant migration and desertion, and the breakdown of Mughal system [which] encouraged
revenue farmers in the north to play a much more interventionist role in the economy, helping to
locate and tie capital and labor” (Subrahmanyam and Bayly 1988:418). Portfolio capitalists
combined their access to the military labor market and financial capital to entrench themselves in
agrarian and commercial economies, and would have most likely been viewed by sovereign
authorities as both needed intermediaries and sources of political threat.172

172

According to Tirthankar Roy, revenue farming also reflected the state’s inability to raise money to
finance wars, succession battles, and other capital-intensive projects. Often, sovereigns repaid holders of
revenue farms (portfolio capitalists) and their co-signees (bankers and financiers) by converting revenue
farm rights into more permanent tenures. The holders of these rights would then style themselves as
zamīndār-s in the eighteenth century. See Roy 2013: 57-64.
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Summary: Aberration, Transfer, and Opportunity Theses
Where then do the aberration, transfer, and opportunity theses on revenue farming stand in
relation to each other, and why are they individually inadequate? Recall that the main limitation
imposed by the aberration thesis is that it takes the scheme of tenurial rights developed by Sher
Shah Sur and Akbar in the sixteenth century as a paradigm for assessing subsequent
developments. Its exponents are thus primarily concerned with the status of cultivators, and they
portray revenue farming as the chief culprit behind peasant uprisings. From the standpoint of the
longer view that I have been articulating, however, it is the agrarian system put in place by Sher
Shah and Akbar that appears to be the real aberration, both in its design and its relative longevity
(Moreland 1926; Misra 1987). Another major drawback with this perspective is that it confounds
subinfeudation as a byproduct of a bureaucracy’s functioning with REVENUE FARM rights as a
strategy to harness revenues from areas where the sovereign’s reach was limited. The historical
genesis and development of the revenue farm concept in the Islamic context suggests that
subinfeudation, which often resembles and in some cases transforms over time into the REVENUE
FARM

type, has long been a part of general bureaucratic functioning and fiscal strategy. 173 We

must then distinguish between the subinfeudation of duties that occurred in the context of highly
regularized land rights (Q1), and the subletting of temporary land rights through auctioning or
through less regularized assignments requiring rent in advance (Q2).
The transfer thesis views the eighteenth century as a time of regional growth and prosperity.
In doing so, REVENUE FARM rights are seen as new, stemming from the commercialization of
Indian society made possible by Mughal political economy. Increased monetization enabled the
growth of urban centers in the provinces, and gave rise to dissent groups wanting a greater share
in agrarian surplus. In Alam’s perspective, ijārah enabled localization of power and gave rise to
provincial consciousness. He is not really concerned with the implications of ijārah as a tenurial
right or the terms under which it is fixed, practiced, or even strategized. Wink’s study of the
Maratha materials does a wonderful job of demonstrating how tenurial rights were varied and
could straddle multiple political systems. He also clarifies the revenue farming rights as a strategy
for sovereigns to rehabilitate inner agrarian frontiers and raise money during crises. However, as I
suggested earlier, even Wink’s formulation of rights in land as a spectrum does not take into
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Revenue farming did not precipitate a free market in land, and even less regularized REVENUE FARM
rights fell within the ambit of one or more investiture granting entities. For the ijārah right holder, these
entities were indispensable in ensuring their physical security. In his study of revenue farming in southern
India between 1500-1650, Subrahmanyam writes “the revenue-farmer operated within constraints set by
custom, power, information, and the fact that-in order to survive-he had to strike a balance between those
above and those below him in the fiscal hierarchy” (Subrahmanyam 1986: 327).
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consideration the range of concomitant duties those entitlements entailed. His discussion also
tends to underplay the role of financial specialists like bankers and financiers who were crucial to
the functioning of land rights in early modern India. It is a mischaracterization to write that “the
mediation of bankers was indispensable for the revenue collection, which was largely in
cash…[but] their direct involvement in the agrarian system was as far as can be made out, very
limited…” (Wink 1983:611, my emphasis). Over the years, Stewart Gordon and Karen Leonard
have demonstrated the crucial role banking firms played in the conquest of new areas, the moving
of wealth across territories, and in land revenue administration and early modern political
economy more broadly (Gordon 1969, 1977; Leonard 1979, 1981). A final problem with the
transfer thesis is that it does not take into consideration longer histories of subinfeudation, or even
subletting as a strategy for raising finances and bringing fallow lands under cultivation. In taking
a synchronic view of revenue farming, the exponents of the transfer thesis tend to mischaracterize
the concept and practice of subinfeudation and ijārah as more novel and peculiar to the eighteenth
century than it might have actually been.
The main limitation of the opportunity thesis is its imprecision. First, Subrahmanyam and
Bayly loosely define the portfolio capitalist as “an entrepreneur who farmed revenue, engaged in
local agricultural trade, commanded military resources [like] war animals, arms, and human
labor, as well as on more than the odd occasion had a flutter in the Great Game of Indian Ocean
commerce” (1988:418). Second, important financial agents like bankers and financiers do not
make the cut as portfolio capitalists. For our authors, these specialists represented merely a class
that individual portfolio capitalists depended on. However, the work of the transfer thesis
historians clearly shows the entrepreneurial spirit of bankers who aspired to political influence by
winning revenue farms, and who were often awarded REVENUE FARM rights as repayment for
loans. Third, the timeline of the opportunity thesis is imprecise. For example, it is unclear
whether portfolio capitalists gained prominence because of the opportunities presented by
Mughal political economy and administration, or because of a more autonomous deepening of the
cash economy and commercialization in the eighteenth century. Also, the opportunity thesis
historians reduce revenue farming as an entrepreneurial strategy for economic selfaggrandizement without considering the substantial duties that holding such rights entailed, and
without explaining how REVENUE FARM rights related to other kinds of land revenue entitlements.
Finally, the opportunity thesis leaves out from its analysis how and why state-sovereigns
reinforced the assigning/auctioning, transferring/maintaining, and arbitrating/converting of
various kinds of rights in land, including those falling under the REVENUE FARM type. As a result,
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it anachronistically assumes that early modern political economy functioned according to
principles of the free market in which individual action was determined purely by economic
calculations and not by other factors like the privileges, risks, and duties associated with holding
particular rights and being part of certain socio-political groups.

Tenurial Rights & Tenurial Duties
It is broadly accurate to identify revenue farming as prevalent in pre-capitalist economies
where credit was less developed, bureaucratic and communication networks poor, and means of
seeking additional finance limited. However, if we isolate revenue farming as a practice linked
with state formation and early capital accumulation alone, we risk obfuscating the precise nature
of the social relationships underpinning economic and political organization. In the various
historiographies on land rights in Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, contrary
perspectives also emerge because revenue farming can simultaneously be “an agent of state
expansion and political decline, of both economic growth and stagnation” (Copland and Godley
1993:48). In this section, therefore, I shall present details of a more comprehensive view of
revenue farming that not only reconciles the aberration, transfer, and opportunity theses as
discussed above, but also situates the concept and practice of revenue farming within a broader
system of rights to land in early modern western and northern India. As will become clear below,
my own thinking about revenue farming is inspired by André Wink’s work on Maratha polity.
However, I depart significantly from his summary graph of land rights reproduced here as Figure
3.
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Figure 3: Land Rights under Maratha Svarājya
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According to Wink, tenurial rights were either permanent or temporary, and fell on a
spectrum of low risk/regulation to high risk/non-regulation. The three major tenurial types in his
schema are temporary assignments of land revenue as salary to state officials (kamāvīs, māmlat,
saraṇjām), permanent hereditary occupation or possession as gift (vatan-cum-inām), and tributary
chieftaincies. It is important to note that for Wink, farming rights were atypical. Authorities
converted permanent tenures of pāṭilkī and zamīndārī rights into temporary farming rights only
when trying to obtain regular income from unsettled territories. This was a conscious strategy for
restoring fallow lands and expanding agrarian frontiers. In addition, recognizing temporary
farming rights was an organizational tactic, especially in times of military and administrative
crisis since income could be secured with little investment in management. This is why Wink
suggests that revenue farming became more widespread after 1761, when the Marathas suffered
defeat by the Afghans in the Battle of Panipat. Broadly speaking, Wink’s schematization of land
rights according to risk and duration is accurate. However, there are certain major flaws that
prevent us from seeing that the revenue farm was, in fact, just one of four tenurial categories
under which various entitlements to land revenue fell. It was not atypical, and various other rights
apart from pāṭilkī and zamīndārī also fell within this category.
The first major drawback of Wink’s formulation is that it does not consider that land rights
were sustained by the capital and financial instruments of independent bankers from the days of
Sher Shah and Akbar, if not earlier. Historians are well aware that Mughal jāgīrdār-s moved their
annual incomes from land through the hundī-s of banking firms.174 Even fledging states like the
Marathas discussed by Wink could not pay soldiers or maintain a loose administrative apparatus
to collect land revenue without capital advanced by professional financiers. A long-term
consequence of this was that merchants, financiers, bankers, and other specialists handling capital
were able to increasingly occupy a position on the spectrum of land rights propagated by the
Mughals, Marathas, and other fledgling polities in early modern India. Not theorizing financial
agents vis-à-vis land rights leads to a second critical error, namely, the confounding of two
different practices that I have distinguished throughout this chapter as subinfeudation and
subletting. Recall that subinfeudation refers to the informal subleasing of regularized rights in Q1,
while subletting refers to the temporary transfer of less regularized land rights for rent in advance
in Q2. It is easy to confuse these two prevalent practices of alienating land rights because both
required strikingly similar forms of advance payment in order to be legitimized (qabż and rasad).
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For a revised assessment on the critical role that hundī-s played in helping administrators and nobles
remit vast sums of money across the Mughal Empire, see Habib 1971.
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This is the root of the widespread misconception that all temporary transfers of land rights in
early modern India should be referred to as revenue farming.
Third, Wink’s conceptualization of land rights is also limiting because he does not analyze
the meaning and significance of tenurial duties as concomitants of tenurial rights. The holder of a
tenurial right had to fulfill certain obligations, or what I am marking out as tenurial duties, in
order to retain their position. Otherwise, they could be displaced by force, or by a competitive
market auctioning those rights. Duties expected from right holders could range from providing
military troops, collecting taxes, partaking in conquest, and extending agricultural frontiers. In
emphasizing the importance of tenurial duties, we see that the overall scheme of entitlements did
not facilitate haphazard cash- grabbing by sovereigns, but that political authority, even in times of
crisis, relied on an overall culture of reciprocity and norms of comportment. In such a system,
subordinates were expected to play the part of good stewards by forging an administration,
increasing productivity, extending territorial reach, and propagating sovereignty. Any theory of
tenurial entitlements in early modern India needs to specify what kind of duties were expected
from holders of particular rights, and what this combination of privileges and responsibilities
accomplished for a sovereign from a political-administrative point of view. In addition,
comprehending land rights in conjunction with specific duties allows us to see that certain modes
of alienating land rights, such as subinfeudation and subletting, signified completely different
kinds of political relationships. Therefore, they cannot be equated or viewed as symptomatic of
similar social conditions.
Tenurial Rights
In my own graphical representation of land rights in early modern South Asia, the entitlement
bundle has two components that must be viewed in conjunction, i.e. Tenurial Rights in Figure 1
and Tenurial Duties in Figure 2. The major focus is land rights during the Mughal Empire and
other sovereign systems in western and northern India until 1818. For reference purposes,
however, I have also included the various other land rights mentioned throughout this chapter. In
Figure 1, the horizontal axis tracks the degree to which any given right was regularized, and this
was in inverse proportion to the risk levels a right holder assumed. As noted earlier,
regularization refers to the extent that a right was recognized and formalized by a sovereign
administration, this being greater in territories falling more securely under its jurisdiction. Rights
that were highly regularized, like the Mughal jāgīr-manṣab, were relatively secure, while less
regularized rights like ijārah carried far greater risk. A dotted line along the vertical axis separates
Q1 and Q2, as well as Q3 and Q4, indicating that degrees of regularization and risk fell on a
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spectrum. Rights in Q1 and Q2, for example, do not carry any absolute values, and the extent to
which any one right is more regularized than another is relative.
The vertical axis represents the tenurial term, or the time period a right is meant to last. A
solid line separates Q1 and Q3, as well as Q2 and Q4, indicating that a right was either temporary
or permanent. For example, while kamāvīs and zamīndārī rights were both highly regularized, the
kamāvīsdār was a state official whose right to collect land revenue was temporary and tied to the
authority of the office they occupied, whereas zamīndārī rights situated in Q3 were permanent
and invested in the personhood of the zamīndār. Similarly, even though both ijārah rights and rājā
holdings were less regularized from the major sovereign’s point of view, rājā-s held permanent
tenures as independent chieftains (Q4) while ijārah rights were temporary, contract based
arrangements (Q2).
When the degree of regularization and the longevity of the right are viewed together, they
determine what I am marking out as the tenurial category. The BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT type
in Q1 comprised rights that were highly regularized and temporary, including iqṭāʻ, jāgīr-manṣab,
kamāvīs, māmlat, saraṇjām, and upati muqatā. These rights were sanctioned as administrative
assignments and were temporary, transferrable, and non-hereditary. The REVENUE FARM type in
Q2 comprised rights that were less regularized and temporary. These could be secured by
informal assignment, as was the case under the Mughals (zamīndārī, ijārah), or as a sublet by
payment in advance as was practiced in Rajasthan (ijārah, muqatā), Gujarat (ijārah), and
Maharashtra (pāṭilkī). If holders in Q2 expanded agrarian frontiers, increased yields, or secured
new revenue streams, their temporary rights could be converted into permanent tenures of the
WAṬAN

or INĀM type situated in Q3.

Rights that were highly regularized and permanent in duration are situated in Q3. There are
two tenurial categories in this quadrant, WAṬAN and INĀM. WAṬAN rights were hereditary vested
rights like qaṭāye‘, malk, pāṭilkī, zamīndārī and daulat175. INĀM rights were those received as gifts
or royal grants like waqf (Islamic religious endowment), madad-i maʻāsh (royal land grant),
devadāna (endowment to Hindu deities), and brahmadeya (grants to Brahmins). Rights in this
quadrant were resilient, and aspiring sovereigns usually recognized the validity of existing
entitlements during conquest. This was especially true when forging an administration in an area
where established land rights held sway. The TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY tenurial types in Q4
comprised tenures that were less regularized and permanent. Tributaries and chiefdoms were held
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Daulat refers to ‘hereditary or pseudo-hereditary dominion or assignment’, and can also be situated in
Q4. Examples include the Bhonsles, Gaekwads, Holkars, and Scindias under the Peshwa authority. See
Wink 1986: xiv.
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by various rājā-s, nāyak-s, nauāb-s, Rajput princes in Rajasthan, Malwa, and central India, and
independent warlords including Afghan mercenaries and Pathan tribes (Wink 1986:347-50; Kolff
1990:117-92). These groups did not necessarily pay tribute to the ruling sovereign, and controlled
vast territories with great autonomy. As aspiring sovereigns themselves, many of these tributaries
had their own system of land rights and investitures that could challenge the political
establishment. Therefore, Q4 does not comprise land rights per se, but rather captures the
territorial position of a tributary or chieftaincy vis-à-vis the dominant political establishment in
the region. The rulers at Amber and Kota, for example, occupied Q4 with respect to the Mughals,
while the Gaekwads of Baroda occupied Q4 with respect to the Peshwas in the eighteenth
century.
Financial agents, including bankers and financiers, are situated in the middle of the summary
chart for two reasons. First, the economic transactions and political relationships between all four
quadrants were created and maintained by the circulation of material texts issued by banking
agents, especially bills of exchange, pay orders, and credit-debit accounts. If the collection and
redistribution of revenue underpinned the system of land rights, we have to account for how
money circulated between various right holders and what long-term effects this movement had on
the overall system of land rights. This also helps us identify where the impetus for credit and
monetization was coming from. I am suggesting that the gradual commodification and
development of land rights in early modern India was concomitant with the need to raise capital
to pay soldiers. It was the most crucial organizing principle of the era, and the day-to-day affairs
of facilitating land rights contributed significantly to local monetization and the development of
rural credit.176
The second reason financial agents are central to my visualization of land rights is that they
advanced money to right holders in all four quadrants. These advances could be used, among
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Om Prakash (1991) argues that Akbar’s demanding of revenues in cash rather than kind marked a new
era in Indian monetary history because it gave greater importance to specialists in the business of issuing of
coins, converting currency, lending money, and moving capital across geographies. Frank Perlin (1993)
takes this analysis forward in a series of conceptually rich essays on the way in which paper and money
stimulated new kinds of territorial relationships, institutions and their administration, and ultimately state
formation in the eighteenth century. It is necessary to point out that banking operations were in the domain
of specialist groups and not the state, and therefore, it is difficult to recover this history since official
archives rarely have substantial materials documenting banking practices. Subsequent chapters in this
dissertation overcome this limitation by focusing on the private papers of two prominent banking families
in Gujarat during the long eighteenth century. The evidence, as we shall see, is overwhelming and proves
the deep financial and social involvement of Gujarati family firms in the business of ijārah, land rights, and
political administration more broadly. Documents pertaining to the famous Jain banker Khushalchand
Jhaveri (1680–1748) are scattered across various private archives in Ahmedabad, while the vast collection
of papers of the Haribhakti Firm, established in Baroda in 1762, are housed at the S.C. Misra Archives at
the University of Baroda.
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other things, to pay the salary of soldiers, purchase more land rights, forge an administration, and
improve agriculture. In return, financial agents received repayments plus interest, WAṬAN or
INĀM

lands, or even REVENUE FARM rights on which they derived large profits. Capital provided

by these financial agents was essential to the working of land rights in early modern South Asia,
and their position and impact cannot be overemphasized. Rather than advocating a top-down or
bottom-up theory of monetization, we need to analyze how capital was flowing, for what tangible
purposes, and with what long-term effects. My contention is that capital was circulating through
financial agents for affecting systems of tenurial rights and duties, and the chief consequence was
that smaller groups vying for public authority were able to carve out new regional spheres of
influence that, in some cases, became the foundation for later full-fledged states.177
It is important to note that individuals and groups could hold multiple rights in different
quadrants simultaneously. For example, a financial agent could maintain their position as a
moneyed specialist in the center and hold an ijārah right, while a powerful official could possess a
jāgīr-manṣab rank and be a rājā. Or a group like the Gaekwads of eighteenth-century Gujarat
could have hereditary vested rights over certain territories while also holding ijārah rights over
adjacent areas. The fact that multiple rights could be held concurrently, and that their meaning
and significance was always relative to other kinds of entitlements, makes disentangling and
schematizing land rights all the more difficult. Finally, I have indicated each of the three major
historiographical positions on revenue farming discussed earlier in square brackets. The
aberration, transfer, and opportunity theses are each placed in the quadrant that best represents the
position from which they view and analyze revenue farming, and land rights more broadly. This
is to emphasize that historiographical debate about revenue farming and land rights has been
conditioned by the quadrant from which scholars have drawn their evidence and based their
narratives around.
Tenurial Duties
The meaning and significance of land rights become clear when viewed in light of the
concomitant tenurial duties right holders had to perform. Figure 2, which should be read in
conjunction with Figure 1, situates a range of duties in relation to the four tenurial categories of
BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT (Q1), REVENUE FARM ( IJĀRAH)

(Q2), HEREDITARY OCCUPATION

(WAṬAN) or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT ( INĀM) (Q3), and TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY (Q4).
The horizontal axis tracks the degree of duty-boundedness. A dotted line separates Q1 and Q2, as
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On the growing practice of financiers and other moneyed persons bankrolling the ijārah of khāliṣa lands
during Aurangzeb’s reign and immediately thereafter, see Satish Chandra’s Parties and Politics, pp. 147-8,
155-6, 211, 301.
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well as Q3 and Q4, indicating that duty-boundedness fell on a spectrum from higher to lower. The
vertical axis represents the tenurial term, and indicates whether duties were temporary or
permanent in nature. Each quadrant in this figure has three levels of text. The first indicates the
tenurial category, or the title of the quadrant. The second level of writing in italics broadly refers
to the kinds of duties that right holders situated in that quadrant were obligated to perform. In
answering what were the desired effects of a state-sovereign’s system of entitlements to land
revenue, the final level of text in the figure refers to what a sovereign gained by propagating,
maintaining, and recognizing that particular tenurial category.
Right holders in Q1 were bound by higher duties even though the tenurial term was
temporary. Individuals possessing these rights were expected to provide military contingents,
fulfill bureaucratic duties, and collect revenues from known territories. These kind of rights were
granted to promote administrative efficiency, as a mode of salary payment, and more broadly, to
maintain sovereignty. For example, a Mughal jāgīrdār would be required to provide a military
entourage to the Mughal Emperor according to his manṣab rank in time of need. Or, in the
Harouti region of Rajasthan, holders of the highly regularized upati muqatā right had to meet
regular revenue targets set by the authorities based on comprehensive land surveys. Right holders
in this category were officials of fairly evolved political organizations, and embraced the virtues
of the administrative office they occupied. Right holders in Q2 were bound by fewer formal
duties, and these were temporary in nature. Their primary duty was to increase profits by
rehabilitating agrarian wastelands or by bringing untilled areas under plow. From a sovereign’s
point of view, holders of this right increased productivity, widened spheres of influence, and
captured new territories to be ruled with less administrative and financial risk than entitlements in
Q1 and Q3.178
Right holders situated in Q3 were bound by higher duties, and their status as revenue payers
178

The National Archives of India in New Delhi has a large collection of ijārah documents from northern
and western India from the period of Jahangir down to Aurangzeb and his successors. Each contract
includes details of the area to be mortgaged, the duration of the sublet, the name of the contractor
(mustā’jir), the rent amount agreed upon, and signatures of witnesses and officials. Some contracts are
bilingual, written in Persian shikastah and in the vernacular devanāgarī script (NAI-2703/2, 2668/2,
2703/3, 2703/15, 2703/16). Others include the name of the official jāgirdār under whose area (maḥāl-i
jāgīr) the ijārah contract corresponds to (NAI-2703/15, 2703/16, 2668/13, 2703/33, 2691/8, 2703/40,
2703/43). If the estimated revenues are not realized due to natural calamities such as the destruction of
crops by grasshoppers (malakh khurī), or due to unforeseen events like attacks by marauders (ghanīm), the
contracts have a provision for reducing the original amount paid (NAI-2668/2, 2703/3, 2703/4, 2668/14,
2691/8, 2694/30, 2703/40, 2703/43). Significantly, the majority of contracts consulted specify that the
mustā’jir extend the cultivatable area, secure the prosperity of peasants, and ensure that no quality land
remains fallow (NAI-2703/3, 2703/4, 2703/7, 2703/9, 2703/33, 2668/14, 2691/8, 2703/40, 2703/43). While
a detailed analysis of these documents is beyond the scope of this chapter, their existence underscores the
importance of REVENUE FARM rights and opens up possibilities for future study.
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and military reserve depended on their relationship with the sovereign. This category was crucial
for enhancing a sovereign’s authority. In addition, it also facilitated and provided an avenue by
which authorities could incorporate older land rights into their own system of entitlements. This
is what explains the durability of certain land tenures like religious endowments. Tributaries and
chiefdoms situated in Q4 did not necessarily pay tribute or partake in the paraphernalia of royal
authority, since these rights were bound by few or no formal duties to the main sovereign. These
land rights were permanent, and were secured and maintained through war. Right holders in this
quadrant functioned as independent sources of more localized authority, vestiges of which remain
even today in the form of defunct nauāb-s. The major sovereign did not necessarily recognize
rights of the TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY types. Depending on various factors like location and
cost, the sovereign would be interested in eventually absorbing rājā-s, nāyak-s, and nauāb-s as
new military gentry, or recognizing them as political allies or tributaries. Rights of the
TRIBUTARY

or CHIEFTAINCY types would have remained in Q4, or more likely, be pushed into Q2

or Q3 depending on the extent to which holders participated in the political language and
administrative apparatus of the dominant sovereign.
One major advantage of seeing tenurial rights in conjunction with tenurial duties is that it
allows us to see the inner workings of sovereignty with respect to land. Decisions about
individual land rights were not necessarily about maximizing profit, although the overall system
of entitlements was aimed at enhancing revenues. An equally important component was
preserving and enhancing a monopoly on public authority. So, for example, rights in Q1 and Q2
were focused on building an administration through the systematic collection of revenue and the
extension of political authority into new areas. By contrast, rights in Q3 and Q4 were geared
towards recognizing specialist groups like religious authorities, incorporating existing
entitlements from previous polities, and building alliances in order to preserve, parcel, and
perform sovereignty.
The central presence of financial agents in the visual representation of rights and duties
allows us to acknowledge and account for the increasing fiscal pressures that state-sovereigns
faced. While monetization may not be a culprit for the spread of REVENUE FARM rights as Alam
suggests, creating and maintaining a standing military, a bureaucracy to manage relationships and
populations, and a royal lifestyle worthy of respect and emulation required an increasing amount
of money. For the period under consideration, state formation and the accumulation of capital
cannot be seen in isolation from the financial networks and social relationships underpinning it.
The legal fiction of rights over land, and social life more broadly, was achieved not only by a
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sovereign’s threat of physical force, but also by the complex credit-debit accounts and
interdependencies that existed between various right holders. Financial specialists like bankers,
merchants, and moneylenders were essential in maintaining these linkages.

Conclusion
This chapter began with the observation that the precise meaning and significance of revenue
farming has eluded scholars of precolonial India. This is partly due to the generic translation of
various source language terminologies as ‘revenue farm’, and the relatively little attention paid to
longer genealogies of concepts and practices related to the subject. In the literature on early
modern India, there have been three major positions on revenue farming when defined as land
rights secured by contractual agreement in which a sovereign transfers the temporary exploitation
of a holding to a tenant in exchange for rent. These were labeled the aberration, transfer, and
opportunity theses. The first position suggests that the revenue farm negatively impacted the
peasantry and the long-term revenue paying capacity of the farmed area, and indicated weak state
control since it was officially prohibited. Advocates of the transfer thesis observe that the revenue
farm was a new tenurial type that facilitated the birth and growth of regional successor states.
And proponents of the final position emphasize the opportunities revenue farming presented to
individuals desiring economic and political power. Discrepancies exist between these
perspectives because all three miss the broader structure within which land rights were situated.
To pinpoint the precise nature and significance of what has been variously understood as revenue
farming, I schematized major land rights in early-modern India into four categories based on the
degree they were regularized, whether they were permanent or temporary, and according to the
duties they entailed. These four groups were BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT (Q1), REVENUE FARM
(IJĀRAH) (Q2), HEREDITARY OCCUPATION ( WAṬAN) or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT ( INĀM) (Q3),
and TRIBUTARY or CHIEFTAINCY (Q4).
The various interpretations of revenue farming, including my own model, are possible in a
political economy where land was more abundant than the population required to make it
resourceful, and in a world where sovereignty was not the indivisible attribute of any single
power. In such a society, rights in land operated on a regularization/risk continuum of the kind
that I have attempted to capture through Figure 1. The overall category of the right depended on
where the right fell on the spectrum of regularization and whether it was permanent or temporary.
In a political economy where land was widely available, such a parceling out of various tenurial
rights should be viewed as a system by which sovereigns increased, maintained, or shared their
authority and as a strategy by which new revenue streams and finances were secured. Figure 2
85

maps a range of corresponding duties that right holders were expected to perform. This dimension
allows us to see that various rights in land were not just a function of material relations, but were
also held together by a constantly developing political culture. Such an ethic of reciprocity, in any
society, is a binding feature that ensures ties do not suddenly break, but adjust and transform
according to changing norms.
From the point of view of a holder, a right of the revenue farm type was one way to
participate, be recognized, and derive financial and/or social worth from the administration of a
growing agrarian political economy. The managing and reproducing of social relations and
hierarchies shared a dialectical relationship with the material conditions of the land and its
productivity. The overall discourse of entitlements, the holding of various rights, and the
performing of particular duties were the lynchpin of political formation and sovereignty in the
precolonial period. In fact, one missing element from the analysis presented here is the symbolic
nature of being assigned or securing particular land rights. It is difficult to recover the imitation,
mimicry, and prestige associated with adopting Mughal or other royal symbols, and reworking
them in highly localized ways. Finally, not all tenurial categories or specific land rights have been
included in Figure 1. For example, pāy-bāqī lands were those in the imperial reserve awaiting
assignment to jāgīrdār-s. Revenues from these lands were directed to the imperial treasury, but we
know little about how these reserve lands were cultivated and managed. After 1818, land rights
and duties as outlined in Figure 1 and Figure 2 continued in modified forms within the
jurisdiction of various native rulers. In territories managed by the colonial state, older tenurial
categories and land rights were abolished and the idea of British paramountcy through new
revenue settlements prevailed. The irony is that it was precisely on the basis of revenue farm
rights that the East India Company initially secured their position in Bengal, paving the way for
colonial rule.
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Chapter 3: Banking Households and Mughal Sovereignty, 1630-1707
By the mid-seventeenth century, the Mughal Empire had evolved into a contractually robust,
bureaucratically complex, and fiscally sound polity. State revenues outweighed disbursements,
and the rank and file military-administrative system kept the crown of successive emperors in
place. In this chapter, I demonstrate that in the Mughal province (ṣūba) of Gujarat, the ruling elite
shared a symbiotic and mutually constitutive relationship with prominent merchants and bankers
of the time. Drawing on imperial royal orders (farmān-s), a hitherto unexamined Sanskrit praise
poem (praśasti) from the Jain monastic tradition, untapped European trading records and
travelogues, and more well-known Persian chronicles from the era, I demonstrate that local
Gujarati businesspersons offered various financial services that were indispensable to commercial
life, bringing together representatives of Mughal authority, foreign traders, local producers, and
transregional business communities into a complex web of credit, debt, and political obligations.
In addition, local merchants, bankers, and other financial agents also supplied precious jewels to
the Mughal court, occasionally made pay advances to provincial governors, and provided quick
loans to members of the royal household during moments of exceptional need. From about 1550
until 1670, the Mughal state did not depend on merchants, bankers, or other financial specialists
for bankrolling state activities such as paying military salaries and building infrastructure like
waterworks, traveler inns, and mosques. During this period, members of the moneyed classes
pursued multiple professional activities including, but certainly not limited to, remitting money
through bills of exchange, commodity trading, changing foreign gold and silver into local
currency, moneylending to European and Indian traders, and procuring rare items of luxury such
as jewelry, foreign peppers, and war animals. Those that could regularly source diamonds,
precious stones, and other foreign objects of desire that sustained royal-aesthetic habits of the
Mughal Emperor and his courtiers were held in especially high esteem.
There were also exceptional circumstances, like during wars of succession between rival
princes in which elite members of the state, especially those belonging to the royal household,
borrowed money from provincial bankers with promise of repayment and other government
concessions such as tax-free land grants, exclusive trading privileges, elegant robes of honor and
lofty titles from the court, and favorable rulings in the case of local property disputes or other
civil matters. Repaying loans with a combination of items of monetary value, social prestige
(gifts, robes, titles), and other subtle markers of favor and hierarchy was an ingenious way to
enhance the visible social and political status of both imperial representatives and those bankers
on the receiving end. In addition, local merchant-bankers depended on the Mughal state for
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critical services such as maintaining security on key trading routes, punishing thieves or other
criminal elements, setting up the infrastructure for converting foreign bullion into local currency,
verifying the buying and selling of private property, especially in urban areas, and being the
supreme adjudicating arm in disputes between rival groups, many of which took on religioussectarian hues. These administrative-legal services were necessary for bolstering commercial
activities in western India, especially exchanges between the port cities that served as a gateway
for foreign goods and bullion into the subcontinent, and the hinterland areas where a variety of
local ethnicities, professional trades, local currencies, indigenous commodities, and socioeconomic aspirations of producers, middlemen, and other mercantile agents were in constant
negotiation with each other. In such an environment, the imperial administrative system of the
Mughals served as a centripetal force bringing together people and resources in relatively
consistent and predictable ways. This consisted of an elaborate and territorially extensive fiscalmilitary bureaucracy that functioned by granting exceptional nobles a military prebend over
revenue generating agrarian lands (jāgīr), a numerical rank that determined one’s military
obligations when required (manṣab), and a robust monetary system that was sustained by dozens
of provincial mints and the expectation that local landlords would pay government taxes in cash.
Emperors also rotated provincial governors to new jurisdictions every three years so that they
were less likely to cultivate anti-imperial links with local groups. And finally, the interface
between the imperial edifice and various militarized fringe groups and private traders within
Mughal spheres of territorial influence were maintained through the elaborate system of
entitlements to land revenue (i.e. tenurial rights and tenurial duties) elaborated in the previous
chapter.
Between 1550-1670, various sources suggest that those in the business of money shared a
symbiotic, and at times co-dependent, relationship with members of the royal household and the
itinerant nobility including provincial governors. Prominent financial agents were not simply
professional dealers in money, but were merchant-courtiers who visited and kept regular
correspondence with the peripatetic Mughal court at Agra, Delhi, Lahore, Ahmedabad, and in the
Deccan. Building on the theory of financial agents, administrative-military land entitlements, and
historical transition offered in the previous chapter, I connect fresh evidence from the locality
with more well-known sources of Mughal history to illustrate how the Gujarati-Jain jeweler,
banker, merchant, moneylender, and revenue-farmer Shantidas Jhaveri (c. 1584-1659)
participated in a world of commercial and political activity where the Mughal regulatory regime
and Persian-Islamic idiom of court-centric sovereignty reigned supreme. Shantidas and his heirs
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are well documented in the Mughal, foreign, and local vernacular archives, providing us unique
insights into the subtly changing relationship between financial specialists and political authority
in late-Mughal India. I begin by sketching the broad contours of the Mughal conquest and
integration of Gujarat province into the imperial ambit by Emperor Akbar in 1572. This review is
meant to emphasize that the imperial takeover was not without difficulty, and strategically left
various tribute paying chieftaincies and hereditary right holders from earlier times in place. 179 I
then explain the run-up to an eventful and deadly rivalry between Emperor Shah Jahan’s four
sons all vying for the throne in 1657. In this brutal war of succession, Shah Jahan’s (1592-1666)
third son Aurangzeb (1618-1707) emerged victorious. This battle for kingship is significant
because Shantidas, his business associate Rabidas, and his sons Manekchand and Lakshmichand
financed the unsuccessful bid of Shah Jahan’s youngest son Murad Bakhsh (1624-61) to the
imperial helm. I explore the financial politics of succession wars and the close association of the
Mughal court with various mercantile groups in Gujarat through a set of forty-three Persian
Royal Orders (1565-1662) brought together from disparate published sources. I then draw on a
Sanskrit praise poem called the Cintamani Prasasti (1640), and a Gujarati lyrical poem called the
Rājasāgar Surī Nirwān Rās (1666) to demonstrate the local-vernacular perspective on the
mutually beneficial relationship that Shantidas and his family shared with representatives of
Mughal authority. Finally, I conclude this chapter by suggesting that by the 1680s, the
expansionist wars led by Aurangzeb into the Deccan radically transformed the Mughal State’s
need for ready capital, and therefore its relationship with those who were in the business of
accumulating it, reinvesting it, and multiplying it. I accomplish this by analyzing hitherto
unexplored passages from the recently published French memoirs of Georges Roques titled La
Manière de Négocier aux Indes (1676-1691). Read alongside various French, Dutch, and English
sources, Roques’ commentary sheds critical light on the changing role of bankers vis-à-vis
provincial Mughal governors, the extent and significance of which I then fully explore in the
subsequent chapter.

Mughal Conquest of Gujarat, 1572
The integration of the Gujarat region into the Mughal dominion as a province began with
Akbar’s military conquest against the Sultans of Gujarat (est. 1400s) and various local kings

179

In the schema outlined in Figures 1 and 2 of Chapter 2, these tributary chieftaincies would fall under
Quadrant IV, while hereditary right holders from previous regimes are situated squarely in Quadrant III.
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(rājā-s) in 1572.180 The new province was organized according to nine core districts that were
under the direct authority of the Emperor, while the remaining areas were headed by longstanding tributary chieftains who paid irregular tribute to the Mughal State. 181 The first provincial
governor or ṣūbadār of this important imperial province was Mirza Aziz Koka Khan-i Azam, a
high-ranking noble and Emperor Akbar’s foster brother.182 Aziz Koka was responsible for
ensuring order in Gujarat by overseeing the administrative activities of local Mughal officials,
and ensuring that landed elites and local chieftains paid taxes and tribute to the provincial
treasury.183 Wajih-ul Mulk was appointed alongside Aziz Koka as the first imperial treasury
officer, or dīwān, of the province. 184 The diwan’s duties included collecting revenue from crownlands, keeping accounts related to old-standing and newly sanctioned charitable endowments of
the various socio-religious communities in the area, allotting and disbursing salaries of provincial
officials, and handling the financial-administrative aspects of jagir-s assigned in the nine imperial
180

This chapter takes a Mughal-centric perspective to initially frame conquest and political authority in
Gujarat during the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For a discussion of the relationship that the
late-Gujarat Sultanate shared with representatives of Mughal authority, along with citations for key primary
sources documenting this rich history from the point of view of the Gujarat Sultans, see Commissariat,
M.S. 1938. A History of Gujarat, Vol. 1. Bombay: Longmans, Green, pp. 53-61, 78-105, 346-371, 492-527
and Sheikh, Samira. 2010. Forging a Region: Sultans, Traders, and Pilgrims in Gujarat, 1200-1500. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-224. Sheikh astutely demonstrates that Gujarat belies three
ecologically and historically distinct regions of eastern Gujarat (fertile and prosperous), Kathiawar
peninsula, and Kucch. This region was forged through pastoralist groups that migrated to the peninsula and
Kucch in starting in the thirteenth century, and eventually became tributary states vis-à-vis the Sultans of
Gujarat.
181
The nine primary sarkār-s or districts were Patan, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Godhra, Champaner, Nandod,
Broach, Surat, and Sorath comprising the southern part of the Kathiawar peninsula. These were further
divided into 192 sub-districts or pargana-s that were administered directly as crown-lands (khāliṣa) or
handed out as revenue assignments (jāgīrdār-s) to imperial officials. See Allami, Abu’l Fazl. 1590-1602.
(1873-96). Ain-i Akbari, trans. Heinrich Blochman and Henry Sullivan Jarrett, Vol. 2. Calcutta: Asiatic
Society of Bengal, pp. 252-59. Larger tributary chieftains occupied Dungarpur, Banswara, Sirohi, Kacch,
Sunth, Dharampur, Halwad in Jhalewar and Nawanagar in Halar. Medium sized tributary chiefs ruled over
areas at Idar, Rajpipla, and Chhota Udaipur. Smaller petty chiefs were found in the Sabar Kantha region
north of Ahmedabad, and scattered across Kathiawar peninsula. The latter tributaries fell under the
watchful gaze of the faujdār, or Mughal garrison commander who was stationed at Junagadh and through
whom tribute was collected. It is important to note that tribute payments were not necessarily paid regularly
or willingly, and the sources refer to periodic tribute-collecting expeditions by the Mughal provincial
governor as mulkgīrī.
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Khan-i Azam’s elevation to Gujarat’s governorship set precedent for the appointing of senior nobles and
other members of the royal household, especially young princes, as subadar-s of Gujarat. For Khan-i
Azam’s biography, see Khan, Shah Nawaz. (1780) 1941. Ma’asir-ul Umara, trans. H. Beveridge & Baini
Prashad. Vol. 1. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, pp. 319-34.
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An important aspect of ensuring order was verifying the buying and selling of private property in urban
areas. One of the earliest official mention of Aziz Koka as governor comes from a bilingual house sale
document dated January 1574. See Bhat, B.W. 1948. “A Deed of Conveyance 375 years old”. Proceedings
of the Indian Historical Records Commission 25: 54-57.
184
Khan, Ali Muhammed. (1761) 1965. Mirat-i Ahmadi, trans. M.F. Lokhandwala. Baroda: Oriental
Institute, pp. 102-3.
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districts.185 Therefore, records kept in the office of the provincial diwan were the paper trails
through which local imperial authority was organized perpetuated. The regular functioning of the
diwan’s office in Ahmedabad signaled the robust functioning of imperial authority to local
residents, foreign traders, and the nearby landed estates. As P. Saran notes, the delicate
collaboration between the subadar and the diwan not only enabled the functioning of the
administrative, military, and financial aspects of the Mughal State, their relatively independent
functioning also served as a check and balance on the manifestation of excessive personal
ambition of either office holder. Therefore, P. Saran has aptly labelled this yin-yang nature of the
subadar-diwan relationship a ‘provincial diarchy’.
Immediately after the initial conquest of Gujarat, Sheikh Abdu-n-Nabi, Akbar’s ṣadr-us
ṣudūr (chief justice) appointed Sayyad Hamid as āmir (administrator) of the Islamic religious
endowments called waqf.186 This suggests that an early and important priority for Akbar was
sorting out existing entitlements to land revenue by translating and incorporating them into the
language and bureaucratic apparatus of Mughal political administration. Land rights in the
immediate aftermath of Mughal conquest in Gujarat were organized according to the spectrum of
tenurial entitlements outlined in Chapter 2. During this period, it is significant to note that Aziz
Koka, who went on to serve as Governor of Gujarat three times between 1573-1605, was a
bonafide Mughal official whose vast fortunes were derived from land revenue collected from
fiefs held as his jagir in the Gujarat and Bihar provinces. He owned a private ship called Ilahi,
and in 1592 embarked on the Haj pilgrimage with six sons, six daughters and their mothers, and
over 100 servants. After reaching Mecca, he spent considerable personal fortunes on endowments
to the tomb’s upkeep and gifts to the elite leaders of the holy city. The size of his army was
determined by his personal rank, and regular salaries for members of his retinue, along with their
upkeep, was funded by revenues and salaries channeled through the Mughal government. He was
neither in debt nor did he borrow from private financiers to carry out his administrative-military
duties as Gujarat’s subadar. During this period, Aziz Koka himself lent money to local
individuals, although the sources are silent on who exactly these people were. It is possible that
he lent money to local traders, and kept a percentage of interest as profit or had the first right of
refusal on commodities procured through his loans. Regarding his borrowers, the Ma’asir-ul
Umara notes that “whenever one of his [borrowers] came before him, if he immediately paid up
the money for which he was regarded as accountable, he was liberated, otherwise he was beaten
185

Saran, P. 1941. The Provincial Government of the Mughals, 1526-1658. Allahabad: Kitabistan, pp. 18397.
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Ma’asir-ul Umara, Vol. 1, pp. 41-44; Commissariat, A History of Gujarat, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.
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till the links of life were loosened. If, after this, he survived, he was not further troubled, [and]
lacs of rupees remained in his (Aziz Koka’s) charge.” 187
The Mughal settlement of Gujarat was not without turbulence or resistance. For example,
when Itimad Khan Gujarati took his post as the fourth governor of the province in 1583, he was
instructed to dismiss a band of 7,000 Mughal troopers serving under the previous governor
Shihab Khan. Once disbanded, these roving military men offered their martial services to
Muzaffar III, the exiled Sultan from the previous ruling regime that Akbar dislodged. Muzaffar
and his entourage mounted a successful, albeit brief, attack on Ahmedabad and recaptured the
throne of the province for six months. 188 Akbar dispatched multiple imperial armies led by a new
governor Mirza Abdurrahim Khan, and Gujarat was recaptured and firmly brought into the
Mughal ambit. Muzaffar fled, and Mughal armies continued to chase him in a haphazard fashion
until 1591 when Aziz Koka, appointed for a second term as governor in 1590, defeated Muzaffar
Khan and his allies, the tributary chieftains residing in the western peninsula of Gujarat called
Kathiawar. After being captured, Muzaffar committed suicide by slicing his own throat en route
to the imperial capital at Agra in December 1592. The tripartite topographical landscape of
Gujarat, namely its eastern agrarian mainland, its peninsular coast Kathiawar, and its marshy drywetlands Kacch contributed to the proliferation of little militarized chieftaincies in the area. These
groups brokered alliances with larger powers, and hedged their bets on who would eventually
become victorious in big battles. Those groups that supported Muzaffar were subdued by Aziz
Koka, and others surrendered and became tribute paying little polities, or waṭan-jāgīr-s, of the
Mughal State. After Aziz Koka departed for Mecca in 1593, Akbar appointed his own second son
Prince Murad as governor of Gujarat. Murad, who was married to Aziz Koka’s daughter in 1586,
spent imperial funds to build gardens and other infrastructure such as traveler inns, mosques, and
wells in and around Ahmedabad. In 1594, he left for military campaigns in the Deccan, and his
imperially-appointed nāʼib (gubernatorial deputy) Suraj Singh served as stand-in governor.189
Once Prince Murad died prematurely in 1599 due to alcoholism, his father-in-law Aziz Koka was
reinstated as governor for the third time until Akbar’s death in 1605.
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Ma’asir-ul Umara, p. 332
Significantly, this was long enough for him to use the Mughal mint at Ahmedabad to strike silver coins
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Gujarat under Jahangir, 1605-1627
Upon ascending the throne in 1605, Emperor Jahangir issued farman-s to all the provinces
conveying observations and executive orders about how he intended to rule. 190 Although his
injunctions are wide-ranging, three of them are relevant for our purposes. First, the problem of
thievery continued unabated in imperial domains, impacting settled peasants and itinerant
merchants. Therefore, jagirdar-s were instructed to populate wastelands and uninhabited areas by
erecting mosques, inns, and waterways. Furthermore, he demanded that hospitals and other public
works be propagated at the expense of the imperial government. Second, Mughal officers were
instructed to not force traders to open their bales when traveling on Mughal roads, and reminds
local officials that merchants should be allowed to sell their goods at will to any party. And
finally, the Emperor recommended abolishing local customs duties and road taxes since these
often lead to the oppression of traders and itinerant groups. From this royal order, it is evident
that by the early seventeenth century, the Mughal imperial government propagated a normative
vision of sound administration based on facilitating mercantile activity, securing the personal
property of urban dwellers and travelers, protecting peasants from forced labor, and building
infrastructure reflecting the long-term vision of a civilized and growing polity. The relative
stability of provincial governments is evidenced by the various building activities undertaken by
successive governors in Gujarat.191 Moreover, public welfare projects, such as the erecting of free
eating lodges for the poor, inns for travelers, and water houses were sanctioned from the
monetary resources generated as land revenue from the Emperor’s hereditary domains, or
(provincial) crown lands called khāliṣa.192
In 1609-10, an imperial military retinue headed by Aziz Koka’s son, and supported by
various local rajas and tributary rulers, was instructed to secure the south-eastern parts of Gujarat
against attack from Malik Ambar, an important military commander and regent of the
Nizamshahi rulers in the Deccan.193 The Mughal military comprised no less than eleven
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independent groups tied together by the Mughal system of tenurial rights and tenurial duties. 194
Here, we witness how a dynamic system of entitlements came together in a moment of crisis, and
how a composite army was forged out of disparate spheres of influence (and resources) bound by
mutual obligations dictated by the Mughal imperial idiom and system of tenurial entitlements
(Chapter 2). This heterogeneous group was not a one-time stop-gap solution to military threats
emanating from the Deccan. Rather, this composite military force of 25,650 horses was stationed
at Dharampur, 100 kilometers southeast of Surat, for four years to protect Gujarat from further
inroads by Malik Ambar and his Deccani allies. Such an arrangement reflects the relative
territorial control exerted by Mughal forces in Gujarat through the elaborate maneuvering of
imperial soldiers and local military allies.
In 1611, Abdulla Khan Bahadur Firuz Jung was appointed subedar of Gujarat, and spent the
next five years on multiple expeditions against the armies of Malik Ambar in the northern
Deccan. After returning to Gujarat in 1616, he was recalled by Emperor Jahangir for interfering
in the regular reports prepared by the imperial news writer (wāqiʻ nawīs) stationed in
Ahmedabad.195 Contemporaneous European accounts also verify Abdulla Khan’s personality, and
suggest that while the Mughal imperial court was accepting of the English trading presence in
Gujarat, this provincial governor was always suspect of foreign merchants.196 He was soon
replaced by Shaikh Hasan titled Muqarrab Khan, Jahangir’s childhood friend, hunting
companion, physician, surgeon, and former mutāṣaddī or port official at Surat and Cambay. 197 As
mutasaddi for seven long years between 1608-15, Muqarrab Khan played a key role in obtaining
foreign luxuries to satisfy the conspicuous consumptive proclivities of nobles, and most
importantly, the Emperor himself. Examples include a European curtain sent from Cambay,
foreign paintings, rubies and pearls, jeweled opium boxes, vessels of gold and silver made in
194

The force of 25,650 horse was composed of the following: Governor at Ahmedabad (4,000), Mughal
nobles of the governor’s court (5,000), Chiefs of Salher and Mulher (3,000), Son of the ruler of Kacch
(2,500), Chief of Navanagar (2,500), Chief of Idar (2,000), Chief of Dungarpur (2,000), Chief of Banswada
(2,000), Chief of Ramnagar (1,000), Chief of Rajpipla (1,000), Chiefs of Ali Rajpur and Ali Mohan at
Chhota Udaipur (650). See Commissariat, A History of Gujarat, Vol. 2, p. 49.
195
Ma’asir-ul Umara, Vol. 1, pp. 97-105
196
Thomas Roe, English diplomat to the Mughal Court, write a first-hand description of Abdulla Khan’s
arrest and subsequent release by the Emperor at Ajmer. See Foster, William. 1899. The Embassy of Sir
Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul: As Narrated in his Journal and Correspondence, 1615-1619,
Vol. 2. London: Hakluyt Society, p. 278. Another important East India Company account, the diary entry
of one Nicholas Withington dated 22-October-1613, mentions Abdulla Khan as being the exalted recipient
of English gifts, presumably in exchange for the Company’s right to purchase Indian textiles from the
markets in Ahmedabad. See Foster, William. 1921. Early Travels in India, 1583-1619. London: Oxford
University Press, p. 206.
197
In his memoirs, Jahangir writes that his friend Muqarrab Khan “is skillful with the arrow and the gun,
and in surgery is the most skillful of his time”. See Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p. 28.
94

Europe, Abyssinian slaves, Arab horses, and many other fanciful items. These were either
purchased from foreign traders, or received as gifts from European emissaries in exchange for
trading privileges at the thriving ports of Surat and Cambay. 198 This indicates that the Mughal
State was not opposed to European traders in its domain, and encouraged commerce by removing
roadblocks such as governors who were unlikely to support relative free trade.
From the above sketch, we can suggest that by the early seventeenth century during
Jahangir’s reign, the Mughal treasury was robust. The movement of officials, the buying of
foreign commodities, and the overall largess exhibited by Jahangir through various building
projects, distribution of money, and injunctions ordering his officials to permit uninhibited trade
confirm that the overall orientation of the Mughal State was one of maintaining their firm control
over agrarian land revenue and imperial appointments while leaving aspects of trade to the
vagaries of the market. Jahangir’s thirst for objects of curiosity, especially those coming from
abroad, also sustained his overall support of trade in western India. It is significant that not a
single passage in his memoirs, nor those in any of the other major Persian chronicles
documenting this period, suggest that Jahangir was strapped for money. In fact, the treasury was
brimming, and in contrast to official sources documenting the late-Mughal period from 1680
onward. Neither the names of specific merchants, traders, and financial agents, nor any
information about their activities as a specialist group find mention in the chronicles of Jahangir’s
time.199
During Jahangir’s reign, the treasury was the most important part of the imperial household.
The English ambassador Sir Thomas Roe, an official guest of the Mughal court, wrote to Prince
Charles from the Emperor’s court at Ajmer on October 30, 1616. Roe’s observations confirm the
relative wealth that Jahangir inherited, and suggest that our contemporary ideas of Mughal
grandeur and wealth match are reflected in the royal culture and imperial excess as epitomized by
Jahangir’s court. Roe writes
If Your Highnes have any vacancy from better recreations to caste your eies upon one of
the greatest theatres of the world, I could take pride in the paynes to relate to Your
Highness many rare varietyes….Some generall light of this kindgdome, at least of the
customes of the court, will not bee perhaps unpleasing. The present emperor (Jahangir) is
descended from Temarlane the Great….The broder westward is Persia, east the Gulph of
Bengala, north the mountaynes of Taurus, sowth the kingdomes of Decan and the Bay of
Cambaya. Plentifull in corne and cattle for mans necessitye, aboundant in wealth and
comodityes of trade for superfluitye. His revenew far above any eastern monarch
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knowne, farr above the Turke, incredible if I sawe not the issues and incomes and could
not give a better reason of yt then report. In jewells, which is one of his felicityes, hee is
the treasury of the world, buyeing all that comes, and heaping rich stones as if hee would
rather build then weare them. 200

It is difficult to ascertain the cash reserves by successive Mughal Emperors. However,
estimates deduced by Abdul Aziz based on various numismatic studies and analyses of Persian
chronicles are generally accepted by scholars of Mughal India. 201 Citing passages from the
Baburnama, or Memoirs of Babur, Aziz argues that Babur’s largess in distributing salaries and
booty after his landmark victory at Panipat against the Lodi Dynasty (1451-1526) to his son and
successor Humayun, the military generals present, and other members of his retinue indicates
both the immense wealth hoarded in India, and the generally redistributive features of the early
Mughal polity. Although we are want of specific numbers for Babur and Humanyun’s treasury,
we know that Akbar left about 20 crore rupees in gold, silver, and bronze cash coins at Agra after
his death in 1605. Jahangir’s cash treasure by 1610 was about 23 crore rupees in gold and silver
coins. We are without proper figures for Shah Jahan’s reign, although Aziz concludes that his
treasury could not have been valued at more than 25 crore rupees. Shah Jahan was not involved in
any great wars, and one would expect that land revenue from his extensive empire would inflate
his treasury to an amount significantly more than what he inherited from Jahangir. Once possible
explanation for this relative stagnation or plateauing of the Mughal treasury is that Shah Jahan
spent considerable amounts to finance monumental architecture and other projects of imperial
grandeur. Aziz also suggests that Shah Jahan’s administration might have seen the onset of more
irregular revenues as he began slow expansion into allied territories while dealing with provincial
rebellions such as those of the Sikhs in Punjab.202
Jahangir and his imperial camp toured Gujarat in 1618-19, and during this visit celebrated the
twenty-seventh birthday of Prince Shah Jahan in great style at Ahmedabad on January 5, 1618.
During this celebration, Shah Jahan was also appointed governor of Gujarat. He continued
touring with his father and selected one Rustam Khan (1618-22) and Raja Vikramajit (1622-23)
as his deputies. During this imperial visit, it is significant that some of the tribute paying
feudatories of the Mughal State based in the outlying areas of direct Mughal influence came to
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pay their respects to the Emperor and members of the royal household. Among those that came to
offer obeisance were Raja Kalyan of Idar located 120-kilometers northeast of Ahmedabad, and
Raja Rao Bharmal of Kacch. The latter was cornered into submission by threats of Mughal
military attack, and readily submitted and preserved his little sphere of influence (watan-jagir) by
presenting 2,000 rupees and 100 horses to Jahangir.203
Towards the end of 1618, while the royal camp was en route to the imperial capital, Prince
Shah Jahan’s wife Mumtaz Mahal gave birth to a son who would later be recognized world over
as Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb would return to Gujarat as governor in 1645-46, and his expansionist
wars into the Deccan as Emperor would ultimately tip the balance of the imperial treasury and the
Mughal bureaucracy, paving the way for local financial agents such as bankers, merchants, and
moneylenders to come into more entangled relationships with representatives of the Mughal
State. Although Aurangzeb features more prominently in theories of imperial decline, a closer
look at events in Gujarat suggests that Shah Jahan began the practice of extorting local merchants
at Ahmedabad during moments of crisis. The merchants of the province were being drawn into
Mughal politics not only as suppliers of rare commodities and luxury goods, but also as new
sources of credit for European trading companies and senior Mughal nobles in need of quick
funds. While no clear evidence emerges of the Mughal state borrowing in sustained and a longterm fashion from these financial groups, we begin to see references to our primary merchantbanker Shantidas Jhaveri during Shah Jahan’s reign. To understand how financial agents were
implicated in Mughal political life at the hyper-local level, we must first turn to Shah Jahan’s
fight for the throne after Jahangir’s death in 1627.

Financial Agents under Shah Jahan, 1628-1658
When news of Jahangir’s death en route to Lahore from Kashmir reached Shah Jahan in the
Deccan, he embarked on a quick journey back to Agra to try and capture the throne from rival
princes.204 In a strategic move, he decided to travel via Gujarat, and hoped to secure support and
money from the European trading companies and wealthy inhabitants of the province. These
sums might not seem significant when compared to the large fortunes required to run an Empire,
but would be considered sizable amounts during extraordinary periods of political uncertainty and
crisis. He arrived near Surat on December 2, 1627, where the principal merchants of the British
East India Company went out to meet him, “whereupon the Prince advanced not, but enordered
203
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(sic) his servants to take some monies by way of loane of the townesmen. From us, they had
5,000 rialls, in part of custome, and 7,000 more which some merchants borrowed of us to lend
him, thereby pretending their want”.205 One explanation for the English lending money to Shah
Jahan is their hope that such a symbolic offering would help the British East India Company
secure a fresh farman confirming greater trading privileges and tax breaks upon the succession of
the young princely aspirant. The 5,000 ryal or English gold coins that were taken “in part of
custome” might not have been a loan per se, but an agreed upon amount so that the English
Factory trading out of Surat could maintain commercial links with hinterland manufacturing
centers falling within the jurisdiction of the Mughal Emperor. Soon after, Shah Jahan travelled to
Ahmedabad and the nobility stationed there under Jahangir came to greet him and accept him as
their new Emperor. They handed over treasure from the imperial holding cells, and gave presents
according their own status. It is significant that the factory records note that during this meeting
“most of the richer inhabitants, knowing [that] (Shah Jahan’s) wants must be releived, hidd
themselves”.206 As a result, Nahir Khan, Shah Jahan’s newly appointed governor of Gujarat,
approved “the gates of Amadavad to bee lockt two daies, whereby the banians etc. Should not
runn away before they had given him 20 leckhs of rupees, of which some Naer Chaun (Nahir
Khan) had gott most parte for him”. 207
The English Factory records are unclear about the extent to which Shah Jahan sanctioned the
extortion of funds for his fight for the imperial throne. Once he departed Gujarat, already
crowned Emperor, his Governor Nahir Khan and the Diwan Mirz Makki continued to exact great
sums of money from Ahmedabad and its environs, “wheather by the Princes order or noe is not
knowne. Itt caused here a generall forsakeing both of house and cittie, the rich as not being
willing to paie, and the poore not able, what they weare taxed att”.208 Finally, Shah Jahan sent a
parwāna or written order to the Mughal officials in Gujarat forbidding the exacting of sums from
the local inhabitants. It is during the immediate aftermath of Shah Jahan’s pit stop in Ahmedabad
that we hear of Shantidas Jhaveri. This is the first instance that Shantidas is documented in the
English Factory records, and confirms that even a merchant of Jhaveri’s stature, one who shared a
cordial relationship with Jahangir, feared extortion from a new generation of Mughal leaders. In a
letter from Ahmedabad to the President and Council at Surat dated December 28, 1627, Nathaniel
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Mountney writes “Santidas, the deceased Kings (Jahangir’s) jeweller, is arrived, but fearing to
bee knowne hath privatelie retired himselfe”.209
It is in the context of a series of letters exchanged from East India Company officials at
Ahmedabad, especially Nathaniel Mountney, that a clear picture regarding the shortage of credit
money for the English East India Company emerges. In a letter to the Surat Council dated
January 6, 1628, Mountney writes that he borrowed 10,000 rupees at one percent per month from
Shantidas, and promised to let the jeweler-banker see any “topha” or rarities from abroad before
anyone else. The rupees were borrowed to pay their former Gujarati creditors who were
becoming impatient for repayment, and to also preempt the Dutch in purchasing saltpeter from
local traders of which there was a limited supply and excessive demand.210 In the letter, he also
confirms purchasing of 2,000 maunds of saltpeter at 2.25 rupees per maund, and begs for a quick
supply of additional funds so that he can procure additional saltpeter. 211 As a jeweler and
merchant catering to the purchasing habits of Mughal elites, it is significant that Shantidas
stipulate that he be granted the right of buying rare items that the English were willing to sell
ahead of any competitors. For Shantidas, extending loans was not only about profiteering from
the interest earned, but was a strategy through which he forged economic relationships that
sustained complex cultures of procuring and selling coveted items. In an intriguing follow-up
letter to this incident ten days later, Mountney writes to his superiors at Surat that he was
eventually obligated to return 7,000 of the 10,000 rupees borrowed from Santidas since they
proved “to bee of the cauzanna and therefore unusefull for our occasions, in reason noe mann will
receave them without great losse”.212 By cauzanna, he means khazāna or treasury, referring to
imperial coins that were minted in years prior, and which carried a devalued market rate vis-à-vis
new sikka or Shah Jahani silver rupees. 213
It is likely that Shantidas Jhaveri mixed 3,000 sikka rupees with a lot of 7,000 old Mughal
coins as a strategy for ridding himself of the devalued bullion. Eventually, Mountney or his
colleagues at Ahmedabad caught this and returned the old coins to Shantidas. With the remaining
3,000 new rupees, the English paid off their most clamorous creditors, and paid a small advance
209
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to saltpeter manufacturers to secure purchasing rights on near-future production of the commodity
that would then be exported to Europe. In this letter, we also get a glimpse into how local money
markets might have functioned. In the same letter, Mountney notes that the gold coins the English
Factory at Surat proposed to send to Ahmedabad to meet monetary needs would not, in fact, be a
profitable venture since the market for gold coins in Ahmedabad was sabotaged by a group of
Dutch traders who had recently pawned their gold coins at below market rates to quickly raise the
sikka required to purchase saltpeter futures. This desperate underselling by the Dutch dropped the
going market rates of gold, creating unfavorable conditions for the English to convert their gold
coins into Mughal silver currency.214 This suggests that navigating the money markets in
Ahmedabad was not only about raising loans from moneyed specialists, but also hinged on every
group’s abilities to move silver and gold bullion along with foreign currencies to trading markets
where their intrinsic value (based on precious metal content) would fetch profitable, or at least
breaking even rates of exchange. The orientation of premodern societies, including seventeenthcentury Mughal India, towards commodity money based on bullion incentivized moneyed
specialists like Shantidas to find creative ways to keep their money moving. Unlike fiat money
where unmoved legal tenders can accumulate as assets (like the dollar under your mattress),
economies functioning on the circulation of commodity money (metallic money assayed
according to its intrinsic metal content) were constantly kept in flux by the perpetually-decreasing
value of minted coins. This aspect of the imperial monetary system might provide a more robust
basis for understanding why capital accumulation in the form of hoarding silver rupees did not
happen in Mughal India. In this brief episode where Shantidas tries to pass off 7,000 khazana
coins as newly minted Mughal rupees demonstrates that no banker was below using information
asymmetry and the desperation of borrowers to not only earn interest, but more significantly, rid
himself of currency that was being devalued at the very moment of its being struck.
Shantidas Jhaveri disappears from the English Factory Records after 1628, and reappears
some eight years later in a letter from Benjamin Robinson and Edward Abbot at Ahmedabad to
the Surat Council. In a letter dated April 24, 1636, Robinson and Abbot clearly demonstrate the
close relationship that Shantidas shared with the Mughal Governor Saif Khan. Shantidas lost
10,000 rupees aboard an Indian ship that was subject to piracy by private English traders off the
coast of Diu. The letter states, “All this citty is full of tumult, curses, and exclamations against us
before this Governor about the junck of Dio by divers Banian merchants the proprieters of her
ladeing, wherof Santidas here is a cheife one and hath earnestly requested us to acquaint you with
214
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his losse of 10,000 rupees; so that wee howerly expect to be haled to prizon, and doe wonder wee
are not shutt up before this tyme. The Governor sent and threatened us the other day and, after
much pretended kindnes towards us for our liberty, hee charged us to send an expresse with
advise unto you of these peoples demands, which is 200,000 rupees, and must presently bee
satisfied”.215
In a follow-up letter three weeks later on May 16, 1636, Robinson and Abbot document
Shantidas’ growing impatience with the English for not apprehending the culprits responsible for
seizing his goods. The letter records that “Santidas, the great Banian, who is very powerfull at
court, declares that he will force them (the English) to satisfy what he has lost in the Diu junk.
They have endeavoured in vain to pacify him, and now suggest that a letter be written him from
Surat. His claim is lowered to 35,000 [sic] rupees”. 216 In the same letter, the factors at
Ahmedabad note the recall of Governor Saif Khan, and his replacement by Azam Khan. After a
few months, Shantidas appears as this new governor’s broker and uses the power of “the
Governor’s angry words” to help move ships of his personal interest from the smaller ports off
the coast of Gujarat to the main dock at Surat.217 The growing importance of influential bankers
and moneychangers (ṣarrāf-s) like Shantidas is evident in their firm control of the money markets
in Ahmedabad, Surat, and other trading hubs in western India. By 1640, four years after the
shipping incident, a letter from three English factors working out of Ahmedabad to the President
and Council of the East India Company at Surat notes the increasing unavailability of money in
the currency market controlled by Shantidas at Ahmedabad. While money was plentiful just a few
years prior, by 1640, local traders had difficulties borrowing even 100 rupees at 1 ¼ percent per
month interest. Referring to the smaller bankers, the record notes “These people follow the greate
ones, as the heard theire leader, for is Santidas or Miah Saw (miyān sāh, “Mister Banker”), or any
of the great sawes (sāh-s), keepe up theire monies, all the rest must imitate them, though they
knowe not theire owne reason”.218
Azam Khan served as governor of Gujarat between 1636-42, and the English and Dutch
records suggest that he was a strong representative of the Mughal State in Gujarat. Apart from
regular military campaigns against roving tribes that plundered settled jagir-s, Azam Khan also
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adjudicated disputes between buyers and producers of Indian commodities. For example, on the
29th of December in 1640, English factors complained to the Governor that the local
manufacturers of indigo at Sarkhej located just outside of the city walls of Ahmedabad were
adulterating the deep blue dye by mixing oil and sand into the indigo cakes. Azam Khan
summoned more than 100 indigo manufacturers to Bhadra Fort and “he threatned no lesse then
death to him that should hereafter dare to mix or sand, oyle, or any other substance then what
nature gives to indico”.219 This passage suggests that a cosmopolitan trading hub like Ahmedabad
generally benefitted from the authority of the Mughal provincial governor. Even if the exercise of
Mughal authority in the locality was imperfect and sometimes arbitrary, the general benefits of
having an adjudicating power backed by other infrastructure such as the provincial mint, road
security, and the walls of the Mughal city itself were integral to social order. European traders
and Indian merchants took every opportunity to enhance their commercial activities through the
support and watchful eye of the Mughal authorities in Gujarat.
We can clearly witness the close relationship that important banker-merchants had with
figures of Mughal authority, and the sizeable bargaining chips that they vis-à-vis foreign traders
through their control over the money and commodity markets in western India. While Shantidas
Jhaveri is the primary example taken up in this chapter, a letter to the Company headquarters at
Surat by the English Factor Edward Knipe on July 18, 1643 demonstrates how another prominent
figure, Virji Vora, managed to manipulate commerce to his advantage. 220
I understood that Virge Vora yearly sends downe his people hither to Callicutt with
cotten and opium, by which hee doth not [gain?] less then double his many to those
people hee buyeth his pepper off, [and] afterwards disposeth of his pepper to us for
double what it cost him ; for I finde pepper to bee worth here but 151⁄2and 16 fannams
the maund, which is not halfe the rate hee usuallyvalleweth it to our people in Suratt.' It
would obviously be cheaper to deal direct; 'but indeed Virge Vora, by reason of our
continual! mighty ingagements, must not bee dis-pleased in any case. I confess him to
bee a man that hath often supplyed our wants in Suratt with moneys, for his owne ends.
Notwithstanding, I hould him to have bynn the most injurious man to your trade in all the
Mogulls dominions; for what ordinary Banian merchant dare come to the English howse
to look uppon corrall or any other comodity, hee by his potencye and intimacy with the
Governour forgeth somewhat or other against the poor man, utterly to ruine him ; so that
no merchant in the towne dare displease him by comeing to our howse to look uppon any
comodity, except some or other sometymes whome hee sends purposely to bid for a
comodity (that hee is about) little or nothing, onely to make us weary of our comodities.
Hee knoweth that wee (in regard of our extreame ingagement) must sell, and so beats us
downe till wee come to his owne rates ; and thus hath bynn his proceedings this many
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yeares. And I conclude that, so long as Virge Vora is so much our credittor, little or no
proffitt [is] to bee made uppon any goods wee can bring to Surratt. 221

To understand the role that prominent financial agents played in the commercial and political life
in sixteenth-century Gujarat, the next section focuses squarely on the prominent Jain merchant,
banker, moneychanger, and Mughal revenue-farmer Shantidas Jhaveri.

Shantidas Jhaveri (1584-1659) & the Cintāmaṇi Praśastiḥ
In 1638, the German traveler Albert de Mandelslo completed a diplomatic mission in Persia
and sailed for Hindustan to begin several months of private adventure in the East. He docked at
the thriving port of Surat, and moved north in a caravan towards the heart of the Mughal Empire.
After visiting several towns and villages along the way, Mandelso arrived in Ahmedabad. He was
duly impressed by the wealth of the area, and remarked on the beauty and liveliness of the various
bazars scattered in the city. Although Mandelslo only spent two days in the great Mughal
provincial capital, he visited a magnificent Jain temple Chintamani Parswanath.
We return’d into the City, to see the principal mosquey (sic) of the Benjans (Banyas),
which without dispute is one of the noblest structures that can be seen. It was then new,
for the Founder, who was a rich Benjan Merchant named Santides, was living in my time.
The Mosquey stands in the middle of a great Court, which is enclos’d with a high Wall of
Free-Stone, all about which there is a Gallery, much after the manner of our Cloysters in
Monasteries, having all its Seats or Cells, and in every Cell a Marble Statue, white or
black, representing a Woman naked, fitting, and having her legs lying cross under her,
according to the mode of the Countrey. There were some had three Statues, to wit, a great
one between two little ones. 222

Built twelve years earlier in 1625, the Chintamani Paraswanath Jain temple (derāsar)
represented the personal wealth and public standing of Shantidas Jhaveri, Gujarat’s most
prominent jeweler, merchant, banker, moneylender, and broker. Shantidas was born sometime
around 1584 to jeweler Sahasra Kiran and his second wife Saubhagya Devi. While it is difficult
to establish an early history of the family with great accuracy, Jhaveri belonged to the Oswal Jain
community, and his father migrated from Osian in Rajasthan during the late sixteenth century. 223
It is likely that Sahasra Kiran learned the jewelry trade as an apprentice to a Jain merchant in
Ahmedabad. Extant scholarship has done a wonderful job of tracing Shantidas’ lineage and
overall importance to the commercial life in Gujarat. Scholars working on this period’s history
from a religious point of view have also noted his influence in the politics of temple management,
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promotions of monks within Jain ecclesiastical orders, and his key abilities to obtain certain
favors such as the banning of animal slaughter and pilgrimage taxes to sacred sites in Gujarat.224
Like the previous section and the ones to follow, this section establishes Shantidas’ intricate
relationship with aspects of Mughal rule in Gujarat, trade in the area, and the wider social
networks that constituted life in seventeenth-century western India. To do this, I turn to the
Cintamani Prasasti, a substantial Sanskrit source that has remained outside the purview of
existing scholarship. This is largely because this prasasti or praise poem was sandwiched between
two folios of another manuscript that was passed between itinerant Jain monks in western India
for three centuries. It is written in a higher register of Sanskrit, and was only recently that two
Jain scholars transcribed and printed the text for our benefit. 225
The prasasti was completed by the Jain monk Vidya Saubhagya on December 4, 1640, and
documents the building of the Chintamani Paraswanath temple in Bibipura near Ahmedabad in
1625. Although the poem was written about fifteen years after the temple was consecrated, it is an
important source for understanding the religious-mercantile world that Shantidas occupied
between 1612-1640. It verifies the genealogy of Mughal emperors, offering commentary on their
personalities. In addition, the text provides a family tree of the Jhaveris in narrative form,
including a list of the women who were married into the family in each successive generation.
Finally, the poem also sheds light on the relevant Jain monks that belong to the tapa gaccha
monastic order that Shantidas’ family patronized and had close associations with. This is a textual
genre that combines elements of praise, genealogy, commemoration, imagination, fact,
commentary, and storytelling. This is an especially important text since, as we shall subsequently
see, the temple was desecrated by Aurangzeb in 1645 and we are without any archaeological
remains. This is the only surviving evidence that we have documenting Jhaveri’s building
activities, and proves that such monumental architectural endeavors enabled the overlapping
sovereignties of kings, saints, and merchants in medieval India.
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Ahead of presenting a translation and analysis of selected verses that support my contention
that Shantidas Jhaveri and Jain elites shared a symbiotic relationship with representative of the
Mughal court and local governors by the mid-seventeenth century, I will provide a brief overview
of the overall structure of the praise poem. The full poem is titled Śrī Bībīpuramaṇḍana Śrī
Cintāmaṇi Pārśvanātha Caitanya Praśastiḥ or A Conscious Panegyric of the Glorious Cintamani
Paraswanath of exalted Bibipura. The poem contains 86 stanzas comprising four lines each, and
begins with the author paying obeisance to his spiritual guide Satya Saubhagya, praises of God,
and laudatory descriptions of Gujarat and the localites of Ahmedabad and Bibipura (Verses 1-6).
The author then provides a brief sketch of Mughal rule in India, beginning with Babur’s victories
over rival armies and ending with adjectives flattering Emperor Shah Jahan (Verses 7-20).
Although lacking detail apart from marriage alliances, the next set of verses describe a long
lineage of the Jhaveri family tracing back eight generations from Shantidas (Verses 21-36).
Following this, the author praises Shantidas and describes his patronage of the building of the
Cintamani temple (Verses 37-60). Verse 61 is unique because it describes a set of gifts that the
Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan bestowed on Shantidas, suggesting the close relationship the
jeweler-banker had with the Mughal court. Subsequently, the poem turns to describing the role
that the Jhaveri family played in helping Jain monks achieve coveted titles that held significance
within the Jain ecclesiastical community, along with the role that Shantidas played in getting
various pilgrimage poll taxes abolished by the Mughal Emperor (Verses 62-82). Verse 83 is in
praise of Azam Khan, governor of Gujarat during the period in which this poem was composed.
And finally, the last few verses close the long narrative by indicating authorship and the date of
composition (Pausha Sud 2, Shukravar, 1697 Vikram Samvat, corresponding to December 4,
1640).

Selected Verses from Cintāmaṇi Praśastiḥ (1640)
Note: I have translated these verses with the gracious help of Professors Daud Ali and Deven Patel of the
University of Pennsylvania. In the process of translation, we have prioritized conveying meaning and intent
rather than preserving literary flair and form.

न िःप्रत्यूहमुपासताां कृतधियिः श्रीपार्श्वधिन्तामणे-

रुत्फुल्लोत्पलभासस ्ाससतजगत ् पादद््यां सद्गुणिः |
साम्राज्यां व्दिात्यसद्द्व्षदलां प्रास्ताखिलोपप्ल्ां

यो द््राज्यकथामवप त्रिभ्
ु े न मल
ूव मन्
ु मल
ू यत ् ||१|| [शादव ल
ू ०]
Without hindrance, let the learned worship (pay homage to) the two feet of Shri Parshva
Cintamani, who gives fragrance to the world through his virtues (sadguṇaiḥ), who shines
(beautifies) like the blue-lotus in bloom, who administers a universally sovereign state that has no
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contemptible enemies, and that is wholly without any public calamities. He has completely
eradicated even the very (possibility of a) narrative of a divided dominion in the three worlds. (1)
उद्िर्त्ाव जगतीियीसमनत व्द ् जजह््ाय भोगीर्श्र-

र्शछे र्त्ा ध््ान्तिमूमहन श
व समनत स्पष्टां ि घस्रेर्श्रिः |
कल्प्याकल्प्यपदाथवसाथवमसकृद् दातेनत दे ्द्रम
ु ो,

यजस्म ् जात्नत क्षितौ स भग्ा ् श्रीआर्श्सेन िः धश्रये ||२|| [शादवल
ू ०]
The lord of snakes (Shesa/Ananta), [who is thought to hold up the three worlds], is embarrassed
in thinking that “He is the one who lifts up the three worlds,” as is the sun (the lord of the day)
who, it is well-known, cuts down the army of darkness every day and night. So too the tree of the
gods (the wish-fulfilling tree) who thinks itself the Giver of everything that is conceivable and
inconceivable. On this earth was born (to) that Lord Sri Ashvaseni (Lord Parshvanath’s father)
for (our) prosperity! (2)
मातङ्गर्श्तुि
व न्द्र(१६७८)प्रसमतशरदद तौ मा तुङ्गाख्यमे ां,
प्रासादां ्द्विमा िः ससज
ृ तुरतुलां शाजन्तदासर्शि शुभ्रम ् |
भास््द्बीबीपरु े सर्त्पगणतरणीपार्श्वधिन्तामणेय,ं

श्रीमद्यहाांगीरराज्ये यु् प
ृ नतयुते तस्य कुमविः प्रशजस्तम ् ||३|| [स्रग्िरा]
In the year of 1678 V.S. (1625), Vardhamana and Santidas created (or established) an
unparalleled beautiful temple (Jain) called Manatunga. We compose this prasasti to that radiant
Parswa Cintamani who belongs to the Tappagaccha (sect) in radiant Bibipur in the holy kingdom
of the young prince Jahangir. (3)
ककञ्ि - श्रीमा ् बब्बरपाधथव्ो गजघटासङ्घट्टदस्
ु सञ्िरां ,
प्राज्यां राज्यमपालयज्ज गणिाणकबद्िोद्यमिः |
माद्यद्दोबवलदपवदवपवतम िःप्रत्यधथवसीमजन्त ी्िव्यव्रतदा कमवगुरुताां सा्वत्रिक ां यो दिे ||७|| [शादवल
ू ०]
(Emperor) Babur protected the rajya. He whose efforts were singularly tied to protecting his
people and that abundant kingdom which had waywardly roaming collection of elephants that
were clashing with each other.
His mind was intoxicated by the pride of the strength of his arms. He is one who places weight
everywhere, on the bestowing of the vow of widowhood onto the women of his enemies
(sīmantinī). (7)
तस्मादाव्रभूद्यथा दशरथाद् रामिः प्रतापाांशुमा ्,
सन्न्यायकमनतहव(हुव)मायु प
ु ावर्ीयोन् नतिः |
ृ नतदव ्

शलेभ्यिः पतताां परक्षिनतभत
ृ ाां र्श्ासान लत्रबवभ्यताां,

ये द्राग्ददताऽश ां फणभत
ू ०]
ृ ाां प्राणोपकारिः कृतिः ||८|| [शादवल
Just as the brave/majestic like son Rama manifested from Dasaratha, King Humayun [of Babur]
whose mind was singularly focused on proper justice, was one whose prosperity and valor were
irresistible. The enemy kings who have fallen from the mountains (or from their pedestals) with
the winds of life giving breath, they have been afraid. He has quickly given life to them (to those
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fallen or rival kings) in the manner that snakes who are given food quickly in the form of air to
restore their life breath. (8)
सू स्
ु तस्य महीभत
ू ण्डलािण्डलिः,
ृ िः समभ्द् भम

शादहश्रीमदकब्बरक्षिनतपनतिः स्फूज्जवत्प्रभाहवपवनतिः |
दा े ाऽधथवसभराजजसभिः परगणिः शूके

दहांस्रिः सज
्,
ृ

मक्
ु तां ्ीरकथामयां जगदददां ्ीरजस्ििा यो व्यिात ् ||९|| [शादवल
ू ०]
That King Humayun had a son, who was like Indra on Earth (samabhavad, of the same nature),
[he was the sun in appearance in respect to his radiance and he was similar to Indira in that he
was the lord of the Earth] in looks and bright like the sun, named Akbar. Akbar established his
heroic valor/narrative and liberated this world with giving, through dana (giving) he was
working with rival groups/supplicants (patron to rival groups), winning/defeating his
enemies/violent groups, through compassion, and with warriors through battle. (9)
यस्योद्यद्दा िारािरपटलसमुद्भूतसौ्णविारासन्िोहप्लाव्यमा िः क््धिदवप लभते

ाऽऽश्रयां दौस्थपङ्किः |

र्शयद्सभद्रावग ् व्पिक्षिनतपनतसभरनतस्पद्विये्ोह्यतेऽसा-

्त्ृ सज्
ृ याऽमुां समन्तात्कसशपुगतभरां सा ुमत्का ेषु ||१०|| [स्रग्िरा]
Like the rains from the cloud dissipate the mud, like that, this king (Akbar) donated money to
wash away misfortune. In fearing this King, even the rival soldier-kings, abandoning the weight
of their provisions-clothes, return quickly among the (back to the) mountain-forests from the
neighboring territories. (10)
तस्य श्रीमद्कब्बरक्षिनतपतेदेदीप्यते साम्प्प्रतां,
सू ुिः श्रीइसलामशादह प
ृ नतिः प्रोत्सवपवक नतवप्रथिः |

भूभारोद्िरणकिीरभुजभत
ृ ् कु्वजन्त यस्य द्व्षो,

द््न्द््ेऽत्युग्रशरप्रहारव्िुरा दे ्ाङ्ग ा ाां मुदम ् ||११|| [शादवल
ू ०]
His son (Akbar’s son), even today or now, he shines. And he whose kirti (fame) is constantly
flowing/spreading in all directions, that is who this Islam Shah (Jahangir) is. The one who bears
a single steady hand in bearing or removing the weight of the earth (kingdom) (He is the
universal sovereign), whose enemies are in battle and are rendered helpless by the striking of his
extremely fierce weapons (arrows/blows). And these enemies, in their death, are made to be the
joy of the devāṅganā (in killing these enemies, he sends them to heaven and makes them the
object of pleasure of the divine women). (11)
दग्ु िाम्प्भोधिभ्र्त्रङ्गव्लसद्डडण्डीरलक्ष्मीमुष-

स्साम्प्याभा्समुत्थदपवकसलता यत्क र्त्यविःस्पद्वधि िः |
िन्द्रस्याऽङ्कमग
ृ स्य के्लसममािः काङ्िजन्त

ो कदहवधित ्,

ेदीयिःजस्थतससांदहकासुतभ्न् ाशां मरुद््त्मवन ||१२|| [शादवल
ू ०]
The competitive urges which are driven by pride/haughtiness to achieve the same quality of the
dawn’s splendor is like the radiance is like the foam of the waves of the ocean’s milk. These
competitive urges of this rabbit marked moon (or tainted) can never expect to destroy or long to
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eclipse these fames of [Jahangir] (or the moon of Jahangir) by becoming a Rahu that is situated
nearby him. (12)
िोणीशिः प्रसरी सरद्गण
ु न धिदे दीयमा ो म ो-

भीष्टाथं प्रणनयव्रजस्य सुि(ष)माां दे िीयतेऽसौ धिरम ् |
यद्भ्रूभङ्ग इह क्षितौ गुरुतुलाां िर्त्े सदा सशिय ्-

न्
ु मर्त्क्षिनतभत्ृ कुलां व् नयतामज्ञातप्
ू ां ज्ात ् ||१३|| [शादव ल
ू ०]
This marching king is a moving treasure of virtues, constantly giving to his devotees the objects
of their mind’s desires. He is making them happy for a long time. Here on this earth, his frown
(disapproving look) equals that of the Guru, who is teaching and disciplining and humbling at
once the maddened kings and it is a look which has not been known before. (13)
सू ुिः शादहजजहा

इत्यसभिया जेजेनत यस्य स्फुट-

लोकभत
ूव लगव्वन जर्शितभव्ष्यद्राज्यभारो गण
ु िः |

यस्य द्राक् कर्ाल एष फणभत्ृ मुख्यां गुरुां बाल्यतो,

न मावये् करे व्राजनत परप्राणक्वृ र्त्ां दित ् ||१४|| [शादव ल
ू ०]
It was determined by all the people of the earth on account of his clear virtues that he would take
on the burden of the kingdom, and this son’s name was Shah Jahan. He was one in whose hand
this sword shone effortlessly and held the fate of his enemies, and this was true ever since his
childhood. (14)
व्योमािीशम्ेक्ष्य बुद्धिन लयां मूतीर्श्रत््ां गतां,

दृष्ट््ा िाऽससतसांयुतां गग गां स््भावणुमादे सशसभिः |
यज्जन्मन्यसभतिः प्रमोदकरणे साम्राज्यमेकान्ततिः,

सजन्दष्टां व्न शम्प्य लोकन िया न जर्शिन््तेऽि् तत ् ||१५|| [शादवल
ू ०]
Having recognized/seen the Supreme Lord of the Sky, but he had gone to the state of becoming
the embodiment of the sun itself! By those who were commanding (army generals), having
observed this Raahu [could refer to Mughal Emperor] accompanied by a black color (or, Raahu
accompanied by the black planet Saturn) were looking upon him as a repository of intelligence
and as the sun who himself has taking on that great form. Even by the world's below (or the
people) they had trust/confidence that here also, just like there [in the Sky/Rahu but also
symbolically referring to Agra/Delhi/the North] there will be a single unified kingdom here in
which through the agency of who [the King], from birth was an instrument of
happiness/prosperity. (15)
तस्याऽमात्यसशरोमणेिः शुधिमनतप्रागल्भ्यकाव्यस्य ता,
आसफ्िा

इनत प्रससद्धिमयतिः कु्ीत को

स्तुतीिः ?

ददग्िक्रे व्जजतेऽवप यस्य सभ
ु टाक णे ितसु भविः स्फुटो-

पायिः सन्यसमदां वपपनतव भु् ां शोभाकृते भूभत
ू ०]
ृ िः ||२०|| [शादव ल
Who would not write praises of this foremost of ministers whose fame is encapsulated in the title
Asaf Khan, about whose radiance, intelligence, and purity there are poems? (Even) after the
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directions which were scattered with good or radiant soldiers had been conquered, the armies of
the King protected the earth by means of precise deployment of the four political stratagems. (20)
यिः सौभाग्यन धििः क्षितीशसदसस प्राप्तप्रनतष्ठोऽन््हां ,
मर्त्ा ेकप-िञ्िलार्श्व्लसद्राजप्रसादोल््णिः |
न िःशेषाङ्धगसमूहदिःु िव्लयस्फूजवत्सुिांप्रापणो(ि)-

द्यक्
ु तोऽसौ जयताजचिराददहमदा्ादोल्लसद्भष
ू णम ् ||४२|| [शादवल
ू ०]
Let him, that man, the one who is a treasure house of wealth and repeatedly receives the support
at the court or assembly of emperors, He (Shantidas) is made powerful by the favor of the King’s
who are blazing with their wild horses and rutting elephants. (Shantidas) who undertook the
establishment of public works and to take away the things that made people unhappy, may he be
victorious for a long time, He is the shining jewel which radiates in the city of Ahmedabad. (42)
लोकयोऽकासम पू्ं धिदमलगणकर्शिोपददष्टिः प्रससद्िां,
साम्राज्यायाऽसभलाषां ्ि मथ मुदा सत्यताां

ेतुमेषाम ् |

त्रबभ्रद्राज्यां स ्षे युग्सुरसभूसजम्प्मते शाहजजहा िः(१६८४),

कयवर्श्ाददप्रसादां प्रणयनत सततां शाजन्तदासस्य यस्य ||६१|| [स्रग्िरा]
In order to lead him towards words which were true, beneficial, and desirable, for the sake of the
Universal Kingdom (sāmrājya), on that date 1684 V.S. (1627) he (Shah Jahan) displayed his
favor in the form of horses, elephants, and gifts, onto the shining (little) kingdom (rājya) of that
Shantidas. (61)
सप्ताशीनतसमताब्दसम्प्भ्बलप्रोज्जम्प्
ृ भमाणप्रथां(८७),
ा ादे शदररद्रदी ज तान् ाददप्रदा ायुििः |

सिागाररणाङ्गणे न हत्ा ् दसु भविव्र्श्द्व्षां,

श्रीमद्गुजरव मण्ड ां स जयनत श्रीशाजन्तदासो भटिः ||६५||
In the year 1687 V.S. (1630), his becoming famous manifest and grew strong through the killing
of the universal enemy (famine; scarcity of provisions) on the battlefield through weapons of
generosity, distributing provisions (food, crops, asylum, sanctuary of necessities) to the poor and
wretched people of various regions. May that Shantidas, a good vassal (mercenary/soldier) and
the ornament of glorious Gujarat, be victorious! (65)
तेऽकब्बरक्षिनतपनतां प्रनतबोध्य जी्ाऽमाररप्र्तव मजस्रमिीकर ् द्राक् |
ससद्िादद्रर्तकभूध्रकरोरुमुजक्तां,

भस्
ू पक्
ु ाय जजजजआकरमोि ां ि ||७७||
ृ सि
Hiravijaya Suri was given garlands by Akbar and time and again propagated our
faith/community during that time. For the pilgrimage to Siddhachal and Revatigiri (Girnar), he
helped abolish the pilgrimage taxes and also obtained freedom from “Jijia Vera” (jizya and
other community taxes). (77)
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ककञ्ि - अङ्गान्युल्बण्ेपथून

सहसा भ्राम्प्यजन्त

ेिाखण य-

न् ामाकणव जाद्भयात ् प्रनतकलां मुह्यजन्त िेताांसस ि |
जायन्ते द्व्षताां स गूजरव िरािीशत््मुज्जम्प्
ृ भय ्,

भम
ू ा ाजमिा एष जयतान्न्यायकन ष्ठो भुव् ||८३||
At every moment, out of fear from the production of twang of the bow string which is held up to
the ear, their eyes were wandering and whose bodies were quivering constantly out of fear of the
arising of his very name in their ears, and their minds were completely confused. Upon the rising
of the overlord of the Gurjara King (Lord), this little king Azam Khan (Governor) who had
through victory accomplished a single polity/authority (propagated a single judicial system/law)
on the earth, he produced these things among his enemies. May he attain victory on this earth.
(83)
ककञ्ि - श्रीसौभाग्यासभिा ामकृत कृतधियाां सद्व्हारप्रशजस्तां,

सशष्यो ्षेऽदद्र न्दक्षिनतपपररसमते(१६९७) सत्यसौभाग्य ए ाम ् |
येषाां मन्दोऽवप लब्ध््ा जयनत समदहृद््ादद्न्ृ दा ् प्रसादां ,

ध््स्ताऽशेषद्युसद्मक्षिनतरुहसुम ोरत् जाग्रत्प्रभा्म ् ||८५|| [स्रग्िरा]
Paraphrase: Shri Saubhagya Muni’s disciple Satyasaubhagya writes this praise poem of the
temple (Cintamani) in Samvat 1697 V.S. (1640). (85)
The Cintamani Prasasti conveys a mythical-historical vision of how Jain monastic elites
viewed their own historical development and prosperity into the seventeenth century. It also
consciously conveys the deeper interconnections between seemingly disparate worlds, i.e., that of
Jain monks, worldly merchant-bankers, and Mughal Kings.226 The panegyric begins by paying
homage to Paraswanath, an early historical Jain monk, teacher, and spiritual figure that lived in
the pre-Buddhist period during the seventh or eighth century B.C. This Paraswanath, whose
iconic symbol is the hood of a serpent, administers a universal sovereign state within which
kingly politics has manifested and continues to into the present. 227 This Paraswanath, born to king
Ashvasena of Banaras, enables prosperity on this earth, and it is to whom the jeweler brothers
Shantidas and Vardhaman Jhaveri dedicate an unparalleled Jain temple called Manatunga in
1625. This temple was built in Bibipur, a suburb located just 15-kilometers southeast of
Ahmedabad, during the “holy kingdom of the young (Mughal) prince/emperor Jahangir” (Verse
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There is a growing body of scholarship that explores similar Jain literary traditions in analyzing Mughal
political authority. See Jain, Shalin. 2015. “Jain Elites and the Mughal State under Shahjahan.” Indian
Historical Review 42(2): 210-225; Truschke, Audrey. 2012. “Setting the Record Wrong: A Sanskrit Vision
of Mughal Conquests.” South Asian History and Culture 3(3): 373-396.
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Scholars broadly agree that Paraswanath was a real historical figure and one of the five most popular
jina-s, or spiritual victors. Paraswanath has taken on the head and coils of the serpent in various
iconographic representations over the past two millennia. See Cort, John. 2010. Framing the Jina:
Narratives of Icons and Idols in Jain History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27, 42, 61, 64, 121.
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3). After this brief introduction, the poet shifts our attention to the establishment and growing
influence of Mughal rule in the subcontinent. He says that Emperor Babur (1483-1530) protected
the people of his kingdom, and his early reign was characterized by the expansion of dynastic
political authority through conquest. The apt metaphor is his collection of waywardly roaming
elephants that composed the strength of his arms, and his bestowing of the undesired gift of
widowhood to the women or wives of his enemies (Verse 7). Babur’s son Humayun epitomized
prosperity and valor, and forged political alliances with enemy kings from the mountains. This
might be an allusion to Humayun’s checkered career as a peripatetic aspirant to the Mughal
throne, one that was achieved by forging intricate alliances with, and seeking due protection
from, neighboring kingdoms such as the Safavids in Persia. The narrative then turns to the
illustrious Emperor Akbar, who consolidated Mughal territorial reach and extended imperial
authority into Gujarat by donating money to needy groups and through military prowess against
rival “soldier-kings”. The reference to soldier-kings confirms that there were various smaller
armed states whose sphere of influence was highly localized, and Akbar either made alliances and
incorporated them into the hegemonic language of Mughal political administration, or classified
them as rival chieftains who had to either pay tribute to the Mughal treasury or be periodically
checked through military action.
Verse 11 refers to the universal earthly sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir (15691627). His battle tactics are fierce, and his enemies are rendered helpless by the striking of his
“extremely fierce weapons”. With a literary flair, the poet suggests that these enemies are
rendered pleasure objects for the divine women of the otherworld. The following two verses
continue to praise Jahangir’s beauty, whose glory and personality was even more striking than the
moon, and his ability to discipline arrogant little kings who might have nibbled at the edges of his
Empire. The Mughal imperial genealogy concludes in praise of Shah Jahan, the young prince in
whose hand the sword shone effortlessly and who took on the burden of empire as Emperor
during the period that this poem was composed. The couplets that discuss Mughal authority
emphasize the ease with which successive Mughal kings pursued and punished rival lords and
petty kings in the subcontinent. The Jain narrative highlights and conveys with beaming pride the
military superiority of the Mughal imperial army and its critical role in establishing a singularly
sovereign state across the norther and western parts of the subcontinent. Verse 15 caps the
discussion of Mughal rule during the poet’s time by suggesting that that the Empire was unified,
and people felt a sigh of relief in knowing the oneness of the kingly dominion. Through the
agency of Emperor Shah Jahan, the unified kingdom was an instrument of happiness and fostered
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an environment of relative trust. Moreover, it was under the leadership of Shah Jahan’s wazīr or
prime minister Abu’l Hasan Asaf Khan (Verse 20) that the Mughal imperial court implemented
the four-fold diplomatic techniques contained in the ancient Indian treatise on military strategy
called Arthaśāstra. In order of preference, these are sama (conciliation), dāna (bribing; gifting),
bheda (sow discord), and daṇḍa (warfare), and the astute prime minister Asaf Khan deployed
these precisely to protect inhabitants of the Mughal Empire.228 Such praise should not be
dismissed as a poet pandering to his patron, for the author Vidya Saubhagya was neither
employed by the Mughal court nor shared any direct relationship with members of the ruling
elite. The prasasti was written for members of the Jain community, and embodies a distinctly Jain
worldview of Mughal politics in the seventeenth century.
Cintamani Prasasti begins a long genealogy of Santidas Jhaveri’s family in Verse 21,
referring to the early patriarch Padmanama and his wife Padmadevi. Although the pedigree
continues by offering only the names of successive children and their wives, this is significant
because no other Sanskrit, Jain, or Mughal sources verify this early history of the Jhaveri clan. I
have provided a family tree containing these names at the end of this chapter. For our immediate
purposes, the story of Shantidas Jhaveri begins in Verse 42 where the poet tells us that the
jeweler-banker is a treasure house of wealth and repeatedly receives the support of the emperor
and his assembly. Shantidas’ influence and social standing is made possible by the various favors
he receives from the Mughal Emperor, and this position is used to establish public works and
charity for the people of Gujarat. In an apt metaphor referring to his profession, Vidya Saubhagya
refers to Shantidas as “the shining jewel which radiates in the city of Ahmedabad”. A later
couplet (Verse 61) is explicit in the relationship that Shantidas shared with the Mughal court of
Shah Jahan, from who the local jeweler received special favors in the form of horses, elephants,
and other valuable gifts. The purpose of such gifting, which took place in 1627, was to establish
an alliance between the sovereignty of the Universal Kingdom of the Mughal Emperor
(sāmrājya) and the little kingdom or sphere of influence (rājya) of Shantidas. This suggests that
the influential financial agent Shantidas shared a mutually constitutive and symbiotic relationship
with the Mughal court and representatives of its eminent domain in Gujarat. The poet is clear in
indexing Shantidas’ relationship as a recipient of favors, and therefore subordinate to the Mughal
228

Abu’l Hasan Asaf Khan’s daughter Mumtaz Mahal was married to the young prince Shah Jahan, and
Asaf Khan supported Shah Jahan’s bid for the throne in 1628. He was “especially proficient in excogitated
matters”, confirming our poet’s observation that he delicately implemented the four stratagems of the
Arthaśāstra to preserve Mughal sovereignty. See Ma’asir-ul Umara, Vol. 1, pp. 287-95. For a discussion of
the four stratagems, see Olivelle, Patrick. 2013. King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya's
Arthasastra. Oxford University Press, pp. 46-51.
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Emperor. However, in his own domain, he was supreme for he displayed his wealth and power in
Gujarat by distributing provisions and undertaking public works. This was especially so during
moments of crisis such as the severe famine which afflicted the province in 1630 (Verse 65). As a
model public figure, Shantidas is characterized as a good soldier or vassal (su bhata) of the
Mughal kings in his eliminating of suffering on the universal battlefield that famine and poverty.
The poet’s singular efforts in linking Mughal earthly rule with the Jain monastic traditions on
the one hand, and the Jain householder commercial realms on the other, is evident in Verse 77,
commemorating Hiravijaya Suri’s relationship with Shah Jahan’s grandfather, Emperor Akbar.
During this period, Hiravijaya Suri, the great pontiff of the tapa gaccha monastic order that the
Jhaveri family patronized, secured various tax breaks from imperial authority, including those
levied by Mughal governors on Jain pilgrims visiting temples at Girnar. 229 The reference to
Hiravijaya Suri suggests that the Jain monastic groups and those merchants that followed them
viewed the cordial relationship between Mughal central and provincial authority, and Jain
ecclesiastical traditions as a long-standing and fruitful one. During Shah Jahan’s reign, this
relationship continued unabated. Verse 83 confirms this in praising Azam Khan, who served as
nāẓim or provincial governor of Gujarat from 1636-42. Azam Khan was a Central Asian migrant
to India, and became known to Jahangir by serving in the retinue of a Mughal faujdar who moved
between Punjab and Gujarat. Under Shah Jahan, he served in the imperial army fighting in the
Deccan, and was eventually made governor of Allahabad, and then Gujarat in 1638. He was
appreciated for using military tactics against the tributary chieftain at Nawanagar to destroy his
“seditious” minting activities in the southern Kacch region.
Azim Khan long governed the extensive territory of Gujarat, and in the 14 th year marched
against the zamīndār (holder of a land revenue right, belonged to a rural class standing
above the peasantry) of Jam who did not, like the other landholders, submit to authority.
He arrived at Nawanagar, the zamindar’s seat. The Jam came to his senses and presented
100 Kucch horses and three lacs of maḥmūdī (silver coin) destroying his mint where
mahmudis used to be coined. 230
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Hiravijaya Suri’s activities at the Mughal court of Emperor Akbar are well-documented in the Sanskrit
account Jagadgurukāvya (Poem of the Teacher of the World) by Padmasagara in 1589. See Audrey
Truschke, “Setting the Record Wrong”, pp. 373-375. A set of farman-s that are examined later in this
chapter also refer to Akbar’s conciliatory efforts towards members of this Jain sect.
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See Ma’asir-ul Umara, Vol. 1, pp. 315-319; Mirat-i Ahmadi, pp. 186-89. During his predecessor Saif
Khan’s tenure as Gujarat’s governor, one Kahanji was the leader of kolī-s, or nomadic forest dwelling
tribes who are documented in the sources as bandits who robbed foreign and Indian traders. To overcome
this, Azam Khan erected many military posts in the forest areas inhabited by koli-s. He also erected two
forts called Azamabad and Khalilabad, and built a traveler’s inn within the walls of the Mughal Bhadra
Fort at Ahmedabad in 1637. He was a strict governor and often displayed his power in local royal
assemblies in cruel ways. Our German traveler Mandelslo documents an incident in 1638 when Asaf Khan
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This verse documents this event from the local Jain perspective, and converges with Mughal
accounts of how this provincial governor subjugated rival chieftains and propagated a single
Mughal authority in the region. For our purposes, it is less relevant whether the Jam of
Nawanagar was a ‘rebellious chieftaincy’ or a legitimate source of localized authority that
Mughal authority unfairly encroached on. Instead, we most note the relative confluence in the
Mughal and Jain documenting of this event which indicates the symbiotic and mutually beneficial
nature of Mughal-Jain socio-political alliances in Gujarat.

Tilaksagar’s Rājasāgar Surī Nirwān Rās (1666)
To further contextualize the Jain monastic perspective on Mughal-Jain relations, and the key
role that financial agents like Shantidas Jhaveri played in forging such links, I turn to a
seventeenth-century Gujarati lyrical poem (ras) composed by Tilaksagar Suri. Completed on July
24, 1666, the Rajasagar Suri Nirwan Ras is a long narrative poem composed in honor of
Muktisagar Suri. Muktisagar was the spiritual guide of Shantidas Jhaveri, and benefitted from the
patronage that the rich banker, jeweler, and merchant provided for his master’s spiritual activities.
This vernacular literary text is also important because it provides key insights into Shantidas’
personality, and his elevated and important standing not only in the Jain community, but also at
the Mughal imperial court. Muktisagar was an itinerant Jain monk who traveled mainly between
Rajasthan and Gujarat. He frequented Shantidas’ residence in the jeweler’s neighborhood
(jhaveriwāda) in the old walled city of Ahmedabad. In 1630, with the critical intervention of
Shantidas and his nephew Vastupal, Muktisagar was elevated to the position of ācārya within the
Jain monastic hierarchy. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact role that these jeweler
brothers played in monastic politics, it is likely that Shantidas and Vastupal made donations and
used their social standing at the Mughal court to convince the greater Jain leader Vijayadeva Suri
to promote Muktisagar to the exalted position of acarya. The ceremony took place with great
fanfare and luxury at the Mahavir Swami jinalaya, or Jain temple, at Ahmedabad, and from then
on, Muktisagar was recognized with the honorific title Rajasagar. Rajasagar died on September 4,

executed twenty women-dancers who refused a visit to his court on pretense of being sick, but where
actually entertaining another patron “at a certain place, where they got money at a more delightful and
easier sport than dancing, and that they absolutely denied to come, saying, they knew well enough the
Governour would not pay them” (Travels of John Albert de Mandelslo, Book 1, p. 30). As mentioned
earlier, Azam Khan also ensured the quality of commodities like indigo that were produced and sold to
foreign traders (fn. 219), and established a Mughal mint at Junagadh in the Kathiawar peninsula suggesting
the role that the Mughals played in facilitating commercial activity and monetary exchange in the Gujarat
region.
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1665 at the age of eighty-four, and the sons of Shantidas and his brother Vardhaman led the final
procession of over 2,000 Jains to the cremation ground.
Rajasagar Suri Nirwan Ras has twenty-one cantos, each containing several short four-line
stanzas. The first five cantos praise Rajasagar, and describe his travels through Mewar and
Gujarat, along with longer laudatory descriptions of Sidhpur near Patan and Ahmedabad. Canto
six is titled Sah Shantidas nu Mamatva (Banker Shantidas’ Affection), and describes how this
banker did not initially have much by way of wealth or values, and how this changed once he
came under the influence of the Jain monks. Soon after, he sent many of his own people, which I
interpret as members of his banking and merchant fraternity, to spread good words, and of such
activities there are so many good stories to tell. Canto seven refers to the bestowing of the
Rajasagar titled on Muktisagar, and how he also received a saropā (robe of honor) and horses
from the Dillipati (Lord of Delhi, Emperor Shah Jahan). The next set of verses in Canto eight
describes the bankers and merchants of the Mughal King. Here we are provided a list of names
(12 verses) along with one line laudatory observations about each of the Jain financial agents who
are imagined by the author as being in service of the Mughal Emperor. Unfortunately, the poem
does not provide any particular details about what this kind of service included. Canto nine
contains a long praise narrative of Ahmedabad city, followed by canto ten which lists all of the
Seths of Ahmedabad (Businesspersons of Ahmedabad). Composed of twenty-three verses, this
long-list of names and one-line praises begins with Shantidas and his sons Lakshmichand and
Manekchand. Beyond conveying the importance of bankers and merchants to Mughal
sovereignty, we are in want of more information regarding the various personalities mentioned in
the poem. Cantos eleven-sixteen discuss the propagation of Jainism in Cambay, Surat, Burhanpur,
Patan, Radhanpur, and the important role of financial patronage that local Jain businesspersons
provided to enable such local proselytizing. The final five cantos focus on the death of Rajasagar,
and the subsequent rituals and final rites performed by members of Shantidas’ immediate family.
Canto 7 is titled Rajasagar ne Acarya Pad, or The Bestowal of the Acarya title on Rajasagar.
The entire canto contains 44 stanzas, of which I have selected six to translate and analyze. These
lines are representative of the longer poem, and demonstrate how a highly local and vernacular
Gujarati text conveyed the mutually constitutive nature of Mughal kingship, Jain monastic values,
and mercantile wealth in western India.
ઈત્યાદિક મુનિવર સનવ મલિઆ , નમલિઆ ચતુર ચકોર રે
રાજસાગરસ ૂરીસર ભાગ્યઈં , જોયો કીધુું જોર રે (15)
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Various monks all gathered, assembled they did the clever ones.
For Rajasagar Suri’s good fortune, for it was the beginning (of his good luck).
દિલ્િીપનિ િરબાદરિં વારું વાર , જેલિ જલગ જસ િીધા રે

પાિશાહ ખુશાિ થઈનિિં , જેહનિ નસરપા િીધા રે , હાુંરે ભાઈ ગજરથ ધોડા ધીધા રે (16)
The one (Rajasagar) who had won over the Delhi Darbar time and again.
The Emperor, becoming elated, on who bestowed a robe of honor and horses.
સહ જજહાુંગીર પાિશાહ પ ૂરો , પ્રખિ પ્રિાનપિં સ ૂર રે
ખ ૂશાિ થઇનિિં જેહનિિં પોનિિં , િીધુું પોિાનુું ન ૂર રે (17)
Shah Jahangir the former Emperor, famous for his bravery.
(He) was delighted, and even conferred his own glory (on Rajasagar).
લચિંિામલિ પ્રાસાિ કરાવી , જેલિंां કીરનિ વેિડી

રોપી રે

સોનિિં રૂપઇં જિઘરપદરंां વ ૂઠો , તુિઇ હરી વિી ઘણુું ઓપી રે (18)
The one who established Cintamani, and sowed seeds of his fame in doing so.
Built gold and silver water houses (wells), and enabled crops and other necessities.
જૈિ ઉધાર ઉધાર વિી િીિિો , જેલિंां ધિ ખરચી કીધો રે
પાિશાહ ઉમરાવે માન્યો , િેલિ જલગ હઓ
પ્રસાધઓ રે (19)
ૂ
The Jain who accomplished much for the poor, and spent lots of wealth for them.
The Emperor and Imperial Nobles appreciated his efforts, and in this way he became famous.
શાુંિીિાસ સરીખા શ્રાવક જેહિઇં , શ્રી પાિશાહ વિીિા રે
હયગય રથ પાયકિા સ્વામો , સકિ ળોકનિિં પ્રીિા રે (20)
“No śrāvaka (Jain) compares to Shantidas”, this is what the Emperor (Shah Jahan) said.
With horse and cow chariots he ruled the roads, and was the beloved of everyone.
These verses written in Old Gujarati demonstrate the intertwined nature of decentralized
Mughal rule, mercantile wealth and standing, and Jain monastic politics. Although the poem was
composed in July 1666 during the initial months of Aurangzeb’s rule, the poet is clearly referring
to Rajasagar and Shantidas’ relationship with the previous Emperor Shah Jahan. This becomes
even more evident when we consider that Rajasagar died during the last few months of Shah
Jahan’s reign in 1665, and that these verses inaugurate the canto describing Rajasagar’s elevation
to acarya in 1630. The poet writes that Rajasagar interacted with the Emperor’s court, and
received a robe of honor and horses as a mark of honor, respect, and investiture. As Stewart
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Gordon and other scholars have documented in various writings, such robes and gifts to nobles,
religious heads, and other elites from the hand of the Emperor were critical in establishing sociopolitical relationships, real and perceived hierarchies, and cultures of reciprocity that allowed
social reproduction. It was a semiotic ritual in which a luxury fabric or other expensive and rare
objects of curiosity were publically presented to individuals to index social and political
relationships. In this case, the Jain tradition celebrates with pride the Mughal bestowal of a saropa
on Rajasagar by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, suggesting that kingly recognition was
important to this monastic tradition. 231 This is further emphasized by the following verse
indicating that even the previous Mughal Emperor Jahangir (“Shah Jahangir Patshah Puro”), who
was famous for his bravery, was also overjoyed with Rajasagar and conferred his glory, perhaps
through gifts and kind words, on the Jain pontiff.
The canto then turns to the philanthropic activities of Shantidas Jhaveri, and once again
documents his building of the Cintamani temple discussed earlier. In addition, we learn that
Shantidas also undertook projects of public infrastructure such as the building of wells, and how
these enabled the growth of crops and met other daily needs. Verse 19 notes that this Jain did
various other work for the poor, and spent considerable amounts of wealth on those in need. His
generosity towards the public was even appreciated by the Emperor and the nobles of the Mughal
bureaucracy (umarāʻ, sing. āmīr). The final couplet quotes Shah Jahan’s impression of Shantidas
as an extraordinary Jain, and ends by painting a vivid and regal picture of the royally favored
jeweler, banker, and merchant in his chariot, dearly loved by everyone around the world (sakala
lok). Taken together, the Cintamani Prasasti of Vidya Saubhagya and the Rajasagar Suri Nirwan
Ras of Tilaksagar Suri are hitherto unexplored sources that demonstrate how the Jain literary
tradition understood, documented, and transmitted the complex worldview that monks,
merchants, and the Mughals occupied. These sources belong to the local Sanskrit and Gujarati
traditions, and confirm perspectives contained in the Persian documents about Mughal rule in
seventeenth-century Gujarat. Jain monks and financial agents are depicted as clearly supporting
members of the Mughal ruling elite right from successive emperors to local governors, and the
political and economic reasons underpinning such vehement and consciousness Jain support of
Mughal rule shall become clear in the subsequent section where I examine a set of Mughal
farman-s or Persian royal orders pertaining to Mughal rule in its most coveted province Gujarat.
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Temple Desecration, Imperial Loans, and Financial Agents, c. 1620-1660
Shah Jahan’s son Prince Aurangzeb was appointed governor of Gujarat on February 25, 1645,
and remained in the province for less than two years. The Prince arrived in Ahmedabad with his
retinue on April 26 of the same year, and soon after desecrated the Cintamani Paraswanath
Temple discussed earlier. The Mirat-i Ahmadi notes “during the governorship of the religious
minded, noble Prince, vestiges of the Temple of Cintamani situated on the side of Saraspur built
by Satidas jeweler were removed under the Prince’s order and a masjid was erected on its
remains. It was named Quwwat-ul Islam (Might of Islam)”.232 More than twenty years later, the
foreign travelers M. De Thevenot and Jean-Baptiste Tavernier recalled the desecration during
their visits to Ahmedabad, indicating that the momentous event continued to dominate local
historical memory of Aurangzeb’s rule as the provincial governor. 233 It is possible that Aurangzeb
and Shantidas had a dispute regarding money matters or even loans refused to the young prince,
since the Mirat-i Ahmadi notes that in the early months of Aurangzeb’s governorship expenses in
the provincial capital outweighed income. Nevertheless, Shantidas was a friend of the court, an
illustrious merchant who supplied jewels and other rare artifacts to the Mughal court, especially
the Prince’s father. Aurangzeb was recalled in 1646, and sent on military campaigns to Balkh and
Badakhshan in modern day Afghanistan. 234 Shah Jahan was given an opportunity to reconcile
Aurangzeb’s misdeeds of desecrating the temple when he learned from his legal counsel that
according to Islamic Law, a mosque built on another’s private property cannot be considered a
232

Mirat-i Ahmadi, pp. 194-95.
Traveling through Gujarat in 1666, Thevenot writes “Amedabad being inhabited also by a great number
of Heathens, there are Pagods, or Idol-Temples in it. That which was called the Pagod of Santidas was the
chief, before Auranzeb (sic) converted it into a Mosque. When he performed that Ceremonie, he caused a
Cow to be killed in the place, knowing very well that after such an action, the gentiles according to their
Law, could worship no more therein. All around the Temple there is a cloyster furnished with lovely cells,
beautified with figures of marble in relief, representing naked women sitting after the oriental fashion. The
inside roof of the mosque is pretty enough, and the walls are full of the figures of men and beasts, but
Auranzeb, who hath always made a shew of an affected devotion, which at length raised him to the throne,
caused the noses of all these figures which added a great deal of magnificence to that mosque, to be beat
off.” See Thévenot, Jean de. 1665-1684 (1687). The Travels of Monsieur de Thevenot into the Levant in
Three Parts: Turkey, Persia, and the East-Indies, trans. A. Lovell. London: H. Clark, Book 3, p. 10;
Having been to Ahmedabad over ten times, the French jeweler and gem merchant Tavernier also noted the
temple desecration episode, albeit in lesser detail during his sojourn ten years after Thevenot’s in 1676. See
Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste. 1676. (1889). Travels in India, trans. V. Ball. London: Macmillan & Co, Vol. 1,
p. 72.
234
Between 1628-58, Gujarat was governed by at least twelve different governors or their deputies,
including three imperial princess Aurangzeb (1645-46), Dara Shikoh (1648-52), and Murad Bakhsh (165458). Shaistah Khan, who governed in 1646-48 and 1654-58, was the brother-in-law of Shah Jahan through
his wife Mumtaz Mahal. Shaistah Khan tried to monopolize the indigo industry for his own personal gain,
and he was recalled and transferred to Malwa after his first tenure. See Ma’asir-ul Umara, Vol. 2, pp. 82536; English Factory Records, Vol. 8, pp. 58, 193; Commissariat, A History of Gujarat, Vol. 2, p. 129.
118
233

genuine place of Islamic worship. Shah Jahan issued a royal order dated July 3, 1648 directing the
new governor Shaistah Khan and his deputy Ghairat Khan to restore the temple lands and
buildings to Shantidas, and compensate him for the damages done.
Be it known to the governors and port-officials of the province of Gujarat, especially to
him who has been worthy of various favors, Ghairat Khan, that formerly, in respect of the
temple of the leading person of the time (zubdat-al aqrān) Satidas Jawahari, an exalted
and blessed order had been issued to Umdat-ul Mulk Shaistah Khan to this effect:
Shahzada Sultan Aurangzeb Bahadur, having constructed in that place some miḥrāb-s
(prayer alter in a mosque), had given it the name of a mosque (Quwwat-ul Islam); and,
thereafter, Mulla Abdul Hakim had represented to His Majesty that this building, by
reason of its being the property of another person, could not be considered a mosque
according to the Islamic law. A world-obeyed order had, therefore, obtained the honor of
being issued that this building being the property of Satidas, the mihrab-s should be
removed, and the building handed over to him. 235

The insult to injury was likely offensive to Shantidas, since we have no evidence
commemorating any rebuilding. The monument eventually fell into decay, and nothing remains
of it now. The only surviving memory of the temple are the literary accounts analyzed in the
previous section, and brief observations by our foreign travelers already cited.
Shah Jahan’s youngest son Prince Murad Bakhsh succeeded to the governorship of Gujarat in
February 1654. He was sanctioned an estimated sixteen crore rupees per annum as salary,
suggesting that he was not in need of borrowing during the relatively stable rule of his
assignment.236 The English Factory Records also document his extensive purchasing of indigo
and saltpeter from local manufacturers at wholesale prices, presumably to sell to foreign
merchants at a profit.237 There are two other rituals associated with Murad Bakhsh gubernatorial
tenure that indicate the imperial treasury, its provincial counterpart in Ahmedabad, and the
personal assets of the princely subadar were cash-flow positive. The first is his second marriage
to the daughter of one Amir Khan, with whom Shah Jahan also sent “jewels, jewel-studded
articles, gold utensils, silverwares, and other things the worth of all was one lakh rupees by way
of dowry”.238 In addition, the Prince was given 120,000 rupees as a gift from the treasury of the
imperial stirrup at Ahmedabad and 80,000 rupees from the Surat treasury, along with additional
jagir-s including the district of Junagadh in Kathiawar. Murad reciprocated his father’s largess by
sending a peshkash or tributary offering “consisting of jewels, precious textiles, twenty-eight
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Arab and Kacchi horses, eighteenth Gujarati oxen, and other articles”. 239 This exchange of cash,
expensive jewelry, and other items of monetary and semiotic value suggests that in the waning
years of Shah Jahan’s rule, the imperial system of managing entitlements to land, local revenues,
bureaucratic rights and duties, and courtly culture was functioning relatively well. The sources for
this period suggest that monetary crisis was not endemic to Shah Jahan’s rule, and local financial
agents, Mughal governors, and foreign traders were part of a commercial political economy
brought together by foreign demand for Indian indigo and saltpeter, the need to convert inbound
gold and silver into local currency, and the demand for land revenue by the Mughal state. The
administrative apparatus of the Mughal government ensured that trade and transactions between
disparate groups were relatively free of extortion, bribery, forgery, and other forms of disruptive
behavior. This is what explains the sustained nature of European commercial relations with
Indian manufacturers, producers, merchants, and local governors from 1600 onward.
Much of this began to change on the eve of September 15, 1657 when news of Emperor Shah
Jahan’s sickness spread through the corridors of Empire. By the early months of 1658, rival
princes began a fratricidal and intriguing contest for the Mughal throne. “The Mogol’s illness
filled the whole extent of his dominions with agitation and alarm. Dara collected powerful armies
in Delhi and Agra, the principal cities of the kingdom. In Bengale, Sultan Sujah made the same
vigorous preparations for war. Aureng-Zebe in the Decan, and Morad-Bakche in Guzarate, also
levied such forces as envinced a determination to contend for empire. The four brothers gathered
around them their friends and allies, all wrote letters, made large promises and entered into a
variety of intrigues.”240 In Gujarat, the governor and youngest prince Murad proclaimed himself
Emperor, and brutally assassinated the Mughal diwan Ali Naqi who stood in opposition to his bid
for the throne. 241 This murder would form the legal grounds on which Aurangzeb would later
imprison and execute Murad. As part of preparation for battle with his brothers, Murad required
immediate cash to buy military supplies, hire foot soldiers, and amass other provisions. Although
his imperial salary was large, these amounts would only be available during harvest seasons.
Even then, the produce would have to be sold in the markets. The process of monetizing the land
revenue that formed the core of his imperial salary would take far too long during this immediate
crisis of war. As a result, he began a local fundraising campaign that relied on tactics of financial
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diplomacy and brute force. He sent men to Surat to seize the royal treasury at the Surat Castle,
and raised a militia that cost more than 500,000 per month in basic salaries to military day
laborers.242 In Surat, a member of Murad’s entourage named Shahbaz Khan obtained a loan of 5
lakh rupees from Haji Muhammad Zahid Beg and Virji Vohra.243 Shortly after on Dec. 5, 1657,
Murad declared himself Emperor at Ahmedabad, having had the khuṭba, or public Islamic
sermon, read in his name. Significantly, he had new silver rupees stamped with the following:
Muhammad Murad, the victorious king, the second Alexander, took the heritage from (Shah)
Jahan, the Lord of Conjunction. Another set of gold and silver coins were stamped at Cambay
with the following: Badshah Ghazi, Muhammad Murad Bakhsh, Murawaj-ud Din, struck at
Khambayat.244
On January 19, 1658, Murad entered the walled city of Ahmedabad and obtained another loan
of 5.5 lakh rupees from the “sons and brothers of Satidas jeweler, a favorite of the Court, and a
devoted man of service to the noble Princes (who) was then in service of His Majesty (Shah
Jahan)”.245 Original copies of the royal orders confirming the loan along with the name of the
villages from which the land revenue would be derived to repay the borrowed sum are preserved
by the contemporary descendants of Shantidas in Ahmedabad. They have also been reproduced
independently and verbatim from the records of the Mughal diwan’s office in the Mirat-i
Ahmadi.246
Be it known to Mutamad Khan (Murad’s eunuch deputy in Gujarat), the asylum of
governorship and administration, receipt of dignity and grandeur, what is sincere and
honored confidant being assaulted and distinguished with boundless favors, that Satidas
Sahu has been blessed with the auspicious audience. By virtue of favors which have been
conferred on him, and Order, obeyed by the world, radiant as the sun, necessary to be
obeyed, is issued to the effect that the sum of money which is due to Manekchand, the
son of the above-mentioned person, and to his brothers, from the Sarkar, which is the
pivot of mankind, taken as a loan at Ahmedabad, the place of accession, and the details of
which loan are given in the endorsement, should be paid back from the revenues of the
autumn season, derived from the districts mentioned in the endorsement. Since
Manekchand has rendered meritorious service, and Satidas has been, out of faithfulness
and devotion, blessed with the holy audience, therefore, the exalted order is repeated to
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the effect that he (Mutamad Khan) should make such efforts in this matter that the sum
advanced by him and his brothers may soon be paid. He should consider this matter as
very urgent and act in accordance with the exalted and holy order.
Loan repayment as per follows:
From Surat

150,000 Rupees

Khambayat

100,000

Pargana Petlad

100,000

Dholka

75,000

Bharuch

50,000

Viramgam

45,000

Namaksar (salt pans)

30,000
Total 550,000 Rupees

As history would have it, Aurangzeb emerged as the dominant force in the fight for the
imperial throne, and had his father Shah Jahan imprisoned at Agra Fort. Murad Bakhsh, who was
betrayed by a false alliance offered by Aurangzeb, was defeated and made a prisoner of
Aurangzeb’s new government. He was eventually beheaded in prison for murdering the Mughal
diwan Ali Naqi in Ahmedabad. 247 For our purposes, it is significant that after being crowned
Mughal Emperor in 1658, Aurangzeb issued a reconciliatory farman addressed to Shantidas and
members of his merchant-banking fraternity in Gujarat. This farman suggests that Aurangzeb was
interested in conveying his support of the professional activities of bankers, merchants, traders,
jewelers, brokers, and the other endogamous specialist groups of commerce. In the inaugural
years of his rule, Aurangzeb cultivated the Mughal court’s longstanding relationship with
Shantidas, and through him, conveyed the Mughal government’s genuine intention of
perpetuating and further cultivating political and economic ties with the businesspersons of
Ahmedabad. Aurangzeb issued two related farman-s to Shantidas on August 10, 1658, and they
are worth reproducing in full.
Be it known to the thrifty and favor desiring Rahmat Khan, who has been honored by the
Royal kindness, that the chief among the Nobles, Satidas Jawahari, who has received the
honor of the audience of his illustrious Majesty, and who has been permitted, location of
auspicious beginning and happy ending, to go from the court to his native place
247
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Ahmedabad, has broad, through the medium of those who stand at the foot of the throne,
to our exalted and elevated notice that Prince Murad Bakhsh has taken at Ahmedabad (as
a loan) the sum of five lakh and fifty thousand rupees, of which amount four lakhs and
sixty-two thousand rupees were from Manekchand, the son, and from Rabidas, the
partner, of the servant Satidas, and eighty thousand from some of the relations of this
humble person, according to the details written below, this has been the cause of anxiety
to the servant. Therefore, on account of our kindness and generosity, we grant the sum of
1 lakh of rupees from the Royal treasury to the said person, and in this connection and
illustrious farman has also been issued to Shah Nawaz Khan (the governor) the epitome
of the family of the Prophet, the chief of the household of Ali, the pillar of the great
Empire, the receiver of boundless favors, the center of unlimited goodness, the elevated,
the Khan. And therefore this world obeyed and obedience demanding order is also issued
to you who deserve favor. Satisfying yourself about this loan of 4 lakhs and sixty-two
thousand rupees made by his son and his partner, you should, with the concurrence of the
above-mentioned Khan, give one lakh of rupees to the said person without any delay and
hesitation so that he may, by making use of it, carry on his business and profit by it. This
should be treated as urgent and considered peremptory. 248
Since all the exalted ambition and all the true intention of his majesty are devoted to the
comfort of all his subjects and of the whole of mankind, who are the precious Trust of the
almighty and eternal Lord, and this time of auspicious beginning and of happy end, the
cream of peers, Satidas Jawahari, has received permission from the court of the Saltanat
and sovereignty to proceed to Ahmedabad, his native place. He has been commanded that
after his arrival there he should announce to all the businesspersons and the mahājan
(great businesspersons, merchants, traders) and to all the inhabitants of that land our
desire for just administration and our regard for the subjects, which are the cause of the
order of the universe and of the regulation of the affairs of mankind, so that all, having
settled in their places and dwellings, may pursue, with composure of mind and
satisfaction of heart, their respective occupations and professions, and may pray for the
permanence of the State granted by God (daulat-i khudādād) which is of eternal duration
without end and of eternal foundation without beginning. The present and future
administrators of important affairs and transactions of that place (i.e. Ahmedabad) are
required to consider the above-mentioned person (Satidas) as the old servant of the court,
which is the asylum of the world, and to discharge the obligations of good dealing and
kind treatment (towards him). They should help him in his financial affairs referred by
him to the court and make sure that no one interferes with or obstructs the affairs of the
above-mentioned, and of the other inhabitants of that place. They should consider this as
urgent and should abstain from disobeying this order. 249

A more longue durée perspective on the Jhaveri family and their relationship to the Mughal
court brings into focus the argument that until at least 1660, the ruling elite did not depend on
Gujarati bankers and merchants for regular finance. Rather, these businesspersons were in
demand for their specialist services such as assaying foreign currency, minting Mughal coins,
transferring money across private networks through transferable promissory notes (hundī), and
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procuring and selling luxury commodities to nobles. 250 It is only during imperial succession
battles between rival princes and their allied groups that evidence about exceptional borrowing
from private financiers and merchants is documented. In an appendix to this chapter, I have
assembled a table of 43 major Mughal Farmans pertaining to imperial rule in Gujarat covering 97
years between 1565-1662. In conjunction with the local Sanskrit and Gujarati evidence examined
earlier, these royal orders suggest that prominent merchants like Shantidas shared a symbiotic
relationship with figures of political authority. His activities as a banker, moneylender, revenue
farmer, broker, merchant, political financier, community leader, philanthropist, patron to Jain
architecture and activities, and Mughal courtier emerge clearly in these royal orders. The various
hereditary land grants (inām, See Quadrant 3, Chapter 2) bestowed on Jain, Parsi, and Catholic
priests during this period suggest that the Mughal Empire was being forged into a contractually
robust polity that was organized around parceling various rights to land revenue to propagate and
preserve imperial sovereignty and the legal fiction of Mughal land revenue rights across northern
and western India. In addition, we also have a copy of the revenue contract that outlines
Shantidas’ purchasing of temporary land revenue rights over certain districts in Kathiawar. These
were immediately renewed by successive emperors in the seventeenth century, suggesting the
important role that prominent businesspersons played in the social and public management of
lands that were beyond Mughal control or kept consciously outside the realm of immediate
Mughal focus for diplomatic reasons (ijārah, See Quadrant 2, Chapter 2).251
The first dozen royal orders were issued by Akbar between 1585-1605, of which five are
madad-i ma‘āsh land grants to Jains and Parsis respectively. 252 Madad-i ma‘ash was a form of
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Islamic charity in which a land grant was bestowed on scholars, ascetics and hermits, the
destitute, or even men of noble birth who were unable to acquire money through their own
efforts. Six royal orders confirm Akbar granting Jain monks their wish to ban animal slaughter for
a few days each month, and a last one grants a group of Jesuits the right to build a church in the
trading port town of Cambay. The next set of eight farman-s were issued by Jahangir between
1608-18, of which four were bestowed on members of the Jain community banning animal
slaughter during the twelve days of Paryushana, or the most important annual event in which Jain
monks and laypersons increase their spiritual activities. Two royal orders were granted to the
Portuguese Padres trading at Ahmedabad, one allowing them to build a church and another
settling a property dispute between Englishmen and the Padres. A final farman, although
incomplete, was issued by Jahangir to our prominent jeweler-banker Shantidas in c. 1616. This
was a first in the long series of Mughal orders addressed to Shantidas, and offers him protection
in exchange for providing the court with rarities that might enhance royal prestige.
The present and future Governors and officers of the province of Gujarat, being favored
with and hopeful of the royal kindness, should know that since we have placed Satidas
Jawahari, a resident of that province, under the protection of the pillar of the state, the
choicest of the devoted Servants of the court of the caliphate, the cream of the devoted,
the choicest of the Faithful Servants, the model of the exalted Khans, the best of the
fortunate disciples, Nizam-ud-din Asaf Khan, so that he (Satidas) should offer gifts and
presents, and every kind of jewelry which he may procure, allure of the exalted Empire. It
is necessary that no one of the governors…(incomplete). 253

The next fourteen farman-s form the core corpus of orders related to Shantidas, and were
issued by Shah Jahan between 1636-57. This was the high-tide of his commercial and political
activities in Gujarat, and the sources clearly demonstrate the coordinated relationship that that
Mughal court sought to cultivate with him. The first farman dated 1636 is addressed to imperial
administrators of the province at Ahmedabad, and tells them that “since Shantidas is a merchant
and a loyal jeweler of the Court”, none of the officials should interfere in his activities as urban
landlord (collecting rent from his various shops and mansions), or meddle in the commercial and
private affairs of his children. 254 The second two orders are almost identical, and were issued on
August 27, 1642 and September 26, 1642, respectively. They emphasize Shantidas’ thriving
business as a provider of precious jewels to the royal court. This suggests that Mughals used
imperial injunctions to facilitate the procuring and transfer of luxury commodities to Shah Jahan
and members of his nobility directly. There is no mention or indirect hint at the Mughals
borrowing money from this great trader. Rather, there is a desire to ensure that no Mughal
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officials in the locality interfere with Shantidas and his agents while they are conducting business.
The farman refers to him as a devoted servant of Islam, suggesting the important role that courtly
diplomacy and imperial language played in connecting the disparate worlds of the royal court and
the local businessperson. Such connections, indexed by the language of political administration
and imperial grandeur, were especially relevant for those elite traders busy procuring items of
conspicuous consumption for Mughal nobles. An order issued by Shah Jahan on August 27, 1642
suggests that many such traders were also serving as brokers and intermediaries of members of
the Mughal court who wished to participate and profit from the lively commercial world
contained within Gujarat.
Since the devoted servant of Islam, Satidas the jeweler, always send some one of his
servants to the Royal courts, and purchases jewels and other articles, this order, played by
the world and to which the world renders obedience, has been issued to the effect that, at
the time of such visits, the officers, functionaries and officials, of the present and future
affairs, of these ports should not interfere with the agents of the above-mentioned person,
and they should give them a safe conduct in the territories within their charge. 255

From this period, we have four additional farman-s that testify Shantidas’ activities as a
world-class jeweler. An order dated September 17, 1644 instructs officials in Ahmedabad to
“procure jewels worth presenting, turning the jewelers of that place, and especially from Satidas
Jawahari, and to forward the same…. And also send, for the exalted Sarkar, the pickles of pepper
(āchar-i mirch) which the foreigners bring”.256 Another royal order issued on September 1, 1655
with the signature of Prince Dara Shikoh admonishes Shantidas for not sending quality jewels to
the imperial court.
Be it known to the most excellent man Satidas, who has been hopeful of royal favors, that
the grace and indulgence which we, of good fortune and good luck, have extended to
him, are well known to the people of the world. It is necessary for him to make a return
for it by sending presents and rare things. For a considerable time, no good has been
rendered by him and he has not sent a gift fit for our approval. Moreover, it is heard that
he has sent good things to other places. Since information has come to us he has secured
a round diamond weighing 44 surkhs, he should send that very diamond to us and make
up for all his past negligence by sending it. If he delays in sending the above-mentioned a
report will be made to the King and he will be called to the court, nay, we shall write to
our well-known and successful brother of high family Sultan Murad Baksh (serving as
Governor in Gujarat) to give him a warning. 257

Two additional orders continue to push Shantidas to send special items to the court. These
orders use the threat of violence as a technique of persuasion rather than an absolute promise. The
orders suggest that the Mughal appetite for procuring rare objects was larger than any immediate
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inclination to use brutal violence against those financial agents and merchants able to source and
sell such desirable goods. In an order dated February 4, 1656, Prince Aurangzeb chastises
Shantidas for sending “articles that were not fit to be approved by the exalted and blessed nature
of the King”, and that “in the future, Satidas should send to the court vessels decorated with
jewels as well as excellent jewels fit for being approved, and these should be rare things”.258 A
final farman of this category is dated July 24, 1656, and Shantidas is summoned urgently to the
court by Shah Jahan, presumably to bring items of great value to the Mughal Emperor. Taken
together, these six farman-s demonstrate that the Mughal court had the financial wherewithal to
purchase rare and expensive goods from Shantidas. The jeweler had a direct relationship with
members of the nobility, and this was not predicated on him lending money for political activities
or propagating the military-fiscal apparatus of the Mughal State. Rather, the financial agent was
brought into the world of Mughal sovereignty by his ability to provide objects of real and
semiotic value that served as paraphernalia of royal sovereignty at the Emperor’s court, and
satiated the Mughal appetite for objects of glamor and value.
Another set of farman-s issued during Shah Jahan’s reign pertain to various forms of land
rights granted to Shantidas in Gujarat. Two documents pertain to the ijarah of village
Shankheshwar in the district of Munjpur near Patan in northern Gujarat. Shankheshwar is located
120 km northwest of Ahmedabad, and literary evidence suggests that it has been an important
Jain pilgrimage town since at least the thirteenth century. The architectural evidence suggests that
new Jain temples were erected in the late sixteenth-century. In these two documents dated
December 23, 1657, Shantidas Jhaveri leases the village for a sum of 1,050 rupees per year, and
the farman specifies that “the above mentioned banker Shantidas, having paid the necessary dues
to the jagirdar-s, is enjoined to make strenuous efforts to promote the prosperity of the said
village and the welfare of its inhabitants”.259 It is important to note here that the grant of ijarah
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Commissariat, “Imperial Mughal Farmans”, Plate XI
The full farman reads “The present and future jagirdar-s of the pargana of Munjpur, being hopeful of the
royal favors, should know that since it has been brought to our holy notice that, in accordance with the
sanad granted by the court and by the former officers, the mauza of Sankhsara (Shankheshwar) in the above
mentioned pargana has for a considerable time been leased (ijara) to the cream of the peers (subdat-al
akran), Satidas Jawahiri, for a sum of one thousand and fifty rupees, and the above-mentioned Satidas pays
the said amount together with some payment in kind (i.e. in edible grains) to the jagirdar; therefore, and
exalted order obtains the honor of being issued to the effect that, in accordance with the above-mentioned
orders, they (the jagirdar-s) should keep that Village intact as an Ijarah of the above-mentioned (Satidas)
and should introduce no change or alteration in the rules thereof. It is the duty of the above-mentioned
Satidas that, having discharged his responsibility to the jagirdar about paying the necessary dues for that
mauza in accordance with the terms of the settlement and agreement, he should make strenuous efforts to
promote the prosperity welfare and comfort of the inhabitants of that place.” See Commissariat, “Imperial
Mughal Farmans”, Plates XIII and XIV
127
259

rights over Shankheshwar to Shatidas Jhaveri does not suggest a simple commercialization of
land revenue administration and the raising of quick capital by the Mughal State. Rather, these
rights were granted to Shantidas for administrative ease. Since Shankheshwar was a Jain
pilgrimage site, it was more efficient for Mughal authorities to lease-out its revenues on an annual
basis to a trustworthy revenue-farmer like Shantidas. Moreover, the relatively small sum of 1,050
rupees indicates that the temporary revenue rights were purchased for a token amount rather than
an amount that would make any significant impact on the Mughal treasury. Therefore, the leasing
out of Shankheshwar was not symptomatic of imperial weakness, but suggests that it was a
strategy by which the Mughal State forged local administration, maintained relationships with
provincial elites, and collected revenues, no matter how insignificant the sum, in its name.
While the two farman-s just cited fall into the category of temporary land rights (See
Quadrant 2, Chapter 2), we have another group of orders that are classified more properly as inam
rights. The management of the land revenues and administrative affairs of Palitana, Girnar, and
Abu in the Kathiawar peninsula was entrusted to Shantidas by Shah Jahan and his kingly
successors. We have five imperial ‘Palitana Farmans’, one by Shah Jahan, two by Murad Bakhsh,
and one by Aurangzeb. While Shankheshwar was a temple town that had land revenue paying
capacity and was therefore farmed out as an ijarah right, the hills at Palitana were considered
sacred and their administration fell squarely under Quadrant III as elaborated in the previous
chapter. Palitana was originally granted by Shah Jahan to Murad Bakhsh as part of his jagir in
Gujarat, and Murad Bakhsh in turn granted it to Shantidas, with the Emperor’s approval, as
perpetual inam for the continued use of the area as a Jain pilgrimage site. Shortly after being
crowned Emperor, Aurangzeb reconfirmed this hereditary right by giving Shantidas a fresh
farman dated March 12, 1660. It is important to note that Aurangzeb also recognized the material
help that Shantidas provided to the imperial army during their various marches in Gujarat during
the 1650s. The farman concludes that “that the grass which grows there may be used for grazing
by the animals and the cattle of the Sravak community, and the timber and fuel which is to be
found on the hill of Satrunja should belong to the sravaka (Jain) community, so that they may
utilize these for whatever purpose they like. Whoever guards the hill of Shatrunjaya and its
temple should be entitled to the income of Palitana, and they should continue in prayer for the
maintenance of the eternal government”.260
During the imperial wars of succession between Murad Bakhsh and Aurangzeb, we have a
curious incident in which both rival princes confirm Shantidas’ hereditary inam rights over
260
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Palitana within one month of each other. As self-proclaimed sovereign, Murad Bakhsh issued a
farman on June 20, 1658 saying that Shantidas requested fresh orders reconfirming all his
hereditary land right from the recently elevated and de facto sovereign Murad. This date was just
a few days prior to Murad’s imprisonment at Mathura by Aurangzeb. On July 29th of the same
year, Aurangzeb granted Shantidas a similar order confirming Palitana as inam, and this was also
at the request of the banker himself. It is likely that Shantidas was uncertain where political
futures of the Empire might fall, and therefore offered his cooperation and sought documentary
reconfirmation from both princes as a preemptive measure. Similarly, even Aurangzeb
understood the value of cultivating relationships with a wealthy friend of the court, and continued
to support Shantidas during the initial years of his reign. Rather than extort or subject Shantidas
to the violence available to Mughal rulers, they preferred tactical solutions that involved
borrowing money during exceptional crisis, granting ijarah rights over certain villages for
administrative ease, and offering inam lands for the propagation and prosperity of the Jain
community that Shantidas represented. The early years of Aurangzeb’s rule continued earlier
Mughal traditions of patronizing Shantidas and other members of the financial and religious elite,
and drawing them into the world of Mughal entitlements to land, sovereignty, and political
futures. These relationships were not cultivated because the Mughal elite required regular loans or
financial assistance of the mercantile class. Rather, they were harnessed for the luxury goods that
people like Shantidas could obtain for the court, their role as intermediaries between the imperial
court and the local religious and business communities, and their critical help, financial and
otherwise, during moments of political crisis such as succession wars. From the perspective of
Shantidas and his business fraternity, cultivating close connections with political power was a
strategy to ensure that their personal property and entitlements to various decentralized forms of
land revenue rights were secure, their businesses protected from arbitrary violence, their religious
rituals and pilgrimages free from harassment, and their families protected by the military might of
the Mughal armies.261 The contours of this delicately balanced relationship would change in the
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There are several deeds documenting the buying and selling of urban private property in Ahmedabad
during the seventeenth century. All contain the seals and signatures of Mughal officials working in the
diwan’s office. Dozens of these original deeds are held by the B.J. Institute of Indology in Ahmedabad, and
might form the basis of a future study demonstrating the strength of Mughal rule in urban areas, and
contrasting this with their more tentative hold of rural areas, especially in the Kathiawar peninsula and in
Kacch. Even Shantidas Jhaveri obtained local Mughal seals of approval for his local property dealings,
including verifying property bequeathed to his children as inheritance. The waṣīyat-nāma, or will, of
Shantidas Jhaveri is held by the National Museum in Karachi, Pakistan, and suggests the strength of the
Mughal legal apparatus in the Ahmedabad locality during the final years of Shah Jahan’s rule. See Jhaveri,
Shantidas. 1657. Waṣīyat-nāma (The Last Will of Shantidas Jhaveri), Persian text reproduced and
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years immediately after 1660, and more drastically after 1680, when Aurangzeb’s unsustainable
expansionist desires, among other factors such as the growing threat of rival militarized groups
emerging from the countryside, enervated Mughal political economy, land revenue
administration, and imperial bureaucracy from within.

Cultivating Financial Crisis under Aurangzeb, 1660-1707
Aurangzeb began his long tenure as Emperor in the final months of 1658. By this time,
Mughal State had evolved into a contractually robust, bureaucratically complex, and fiscally
sound polity. Of course, these descriptions are relative, and simply refer to the fact that the
Mughal Emperor was the most influential source of public authority and social organization
across much of northern and western India. As explored in the previous chapter, its flexible
system of tenurial entitlements accommodated various social groups who sought sustenance from
land revenue, and allowed financial agents who offered relatively independent but critical
services as assayers, mint masters, financiers, remitters, and foreign currency converters to
partake in the growing monetization of the agrarian economy and the early onset of the
commodification of the office of the land revenue right holder. The earlier sections have duly
demonstrated how merchants, epitomized by the professional activities of the Gujarati jeweler,
banker, revenue farmer, and inam right holder Shantidas Jhaveri, were incorporated into the
increasingly complex bureaucratic-fiscal practices of the Mughal State and into the extended
patrimonial household of the royal family. The loans that Murad Bakhsh raised from Shantidas
and his children during his bid for the throne, and which were later repaid by Aurangzeb with
respectful acknowledgement of the Gujarati banker’s years of service to the Mughal court,
suggest that until 1660, the Mughal State depended on financiers for cash advances only during
moments of exceptional need. In the immediate years after Aurangzeb’s coronation, nobles and
officials of the provincial government still received their salaries from the Mughal diwan’s office
or through payment in cash and kind raised from the jagir lands they held as part of their military
stipends.
Aurangzeb inherited the coveted throne of kingship, and with it, the many endemic problems
that had slowly and subtly accumulated within the complex Mughal bureaucracy since the midsixteenth century. In addition, the centripetal force that the Mughal paraphernalia of sovereignty
exerted on local groups brought the Mughal armies under growing conflict with smaller states in

translated by Chaghatai, M. Abdulla. 1971. “A Rare Historical Scroll of Shah Jahan’s Reign”. In Journal of
the Asiatic Society of Pakistan 16(1): 63-77.
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Rajasthan and the Deccan, and militarized zamindar-s who aspired political autonomy. 262 While
many of these little polities already had de facto spheres of independent influence that were
maintained by periodically paying tribute to the Mughal garrison commander stationed closest to
their lands, they now sought more explicit and official arrangements for not paying tribute and
perpetuating their own forms of political administration. Many of these revenue-sharing
arrangements that Aurangzeb had to reassess upon being enthroned had longer histories. Perhaps
the most important of these political alliances was established between 1630-35 by Shah Jahan
during his campaigns towards southern India. He extracted strict terms on which the rulers of
Bijapur and Golconda were made into tribute paying states of the Mughal Empire. Indirect rule in
the Deccan enabled the Mughal State to have a geopolitical buffer in the south that did not impact
resources of the Mughal treasury or army. As John F. Richards notes, “over the next forty years
(1636-76) this unchallenged settlement contributed greatly to the peace and prosperity of Bijapur,
Golconda, and the Mughal provinces in the Deccan”. 263 The southern states also benefitted from
pay about 800,000 silver rupees as recognized tribute per year. This alliance of sorts prevented
incursions into the Deccan from Mughal armies and other recalcitrant military groups from the
north.
Aurangzeb, who served as governor of the Deccan twice before assuming the throne, held a
different view on Mughal relations with the Muslim tributary states of Bijapur and Golconda. He
preferred an outright annexation of these regions, and this was likely due to the untapped revenue
potential of the lands, its rumored mineral reserves, and perhaps as a more secure long-term
strategy of geopolitics. In 1656, Aurangzeb invaded Golconda and his armies looted Hyderabad.
However, Shah Jahan ordered the Prince to drawback, and it would take another thirty years after
being crowned Emperor for Aurangzeb to successfully annex the southern states into the Mughal
dominion.264 During the eventual conquest of the Deccan in 1687-88, Aurangzeb did not
incorporate the Telugu-speaking Hindu elite into the rank and file of the imperial administrative
system. In addition, the wealth of Golconda was drained and surplus was sent to Aurangzeb’s
peripatetic encampment at Aurangabad. Such a major shift in the redistributive system of
Golconda, as Richards has effectively demonstrated, sowed the seed for a joint Maratha-Telugu
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For a detailed analysis of political change in seventeenth-century Mughal-Deccan relations, see
Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda, pp. 35-51
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challenge to the legitimacy of Mughal rule in the Deccan, if not the entire subcontinent. 265
Therefore, although the conquest of the area was accomplished with relative ease, it was the
hyperlocal configuration of imperial power in face of existing languages of political
administration, fiscal practices, executive precedent, and military culture that proved the most
challenging. The various Mughal governors and diwans sent to the area were faced with limited
resources, and had to draw immense money from the imperial treasury to overcome financial
limitations. Jan Sipar Khan, the first major Mughal governor of the Deccan between 1688-1700,
was faced was raids from the Marathas and had little local resources to forge an army. Therefore,
he requested Aurangzeb to send a force of 500 heavy horsemen and 5,000 musketeers to protect
the newly conquered Mughal domains. For several years, this force of 5,500 military men drew
their pay from the Mughal treasury at an annual cost of 500,000 silver rupees. 266 The Deccan
campaigns and the unanticipated costs of integrating the old-standing revenue system of
Hyderabad into the imperial apparatus between 1690-1700 tipped the overall balance of Mughal
finance.
Aurangzeb clearly did not intend to invest heavily in duplicating the agrarian structure of
longer-settled parts of the Mughal empire in the eastern Deccan. The emperor’s concern
was for immediate returns which could support his armies in South India. This concern,
although certainly understandable, explains what appears to have been inadequate
manpower, financing, and attention from the emperor in Hyderabad between 1687 and
1700. From the perspective of an observer in Hyderabad, despite a slow process
consolidation and centralization, the province was really under administered and under
financed. The surplus taken from it every year was largely artificial. In practice…most
jagirdar-s assigned lands in Hyderabad, Bijapur, and the two Karnatiks could not get their
full salaries from these holdings.267

Reverberations of the wars in the Deccan were felt in various ways in Gujarat. First, in a
significant departure from earlier imperial protocol, governors appointed to Gujarat during
Aurangzeb’s reign began having significantly longer tenures than their predecessors. Contrary to
M.S. Commissariat’s position that longer gubernatorial tenurial terms in Mughal India suggest
good administration and relative provincial prosperity, my research suggests that Aurangzeb’s
Deccan campaigns shifted imperial attention and resources away from existing provinces in
northern, western, and eastern India.268 While the average tenurial term for a governor in Gujarat
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during Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan’s reign was three years, the average length a noble
occupied the governor’s seat during Aurangzeb’s reign was 4.7. While this may not seem
significant, consider that during the critical years between 1672 and 1701, only three different
nobles held the post of subadar of Gujarat, and the average term length was 9.3 years. These years
correspond to the high-tide of the Deccan campaigns, and bolsters the idea that imperial attention
and resources were overextended in southern India and this impacted how existing Mughal
holdings were administered. In addition, between the late 1660s and 1700, existing land revenue
entitlements, social life of commerce, and agrarian productivity in Gujarat were severely
undermined by the creeping influence and plundering tactics of Maratha marauders from the
Deccan. The implications of these raids are explored in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.
For now, I must emphasize that Mughal presence in Gujarat suffered from the halt on the regular
rotation of governors that was critical to Mughal political administration in earlier times. This
undermined the nature and extent of Mughal reach in western India, and was likely a major
reason why Mughal powers in Gujarat had a difficult time subduing local warlords and
militarized zamindar-s who aspired greater autonomy and authority.

his very considerable powers and ample resources, might possibly threaten the security of his throne if
allowed to remain too long in the possession of his office” (A History of Gujarat, Vol. 2, p. 185).
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Average Length of Imperial Governors Appointed to Gujarat, 1573-1707
Akbar’s Reign
Governor

Start

End

Years

Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-I Azam

1573

1575

2

Mirza Abdurrahim Khan

1575

1578

3

Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan

1578

1583

5

Itimad Khan Gujarati

1583

1583

0

Mirza Abdurrahim Khan

1584

1589

5

Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-I Azam

1590

1593

3

Prince Murad

1593

1594

1

Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-I Azam

1600

1605

5

Average

Tenure

3

Governor

Start

End

Years

Qulij Khan and Raja Vikramajit

1605

1606

1

Murtaza Khan Bukhari

1606

1609

3

Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-i Azam

1609

1611

2

Abdulla Khan Firuz Jung

1611

1616

5

Muqarrab Khan

1616

1618

2

Prince Shah Jahan

1618

1623

5

Prince Dawar Bakhsh

1623

1624

1

Khan Jahan Lodi

1624

1627

3

Average

Tenure

2.75

Jahangir’s Reign

(continued on following page)
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Shah Jahan’s Reign
Governor

Start

End

Years

Sher Khan Tur

1628

1631

3

Islam Khan

1631

1635

4

Saif Khan

1635

1636

1

Azam Khan

1636

1642

6

Mirza Isa Tarkhan

1642

1645

3

Prince Aurangzeb

1645

1646

1

Shaistah Khan

1646

1648

2

Prince Dara Shikoh

1648

1652

4

Shaistah Khan

1652

1654

2

Prince Murad Bakhsh

1654

1658

4

Average

Tenure

3

Aurangzeb’s Reign
Governor

Start

End

Years

Shah Nawaz Khan Safavi

1658

1659

1

Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur

1659

1662

3

Mahabat Khan

1662

1668

6

Bahadur Khan

1668

1670

2

Maharaja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur

1670

1672

2

Muhammad Amin Khan

1672

1682

10 [The

Mukhtar Khan

1682

1684

2

Shujaat Khan Kartalab Khan

1685

1701

16

Prince Muhammad Azam Shah

1701

1705

4

Prince Muhammad Bidar Bakht

1706

1707

1

Average

Tenure

Deccan
Campaigns]

4.7

The breakdown of the imperial system of rotating governors across various provinces after
every two or three years might have engendered a change in the nobility’s perspective on their
futures positions, power, and professional prospects within the Mughal redistributive system.
Since much of the Mughal imperial resources were being channeled towards the Deccan, Gujarat
was neglected and virtually without imperial protection or close attention. One result of this was
the proliferation of revolts in not only the agrarian countryside, but also within the walls of the
capital city at Ahmedabad. 269 Between 1681 and 1696, the Mirat-i Ahmadi also notes more than
six droughts and famines in Gujarat, and suggests that the Mughal government was unable to
269

For example, the revolt of the Ismaili Momna from central Gujarat in 1691, the refusal to pay taxes by
groups in Jhalewar in the northern Kathiawar peninsula in 1692, and the Mughal approved sacking of
Vadnagar temple in 1694 for cash and jewels on the pretext of collecting revenue arrears.
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redistribute resources to prevent the loss of human life of its tax-paying subjects. In the three
famines of 1681, 1685, and 1691, Ali Muhammad Khan effectively suggests that famines were
induced by the local Mughal revenue officials who “took bribes from corn-dealers and
consequently fixed high prices”.270 So severe were market conditions in Gujarat during the 1680s
that by 1692, the Mughal State faced an imperial monetary crisis in which the shortage of Mughal
rupees brought commerce to a halt. The governor Shujaat Khan said to the diwan “the affairs of
the people are at a standstill for the sake of chalani rupees”, or a shortage of Mughal coins that
were minted in previous years but were critical for the functioning of the monetized local
economy. These coins had become so debased that local moneychangers raised their rate of
discount on rupees that fell below the legal weight. This parameters of what constituted
reasonable precious metal loss on older coins was expanded by a royal decree, and the prevailing
markets rates for currency exchange were fixed so that “all rupees not more than three surkhā-s
short of the proper weight were to be accepted as current legal coin, and all which were below
that standard should be taken to the mint for being re-coined”.271 It is likely that in years
immediately prior to the order, coins that were short by two surkha-s or more were not considered
current.272 The timely order not only suggests that the circulation of newly minted coins called
sikka was severely restricted, and as a result, regulations about what constituted a current coin
had to be relaxed so that older devalued coins could be used without penalty. The official notice
gave the local Gujarati bankers who were excessively discounting older coins a legally-backed
opportunity to lower their minting standards and thereby keep the economy monetized. The shift
in the imperial monetary policy, which might have caused inflation in the long run, was also
backed by another executive order that all precious metals should only be melted in the imperial
mint. Other evidence, including the governor Shujaat Khan’s repeated pleas to the Emperor for
more money to pay his provincial army and fix dilapidated buildings, and various attempts by
Mughal officials to prevent grain hoarding by grocers suggests that Mughal rule in Gujarat was
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given coin should still be considered full weight is borne out in the quintessential Mughal chronicle Ain-i
Akbari. Abu’l Fazl discusses at least five phases in which royal orders were issued changing the scale of
acceptable devaluation of silver rupees from as much as six surkha-s short to more strict moments when a
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Akbari, Vol. 1, pp. 32-36. For an overview of the dynamic nature of the Mughal money markets, see
Haider, Najaf. 1996. “Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal Empire.” Journal of
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hanging by a thread. 273 Any efforts to increase the money in circulation along with rules to keep
the Mughal mints the sole authorized epicenter of money-changing activities was symptomatic of
a latent crisis in the redistributive apparatus that was the Mughal bureaucracy.
During the years that Aurangzeb was forging Mughal imperial rule in the Deccan, Shujaat
Khan in Gujarat was occupied with militarized negotiations with the watan-jagirdar-s of Marwar
led by Durgadas Rathor. The conflict began in the aftermath of Maharaja Jaswant Singh’s death
in 1679 when Aurangzeb invaded his watan and annexed his political fiefdom in Rajasthan to the
Mughal Empire. Previously, Jaswant Singh served as a Mughal subadar in Gujarat (1659-62,
1670-72), and held hereditary patrimonial rights over land in his native Rajasthan. Jaswant
Singh’s heir Ajit Singh was a minor, and Durgadas served as his farsighted regent and de facto
Raja of Marwar. Shujaat Khan spent up to six months a year between 1687-1698 fighting in the
harsh climate and topographic conditions of Rajasthan, taking away considerable attention,
resources and money meant for Gujarat. We are fortunate to have a unique Persian work titled
Futuhat-i Alamgiri written in 1701 by Ishwardas, a Nagar Brahmin of Patan who served as an
intermediary between Shujaat Khan and Durgadas during these conflicts. 274 Although a relatively
brief manuscript of 168 folios, the text documents shortage of money, food, and resources in the
imperial camps in Gujarat and the Deccan. 275 Shujaat Khan’s efforts in Marwar were draining the
Mughal imperial treasury, and Aurangzeb’s own campaigns in the south prevented his offering
the complete support of the royal court in matters related to Gujarat and Rajasthan. By 1696, “in
most of the pargana-s, and especially in the district of Marwar, there was a famine uniformly
from Patan (northern Gujarat) to Jodhpur so much so that grass and water were not available”. 276
Finally, Aurangzeb agreed to reconcile with Durgadas through the mediation of Ishwardas, and
both were offered appropriate mansab ranks, studded daggers, gold pendants, pearl necklaces, and
appropriate jagir-s.277 While the Mughal capital of Gujarat at Ahmedabad remained the epicenter
of political activity in western India, centrifugal forces from Durgadas in Rajasthan impinged on
the resources of northern Gujarat, while the growing presence of Maratha tribute-seeking
warlords from the Deccan chipped away at the southern portion. Shujaat Khan’s attention was
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divided between preserving semblance of Mughal authority in Gujarat while fighting the watanjagir-s of Marwar, and the lack of financial support from the imperial treasury made such juggling
even more difficult.
It is in this context that I conclude this chapter with Georges Roques’ unique observations
about Mughal rule, financial agents, and the changing contours of political power in Gujarat
during the final years of the seventeenth century. Georges Roques was working as a procurer of
Indian textiles for the French East India Company (est. 1664), and traveled extensively between
Surat and Ahmedabad between 1676-91. During these fifteen years, he made keen observations
about local mercantile life, the habits of financial agents such as bankers and moneylenders, and
the changing nature of Mughal rule in western India. His experience was compiled into a
formulary text titled The Manner of Negotiating in India, and remains a relatively underutilized
source for analyzing this period. This is perhaps because a full translation of the text remains to
be undertaken, and the French original was only recently issued in a modern typeset. 278 In
addition, Roques has been characterized as a typical European pessimist by scholars working on
this period, and dismiss his views as overly biased against Indian markets and the weavers,
bankers, and brokers that constituted them. 279 Nevertheless, his account is replete with unique
ethnographic and personal observations about local economic and social life, and supplement the
other European and Indian accounts of Aurangzeb’s Gujarat examined throughout this chapter.
La Manière is collection of episodes meant to instruct new French merchants in the art of
commerce in western India. The set of didactic tales focus on how to procure local currency and
capital loans from local bankers to purchase silk and cotton textiles for profitable export to
Europe, and takes on the format of a series of personal narratives and short allegorical stories that
convey axiomatic truths about dealing with Indian weavers, brokers, bankers, merchants, and
Mughal governors. For our purposes, the years covered by Roques cover the gubernatorial terms
of three important Mughal subadar-s of Gujarat, Muhammad Amin Khan (1672-82), Mukhtar
Khan (1682-84), and Shujaat Khan (1685-1701). In his worldview, undertaking business in India
is difficult for three reasons. First, thievery, unpredictable road taxes by native rajas, and general
physical insecurity in certain areas renders business transactions unsafe. Although prices of
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manuscript is La manière de négocier dans les Indes Orientales dédiée à mes chers amis et confrères, les
engagés de la royale Compagnie de France, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Fonds Francais 14614.
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Ray, Indrani. 1999. The French East India Company and the Trade of the Indian Ocean: A Collection of
Essays. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, pp. 1-10; Ray, Aniruddha. 2004. The Merchant and the State:
The French in India, 1666-1739. 2 vols. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, Vol. 1, pp. 123-81.
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textiles tend to be cheaper in the more disturbed areas of Gujarat not squarely under the
jurisdiction of the Mughal King, Roques suggests that paying a premium (higher prices) for
textiles obtained in the stable urban markets of Ahmedabad and Surat is a better bet. Second, the
nexus between weavers, brokers, and indigenous bankers is difficult to break. Brokers take a
certain percentage from the profit of the procurers, and Roques has an entire section devoted to
how brokers purchase wholesale textiles at a discount from weavers, and in collusion with the
bankers who advance money to the French to purchase textiles, inflate the selling price of goods
to European buyers for handsome profits. Third, Roques remarks on the shortage of money
supply in Gujarat for purchasing textiles. By the time French ships laden with foreign gold and
silver make it to India, the optimal season for procuring commodities at fixed prices is finished.
To overcome this limitation, the French, like their English and Dutch counterparts, must take out
cash advances from local bankers who benefit not only on the interest earned, but also on the
amounts they discount on the foreign bullion they purchase and later mint into Mughal rupees. As
intermediaries, these bankers would sit on the foreign gold and silver and take it to be minted in
lump sums when the prevailing rates of the imperial mint were in their favor. Although these
bankers made significant profits in converting foreign currency into sikka-s or new coins, this
critical service also allowed foreign merchants to secure the best prices for textiles delivered at an
agreed future date through advance purchases. Writing during the same period, Roques colleague
Francois Martin seconds the importance of local credit for all European trading companies in
Gujarat, and highlights the services of Hindu and Jain moneylenders in Surat and Ahmedabad. 280
For our purposes, the Roques manuscript is critical for the insight it provides on the changing
nature of Mughal rule vis-à-vis financial agents, local entitlements to land revenue, and the
growing influence of external threat from the Marathas in the Deccan, the Marwaris in Rajasthan,
and the local forest dwelling communities in Gujarat itself. He notes that during this period, the
great sarraf-s would lend money to Mughal officials so that they could pay their armies and carry
out their imperial responsibilities of maintaining local law and order. This great banking class, to
which members of the Jhaveri family belonged, were gambling their money on political futures,
hedging their bets on the governors and princes that were likely to be promoted within the
Mughal administrative system.
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“We applied ourselves to an examination of the difficulties faced by the Company in Surat. These
included the insufficiency of funds sent from France, the sustained pressure of creditors demanding
repayment, the utter insolvency of the treasury which sometimes made it impossible to buy even the
essentials, and the repercussion of these difficulties, not only on the reputation of the Company but that of
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The ones I have just discussed are the sarraf-s of (foreign) exchange and of remittances.
There are others of a premier class who make much more noise, as much by the splendor
of obtaining (having) credit as by their spending and gifting, and who are less assured
than the others (those that do foreign exchange and remittances), or the small money
changers of copper for badams - these are bitter almonds which serve as little money - as
well as cowries in Bengal. These great sarrafs follow the (Mughal) court, their function is
to lend money to the great men of the kingdom: admirals, mansabdar-s, and other officers
who have made a profession of arms and are in the pay of the King. They will advance to
them their wages to come, from a portion of six months or a year (of salary), sometimes
one-half, one-third, or one-quarter, depending on what they agree. It is a very dangerous
business, and I have not seen many people who do it and whose nose does not end up in
the earth. The reason is obvious, for borrowing on such expensive conditions must
always stem from need. The money is consumed six months before the king's pay, and
you must always commit again. The sarraf, in order not to lose his first advances,
finances for the following quarters, and bases his hope on the recovery of his dues only
on the (social) elevation of those to whom he lends - either by the government of some
place, a more important charge, or a pay increase - [and] who, most often, go broke or
die. He (the sarraf) may plead and rant and rave that “that man must be brought to
justice!” The king seizes all property after the death (of governors) without giving
anything to the widows or the children, and supports his right on the number of years
[during which] the deceased was under his pay and what he received, of which is kept a
very exact register. All the accumulated amounts amount to large sums that houses and
inheritances cannot equal. Thus, all remains to His Majesty. The most prudent among
them, who know the law of the (Mughal) Prince, entertain themselves during their
lifetime. Others, who have been fond of their children, do not make acquisitions, reduce
what they handle in gold and (precious) stones which they effectively hide secretly, and
declare to their children only when dying. We have described well in an elongated
manner the ways of the sarraf-s that came to my knowledge, or that I have experienced
on my own such as (in) this narrative. 281

Roques comments highlight the close relationship that major bankers shared with the Mughal
court and its provincial governors. The administrative functioning of the jagir-mansab system
mentioned at the outset was predicated on a complex layering of revenue collection mechanisms
in the locality. This did not immediately satisfy the financial needs of governors entrusted with
extending and propagating Mughal political authority across the province. Therefore, they
resorted to borrowing from the bankers who had reserve capital and could advance sums on a
regular basis. The nature of lending to imperial governors meant that these imperial officials
started accumulating debt, and unless they resorted to exorbitant violence (thereby undermining
the long-term revenue paying capacity of an area), they could not easily repay their short-term
loans. As such, banker held their hopes out on the eventual social elevation of governors to higher
posts, or other concessions from the imperial order such as favorable trading rights on certain
commodities, or more significantly, exclusive financial privileges such as a monopoly on the
business of discounting foreign currency and recoining bullion at local mints for profit. The long-
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La Manière, from the section “Suite des maximes des serafs”, pp. 144-45
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term impact of governor’s beginning to borrow money from local bankers in the late seventeenth
century are indicated clearly in another passage by Roques.
In the past, no robbery was made in the lands of the Mughal, which was not repaid by
giving witness to the truth. The Mughal King, in order to render commerce free in all his
kingdom, made statutes in favor of merchants who, very often, were robbed along the
way. On their complaints, this great prince (Mughal Emperor) ordered that local
governors in whose localities thievery was committed would be forced to make a search
for the renegades, failing which they were obligated to pay the complainants on their
own. This judicious law has been in effect for a long time, however, for the last twenty
years, nothing has been done because governments only give themselves to those who
offer more, and most of them sacrifice not only all their property, but also engage in
procuring loans, which renders them tyrants and full of vexations to recover (what they
have borrowed), and [governors] do right only by those who give them more for the evil
causes that they have.282

This passage highlights two critical aspects of the inner workings of political and financial
life in Mughal Gujarat during the 1680s. First, there is a reference to an earlier period of Mughal
rule, likely referring to Shah Jahan’s reign from 1628-58, when the safety and security of
business transactions were guaranteed by the highly functioning local apparatus of the Mughal
State. So strict were imperial injunctions during this period that in the event thieves were not
apprehended by the provincial governor in charge, he would be required to compensate those
traders whose goods were wrongfully taken within Mughal territories. In addition to possessions,
this system also facilitated the efficient converting of foreign currency into local coin. Also, the
legal-executive apparatus of the local Mughal state provided a mutually intelligible system
through which market transactions could take place and disputes resolved. The Mughals sudden
need for money over the past twenty years, referring to period beginning with Aurangzeb’s
coronation in 1659, slowly led to an imperial culture of borrowing from prominent bankers in the
locality. These loans were a risky proposition for lenders, and the initial shifting of the fiscal
burdens of empire onto this local class of financial specialists gradually became irreversible since
imperial pay could never quite catch up to the amounts needed to repay loans with interest. As a
result, governors become “tyrants and full of vexations”, and only favor those groups, presumably
other financial specialists or minor warlords with money, who can pay upfront (ijarah) for ad-hoc
revenue sharing privileges. The keen observations of Roques suggest that by the middle years of
Aurangzeb’s rule between 1680-1700, the Mughal need for capital was far greater than the
revenues coming in, and the management of existing revenue arrangements were now being
subject to commodification of the bidding type. The subsequent chapter explores this aspect of
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waning Mughal rule in detail, and sets out the long-term consequences of Aurangzeb’s inability
to manage an empire that was trying to grow beyond its means.

Conclusion
This chapter began with the incorporation of Gujarat into the political and administrative
ambit of the Mughal Empire in 1572. The coming of Mughal rule to Gujarat brought an imperial
monetary system based on the silver rupee, a culture of local governance based on the dual
authority of the provincial governor (subadar) and the officer of the treasury (diwan), and a new
system of public authority centered on the exalted position of the Mughal Emperor. Taken
together, the power and position of these two officials represented a provincial diarchy in which
the administrative, military, and financial aspects of social organization were linked directly to
the royal court. The material basis for Mughal rule in Gujarat was a combination of land revenue
generated from its agriculturally rich lands, custom dues and other trading taxes levied on foreign
and Indian merchants, and profits accrued by maintaining the sizeable and important
infrastructure of the royal mint. As a source of great profit, the royal mint was staffed by a class
of independent financial agents who served as assayers, mint masters, brokers, wholesale buyers
of foreign currency and bullion, and sellers of Indian currency. Since it was considered the
official currency of the Empire, the Mughal silver rupee was the most coveted currency. It was
also in demand by indigenous weavers and traders for their commercial needs. This chapter has
demonstrated that for the first 100 years after the initial conquest of Gujarat, the Mughal state
apparatus had evolved into a contractually robust, fiscally sound, and bureaucratically complex
imperial system that shared a symbiotic relationship with members of the financial classes. These
local financial agents depended on the social, legal, and financial stability that the Mughal
administrative apparatus provided to specialize in financial services such as banking, brokering,
moneylending, converting currency, and providing short-term credit to merchants wanting to
purchase local textiles and commodities. The crux of this system was the system of entitlements
to land revenue, explored in the previous chapter, and the converting of vast foreign bullion into
acceptable currency for local use.
Drawing on evidence pertaining to the financial, banking, and professional jeweler activities
of Shantidas Jhaveri and his family, I suggested that major businesspersons in the seventeenth
century shared a relationship of mutual interdependence with members of the nobility and
members of the provincial government. They provided the court with luxury items such as rare
jewels, foreign spices, and other items worthy of conspicuous consumption in early modern India.
In recognition for their services, such prominent businesspersons were offered royal titles, special
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trading concessions, and certain land revenue rights that made investment into the Mughal system
of tenurial entitlements worthwhile (ijarah, inam, see Chapter 2). During this period, the Mughal
ruling elite did not depend on loans from these financial agents to run the administration,
including paying its military and building infrastructure such as inns, mosques, and waterways. It
was only during moments of exceptional crisis, especially during succession wars between rival
Mughal princes, that members of the ruling class turned to rich financers and bankers for loans
that were duly documented and even repaid. When Aurangzeb became Emperor in 1658, he not
only inherited an illustrious legacy of Mughal rule in the subcontinent, but also accepted a large
imperial corporation that was on the verge of dissipating from within. A key aspect of the slow
unraveling of Mughal authority in Gujarat, and eventually across the subcontinent, was the
growing depletion of the Mughal treasury and resources during the long and drawn-out
expansionist campaigns in the Deccan. The Deccan wars shifted Aurangzeb’s attention away
from existing holdings in northern and western India, and this is borne out by the excessive length
of gubernatorial terms in Gujarat between 1662-1700. The crux of the earlier Mughal system was
the regular rotating of provincial governors every three years. During Aurangzeb’s reign, the
average tenure of governors in Gujarat was an astonishing 4.7 years, with a maximum of 16 years
for a single governor Shujaat Khan between 1685-1701.
The Mughal inability to simultaneously manage the consolidation of new resources in the
Deccan with maintaining existing strongholds in western India led to fissures in the provincial
government of Gujarat. Growing threats from roving bandits and militarized zamindar-s emerging
from Rajasthan, the outlying areas of Kacch and Kathiawar in western Gujarat, and the Maratha
marauders from northern Maharashtra proved too overwhelming for a single Mughal governor to
handle without adequate monetary resources. As a result, we see the beginnings of a system in
which former friends of the court, such as Shantidas and his fraternity, being drawn into a
relationship of regular lending to Mughal governors. In addition, the imperial monetary crisis
engendered a shortage of running currency in the money and commodity markets of Ahmedabad,
leading to a series of executive orders propagating relaxed conditions for minting new coins and
discounting older ones. By the closing years of the seventeenth century, the French trader and
writer Georges Roques noted the changing contours of Mughal rule. He clearly documented the
shift from a society in which commerce was protected by the Mughal King through statutes that
were enforced by local representatives of imperial authority to an emerging and dangerous culture
of Mughal governors borrowing to bolster their local positions and the waning royal authority
vested in them. Such a change in imperial fortunes made these governors “tyrants and full of
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vexations” to recover what they have borrowed and to salvage their powers and privileges. The
next chapter explores how the Mughal inability to protect Gujarat from rival warlords, especially
the Marathas from the northern Deccan, led to a further unraveling of the Mughal office of
governor. One aspect of this breakdown was the increasing speed and brutality with which
financial agents, including Shantidas’ grandson Khushalchand, were brought into the whirlwind
of local political crisis and uncertain political futures. The final attempt by Mughal authorities to
suddenly shift fiscal burdens of empire to a local class indigenous bankers, merchants, and
financiers proved unsustainable in a society where new nodes of authority and land revenue
sharing entitlements were starting to coagulate around ad-hoc and temporary alliances between
recalcitrant Mughal governors, rival warlords, and other militarized groups with no clear
allegiance to any singular authority. Financial agents struggled to find their proper place amidst
social chaos in the early decades of the eighteenth-century, and would eventually emerge in the
1750s as financers, bankers, and treasurers of new forms of political order funded by debt and
organized around the administration of revenue farming.
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Appendix 3A: Mughal Trade Routes in Western India

This map conveys the major routes that connected northern Gujarat, including the Mughal capital
of the province Ahmedabad, with areas in Rajasthan all the way to the imperial capitals at Agra
and Delhi.
Source: Tripathi, Dwijendra. 1981. The Dynamics of a Tradition: Kasturbhai Lalbhai and his
Entrepreneurship. New Delhi: Manohar, p. 17
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Appendix 3B: Simplified Family Tree of Shantidas Jhaveri

This family tree has been compiled based on evidence from the Cintamani Prasasti, along with
data from various Gujarati texts composed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. For
a more complex genealogical tree, but one that omits critical date about the early ancestors of
Shantidas Jhaveri, see Dwijendra Tripathi’s The Dynamics of a Tradition: Kasturbhai Lalbhai
and his Entrepreneurship (1981). New Delhi: Manohar.
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Appendix 3C: Mughal Farmans in Gujarat
Mughal Orders (farman-s) related to Shantidas Jhaveri
and other major groups in Gujarat, 1565-1662
Issued to

Subject

Abridged Citation (see
Bibliography)

#

Year

Emperor

1

1565

Akbar

Chandu Sanghvi

Inam

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 393

2

1584

Akbar

Hiravijaya Suri

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Malcolm, Memoir of Central India,
Vol. 2, pp. 163-65

3

1590

Akbar

Hiravijaya Suri

Jain Worship

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 375

4

1590

Akbar

Dastur
Kaikobad

Inam

Modi, Parsees at the Court of
Akbar, pp. 106-110

5

1592

Akbar

Hiravijaya Suri

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Palitana Jain Case, pp. 101-102

6

1597

Akbar

Meherji Rana

Inam

Modi, Parsees at the Court of
Akbar, pp. 106-110

7

1598

Akbar

Jesuit Society

Christian
Worship

Felix, Mughal Farmans, pp. 10-11

8

1601

Akbar

Vijayasena Suri

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 379

9

1603

Akbar

Dastur
Kaikobad

Inam

Modi, Parsees at the Court of
Akbar, pp. 106-110

10

1603

Akbar

Dastur
Kaikobad

Inam

Modi, Parsees at the Court of
Akbar, pp. 106-110

11

1605

Akbar

Vivekharsha
Paramanand

Jain Worship

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 382

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 387

12

1605

Akbar

Bhanuchandra
and
Siddhichandra

13

1608

Jahangir

Vivekharsha
Paramanand

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Palitana Jain Case, pp. 103-104

14

1610

Jahangir

Vivekharsha
Paramanand

Jain Worship;
Slaughter Ban

Mehta, Studies in Indian Painting,
pp. 69-73

15

1612

Jahangir

Portuguese
Padres

Christian
Worship

Felix, Mughal Farmans, pp. 17-18

16

1615

Jahangir

Portuguese
Padres

Protection

Felix, Mughal Farmans, pp. 18-19

17

1616

Jahangir

Vivekharsha
Paramanand

Jain Worship

Plate I, Imperial Mughal Farmans in
Gujarat

18

1616

Jahangir

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Protection;
Jewelry

Plate II, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

19

1618

Jahangir

Vijayadeva Suri

Jain Worship

Suri, Surishwar aur Samrat Akbar,
p. 390
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20

1618

Jahangir

Mulla Jamasp &
Mulla Hoshang

21

1636

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

22

1642

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

23

1642

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

24

1644

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Personal
Property
Personal
Property;
Jewelry
Personal
Property;
Jewelry
Personal
Property;
Jewelry

25

1644

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Lonka Gaccha

Plate VII, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

26

1647

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Plate VIII, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat

27

1648

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Cintamani
Temple

Plate IX, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

28

1655

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Jewelry

Plate X, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

29

1656

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Jewelry

Plate XI, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

30

1656

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Summons

Plate XII, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

31

1656

Murad
Bakhsh
(as
Viceroy)

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Commissariat, Studies in the
History of Gujarat, p. 65

32

1657

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Ijarah

Plate XIII, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat

33

1657

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Ijarah

Plate XIV, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat

34

1657

Shah
Jahan

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Commissariat, Studies in the
History of Gujarat, p. 66

35

1658

Murad
Bakhsh

Manekchand
Jhaveri

Loan

Plate XV, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

Inam

Modi, Farman of Emperor Jehangir,
pp. 422-36
Plate III, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat
Plate IV, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat
Plate V, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat
Plate VI, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

36

1658

Murad
Bakhsh

Manekchand
Jhaveri

Loan

Plate XVI, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat; A copy also
included in Mirat-i Ahmadi, Persian
Text, Nawab Ali, I, pp. 238-39

37

1658

Aurangzeb

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Loan

Plate XVII, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat
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Protection

Plate XVIII, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat; Reproduced in
Mirat-i Ahmadi, p.

38

1658

Aurangzeb

Shantidas
Jhaveri

39

1658

Murad
Bakhsh

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Commissariat, Studies in the
History of Gujarat, p. 66

40

1658

Aurangzeb

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Commissariat, Studies in the
History of Gujarat, p. 67

41

1659

Aurangzeb

Lakshmichand
Jhaveri

Personal
Property

Plate XIX, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat

42

1660

Aurangzeb

Shantidas
Jhaveri

Inam

Plate XX, Imperial Mughal Farmans
in Gujarat

Aurangzeb

Askaran and
Lalchand
Jhaveri

Jewelry

Plate XXI, Imperial Mughal
Farmans in Gujarat

43

1662
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Chapter 4: Rival Governors, Local Bankers, and Financial Crisis in late-Mughal
Gujarat, 1706-1730

યે અમારે શીર થાનપયો ત્હેં ઘિી િે િો ગરડો થયો િેઉ વર્ષે
િે પ્રનિપાિિા િથી રે સક્િો કરી િો અમ સારી િે કોિ કરશે
Emperor Aurangzeb, our head of state, has now become an old man of ninety.
Unable to look after even himself, whom can we expect to care for us?
- Ganim no Pavado, Gujarati, Vishwanath Jani (1706)
)روزی که فدوی داخل این پرگنه بروده گردید تا حال که هشت ماه باشد سوای شور و شر و فساد و هنگامه (مخاذیل
 ملک خراب و خاکستر شده و میشود و هیچ کس غور و پرداخت رعایا نمی. عجب حالتی روداده.چیزی دیگرندیده
 از یک طرف کنتا تا خت و تاراج می نماید و از طرف دیگر کسان پیالجی و از جانب دیگر پرمار فساد.کند
قوت به فعل آرد
ّ  او سبحانه در آنچه خیریت بنده های او بوده باشد از.همه ها قایم است و هر روز زیاد می شود
چون پرگنات ویران و خراب اند و رعایا همه سقیم االحوال لهذا دعا گوی نیر بغایت پریشان و بقوت خوب
 هللا تعل لی چنانچه حقیقت این ضلح از خارج هم مفصل بسمع مبارک رسیده سابق از این.محتاج و حیران است
که دیسا ئیان و مجمو عه داران و مقدمان پرگنه و سیته ها و مهاجنان وغیره قید کرده از اینجا به دکهن بردند
خالص نکرده اند آنها در اینجا گرفتار و در قید و حبس پریشان بسیار و کسانی که اینجا مانده اند از
.(تصدیعات) هر طرف بغا یت عاجز و درمانده هرچه رضای قادر مطلق شده است می آید
It has been eight months since I entered this area Baroda, and since then, I have seen nothing
other than disturbances, riots, corruption, and unfortunate events. It is a very strange situation
here. The country is being destroyed, and continues to be ruined. No one is taking care of the
public’s welfare. On one side, Kuntha Dakhani is ruining and destroying, and on the other side,
Pilaji Gaekwad’s men are destroying, and yet on another are the local Parmar scavenger groups
who are causing disturbances. Everyone is occupied with destruction, and each passing day,
things are getting worse. What is good for God’s people, God shall bring. Because the localities
are deserted and ruined, and the public is in bad condition, I also am greatly disturbed. Even I
am unable to secure foodstuffs. [O Emperor Muhammad Shah], the truths of this district have
surely reached you from other sources. Earlier, local village landlords, accountants, headman of
districts, merchants, and bankers have been imprisoned and taken to the Deccan, and have not
been freed. They are greatly disturbed in prison, and those that remain in Gujarat are also
tortured.
- Mirat-ul Haqaiq, Persian, Itimad Ali Khan, (3rd January 1727, f. 484a)
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Map of Eighteenth Century Gujarat

Adapted from:
Nadri, Ghulam. 2008. Eighteenth-century Gujarat: The Dynamics of its Political Economy, 1750-1800. Leiden: Brill.
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Mughal authority in Gujarat started facing insurmountable challenges during the twilight of
Emperor Aurangzeb’s rule. Growing financial constraints bred acute anxiety among nobles sent
to maintain order in the provinces, but unable to effectively quell external threats due to the rising
costs of maintaining military retinues. Corrupt behavior was exacerbated by the growth of
absentee administration in which various gubernatorial deputies (nāʼib-i nāẓim) were entrusted
with maintaining local control while governors (ṣūbadār or nāẓim) occupied themselves with
court intrigue wherever the imperial camp was stationed. Drawing on hitherto unexamined
sources in old Gujarati and Persian including Ganim no Pavado (1706), Rustam no Saloko
(1725), and Mirat-ul Haqaiq (1717-1727), I argue that increasingly impoverished Mughal
governors began relying on their exalted positions as bureaucrats to extort local merchants and
bankers for confiscatory sums. 283 In the process, they gradually alienated these financial elites
from Mughal politics and undermined the very authority that their own positions represented. By
the 1720s, such rapacious behavior severed relations with moneyed groups, and limited the state’s
access to mercantile credit networks, routes of exchange, and the friendship and support of the
accumulating classes. During this period, roving bandits from the Deccan Plateau identifying as
Maratha saw great opportunity in Gujarat. Its fertile lands produced indigo, cotton, and tobacco,
and much wealth could be taken from settlements barely protected by enervated Mughal armies.
While the previous chapter identified the more symbiotic relationship that an earlier
generation of financial elites had with Mughal officials, this chapter demonstrates how these
associations unraveled in the first three decades of the eighteenth century. I analyze the changing
relationship between local bankers and Mughal governors by triangulating the above-mentioned
sources with authentic accounts found in Ali Muhammad Khan’s Persian chronicle Mirat-i
Ahmadi (1762) and in the biographical compendium of Mughal nobles Ma’asir-ul Umara
(1780).284 I begin with Gujarat during the last years of Aurangzeb’s rule, and then turn to the
nature and significance of administrative problems after his death in 1707. I then analyze the tugof-war between Hamid Khan, Shujaat Khan, Rustam Ali, and Sarbuland Khan, mighty governors
and deputies fighting for control over Gujarat. It is during these intra-Mughal battles taking place
around Ahmedabad and Surat that I highlight the critical role that the third-generation jeweler-
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banker Khushalchand Jhaveri played in financing local rivalries. Khushalchand (1680-1748) was
the grandson of Shantidas Jhaveri (1584-1659), the court jeweler, revenue farmer, and banker
analyzed in the previous chapter. While Shantidas shared a courtier-like relationship with
successive Mughal Emperors Jahangir (1569-1627), Shah Jahan (1592-1666), and Aurangzeb
(1618-1707), Khushalchand had a more volatile and unpredictable relationship with
representatives of Mughal authority.

Gujarat on the Eve of Aurangzeb’s Rule
Countryside bandits led by Shivaji Bhonsle (1630-1680) inaugurated the Maratha presence in
Gujarat in 1664 by sacking the Mughal port-city of Surat. Four decades later, the Marathas
continued with regular tribute-seeking campaigns in Gujarat. Their guerrilla style of plunder
made it difficult for the better-equipped but slower-moving Mughal armies to retaliate. While
historians are familiar with evidence from Mughal-centric Persian sources, Gujarat was also
home to vibrant literary cultures that recorded local life in vivid detail. Like the Sanskrit praśasti
(praise poem) and Gujarati rās (narrative verses) texts examined in the previous chapter, the
poems I analyze below stem from a growing culture of vernacular writings that encompass
political commentary and socio-economic critique. A unique text comprising at least eighty
couplets is Ganim no Pavado or A Ballad of the Enemy, a narrative poem written in 1706 by
Vishwanath Jani. 285 This work pinpoints growing fissures in the Mughal administrative apparatus
and the devastating impact of successive Maratha raids. Until now, this unique source has not
been translated or evaluated in light of changing politics in early eighteenth-century Gujarat.
Vishwanath Jani was a Nagar Brahmin by caste affiliation and belonged to Patan 125-km
northwest of Ahmedabad. Respected among his contemporaries, Jani was best known for his
hagiographical poem about the saint-poet Narsinh Mehta. 286 Jani was most prolific between 16501700, suggesting a lifetime of experience with Mughal government. His stirring ballad is written
as a plea to the mythical Ambika, the eight-armed Goddess and demon destroyer. It emphasizes
that a decaying Mughal administration cannot match the unscrupulous tactics of the Marathas.
Jani does not mention the specific battle he is versifying, but contemporaneous evidence from
Mirat-i Ahmadi suggests that it was the 1706 fight between Dhana Jadhav, chief of the Maratha
army, and Abdul Hamid Khan, the local Mughal deputy-governor. Dhana Jadhav collected
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80,000 troops and made his way to Surat. Abdul Hamid was slow in assembling equipment.
Many rank-holding soldiers were without horses, and hired animal carriages from local villagers
for transport. Abdul Hamid’s army was scattered, and several hundred Mughal soldiers were
captured, killed, or drowned in the nearby Tapti River. Jadhav’s forces plundered settlements in
the 60-km fighting region between Surat and Broach, forcing villagers to pay new protection
money called khandani. Jadhav finally captured Abdul Hamid, demanding 300,000 rupees for his
release.287 Emperor Aurangzeb denied the request since the provincial treasury was empty,
highlighting the Mughal King’s critical inability to financially and militarily reinforce those
fighting on his behalf.288
Vishwanath Jani’s commentary on this Mughal-Maratha battle provides a third-person
Gujarati perspective on the growing public disorder in the region. I have translated thirteen
couplets that suggest local residents were unnerved by the stability of Mughal rule slipping
quickly from under their feet. The parenthetical references correspond to verse numbers in the
full poem.
Selected Verses from Ganim no Pavado (1706)
O Goddess Ambika, take care of Gujarat with all your divine love.
The people are childish and innocent, unable to bear suffering coming all at once. (1)
We fear the swords of the enemy (Marathas) more than even tigers and snakes.
The fiery swords of the enemy are capable of thwarting the messengers of Death (2)
Emperor Aurangzeb, our head of state, has now become an old man of ninety.
Unable to look after even himself, whom can we expect to care for us? (8)
Suffering abounds due to expenses, and no rains in sight. How shall your people survive?
We are making requests repeatedly, for the enemy is near. Allow the oil of my candle to burn.
(10)
Free us from impending death and annihilate those soldiers quickly.
With ferocity in your brow, target the enemy’s army and rid us of sorrow quickly. (15)
In waiting one month has passed. Yet no subadar (governor) has been seen with an army.
The diwan who looks after the city, that poor fellow languishes in prison (Abdul Hamid Khan)
(20)
Many days have passed; our requests haven’t reached your ears. Hopefully, this one shall.
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If possible, start war with evil. Send the brave (strong Mughal soldiers) on your behalf. (21)
The people of Gujarat are poor, living hand to mouth.
Despite occasional internal quarrels, the entire village is behind one ‘Mir’ (Mughal leader). (25)
Goddess manifest! Come out openly to aid us. Remove our heart’s worries, the enemy!
Grace your hands on our forehead, for this is the right time to rid our suffering. (27)
The rains have not come for twelve months, yet you managed to grow vegetables for us.
This is why we call you the bearer of vegetables, and recite your name in religious texts. (31)
You are the Narmada River, how dare the enemy cross across it?
Not respecting the God of Fighters (arrows), they shamelessly loot towns and people, causing
flight. (34)
Without you, we are not protected, and remain unstable.
If you are there for the warriors, those in arms, bless the ‘Mirs’ (Mughals) who are fighting for
us. (38)
Just like Baroda was destroyed, in that way were destroyed other villages.
The terror of the enemy has been such that we have neither tattered clothes nor sparse food left.
(40)
The ballad begins with an ode to the warrior Goddess Ambika in which Jani highlights the
distress caused by the violence. So fierce are the fighting tactics of the Marathas that even death
fears their swords. This battle is especially significant because the nonagenarian Emperor
Aurangzeb is unable to defend the province from these bandit warlords. As a rhetorical phrase,
the poet bitingly asks, if the Emperor cannot take care of himself, what is left of imperial
authority and how can he protect his subjects residing so far from the imperial court?
Furthermore, the enemy has made inroads into southern Gujarat, and this insecurity is causing
severe inflation and hiked grain prices in the local markets. Perennial droughts have adversely
impacted the area, and people are subsisting on prayers. Verse 20 provides a detailed assessment
of Mughal administration. In this couplet, Jani emphasizes that the province has been without a
strong governor and military protection, and that Abdul Hamid Khan languishes in Jadhav’s
custody. The dilapidated nature of Mughal administration during the final years of Aurangzeb’s
reign is palpable through Jani’s words. No real governors resided in the region, and
administrative duties were vested in deputies like Abdul Hamid Khan who juggled multiple posts
with little financial support. The dearth of capable personnel to run one of the most coveted
provinces of the Mughal Empire suggests that by the early eighteenth-century, imperial
administration was fissured beyond immediate recovery.
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Jani goes onto describe poverty in the region, despite which entire villages still support their
Mughal leaders. Even though there are occasional quarrels with local officials, Verse 25
underscores the people’s unified support for the declining imperial order. These passages indicate
that Mughal rule, at least until then, provided stability that residents of Gujarat hoped to preserve.
In a metaphoric plea likening the Goddess to the Narmada River, the major barrier that
demarcates southern Gujarat, including Surat, from northern Gujarat, including Baroda and
Ahmedabad, the poet rhetorically asks, how is the enemy able to traverse its deep waters to
shamelessly loot people on the northern side? Jani notes that residents feel so vulnerable that
many are fleeing the area. He urges the Goddess to bless the ‘Mir’, referring to Mughal governors
fighting on their behalf. The poem closes with vivid imagery of Baroda and other towns being
destroyed, foreshadowing the further unraveling of Mughal authority in the province. 289

Gujarat after Aurangzeb, 1707-12
Emperor Aurangzeb died at Ahmednagar in 1707. In line with Mughal precedent, his rival
sons fought to occupy the throne. The elder son, Muhammad Azam Shah, marched back from
Malwa where he was appointed governor few months prior, and the younger Muhammad
Muazzam Bahadur Shah hurried back from his post at Kabul. They met on an open battlefield at
Jajau, 32-km southwest of the old Mughal capital at Agra. Muhammad Azam and his son Bidar
Bakht perished in this fratricidal battle. Shortly after being crowned the seventh Mughal Emperor,
the victorious Bahadur Shah appointed a senior noble Ibrahim Khan as subedar of Gujarat.
Ibrahim Khan was successful in promoting agriculture, collecting revenues, and punishing
outlaws. After a few months, however, he retired from service and appointed one Muhammed
Beg as his naib-i nazim, or deputy-governor.290 Taking up his deputyship with alacrity,
Muhammed Beg requested the diwan of the province to earmark funds for enrolling new soldiers
and maintaining equipment for his military entourage. By this time, the Marathas had made
progress farther north into middle Gujarat between Surat and Ahmedabad. After delay, an order
was finally received approving the use of imperial funds from the Ahmedabad treasury for
recruiting soldiers.291
In lieu of Ibrahim Khan, Emperor Bahadur Shah appointed one of the highest-ranking nobles
to the governorship of Gujarat: Ghaziuddin Khan Bahadur Firuz Jung, a leading member of the
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Turani faction and a former commander in Aurangzeb’s army. 292 Firuz Jung was aging and nearly
blind, and only occupied the post of governor for two years until his death in 1710. During his
tenure, Firuz Jung hired fifty spies who were instructed to bring news of Rajput rebels residing
north of Gujarat in Rajasthan, and the Maratha bands working their way up through southern
Gujarat. This suggests that even elite nobles with military experience were apprehensive about
the threat of marauding groups emerging from the countryside. Unfortunately, the Mughals could
not implement any sustained plan for stabilizing their hold on Gujarat, especially because the
tenure of successive governors in the province was so short or because their personal ambitions
were enervated. Upon his death, Firuz Jung’s entire property was confiscated by royal orders, and
he was accused of misappropriating funds. Amanat Khan, then serving as a port-official at Surat,
was appointed temporary governor and reached Ahmedabad five months later in May 1711. 293
The intervening months between imperial appointments and individuals actually taking up their
posts was caused by several factors. First, communication barriers were relatively high during
this period. It could take several days for news to circulate throughout the empire. Second, delays
were inevitable when an official had pending work in the current post. The growing gap between
executive decisions and the time it took for appointees to reach their destination meant that the
province was regularly starved of effective leadership for months. One may surmise that these lull
periods also contributed to a growing discomfort among the local populations, and perhaps one
unintended effect of deadbeat locality authority was that elite classes including rich jewelers and
merchants residing in Ahmedabad took on greater responsibility for the public’s welfare and in
the distribution of resources. It is around this time that we see the birth of the nagarsheth
institution, or the elevating of exceptional and rich merchants to the position of city patron. 294
After reaching Ahmedabad, Amanat Khan requested a monthly stipend of one lakh rupees to
raise foot soldiers and artillery to meet the Maratha challenge. It was in this same year that
Khanderao Dabhade reached as far as Broach, located 150 km south of Ahmedabad and 60 km
north of Surat. During this period, we witness a series of violent and unprecedented civil disputes
and skirmishes between rival Mughal officials in the locality. Amanat Khan and the deputy
governor Muhammed Beg had a series of violent outbursts against each other, and it is clear that
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money was at the center of these intra-Mughal disputes. To elaborate further, Amanat Khan felt
that his predecessor Firoz Jung owed revenues to the Mughal state, and that as his deputy,
Muhammed Beg should provide accounts of expenditures made during Jung’s tenure. Beg felt
insulted by these investigations, and refused to cooperate. Amanat Khan turned up uninvited at
Muhammed Beg’s home to forcibly recover money from him, and a violent battle ensued in
which “cannons, guns, and arrows were used”.295 Six or seven thousand Afghan horsemen and
footmen loyal to Muhammad Beg showed up from all four corners of the city, and many men lost
their lives. The chronicler Ali Muhammad Khan writes, “This kind of civil war had not taken
place in the old days in the city. It was an innovation”. 296 The royal paymaster Meher Ali Khan
and the jagirdar Safdar Khan Babi eventually broke up the fight. For our purposes, the episode
highlights that the crisis of Mughal administration was far more complicated than decisive battles
between external threats like the Marathas or Rajputs. Equally important were the growing civil
disputes that threatened the lower echelons of Mughal bureaucracy and their ability to rule with a
unified front in the locality.
Emperor Bahadur Shah died at Lahore in February 1712. By then, Gujarat was beginning its
second year without a proper, long-term governor. After winning a fratricidal war, Jahandar Shah
became emperor. He appointed Asaf-ud-Daula Asad Khan subedar of Gujarat, and suggested that
Muhammed Beg return to the city and be appointed deputy-governor.297 Muhammed Beg served
as deputy for three months, and was subsequently transferred to Surat as port officer. As the
Maratha threat was growing, the high-ranking soldier Sarbuland Khan was appointed deputy to
Asaf-ud-Daula.298 After arriving to the city, Sarbuland Khan drew 240,456 rupees from the
treasury to hire soldiers. Within a few months in March 1713, he received news that Emperor
Jahandar Shah was murdered and that Farukh-siyar was king. Although himself a deputy of Asafud-Daula, Sarbuland Khan further deputized his post to Syed Aqil Khan so that he could also
partake in courtly politics at the imperial capital in Delhi. In this context, the further deputizing of
an already deputized post does not indicate organizational strength or efficiency, but rather
highlights the anxiety of officials feeling insecure about their own bureaucratic rights and
privileges within the shrinking orbit of imperial politics. Within a few weeks, Syed Aqil received
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word that one Amanat Khan was the new governor of Gujarat.299 Hardly in Gujarat for a
fortnight, his post was reassigned to Daud Khan Pani. 300
Daud Khan Pani reached Ahmedabad in October 1713. 301 While Pani had an illustrious
military career in Hyderabad prior, he spent his days in Gujarat exploring the countryside and
sporting wild game with hunting dogs. The court at Delhi noted his negligence of administration
and financial mismanagement. Through a petition sent by one Sherzad Khan, appointed police
officer and tax collector of the cloth-market in Ahmedabad, Farukh-siyar learned that ghee
(clarified butter), cotton, and other essential commodities sold in the market were not being taxed,
and that the government was losing significant revenues on trade. In addition, fresh fruits and
vegetables, duly taxed in the other provinces of the empire, were not taxed even a single penny in
Gujarat. Sherzad Khan suggested that the markets for all commodities be consolidated under a
single tent, and that he be entrusted with collecting regular taxes from them. Ali Muhammed
Khan notes in Mirat-i Ahmadi that cotton markets in Ahmedabad were scattered throughout the
city, and local traders did not favor having a single marketplace. He also remarks that since taxes
on ghee and vegetables were innovated by the former governor Firoz Jung, local Mughal felt that
any money received from these innovative taxes should remain in the cashbox of the serving
governor and not be credited to the royal treasury. When the Emperor Farukh-siyar learned of
this, he issued a royal order reiterating that not even governors are to interfere with land revenues
and market taxes allocated for the Crown.

Hollowing Authority and Private Finance, 1713-1715
Farukh-siyar (1685-1719) was crowned ninth Mughal Emperor in 1713, and appointed a
senior noble Daud Khan Pani governor of Gujarat. It is during his tenure that we witness
emerging rivalries between Mughal governors, their deputies, and moneyed classes at
Ahmedabad. Holi is an annual festival celebrating the arrival of spring. During the festival in
1714, a Hindu or Jain banker by the name Hari Ram instigated a communal riot. While making
merry with his fellow caste men, they encircled a Muslim passerby and threw powdered color on
him. After escaping the humiliation, this pedestrian riled up fellow Muslims of “high and low
faith” and ended up at the home of the Qazi, or local magistrate. Upon refusing to meddle in such
affairs, the mob torched the Qazi’s house. They proceeded to the cloth market and set a row of
Hindu and Jain banking shops ablaze. The prominent banker Kapurchand Bhansali took the
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opportunity to further instigate his ongoing rivalry with the Muslim businessman Mullah Abdul
Aziz. Ahmedabad during this time was teeming with unemployed Muslim military men who
offered their services for hire. Every morning, they sat at the gates of major bankers and
merchants, and agreed to fight on behalf of anyone that paid them. During the two-day riot,
“arrows and guns turned into mines of stones and clods of earth”, and many from both sides were
killed.302 Both Mirat-i Ahmadi and Mirat-ul Haqaiq suggest that by the second decade of the
eighteenth century, bankers, merchants, and moneylenders started hiring armed retainers for
mounting attacks against rival businesspersons and even representatives of the state. While there
are three different versions of this incident, they all end with Kapurchand and Abdul Aziz
personally conveying details of the communal riot to Emperor Farukh-siyar in Delhi and escaping
punishment from the court. 303 The significance of this episode lies in the relative ease with which
financial agents hired armed retainers in the provincial capital of an imperial order. Local rioting,
urban disorder, and vagabond military men underscore the state’s inability to adjudicate civil
disputes or maintain internal order. It also highlights martial groups turning to private citizens for
their daily bread since the state was unable to provide suitable employment and sustenance.
During Daud Khan’s governorship, financiers and bankers began taking greater control of
economic affairs. In a particularly detailed passage, Ali Muhammad Khan reflects on the growing
practice of anth. Anth refers to “that which bankers advance in time of shortage of cash
money”.304 While it is difficult pinpoint whether this phrase refers to Mughal fiat currency,
valuable jewels, financial instruments representing fiat values, interest charged as premium, or all
of these depending on context, we know that it was a new financial innovation that was
propagated during a growing monetary crisis. In 1714-15, anth had reached “as high as twenty
percent”, referring to the interest charged on loans provided by bankers. The dīwān, or treasury
official of the province, Muhtarim Khan summoned Kapurchand and other bankers and noted that
the market was short of cash. He urged these financial specialists to reduce anth. While
Kapurchand agreed, Hari Ram, the protagonist of the Holi riot, refused to lower interest rates
because his firm earned large profits by advancing money during financial crises.
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Another contextual meaning of anth is the premium discount charged when a bill of exchange
(hundī or saftah) was cashed at Ahmedabad. There was an inverse relationship between the
availability of cash and demand for it, and as much as 20% was levied as banker’s fees on bills
cashed there. Imagine a person deposits a fixed sum at Surat port for a single bill of exchange.
They travel with that hundi to Ahmedabad to purchase goods. If they cash the financial
instrument, the loss might be as high as 20% on the initial amount paid, and signifies the
premium paid for the privilege of carrying a bill in lieu physical money. Given the high premium
and the need for commerce to continue, the bearer likely finds another merchant to whom he can
transfer the hundi to, thereby avoiding the 20% premium. “If another person had demanded a
hundi of the same amount from the bringer, he gives it to him and thus frees himself from the
obligation…there is no cash in between”.305 The sources confirm that private bankers not only
drafted hundi-s for the financial markets, but also helped transmit them across empire through
their clientele. Such movement contributed to the growth and availability of credit through
principles of book money.
Smaller traders complained that while bigger merchants and bankers could afford keeping
their shops shut during unprofitable times, they did not possess sufficient capital reserves to
suddenly withdraw from commerce. Reports of the dejected nature of the Ahmedabad market
reached the Emperor through news reports, and he summoned the leading bankers Kapurchand,
Hari Ram, Abdul Aziz, and the preacher Muhammed Ali to the imperial court at Delhi.
Kapurchand was imprisoned, and Daud Khan was ordered to confiscate his property and assets
based on testimonies of Abdul Aziz and Muhammed Ali. Quickly realizing the turn of events,
Kapurchand reached out to his business rivals and said, “We hail from the same place and region.
Forgetting the quarrel, and changing enmity into friendship, we must so manage as to return
safely to our native place in harmony”. 306 Although they made it back to Ahmedabad safely,
Farukh-siyar blamed the nazim Daud Khan for not regulating the markets, being careless in
collecting taxes, and not protecting the settled areas from bandits. For the Emperor, the dismal
state of the markets in Ahmedabad and Gujarat threatened livelihoods, and significantly
undermined local revenue paying capacities to his depleted coffers.
From these episodes regarding anth, I suggest that administrative control, the peaceful
transacting of business, and the influence of merchants and bankers with great capital reserves
were intimately linked and codependent. While it is tempting to see financial agents forming an
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independent axis to political authority, the sources suggest that commerce depended on the rules
and regulations established by political authority and its legal-administrative bureaucracy.307 Even
though bankers were capable of profitable innovations such as creative charges levied for
borrowing money, arbitrary fees for writing hundi-s, or just demanding exorbitant interest rates,
this tended to be short-lived because there was a fairly robust network of information and
communication between the imperial court at Delhi, where royal orders were issued, and the
province, where the intricacies of social life including the buying and selling of commodities, the
circulation of money, and personal allegiances and alliances played out. Not only were the
parameters of local life determined by the personality and administrative inclinations of the
nazim, they were also animated by the relationships that financial elites like Kapurchand, Hari
Ram, and Abdul Aziz had with each other. Lastly, even though the Mughal State was in a severe
financial crisis, its normative vision of maintaining local urban markets did not disappear so
quickly.308 This suggests that even though the impact of poor finance was immediate, its effects
on established social practices and modes of comportment were more gradual.
In the first decade after Aurangzeb’s death, even the most powerful merchants and bankers in
Ahmedabad responded to imperial summons with alacrity. The evidence emphasizes frequent
“business trips” that financial agents took to the royal court at Delhi. While financial technologies
and networks of capital arguably condition modern political practices, this was not the case
during the high tide of Mughal rule.309 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the
apparatus of empire dictated the limits of commerce. This started changing after Daud Khan’s
governorship, as officials realized no monetary support would be forthcoming from the court. The
appointment of the next nazim, Maharaja Ajit Singh, marks the beginning of a new style of
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administration in which local governors asserted greater control over local finance in their efforts
to consolidate power in the shrinking shadows of the imperial umbrella.

Bīware and Political Vernaculars
Maharaja Ajit Singh was appointed governor of Gujarat in 1715, but only reached the
province on March 3, 1716. 310 He was occupied with administering his hereditary lands (waṭanjāgīr) in his native Rajasthan, and appointed deputies to handle his new gubernatorial duties in
Gujarat. His rule by proxy was sustained by raising quick capital from private bankers and
citizens in Ahmedabad, and also through the imposition of illegal taxes and fines called bīware.
Biware was likely brought to Gujarat by Ajit Singh from prevailing practices in Rajasthan, and
became an onerous burden for local Gujaratis. Both Mirat-ul Haqaiq and Mirat-i Ahmadi use the
term frequently, but the term is certainly not Persian in origin since it cannot be located in any
major dictionaries of the era.311 Its meaning can be gleaned contextually from the sources as fee,
fine, tax, or raising amount or sum of money. A later colonial multi-lingual compendium of Indic
terminologies lists it as a Marwari word meaning “discharge of business or settlement of a
debt”.312 While it is tempting to accept this as a simple borrowing of a vernacular loan word from
a region and language neighboring northern Gujarat, Mirat-i Ahmadi suggests that local life in
Ahmedabad was coming to be dictated by vernacular political lexicons adopted and reframed by
recalcitrant governors within the established but decaying apparatus of the Mughal State.
Ali Muhammad Khan provides a glimpse into how this practice from Rajasthan gained favor
among the nobility. The text suggests that the diminishing character of Mughal administration
was desperately trying to maintain order and generate revenues, even if it meant propagating
fines, taxes, and other exactions that neither had precedent nor the approval of Emperor Farukhsiyar. Ali Muhammad writes that biware was a racket exercised by strict and merciless taxgatherers appointed by provincial governors and their commanders. The author reflects that he
“had never heard of the word biware until he arrived in Gujarat” in the early eighteenth century,
and “now the nazim-s impose this unpleasant tax on various excuses such as differentiation in
trade, community, head counting, house counting, etc.” 313 Similarly, Mirat-ul Haqaiq contains
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several episodes in which biware is levied on local citizens between 1717-1727.314 This suggests
that the language of political authority was starting to be dictated by new terms and practices. Ajit
Singh began raising loans in administratively unsound ways during his five-year tenure as
governor (1715-17, 1719-1721). This included setting unfavorable terms of borrowing with
bankers, outright extortion of moneyed persons, and illegal impositions and taxes backed by the
threat of naked violence. It is true that Mughal state finances were in disarray, and the central
government could not afford to send required money to pay salaries, maintain bureaucratic
expenses, or equip provincial armies. The complexity of the bureaucracy exacerbated this reality,
as did overlapping jurisdictions of gubernatorial deputies who quarreled about whose nazim
retained the right to levy taxes, collect revenues, and serve as the authentic face of Mughal
authority.315 Ajit Singh relied on his deputies in Gujarat. Let us exam the office of the naib-i
nazim, or deputy-governor, in greater detail below.
By the early eighteenth century, administrative manuals, historical chronicles, and other
sources suggest the growing importance of the naib or deputy. To be sure, the idea of deputyship
was developed at least as early as the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) when various iqṭāʻ holders
were expected to both manage their territories at a distance from the imperial court while
simultaneously being present near the sultan to partake in court intrigue and politics. 316 The naib
was the lieutenant, viceroy, or deputy of an iqta holder and was expected to carry out local duties
on their behalf. While the long-term development of the naib does not concern us here, the
prevalence of the office can be correlated to the waxing and waning of Perso-Islamic Empires in
South Asia during the second millennium. 317 In other words, the nature and functioning of the
office sheds considerable light on state, society, and power relations in the locality. Farhat Hasan
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argues that the chain of deputies that emerge in eighteenth-century Gujarat suggests “the
proliferation of shares in imperial sovereignty, taking the form of sub-infeudation of offices
through a chain of deputies”. 318 While I agree with Hasan’s empirical assessment of the naib and
its increasing visibility in the local administration of the Mughals in Gujarat, I would not
characterize the phenomenon as “a response to the need to accommodate the rising aspirations of
intermediate social groups”.319 Rather, I have come to see the increasing prevalence of
eighteenth-century deputyships as a symptom of imperial weakness where nobles entrusted with
governing areas away from the epicenter of political power were torn between playing court
politics and the very real demands of their local assignments requiring their physical presence. It
resembles the classic problem of having to be in two places at once, solved by the management
tactic of appointing another person to act on your behalf. It was a definite sign of imperial
weakness and a crisis of personnel in which local agents integrated themselves into decentralized
bureaucratic offices of the Mughal Empire without necessarily having the skills or experience to
work there.
Hasan overlooks the essential features of deputyship. Greater attention to histories of multiple
naib-s clashing for control over Ahmedabad indicates that there was no uniform or consistent
strategy for implementing the office. Rather, it became, by the early eighteenth century, a
haphazard administrative post that was precariously contingent on the prowess of competing
naib-s navigating the delicate distance, both real and symbolic, between politics at the court in
Delhi and local affairs in Gujarat. This did not mark a downward shift in the “center of political
gravity” as Hasan suggests, but made the locality the laboratory of Empire–at once distant enough
from the center to engender administrative amnesia, but close enough to cause concern and chaos
for increasingly weak Mughal emperors irresponsibly sending newer deputies in hope of
reprimanding and replacing recalcitrant ones. In the years between 1707 and 1725, local Gujarat
was slowly cut off from the financial resources of the Emperor’s court. Simply put, the Mughal
treasury could no longer manage a financially sound network of income and disbursements
between center and periphery, resulting in nazim-s and naib-s carving out their own independent
domains of authority. If it were not for deep personal rivalries within the nobility, naib-s would
have certainly become the heads of Mughal successor states. It was only because governors and
deputies were still caught up in the ritual and symbolic world of Mughal authority that external
groups, like the Marathas from the Deccan, could make inroads into Gujarat. I shall explore the
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Marathas strategy of raising money from local bankers in the following chapter. For now,
perspectives that see merchants appropriating segments of the state by purchasing local
government offices dominate scholarship on the crisis of the Mughal Empire. 320 Rather than
accepting this view outright, my reading of imperial and local sources suggests that at least in
Gujarat, local financial agents including merchants, bankers, and traders, and the service gentry
were brought, often unwillingly, into the politics of Mughal administration and finance in ways
that were rapid, unsustainable, and often brutal.
In the years after Aurangzeb’s death, no indigenous power or strong arm emerged in the
subcontinent. Gujarat became the chessboard for imperial politics, with emperors on one side and
dissatisfied nobles on the other. The various pieces and individual moves represented shifting
alliances and inconsistent pacts between local rājā-s, governors, and various deputies who were
inconsistent in their intention and behavior due to the overall insecurity of money, power, and
employment characteristic of the declining Mughal order. It is in this context that we must
understand political instability in the locality, and the growth of less complex bureaucracies
funded by private money as a response (Chapter 5). Although the office of the nazim and naib
kept Mughal hierarchies nominally intact, the need for finance and reliable personnel to govern
appropriately led to much chaos. It was in this situation that skirmishes between military groups
played out, and we witness their growing reliance on borrowed money to fund political
aspirations. We also get the same prominent bankers and financiers lending money to opposing
camps, not necessarily because they are motivated by greater opportunities for profit, but rather
because they are caught in a whirlwind of disturbances far beyond their own control. Given the
uncertainty, we must make a distinction in the growing literature on fiscal states between those
polities that had robust and sustainable revenue sources to maintain public order, and those which
squeezed and gambled finance from prominent citizens and the public to keep the aura of
statehood going. This chapter helps us push the literature on fiscal states by analyzing the
circumstances under which a financial crisis was generated, and the mechanisms by which a
revenue-surplus state like the Mughal Empire was replaced by fiscal states funded by debt. It is
during this transition period that racketeering and corruption were pronounced. Greater attention
to these processes better explains the rise and fall of modern states, local histories of moneypower relations, and the significance and impact of new governments funded by debt.
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The closing of Maharaja Ajit Singh's first tenure as governor of Gujarat in 1717 marks the
end of the first phase that I am tracking in which the imperial administration at the provincial
level starts disconnecting with normative visions of Empire. We see provincial governors seeking
independent sources of money. While their land revenue assignments were legitimate and
provided revenues during the harvest season, they required finance more quickly, and realized
that arbitrary taxes on the urban classes and forced loans from rich merchants provided an
expedited stopgap solution. The administrative apparatus of the Mughal Empire, especially
during its high tide in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, did not rely on capital from private
financial agents or even merchants. Contrary to the thesis advocated by Karen Leonard in her
‘Great Firm’ theory of Mughal decline, we see that the administrative apparatus had to maintain
political and social stability, and it was only within that order that commercial activities could go
on uninterrupted. 321 The shift away from strong centralized rule with a well-oiled administrative
bureaucracy was caused by bankruptcy, not by any Great Firms pulling their finances from under
the feet of the Mughals.
As a result the Empire could not keep provincial officials like Ajit Singh in check, either by
paying them higher salaries or by submitting them to more powerful armies. These local officials
were likely perplexed, for on the one hand they felt compelled to pledge allegiance to the
Emperor, while on the other they undermined his authority by perpetuating illegal actions, fines,
and other malpractice. And while the administrative theory of principal-agent relations tells us
that deputies are selected precisely for their ability to make appropriate decisions on behalf of
their superiors, the entire model is jeopardized when a deputy not only acts contrary to his
master’s interest, but propagates an altogether different system of social organization and
resource distribution with a set of vocabulary (anth, biware) and practices that neither those
higher in the chain of command, nor those on the receiving end, can anticipate, understand, or
even dispute. It is in this context that I understand the beginning of phase two, namely, the growth
of rivalries between multiple governors sent to Gujarat in which parties are no longer able to rely
on Mughal authority, royal decree, or even financial support from the Emperor. Instead, they
must source their own money and personnel through networks and connections that are forged in
the locality. I view the period 1717-1730 as decline of central authority being simultaneously
reborn as rebellion and innovation in the provinces. Led by the very same personnel that initially
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derived meaning, status, and purpose from the integrity and authority of the Mughal political
order, the changing face of public authority in Gujarat until 1730 represents a final failed attempt
to reconcile center and periphery within a single imperial idiom.

Of Governors, Deputies, and Kingmakers
After the nazim Ajit Singh was recalled to Delhi, Khan Dauran Samsam-ud-daulah was
appointed subadar of Gujarat in 1717. 322 However, he decided to stay back at the Emperor’s court
in Delhi, and relied on naib-s to carry out the duties entrusted to him. The waning of Mughal
power was met by an increasing anxiety among nobles that if they left the imperial court and its
intrigues, rivals would usurp their position, titles, and honors by misdirecting the Emperor. Khan
Dauran appointed Haider Quli Khan as his naib, an upwardly mobile yet irascible noble who dealt
severely with his colleagues and the locals. 323 He arrived in Ahmedabad in April 1718, but
received news that Khan Dauran’s governorship of less than a year had been revoked. He left for
Delhi immediately, hoping to secure a more lucrative post. During this period, there was severe
famine in Gujarat, and residents were forced to boil weeds. Many even sold their children into
slavery for as little as two rupees. It is in this context of agrarian strife and administrative
mismanagement that Pilaji Gaekwad, cited in the second epigraph at the outset, began regular
raids around Surat. He plundered villages, and Mughal bands were no match for his forces.
Gujarat also had a growing problem of local bandits identified as kolī and qaṣbātī who usurped
commercial goods on caravan routes between Surat and Ahmedabad. 324 Unfortunately, the
attention of Mughal officials in charge was inward looking. Court politics was serious business,
even if participating in them came at the cost of real resources and territorial fiefdoms that nazims were supposed to rule and raise revenues from.
At the imperial capital in Delhi, courtly life took a sinister turn with the rise of the Sayyid
Brothers, two powerful Mughal army generals intent on manipulating the remaining prestige of
the Mughal Empire for personal gains. 325 In short, these two brothers decided that the violent
business of being king makers and breakers was more lucrative than any other position in the
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dying imperial order. They summoned various powerful nobles including Ajit Singh, Sarbuland
Khan, and Nizam-ul Mulk to dethrone Emperor Farukh-siyar. They imprisoned him under severe
circumstances, and eventually sent professional stranglers to execute him. For his cooperation and
support in the deposition, Ajit Singh was reappointed governor of Gujarat in 1719. His extorting
and exacting behavior intensified the second time around. While the Maratha incursions were
becoming more regular, the imperial hold over Gujarat was slipping further. The Sayyid Brothers
appointed Meher Ali Khan as Ajit Singh’s naib in Gujarat, an early instance of a nazim not
directly appointing his own naib. In other words, the Sayyid Brothers were playing chess with the
nobility down to the level of gubernatorial deputies.
Following Farukh-siyar’s deposition, the Sayyid brothers appointed two feeble kings in
succession, Rafi-ud-darajjat and Rafi-ud-daulah. Their reign was short-lived but allowed the
Sayyid Brothers to further their agenda in Gujarat. 326 Mirat-i Ahmadi reproduces three important
royal orders from this period. 327 These documents were held in the revenue collector’s office at
Ahmedabad. The first was issued by Rafi-ud-darajjat on February 18, 1719. Addressed to Ajit
Singh’s naib Meher Ali, it conveys that despite Farukh-siyar’s death, all earlier land revenue
entitlements and property deeds are to remain valid. Fresh documentation was not required to
verify older proprietary claims. This order indicates that although the head of the State changed, it
would not impact local affairs in Gujarat. A second farman was issued in March 1719 appointing
Ajit Singh’s right hand man Nahar Khan as the diwan of the province. This is significant because
the diwan, or local treasury official, was supposed to act as a check on the governor’s authority.
While a naib would likely be in cahoots with his nazim, the diwan was expected to maintain an
independent and parallel channel of communication with the royal court. The appointment of Ajit
Singh’s ally as diwan suggests a breakdown of administrative checks and balances in
government.
A third Farman was issued on March 21, 1719, and is addressed to Nahar Khan. It grants Ajit
Singh’s request to abolish jizya, or the capitation head tax paid by non-Muslim subjects of
Empire. This suggests that Ajit Singh had considerable autonomy in arranging taxation schemes
of the locality. While he abolished a religious head tax for members of his community, he
perpetuated other forms of maladministration like extorting bankers at will. It is in this particular
farman that we get a glimpse into the turning tide for Ahmedabad’s wealthy residents. The order
instructs Nahar Khan to confiscate the house and moveable wealth of the banker Kapurchand
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discussed earlier. Readers are spared the details of the actual assault, except that the naib Meher
Ali and the diwan colluded in organizing the attack. In seizing the private property and wealth of
Kapurchand, this order officially initiates the attack on Ahmedabad’s wealthy merchants,
jewelers, and traders. It is clear that the imperial court did not approve such gross misuse of local
administrative powers.

Itimad Ali Khan’s Mirror of Events
Before delving into details of Gujarat in the 1720s, I shall introduce the unique unpublished
Persian diary of Itimad Ali Khan, a middling Mughal bureaucrat who held various posts in his
thirty-year career in the province. The diary, titled Mirat-ul Haqaiq or Mirror of Events, is an
impressively large but incomplete manuscript spanning 489 folios. 328 It is divided into two parts,
and covers events from 1717-27 in a continuous fashion. The first comprises the short
biographies and miniature portraits of eight successive Mughal Emperors from Aurangzeb to
Muhammad Shah. The second part of the manuscript includes revenue statistics and custom dues
from Gujarat’s port cities, list of workshops and living quarters in the cities, and various episodes
of daily life in Gujarat that Itimad Ali directly witnessed or compiled from reliable news reports.
Itimad Ali Khan’s diary provides rare insights into local dynamics of Mughal power during an
unstable decade. The only manuscript of this handwritten diary is held by the Bodleian Library at
Oxford University.
Itimad Ali Khan held about twenty minor administrative posts in the three decades he lived in
Gujarat.329 Towards the end, he fell into relative obscurity, his posterity saved by the sole copy of
his elaborate diary. Itimad Ali’s father, Mulla Muhammad Tahir, migrated from Iran and held
various posts in Aurangzeb’s administration in the late seventeenth century. His most important
posts included port-official at Surat followed by a diwanship at Ahmedabad. Other members of
Itimad Khan’s family also served in the local bureaucracy, including his paternal uncle Idris Khan
and his cousin Saiyid Muhsin. Itimad Khan’s own sons Hadi and Dervish also worked as naib-s
to various officials in Gujarat. Itimad Ali’s real name was Muhammad Muhsin, and Aurangzeb
titled him Itimad Khan in 1697. His title was changed to Muhsin Khan under Jahandar Shah’s
reign in 1712, and finally to Itimad Ali Khan under Emperor Farukh-siyar. He was given his first
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appointment as port-official of Cambay in 1693, and after his father’s death in 1695, replaced him
as diwan in Ahmedabad. A year later, he was transferred 400-km east to Burhanpur where he
made an offering of the Quran and three exceptional horses to Emperor Aurangzeb who was
encamped there. He was then assigned to the service of Aurangzeb’s grandson Prince Bidar
Bakht as paymaster of his army. After holding various other positions in the prince’s retinue, he
was transferred to Cambay as port official. Before being appointed, he was summoned to the
royal encampment and tested on his knowledge of horses. 330 This is likely because rare horses
were offloaded at Cambay port and the finest were to be selected for the royal stable.
Unfortunately, it was during his time at Cambay that he was also accused of embezzling 1,345
rupees from the port revenues of Gogha. The amount was recovered from him, and he was
transferred without fault (bī-taqṣīr) to another army.
By 1705, Itimad Ali was sent back to Bidar Bakht’s army, serving as bakhshī or paymaster,
wāqiʻ nawīs or news writer, and mīr-i ātish or head of artillery. In 1708, he was appointed faujdar
at the towns of Baroda, Bakhera, and Sonkher, and shuttled between the three areas for sixteen
months. Itimad Ali Khan provides key insights into the dwindling revenues of the area due to
maladministration and the chaos caused by the Marathas. For example, he writes that although the
estimated annual revenue of Sonkher village was 40,000 maḥmūdī silver coins, no more than
7,000 were realized that year.331 He also writes that a total of 220,000 rupees were collected from
the pargana or district subdivision Nadiad located 60-km southeast of Ahmedabad. The funds
were dispatched in installments through hundi-s to royal treasuries at Burhanpur in central India
and Hyderabad situated in southern India. This suggests that the Mughal bureaucracy relied on
financial instruments and private banking networks for transferring large sums of money across
empire. In 1709, Itimad Ali was reappointed port-official at Cambay, and in 1710, to the same
post at Surat. We may surmise that Itimad Ali developed an expertise in managing Mughal ports,
and it is likely that his relationship with Indian and foreign traders, and knowledge of port affairs
and administration, kept him in the running with the higher authorities.
The entries in the tail end of the diary indicate that Itimad Ali Khan retired prematurely and
without money. He lived in the small house of a ship captain called Muhammad Jafar who did not
even charge rent. The diary captures the political unrest and disorder he directly witnessed in the
years after Aurangzeb’s death. Writing about the office of Mughal Emperor during Muhammad
Shah’s reign in the 1720s, Itimad Ali laments, “how strange has become the fate of the Sultanate
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of Hindustan, that the prerogatives of the Monarchs are in the hands of the servants, and whatever
they want, whatever wickedness they want to perpetuate, the Emperor does that”. 332 The diary
breaks off after January 20, 1727, and a subsequent part is regrettably missing. I have not been
able to trace the author in other contemporaneous sources after 1718, leaving us an incomplete
picture of this exceptional person. His unpublished journal captures intrigues that transpired in
Gujarat between Mughal administrators, petty officials, local bankers, and residents of the area in
the tumultuous twenty years after Aurangzeb’s death. His commentary on changing concepts of
public authority and responsibility make it a valuable source for studying political life in the wake
of a dying precolonial empire. I have identified and translated relevant passages that shed light on
the changing fortunes of the financial classes in Gujarat. We shall return to these colorful
episodes in a subsequent section.

Kapur Bhansali and Marwari Oppression
When Muhammad Shah was enthroned on September 18, 1719, few anticipated that he would
remain head of empire until 1748. In the immediate decade after his accession, we see further
breakdown of imperial administration and the creeping expropriation of public authority by
regional forces. Maharaja Ajit Singh retained his position as governor Gujarat, and sent Anup
Singh Bhandari as his deputy in April 1720. Upon arriving, Anup Singh realized that military
equipment and other state infrastructure was outdated and broken. In 1720, Anup Singh sent a
petition that “most of the cannons and swivels of the government, and lead and gunpowder in the
city, need repairs”.333 Around the same time, a royal order was issued that Nahir Khan, the diwan
at Ahmedabad, be given a cavalry of 3,000 horses and matching infantry to stall Maratha
penetration into Gujarat. Anup Singh took 185,000 rupees from the provincial treasury while
Nahir Khan withdrew 492,383 rupees. Mirat-i Ahmadi records that scribes working in the
diwan’s office observed this and noted that Nahir Khan withdrew this sum “by a forged permit
which he himself issued in his own name”. 334 We see that a combination of outdated military
equipment and resource scarcity inspired local nobles to raise finances to propagate their own
visions of public authority.
Anup Singh began a campaign of extorting fines and falsely accusing the city’s rich jewelers,
bankers, and merchants of transgressions against the state. The jeweler-banker Kapurchand
intervened against such crooked exactions. As the nagarsheth or chief merchant of the city,
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Kapurchand was expected to protect the urban citizens from arbitrary threats. Anup Singh drew
on his sense of impunity, inflated by his close connections to Ajit Singh and the Sayyid Brothers
at the imperial court, to oppress local citizens. In protest, Kapurchand stopped frequenting the
regular assembly of nobles at Bhadra Fort in Ahmedabad, a gesture of disrespect to Anup Singh.
Rumors quickly spread that Anup Singh wanted to assassinate Kapurchand since he was
becoming an obstacle in the way of stripping unscrupulous sums of money from the business
classes at Ahmedabad. As a preventive measure, the jeweler relied on the wide availability of
unemployed soldiers to protect his personal being and property. 335 He “employed nearly 500
unemployed persons as mounted cavalry and foot soldiers and kept them around his house”. 336
When Anup Singh harassed private citizens or fellow merchants, Kapurchand would send these
hired retainers to “release them with force and violence”. 337 Such a situation passed for a month
when in 1720, Anup Singh ordered the assassination of Kapurchand. One Khwaja Baksh entered
the jeweler’s mansion with counterfeit letters and fatally stabbed Kapurchand with a javelin.
The Mirat-i Ahmadi refers to Ajit Singh’s governorship and Anup Singh’s deputyship in
Ahmedabad as a specific form of Marwari tyranny. Ajit Singh and his entourage are not identified
as Mughals, but are seen as ethnically Rajasthani vassals of the Emperor in both the Persian and
Marwari language sources.338 Oppressive measures adopted in Gujarat under the Mughal banner
did not necessarily stem from imperial edict, but rather represented a clear case of local
customary practices of the Marwar region in Rajasthan being applied in an excessive and
unfamiliar manner to Gujarat for raising revenues, undermining established administrative
practices, and diverting official directives from the imperial court. It was an administrative
problem in which the imperial court relied on untrained or unchecked deputies in forging
administration and maintaining some semblance of Mughal rule, and in turn, those deputies
roughly translating customary practices and habits from their own familiar domains to new ones
without being sensitive to local conditions, or without paying heed to normative ideas of good
governance as emphasized in Mughal royal orders and treatises on statecraft. Meanwhile at Delhi,
senior nobles planned the assassination of the Sayyid Brothers since their hold over political
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affairs was becoming monopolistic. Emperor Muhammad Shah, who was certainly aware of the
key role that the brothers played in ruining former emperors, confirmed the plan. Hussain Ali
Sayyid was assassinated in Delhi on his way to the market. News of his death spread across the
subcontinent, and the Mirat-i Ahmadi records that it caused “a kind of disturbance in the
collection of revenues from the crown-lands and settlements of governors”.339 The elder Qutb-ul
Mulk Sayyid was on a military campaign in the Deccan when he was captured and executed by
imperial forces. This also meant the end of Ajit Singh’s governorship of Gujarat. The highranking noble Nizam-ul Mulk (1671-1748) replaced the Sayyid Brothers as grand vizier of
Empire.340

From Deputy to Governor: Haider Quli Khan, 1721-22
Haider Quli Khan, who earlier served as deputy to Khan Dauran, became the next governor,
and arrived in Ahmedabad in 1721. He did not rule in absentia. Unlike Ajit Singh, Haider Quli
did not possess any hereditary vested land rights elsewhere in the Empire, so his attention was
focused on Gujarat. Second, social unrest in the area compelled him to arrive more quickly than
his predecessors. Haider Quli appointed Shujaat Khan, a Gujarati noble as his naib, and Shujaat
Khan’s brother Rustam Ali Khan as faujdar at Baroda.341 The significance of these appointments
is that Shujaat Khan and his brother were local nobles, Gujarati in their identification and in their
loyalty. They were not Marwari, Turani, or even Mughals sent from other regions of Empire. This
is significant because their attachment to the province probably influenced their own style of rule,
one that has been remembered and eulogized in a rare Gujarati source examined in detail below.
During the short tenure of Haider Quli, he not only seized horses meant for the royal stable in
Delhi, but also “confiscated jāgīr-s (land assignments) of royal manṣabdār-s (rank holding
officials), provincial military commanders, [and] lands granted for means of sustenance to
eminent Sayyids”, and granted them to persons of his choice. 342 On hearing about these misdeeds,
the grand vizier Nizam-ul-Mulk requested Muhammad Shah that he be granted the governorship
of Gujarat. When Haider Quli heard the news of his impeding replacement, he panicked and the
city’s leading physicians were summoned to treat him for dementia.
After Haider Quli left the area, his deputies Shujaat Khan and Rustam Ali received Nizam-ul
Mulk with respect. This suggests that although Mughal imperial rule showed visible signs of
fracture and mismanagement, it still provided opportunities, although shrinking, to some higher
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ranking local nobles like the brothers Shujaat Khan and Rustam Ali who were invested in, and
continued to benefit from, the authority and opportunities of the waning Mughal State. After
arriving in 1723, Nizam-ul Mulk appointed his uncle Hamid Khan as his naib. He also rearranged
local land entitlements in his favor.343 Nizam-ul Mulk’s arrival marked the imperial court’s
renewed interest in settling the province once and for all. Although Nizam-ul Mulk was arguably
the most powerful Mughal commander of his time, his decision to control Gujarat through his
ruthless uncle and deputy Hamid Khan proved consequential.

Treacherous Alliances: Hamid Khan, the Marathas, and the Battle of Adas
Persian histories, the diary of Itimad Ali Khan, and vernacular writings confirm that Hamid
Khan became exceedingly greedy in controlling Gujarat by February 1723. The sources suggest
that his alliance with Kuntha Kadam was especially critical in further destabilizing Mughal
administration in Gujarat. Kuntha Kadam, often called Kunthaji Dakhani in the sources, was a
commander in the retinue of the Maratha Khanderao Dabhade. Kunthaji and Pilaji Gaekwad, the
adopted son of another Maratha leader, were responsible for raising tribute payments called
chauth for their separatist confederacy. Chauth was a distinctly Maratha form of tax, levied at
25% of estimated land revenues of a region. By then, Pilaji Gaekwad had already established
himself 90-km east of Surat at Songadh Fort, and drew revenues from its environs. 344 His
accomplice Kunthaji reached Dahod and Godhra, 120-km east of Ahmedabad, and regularly
plundered settlements towards Gujarat. Kunthaji began exacting “safety money, known as
khandani” from the locals.345 By July 1723, Rustam Ali was transferred to Surat as port-officer.
He faced growing Maratha assaults on the city along with religious riots and civil disputes within
the city.346
Nizam-ul Mulk abandoned his post as grand vizier of the empire in December 1723. As this
was considered outright rebellion, his governorship of Gujarat and Hamid Khan’s deputyship was
revoked. The local government was handed over to Sarbuland Khan, who was, until then, serving
as nazim at Kabul in present day Afghanistan. Shujaat Khan was appointed his naib. However,
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Hamid Khan was not ready to leave Bhadra Fort within the city walls of Ahmedabad, and for
three days and nights, a civil war broke out in the citadel in which many houses were damaged
and lives lost. Safdar Khan Babi, an Afghan Pashtun military man allied to the Mughals,
convinced Hamid Khan to temporarily leave the city. Hamid Khan travelled to Dahod, 200-km
east of Ahmedabad. Hamid Khan’s intention of controlling Gujarat remained firm, and he hired
soldiers during the monsoon season comprising Gujaratis, Kasbatis, Arabs, and Dakhanis. In the
opposing camp, the cost of maintaining Mughal authority in Gujarat was exceeding funds being
sent from Delhi. By 1724, Sarbuland Khan required money quickly, and in what seems to be a
significant move, took 200,000 rupees from the banker Jiwan Chughal upon mortgaging the
revenues of Dholka, Broach, Jambusar, and Maqbulabad (Amod) to him. Meanwhile in Surat,
Rustam Ali Khan also engaged in multiple skirmishes with Pilaji Gaekwad, constantly chasing
him back to his fort at Songadh. 347
Shujaat Khan sent a notice to the Emperor Muhammad Shah at Delhi that he had 20,000
horsemen ready to fight against the rebels Nizam-ul Mulk and Hamid Khan. If the Emperor
desired, money should be sent so that he and his loyal brothers Rustam Ali and Ibrahim Quli
could carry out the attack. The Emperor approved, and 300,000 rupees were assigned from the
revenues of Surat for this pressing deed. Unfortunately, the local soldiers hired by Shujaat Khan
paled in comparison to Hamid Khan’s seasoned fighters and Maratha allies. After corresponding
with Hamid Khan, Nizam-ul Mulk enlisted Kunthaji in a grand plan to overthrow Shujaat Khan
and his official deputyship in Gujarat. Hamid Khan and Nizam-ul Mulk agreed to pay Kunthaji
chauth from Gujarat’s revenues. The armies of Hamid Khan and Kunthaji met at Dahod and
turned to Ahmedabad for attack. It remains unclear who supported Shujaat Khan and who rallied
behind his rival Hamid Khan. The Persian and Gujarat sources, however, suggest that some
prominent bankers, including the well-known jeweler and by then nagarsheth Khushalchand
Jhaveri initially sided with Hamid Khan. Perhaps supporting the renegade Mughal deputy Hamid
Khan held out promises of greater financial rewards and political futures.
In 1724, a fierce battle ensued in which Hamid Khan and his Maratha allies overwhelmed
Shujaat Khan’s forces. In the end, Shujaat Khan was beheaded along with his sons Husain Quli
and Mustafa Quli. Kunthaji and Hamid Khan divided up the revenues of the area and began
levying fines from surrounding villages. Much of this was in the form of khandani, or protection
money that was a distinctly Maratha form of tribute-tax. This levy should be contrasted with the
regularized and systematic land tax, or māl-i zamīn, that locals paid to the Mughals. Hamid
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Khan’s most symbolic blow to Mughal authority was dismissing official accountants and tax
collectors, seizing the khāliṣa or local crown lands of the Emperor and putting them in charge of
his men, and destroying the records of all local government offices that were kept by the diwan of
the province.348 The destruction of the local Mughal archive suggests that Hamid Khan wished to
remove all paper trails of existing property rights, official appointments, and other land grants and
concessions sanctioned by the Mughal State to local officials and citizens. The attack must have
also been a symbolic blow for residents given that the diwan’s office building was the most
concrete manifestation of Mughal authority in the locality. The English Factory Records also
document Shujaat Khan’s death, and convey their worry about how it would impact their own
relationship with his brother Rustam Ali, the Mughal port-officer at Surat where the English held
trading privileges.349
Soon after, Hamid Khan assassinated Shujaat Khan’s third brother Ibrahim Quli. His body
was displayed publically, and others who were seen to be in cahoots with the slain brothers were
also arrested. Although we do not have details pertaining to the initial arrest of Khushalchand
Jhaveri, grandson of the jeweler-banker Shantidas Jhaveri examined in the previous chapter, we
know that it was sometime in 1724 after Hamid Khan’s first major victory that Khushalchand was
summoned and arrested for aiding the brothers Shujaat, Ibrahim, and Rustam. Hamid Khan also
confiscated property belonging to Shujaat Khan and Ibrahim Khan, and illegally appropriated all
of the money deposited in the royal treasury at Ahmedabad. He also levied biware and other
illegal fines on commercial goods brought into the city. 350
Hamid Khan moved towards Surat to fight Rustam Ali Khan. Rustam left his position as portofficer of Surat and prepared to avenge the death of his two brothers, nephews, and other allies
killed. He enlisted his rival Pilaji Gaekwad for 100,000 rupees, and they agreed to attack Hamid
Khan jointly. Shortly after, however, Pilaji was invited to Hamid Khan’s camp and offered
greater rewards for agreeing to turn on Rustam Ali during the fight. This clearly suggests how
feeble rivalries and alliances could be. The battle took place in the plains of Adas. Initially,
Rustam Ali Khan plundered Hamid Khan’s camp and freed two nephews imprisoned there.
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Kunthaji and Pilaji raided Rustam Ali’s camp, and the lone warrior was cut off from necessary
supplies. Finally, on February 4, 1725, Rustam Ali pushed beyond the troops encircling him, and
marched towards Ahmedabad. He barely proceeded a mile when he was met by enemy forces. He
was slain on February 10 by the Maratha allies of Hamid Khan hoping to secure revenues rights
that fell under Rustam Ali’s jurisdiction at Surat.
After his victory, Hamid Khan entered Ahmedabad ceremoniously on elephant back,
followed by his allies Kunthaji and Pilaji. They agreed that chauth for the villages north of the
Mahi River would be assigned to Kunthaji, while those south of it down to Surat would fall
within Pilaji’s rights. This left Ahmedabad and the surrounding areas to Hamid Khan. Hamid
Khan dealt another symbolic blow to royal authority by seizing 80,000 rupees from the treasury
and valuable silk and cotton fabrics made especially for Emperor Muhammed Shah. Once again,
he ransacked the provincial Mughal archive and other local offices of Empire. Destroying records
and causing administrative chaos allowed him to seize legitimate jagir-s and draw forged deeds
on crown lands in his name. This suggests that paper documentation of property ownership, land
rights, and entitlements held a kind of legitimacy despite being invalid. It was Hamid Khan’s
attempt to restructure local power relations, initially through the sword, and then based on the
might of the pen.
We are fortunate to also have records from officers trading for the British East India
Company. These diaries and letters corroborate evidence offered by Persian and Gujarati sources.
Daniel Innes, the English Agent at Cambay writes on April 11, 1725 that Pilaji and Kunthaji had
a rivalry but were also united in plundering cities in Gujarat. Regarding the revenues of Cambay,
Innes believes that Hamid Khan granting both Maratha bandits revenue rights over the port “was
the worst step that could be permitted, for the city is now entirely at their mercy, and I can make
no judgments of its condition, as our lives and fortunes are dependent on the caprice of armed
villains, who among the rest have cessed me 5,000 rupees. I have absolutely refused the payment,
pleading our [official order] and friendship with Shahu Raja, all which they laugh at and have
renewed their threats.”351 By this time, even Hamid Khan was having trouble securing finances to
propagate his fledgling administration in Gujarat. He not only squeezed money from individuals
in Ahmedabad, but also sent agents to Cambay to raise funds and forced loans from bankers and
merchants there. Innes writes on May 4, 1725, “Hamid Khan is not out of Ahmedabad, but the
bazar news is that he intends with all the ghanīm-s (Marathas) to leave these parts shortly. By his
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great oppressions, the shroffs (Persian: ṣirāf, bankers and money changers) and merchants at
Ahmedabad are daily running away. He cesses the houses, and, as he catches a man, according to
his estate squeezes him. He has sent (to Cambay) 130 horses with two officers, whom he has
given bills (of exchange) on the (Mughal) Government towards the payment of some of his troops
for 150,000 thousand rupees. To enable him to comply therewith, as the King’s customs collected
here are a trifle to that sum, every house is cessed at 12 rupees, and orders are given for seizing of
about 50 of the head shroffs and merchants in the city to demand of them the advancing of the
above sum, and on their refusal to send them (sic) to him, which occasioned a great many
(shroffs) last night to run away.”352
Rustam no Saloko or A Poem for Rustam
Until now, the Persian sources Mirat-i Ahmadi and Ma’asir-ul Umara have been key in
analyzing early eighteenth-century Gujarat. And while they contain authentic accounts, it is worth
comparing them to other contemporaneous vernacular sources. I was able to locate an important
local source in Gujarati written by the poet Samal Bhatt. 353 In Rustam no Saloko or A Poem for
Rustam, a different picture emerges in which the Gujarati jeweler-banker Khushalchand is viewed
as a traitor in the financial assistance and information he provided to Hamid Khan. The three
Gujarati Mughal brothers Shujaat, Ibrahim, and Rustam are highly praised in the text, and we get
a sense that the local population preferred the stability and order provided by Mughal imperial
rule to the haphazard ways of the renegade Mughal Hamid Khan and his Maratha allies. Histories
of Mughal life in early eighteenth-century Gujarat have largely been confined to elite sources
including Persian chronicles and royal orders, and foreign travelogues and company records.
Local Gujarati sources have remained glaringly absent, and this section allows us to incorporate
the regional perspective on major political transformations in late-Mughal Gujarat.
Samal Bhatt was born sometime in the final years of the seventeenth century, and lived until
about 1766. He was born and raised in Venganpur, a suburb of Ahmedabad now known as
Gomtipur. Bhatt was well versed in Sanskrit, Persian, Hindustani, Braj Bhasha, and Gujarati
languages. Although adept in Braj Bhasha prosody and the classical meters of Sanskrit poetry, he
preferred to write in simpler forms such as doha (couplet) and chaupai (quatrain). A towering
personality in early Gujarati literary history, he was a regular favorite at poetic gatherings and
storytelling sessions in Patan and Ahmedabad. The literary tradition coming out of Gujarat has
identified a total of twenty-four major works produced by Samal Bhatt. In this particular narrative
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poem comprising 180 verses, Samal recounts the important battle between Hamid Khan and the
three Gujarati-Mughal brothers and imperial deputies Shujaat, Ibrahim, and Rustam. It is, in
effect, a recounting of a civil battle within the Mughal fraternity, and clearly demonstrates the
loss of imperial control in the locality, the kind of treachery perpetuated by renegade Mughal
officials like Hamid Khan, and the role that prominent financial agents like the jeweler-financier
Khushalchand played in lending money to penniless officials. It becomes clear from this text, and
also in our earlier discussion of Ganim no Pavado, that the people of Gujarat benefitted from
Mughal rule in the years leading up to Aurangzeb’s death. They feared the increasing presence of
Maratha marauders from the Deccan who were seeking new forms of tribute and taxes from
Gujaratis. Samal Bhatt’s poem highlights the social anxiety and political instability that the
defecting deputy Hamid Khan brought to the region.
Both manuscript and printed copies of this text have been difficult to locate. The B.J. Institute
of Indology at Ahmedabad possesses an exceptional 1956 copy of the text issued by the Gujarati
Forbes Sabha of Bombay. Samal Bhatt’s work has remained outside the purview of scholarly
analysis, partly because historians of this period are more familiar with the Mughal sources
written in Persian. Local Gujarati sources are missing from analysis because they are not easily
available and are written in non-standard language, making their comprehension and translation
difficult. I have drawn on my knowledge of Gujarati, Sanskrit, Hindustani, and Persian to analyze
and translate into simple verse this older form of Gujarati embodied in A Poem for Rustam. These
verses shed critical light on Hamid Khan’s key role in undermining Mughal imperial authority by
forging alliances with the Marathas, and by extorting prominent citizens in Ahmedabad for
money. In order to convey the spirit of the verses and imprint the range of metaphors that Samal
Bhatt uses to convey his message, I have provided a translation of the most important verses
below. The parenthetical numbers refer to the order of the couplets in the published text.
Selected Verses from Samal Bhatt’s Rustam no Saloko (1725)
Part I:
The Emperor of Delhi Muhammad Shah lives, his candle burns across nine provinces.
On the head of those ruling in Gujarat, he appointed Hamid Khan to the governorship of
Gujarat. (3)
The kingdom rules over the city and in the sixteen surrounding villages.
The Gujarati Mughals are witty and clever, I praise all the three brothers (Shujaat, Ibrahim,
Rustam). (4)
Soon the Emperor pondered, why did I grant the Gujarat area to Hamid Khan?
He sent five messengers by horse, and Shujaat Khan received the Royal Order. (9)
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He gave the leadership of Gujarat to (Shujaat Khan), distancing Hamid Khan.
This appointment of Shujaat Khan startled Hamid Khan, and he wrote a complaint (to Nizam-ul
Mulk). (10)
“Arise Hamid Khan, ready yourself, free from intoxication head out (and fight)!”
In hearing that, Hamid Khan battled Shujaat Khan. (11)
Face to face they shouted at one another, parasols protecting cannons in action.
Bullets fire and heap lay strewn, cowards unable to stand. (12)
Shujaat Khan sat playing cards (strategizing), Ibrahim Quli was in the war ground.
Having killed Mewasis (local ethnic soldiers fighting for Hamid Khan), he took their property
and land. (13)
Ramdad Khan fought bravely in the war, and took lives to protect his leader (Shujaat Khan)
Hamid Khan lost the battle, and in anger sought advice from Safdar Khan Babi. (14)
Nizam-ul Mulk heard this news, and said ‘you old man breaking a sweat?’
‘Why did you run away cowardly’, that was the message he sent to (his deputy) Hamid Khan. (17)
There were two armies, there was a competition. They were fighting in opposition.
Hamid Khan cheated and declared victory, but the Gujarati warriors continued fighting. (23)
Shujaat Khan himself entered the war, arrows, quiver, and gunpowder blazing.
His own elephant’s were boisterous, and all the enemy warriors scattered away. (24)
Khushalchand turned, opening the gates of the city walls.
Hamid Khan entered Bhadra Fort, and Ibrahim Quli fell into worry. (35)
Ibrahim Quli met Hamid Khan, and returned and alerted his colleague.
Why are you sitting around, we have been cheated. Our banker (Khushalchand) is a traitor. (37)
The chauth of villages and pargana-s were handed over to the Maratha Kunthaji.
Having taken tribute from the city today, they want to work against Rustam. (53)
The big merchants gathered, and did well for the people of Gujarat in helping Rustam.
Those (merchants) who were against the two brothers, that news reached Rustam. (54)
Giving each other their oath, Pilaji gave Rustam his word.
With affection they made an oath, and it was sealed by recitation of Ram - Rahim. (59)
The army marched to the destination in rhythmic horse gallops, at Adas the armies came face to
face.
The reserve army, comprising 16,000 soldiers, stayed back. (88)
There were so many soldiers, Kunthaji himself had 20,000.
There were five experienced leaders on the winning side (five Rohilas, or Afghan Pathan
commanders). (89)
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VERSES 90-102: A DESCRIPTION OF THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE OF ADAS.
Pilaji proceeded with thoughts in his mind, this was an opportunity to betray (play the hand).
He looted Rustam’s camp, and seized all his treasure and artillery. (103)
The men from the South (Pilaji and Kunthaji), all of those Marathas got together.
Pilaji defeated (killed) Rustam, while Kunthaji looted Hamid Khan. (108)
On the battlefield they found 100,000 Marathas, in that entire area falling under Rustam’s
jurisdiction.
O Samal (Bhatt), what can I say, in my mouth I have only one tongue (how much more can I say).
(134)
Part II:
Rustam’s fall was being discussed all-over, he wrongly dropped his taqiyah for the paghri in
allying with Marathas.
Hamid Khan decorated the elephant, and from Surapura he turned. (172)
From there Hamid Khan came to Gujarat (Ahmedabad), bringing all of the Marathas with him.
The promise that I gave you can be fulfilled, “for one and a quarter day, you may loot the city”.
(173)
Hamid Khan taxed according to religious affiliations, levying fines sometimes twice.
People thought paying such taxes might be a good deed, it might shortly turn their stars around.
(176)
Samvat 1781, Maksar Vad, thirteenth day (corresponding to 1725).
Samal Brahmin of the Shree Ghod community says, study these verses. (177)
I am pleading to you God, you know who has excess and less (you account accordingly).
The area Vaso is governed by Rustam, and even in his posthumous name people believe iron shall
bend. (179)
Those who listen to this and donate, will receive from the sky their daily bread.
Whatever I have learned, heard, I am telling you that after putting my hands together. Praise the
Lord! (180)
Citing Emperor Muhammad Shah’s Kingship from Delhi, Samal Bhatt says his authority
radiates across the nine provinces (nau khanda) of the Empire, and that he appointed Hamid Khan
governor of Gujarat (Verse 3). Hamid Khan, who was actually the naib of Nizam-ul Mulk, rules
Ahmedabad and the surrounding villages and towns according to his own whimsy. However, the
three Gujarati Mughals who are the protagonists of the ballad are witty and worthy of high praises
(4). These brothers are the heroic Shujaat Khan (5), Rustam whose strength is unbeatable (6), and
the youngest Ibrahim Quli who successfully thwarts thieves and bandits in the region (7). Once
the Emperor Muhammed Shah came to know the bravery of these three Gujarati Mughals, he
began wondering why he granted the province to Hamid Khan. He sent five messengers by horse
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to quickly deliver a royal order to the eldest brother Shujaat Khan (9). He entrusted the province
to the deputyship of Shujaat Khan, and this appointment startled Hamid Khan. Thereafter ensued
a battle between Shujaat Khan and Hamid Khan in which cannons were fired (11, 12). Shujaat
Khan retreated and strategized, while his youngest brother Ibrahim Quli fought in the war ground
killing Mewasis and seizing their property and land (13). 354 Hamid Khan lost that battle, and in
great frustration consulted the local Mughal commander Safdar Khan Babi (14). 355
When Nizam-ul Mulk heard the news of his uncle Hamid Khan’s defeat, he sent a note saying
“You old man, breaking a sweat? Why have you come away so cowardly?” (17) “If you would
have won, I would have certainly gifted you with a saropā (robe of honor)” (18). On hearing this,
Hamid Khan went and recruited more soldiers, especially Mehwasis, to fight in his army (19). He
also recruited Kunthaji Kadam and his Maratha soldiers (20), and hoped to defeat Shujaat Khan
in a single decisive blow. The two armies met again in opposition, and Hamid Khan cheated and
declared victory, but the Gujarati warriors fighting for Shujaat Khan did not back off (23).
Shujaat Khan himself had arrows, quiver, and gunpowder blazing, and his own elephant’s roar
sent the enemy cackling away. Once Hasan Quli, an ally of Shujaat Khan, heard news of the
battle, he quickly rushed to the scene. Using bow and arrows, he broke the spirit and killed many
Marathas on Hamid Khan’s side (31). By then, it was nightfall and the armies retreated. Ibrahim
Quli and Shujaat’s forces retreated to Ahmedabad, and ensured that all twelve gates of the city
walls were shut (33). Ibrahim Quli made up his mind to kill Hamid Khan (34). Unknown to the
brothers Shujaat Khan and Ibrahim Quli was that the jeweler-banker Khushalchand was in
alliance with Hamid Khan. It is possible that Khushalchand was coerced into coopering, but we
cannot be certain about the terms under which he worked with Hamid Khan. Was Khushalchand
operating from a place of fear, strength, or opportunity? In the dead silence of night,
Khushalchand opened the gates of Ahmedabad city, and Hamid Khan and his allies entered the
Bhadra Fort located within the city walls.
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The next morning, Hamid Khan invited Ibrahim Quli to Bhadra fort to discuss matters (36).
Although we are given no details about the meeting, the next verse says that he went early in the
morning to meet Hamid Khan, and returned back and woke up his colleagues. In state of angry
disappointment, Ibrahim Quli said to his colleague “why are you sitting around, we have been
cheated. Our banker Khushalchand is no longer what we thought he was!” (37). At that moment,
Ibrahim Quli decided to fight Hamid Khan within the city walls at Bhadra Fort (40), and after a
second night of battling, no single party emerged victorious (41-51). The next day, it seems that
Shujaat Khan told Khushalchand the truth of what happened to the city. It is likely that Shujaat
Khan approached the banker and informed him of the treacherous plans designed by Hamid Khan
in which “the chauth of the villages and pargana-s were given to the Maratha Kunthaji” (53). The
poet then writes that in order to protect the city and suburbs, Gujaratis should work for Rustam in
fighting the Marathas (53). Here the poem changes direction and describes the resistance that
Rustam Ali tried to offer against the Marathas in his own jurisdiction consisting of Surat and its
environs. Initially, he decided to fight Pilaji Gaekwad who continued to loot Surat. However, both
rivals finally met and struck a deal to defeat Hamid Khan jointly. “Giving each other their oath,
Pilaji gave Rustam salutations, and with affection they made an oath, and it was sealed by the
recitation of Ram-Rahim” (59).356
On the battlefield, at least 3,000 soldiers of Rustam were protected by metal armor, and it
seemed that no one could escape their grip (63). There were soldiers to the right and left, and the
sight was magnificent. “Turkish, Arab, Shohiye, Kekan Kachi, and Multani, those were the
beautiful horses of the army” (68). Even English soldiers, likely working on behalf of the British
East India Company at Surat, took delight in watching the battle unfold. They sat on horses and
camels with parasols, watching the clashing groups from afar (71). The armies marched to the
destination in rhythmic horse gallops, and at Adas they came face to face (88). On Hamid Khan’s
side, his ally Kunthaji commanded a sizeable army of 20,000 soldiers, indicating that the total
entourage fighting for Hamid Khan must have been significantly greater (89). During the battle,
Pilaji realized an opportunity to “play his hand”, and he decided to betray Rustam by looting his
camp, seizing his valuable treasure, money, and artillery (103). During the battle, the Marathas
Pilaji and Kanthaji, who were until then supporting opposite sides of the Mughal civil war,
decided to work together. While Pilaji was busy detracting Rustam, Kunthaji simultaneously
looted Hamid Khan’s camp (108). Although Kunthaji eventually returned Hamid Khan’s
equipment, the shifting alliances and double-crossing between the Maratha commanders and
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opposing Mughal camps demonstrates how uncertain and quickly the changing dynamics of local
wars were. After all, Gujarat was a wealthy province and controlling it meant access to regular
land revenue and taxes from its vibrant ports. At the close of the first day of fighting, Kunthaji
gave refuge to Hamid Khan. At this point, Samal Bhatt signs off and declares that these initial
battles have been described in brevity.
In the second half of the poem, Shamal Bhatt describes the subsequent battle in which
Rustam lost his life. The poem begins with Kirpa Shankar, a Nagar Brahmin, and one Asad Khan
promising Rustam help in the struggle against Hamid Khan and his Maratha allies. On the
battlefield, they found about 100,000 Maratha soldiers. After a fierce battle in which the
Mehwasi’s played a decisive role in aiding the Marathas and Hamid Khan to victory, the valiant
Gujarati Mughal port-official Rustam Ali was killed. Although it is unclear in this poem and in
other contemporaneous sources who killed Rustam, it is likely that a member of Hamid Khan’s
army or Pilaji Gaekwad himself slay the beloved son and servant of Mughal administration in
Gujarat. The next day, the fall of Rustam was talk of the town, and locals unceremoniously
criticized him for allying with the Marathas. In a metaphoric display, Samal says Rustam made a
fatal mistake in dropping his taqiyah, or distinctly Muslim headgear, for the paghri, or the unique
turbans worn by the Hindu Marathas (172). From there, Hamid Khan returned to Ahmedabad,
bringing his Maratha allies with him on elephant back, and fulfilled his promise to Pilaji and
Kunthaji for their critical allegiance during the battle against Rustam. For little over a day, the
Marathas were given the right to loot the city of Ahmedabad and its environs all the way to
Sarkhej, located ten-km west of the walled city beyond the Sabarmati River (174). While Hamid
Khan stayed in Ahmedabad, the Marathas left after destroying the city and looting its people
(175).
After this planned assault, Hamid Khan further punished the city’s residents for allying and
supporting the three brothers Shujaat, Ibrahim, and Rustam by levying head taxes. His practices
were so ruthless and unfair that he often levied them twice (“taxed 12 rupees twice”). The people
of the city were helpless, and hoped that paying these arbitrary fees would eventually lead to
peace (176). Shamal Bhatt concludes the poem in several ultimate verses that include the date of
composition as 1725. He urges listeners of the poem to offer material support to the poet. In
underscoring that these verses were written in support of Rustam Ali, he says the people of
Gujarat still believe that Rustam is the legitimate face of Mughal authority in the locality, and
even iron bends out of shape on hearing his glorious name. In the final line, he authenticates his
narrative poem, noting that these 180 verses were put together according to all that he learned and
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heard. This suggests that even though the poem was bound by certain literary conventions and
Gujarati poetics, the description of characters, the sequence of events, and the analysis of power
and politics are faithful to what transpired in and around Ahmedabad in 1725.

The Ahmedabad Guild’s Promise to Khushalchand, 1725
In addition to the two major Gujarati literary sources offered in this chapter, I have also relied
on a unique Gujarati document preserved by the contemporary descendants of Khushalchand
Jhaveri in Ahmedabad. 357 While we are still to determine the precise nature of Khushalchand’s
character and the role he played as major financier in the major Mughal civil battles in 1724-25,
this local document suggests that Khushalchand actually saved Ahmedabad from being
completely looted by Pilaji Gaekwad and Kunthaji Kadam in the aftermath of Rustam Ali’s
death. Taking the form of a collective oath and a financial instrument executed on October 8,
1725, this historical deed records the Ahmedabad merchant’s guild offering nagarsheth
Khushalchand four annas or ½ rupee on every hundred rupees worth of goods entering and
leaving the city. It was supposed to be a perpetual promise, payable to Khushalchand’s
descendants and heirs. A relevant excerpt suggests that the jeweler-financier Khushalchand may
have indeed provided a valuable service in the aftermath of war, and only realized the
consequences of allying with Hamid Khan after Rustam’s death. It is likely that he offered to pay
off the Marathas before they could effect complete destruction on Ahmedabad after winning the
Battle at Adas.
[October 8, 1725] To Shethji Khushalchandji, son of Lakshmichandji: We, the signatories,
the combined businesspersons (mahājan-s) of the city of Ahmedabad, have resolved of our
own free will and pleasure to the effect that when during the rule of Nauwāb Hamid
Khanji, the armies of the marauders came to loot the city, Shethji Khushalchandji
Lakshmichandji saved us and the city from being plundered by spending money from his
own resources and at the risk of his life; for which reason all the businesspersons do
resolve of our free will that on all goods stamped for the town duties, as also on all
commodities, spices and silks entering into or leaving the city, we shall pay him at the rate
of four annas for every hundred rupees worth of goods, and also those shall pay who farm
these taxes. This shall continue to be paid to the sons and descendants of the Sheth by our
sons and heirs. He who breaks this written pledge belies his parentage. This is delivered in
writing by all the mahajan-s conjointly of their free will and pleasure and we shall abide
by it as we would by our fathers’ word. The sun shall bear witness to this, herewith our
signatures.

In reading both Samal Bhatt’s epic poem and the document addressed to Sheth Khushalchand
from the mahajan-s of the city, it is clear that the jeweler-financier played a very important role in
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initially sustaining Hamid Khan, and then undermining his position and victory by paying the
entirety of extra ransom money levied by Pilaji and Kunthaji on the city. As we shall see below,
Khushalchand also negotiated his prestige, power, and position with the next subadar of the
province, Nauwāb Sarbuland Khan. In the events highlighted in this section, and in anticipating
the episodes from the next, Khushalchand emerges as an important financier and banker, but one
that is caught up in the smoking mirrors and uncertainty of local political authority in Gujarat. In
trying to read and respond to the changing tide of Mughal rule in the locality, Khushalchand tries
to ally himself with the most promising and profitable claimant to the governorship of Gujarat. In
doing so, he is unable to sense the larger changes taking place in the politico-ethical world of
imperial weakness and regional growth, i.e., moneyed men were the source of abundant wealth,
resources, and services that insecure governors initially courted and subsequently seized.

Mirror of Events Revisited: Gujarat between 1724-1730
In the initial months of 1725 during which the three Gujarati Mughal brothers lost their lives
in battle with Hamid Ali Khan, the official subadar of the province was Sarbuland Khan.
Appointed to the position in 1724, Sarbuland Khan was ruling in absentia, initially from Delhi
and then subsequently from the outskirts of Gujarat. He was waiting for an opportune moment to
enter the region and wrest control from Hamid Khan and his Maratha allies. We are able to write
a fine-grained history of this period by focusing on episodes from Itimad Ali Khan’s diary Miratul Haqaiq introduced earlier. The various entries provide commentary on politics and day-to-day
affairs in the aftermath of Rustam’s death. Drawing on hitherto unexamined evidence from this
unique source, this section reconstructs how political alliances and intra-Mughal rivalries played
out in Gujarat between 1725-1727, and how Gujarat’s most prominent jewelers and bankers were
at the center of extortion campaigns and desperate grabs for money. In combining new
perspectives from Itimad Ali Khan’s journal with more scattered references in the better-known
treatises of the period, I argue that the rebel Mughal official Hamid Khan and the appointed
subadar Sarbuland Khan both relied on the same networks of information and individuals for
raising much needed finance in their administrative efforts. Both individuals used tactics of
persuasion, coercion, false promises, and other unofficial revenue generating strategies to
propagate their authority and forge a local administration loosely resembling governance.
Unfortunately, Emperor Muhammad Shah at Delhi could not enforce his own normative vision of
the Mughal Empire since he was also bankrupt. This caused an acute crisis of personnel in which
he could neither send a more robust army to take control of the province, nor could he ensure that
regular revenues were received from Gujarat. He was dealing with a makeshift version of the
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Mughal Empire in the locality, and rather than risk it all through drastic measures, he resorted to
running a haphazard administration that was being successfully thwarted by competing
authorities in the province.
On June 3, 1725, Itimad Ali records that Kunthaji requested and was granted leave from
Hamid Khan’s camp. In the aftermath of their victory at Adas described in the previous sections,
Kunthaji and Pilaji regularly visited Hamid Khan to update their revenue sharing arrangements
and to discuss their changing spheres of influence in the province. In the same episode, Itimad Ali
includes two more pieces of vital information. In the first, relying on daily news report from
Delhi, he writes that that the Emperor Muhammad Shah was unsure of Sarbuland Khan’s ability
to restore order in Gujarat, and instructed one Munawar Khan to present himself in front of the
King to convey the “truth of the retinue of Sarbuland Khan”. Second, the episode records that
“Khushalchand Jeweler raised 500,000 rupees insured by his own precious gold from the people
(local bankers). After raising the amount, he deposited it to the authority (of Hamid Khan).”358 It
is significant that the loan was raised by combining smaller amounts of money through the local
financial networks of Khushalchand. Khushalchand offered his own gold as collateral to those
nameless financial agents providing him the smaller sums that composed the large loan. This
suggests that Hamid Khan depended on Khushalchand to rally his fraternity around the growing
business of moneylending to his fledgling authority.
This episode also demonstrates the slow response time of the central authority at Delhi to new
and relevant information about the locality. Hamid Khan and his Maratha allies plundered the city
and destroyed Mughal paraphernalia in February 1725, and four months later in June, the
Emperor was still inquiring into the military capabilities of Sarbuland Khan and deciding whether
to approve his entry into Gujarat. This also highlights that Mughal authority in Gujarat came in
waves, and there were months, like between March-October 1725, when it was unclear which
nazim was in charge. While it is likely that Khushalchand and Hamid Khan had a clear alliance, it
is also possible that Khushalchand and his banking fraternity were part of an ambiguous network
of political and financial intrigue that only hindsight and triangulating evidence helps us sort.
Therefore, I do not view the merchant guild’s promise analyzed previously, the negative portrayal
of the banker in Samal Bhatt’s poem, or the characteristically neutral image offered by Mirat-ul
Haqaiq as necessarily contradicting or conflicting. Each provides one angle on a prominent
personality caught in a complex sequence of events.
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On June 22, 1725, approximately three weeks after the previous episode, Hamid Khan
summoned Safdar Khan Babi to the Bhadra Fort in Ahmedabad and asked “when we had gone to
war with Rustam Ali Khan, we kept jewelry and other valuables in your possession. Where have
they been kept?” As the reader may recall, Safdar Khan was a key ally of Hamid Khan during the
war with Rustam Ali at Adas. Safdar Khan replied unconvincingly that the wealth would
eventually be brought to him, after which Hamid Khan offered Safdar Khan a lethal betel leaf.
“After eating the pān, his condition worsened, and he left Hamid Khan and arrived home and
died.”359 In another scene from two days later, a trader from Ahmedabad called Vallabh Das sent
goods to Delhi. En route, koli-s attacked the carrier and one of the caravans was hijacked. Instead
of finding the thieves, Hamid Khan scolded Vallabh Das, “why did you send goods without my
order? Now, you must pay 3,000 rupees in fines for breaking the rules and not informing me.” 360
Vallabh Das could not afford the amount, and was subsequently imprisoned. From these two
episodes, it becomes clear that although Sarbuland Khan was the appointed governor of the
province, his physical absence enabled Hamid Khan to propagate his own version of Mughal-esq
authority in Gujarat. The episodes also highlight the strategies and character of Hamid Khan, at
once demanding and inquisitive, but also ruthless in poisoning his allies and exacting fines from
those least expecting it.
There are several episodes in which Hamid Khan asks Khushalchand to raise money for
paying his soldiers. On June 25, 1725, Hamid Khan summoned the prominent jeweler to Bhadra
Fort and instructed him to raise ten lakh rupees (1,000,000 rupees) either through “biware from
the people” or from “your own house (banking firm)”. 361 The banker was slow in delivering his
promise, and by then, Hamid Khan’s paymaster of soldiers was clamoring excessively. Finally,
“through the acquaintances (maʻrifat) of Khushalchand the jeweler, one lakh rupees is being
immediately raised in sums of ten-thousands. Some men [of Khushalchand] went from
neighborhood to neighborhood to raise the amount, but when they were shown the letter from the
authority (of Hamid Khan), they tore it up.” 362 It was also around this time that Hamid Khan
anticipated the arrival of Sarbuland Khan. Stationed in the outskirts of Rajasthan, Sarbuland Khan
was occupied with preparations for the impeding war with his rival Mughal. For Hamid Khan, the
earlier skirmishes with Shujaat Khan, Ibrahim Khan, and Rustam Ali were minor vis-à-vis the
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potential for loss against an experienced commander like Sarbuland Khan. In addition, Hamid
Khan did not have the support of the imperial government, and was without money and personnel
to put up a formidable fight. It is in this context that we must understand Khushalchand’s critical
assistance in arranging large loans for the renegade Mughal governor.
Khushalchand was Hamid Khan’s right hand financier, and relied on professional networks to
raise loans for him. Khushalchand’s fundraising through lead lending or syndicated loans
suggests that bankers had strategies for sharing risk, since no one financier was willing to lend the
full amount to a Mughal official with a questionable reputation and an uncertain future. It is
possible that Khushalchand also had formidable rivals at Ahmedabad, an observation that Mirat-i
Ahmadi also alludes to. Perhaps he had to be strategic in how and from whom he raised the
required capital to make loans to Hamid Khan. It is also possible that Khushalchand did not want
to risk his own capital, and was prudent in lending other people’s money and benefitting from a
percentage of the interest that would eventually be paid back. This is especially likely given the
overall economic insecurity during these times. In his entry for July 9, 1725, Itimad Ali writes
that the news of an impending war “raised prices of important foodstuffs in the city”. On that day,
“Hamid Khan, through the acquaintances of Khushalchand the jeweler, raised the salary of
Salabat Rohile for his own necessities [army] and five lakh rupees were raised from the people
(bankers) of the entire city, owing to which many people fled the city.” 363 In the ensuing days,
there was great fear among those residing in Ahmedabad, and daily commodities became very
expensive.364 While we are not privy to Khushalchand’s perspective in his encounters with Hamid
Khan, the episodes in Mirat-ul Haqaiq suggest that Khushalchand was a middleman, a person
entrusted with the Herculean task of raising several hundred thousand rupees from financial
agents at Ahmedabad. This not only suggests the immense concentration of wealth in this city,
but also points to Hamid Khan’s relatively limited direct contact with individual bankers and
merchants for raising finance. Khushalchand was his point of contact in accessing wider networks
of credit in Gujarat.
By August 12, 1725, Itimad Ali Khan writes that Muslim and Hindus from both sides of the
city walls were appointed as soldiers, and took their salaries directly from Khushalchand
Jhaveri.365 This is an important episode because it not only demonstrates the critical role that the
jeweler-banker played in raising funds to support Hamid Khan, but also underscores his help in
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directly administering wages to Hamid Khan’s fighters. He was, in effect, the bakhshi of Hamid
Khan’s militia. Until now, there have been some doubts about Khushalchand’s awareness
regarding what his loans were used for. However, this episode definitively documents his
collusion in the impending civil war between Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan. Contrary to the
promise of the merchant guild examined earlier, it suggests that Khushalchand was not the
archetypal wealthy and generous Jain merchant who protected the city from plunder.
Khushalchand contributed fuel to the fire by providing much needed money to Hamid Khan to
prepare for battle. In describing the banker’s activities, Itimad Ali also highlights a well-known
feature of the early-modern military labor market, i.e. Hindus, Muslims, and other groups fought
alongside, and their only allegiance was to the bakhshi who paid often and on time.
Khushalchand was that paymaster, allocating salaries according to four different pay grades
ranging from three to nine rupees per day. 366
After a delay of several months, Emperor Muhammed Shah finally assigned 10,000,000
rupees to Sarbuland Khan, and instructed him to leave for Ahmedabad. He was to push the
Marathas back, eject Hamid Khan from the province, and restore legitimate order and imperial
prestige in the locality. Of the total amount, 5,000,000 rupees were sanctioned for immediate use,
and the rest would follow in monthly installments of 300,000 rupees. This was certainly an
unusual turn for a bankrupt treasury. One would have expected that Sarbuland Khan be assigned
jagir-s in Gujarat to draw revenues from. It is likely that Muhammed Shah understood the gravity
and urgency of political disorder in Gujarat, and approved the amount after inspecting Sarbuland
Khan’s retinue, horses, and military equipment. Sarbuland Khan reached the environs of Gujarat
in March 1725, but he camped on the outskirts of the city preparing for war. 367 The Emperor
himself was to lead Sarbuland Khan’s army in taking control of Gujarat, but he backed out at the
last minute. This highlights a key shift in Mughal imperial politics from the previous century.
That is, military prowess and its periodic performance was no longer requisite to becoming
Emperor or maintaining a position as head of state. Sarbuland Khan entered the immediate
surroundings of Ahmedabad on December 1, 1725. Hamid Khan was waiting on support from his
Maratha allies, but “he saw no trace of them despite emphatic letters (being sent)”. 368 Finally,
Hamid Khan met Kunthaji near the Mahi River, and they both set out for Ahmedabad to fight the
rival governor Sarbuland Khan.
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Hamid Khan’s victory over Ahmedabad was unlikely since his militia of five thousand
soldiers could not match the twenty thousand plus soldiers fighting for Sarbuland Khan. In
addition, “salaries of soldiers were in arrears and many other persons had deserted Hamid
Khan”.369 By December 11, Sarbuland Khan reached the outer walls of the city and began
appointing new faujdar-s, āmil-s (revenue collectors), and thānadār-s (police inspectors). He also
consulted various local nobles on how to deal with growing threats from Pilaji and Kunthaji. It
was in these days that “Khushalchand Nagar Sheth, leading banker of the Hindu and Muslim
merchants went and saw (Sarbuland Khan)”.370 Although we are not told for what purposes, it is
significant that Khushalchand, who was earlier raising funds for Hamid Khan and even
administering payments to directly to soldiers on his behalf, was now face to face with the rival
governor discussing plans to reorganize Gujarat and the ways his banking fraternity might assist
the new nazim. By this time, Pilaji, Kunthaji, and Hamid Khan met on the south side of the Mahi
River, and began plundering village communities. It is significant that Sarbuland Khan could not
take control of Surat, which in earlier decades fell within the core jurisdiction of the Mughals.
The Empire had shrunk, and preserving what remained north of the Narmada River motivated
Sarbuland Khan to limit his military activities to Ahmedabad and its environs.
By January 1726, Sarbuland Khan was also in need of additional funds and called on
Khushalchand to raise an arbitrary tax of nine rupees per house in Ahmedabad city. 371
Furthermore, Sarbuland Khan instructed the “bankers and financiers of Ahmedabad to give
500,000 rupees”, and “it was given in writing to the bankers that within twenty-five days, the
government expects a response”. Itimad Ali notes that due to this demand, financial agents and
capitalists of the city became “anxious and disturbed”. 372 On January 17, 1726, Itimad Ali writes,
“Khushalchand Jhaveri was busy recovering 500,000 rupees from the bankers, which he was
intent upon sending to the government of Sarbuland Khan.” 373 Khushalchand’s ability to raise
money from his fraternity is as remarkable as his seamless switch from assisting Hamid Khan to
supporting Sarbuland Khan. He not only used his personal wealth and position to enmesh himself
in the financial economy of Mughal rivalries, he moved between opposing camps with relative
ease.
Sarbuland Khan also started raising money by mortgaging villages, towns, and offices in his
administration to those rank holding officials (mansabdar-s) able to make advance payments in
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exchange for temporary revenue rights (ijārah). For example, Jawan Mard Khan spent 120,000
on the “ijarah of the faujdāri of Patan from Sarbuland Khan” while Salabat Muhammad Khan
“took district Jhalewar on ijarah from the government for 150,000 rupees”. 374 In other districts,
such as Idar in which speculators like Shirani Khan earlier took ijarah from Hamid Khan,
Sarbuland Khan rescinded contracts and summoned agents to his assembly to clear former
informal revenue arrangements. 375 It is in both the rescinding of former ijarah contracts and the
implementation of new ones that we witness the increasing role of local bankers in advancing
money to those officials and local mansabdar-s trying to secure profitable revenue rights through
advance purchase (for an elaborate analysis of ijarah, see Chapter 2). For example, on February
22, 1726, Itimad Ali notes that the districts of Jhalewar and Patan were “given out on ijarah by
the government to Muhammad Salabat Khan and Jawan Mard Khan. The assistant of the
aforementioned two has been kept in the kacheri (local government office) in order to arrange
money from him. The guarantor of the ijarah, Rangile Das banker, went to the court, and said I
will arrange for the necessary funds.” 376
Towards the end of January 1726, Sarbuland Khan had gathered with his large army outside
of Ahmedabad city when he received word that the Marathas reached Champaner, located 115km southeast of Ahmedabad, and were demanding chauth.377 The Marathas occupied the nooks
and crannies of the province, making it difficult for the various faujdar-s and thanedar-s
appointed by Sarbuland Khan to reach their jurisdictions. For example, one Mirza Abu Torab was
sent to Cambay to ensure that the neighborhoods were in good order. Even after establishing a
suitable military rank or manṣab for the Mirza, “he was not been able to reach the port of Cambay
because of the disturbances (caused by the rebels)”.378 During this time, Khushalchand was also
instrumental in raising money for other borrowers from within the Mughal provincial
bureaucracy. For example, he gave one Asad Khan 300,000 rupees, again by raising the amount
through lead lending. When Sarbuland Khan heard of this loan, he became upset and asked Asad
Khan why he took the loan from Khushalchand. Asad Khan replied that it was spent on the safety
of the unnamed town he was in charge of, and on drinking money (milāwā) for his soldiers. This
caused resentment between the two, and Asad Khan was removed from his post.379 Other bankers
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also find regular mention in this period, including Jeevandas Chughal who solicited Bharuch on
ijarah from Sarbuland Khan for 500,000 rupees for the year. However, he could not seize control
of the area since another ijārahdār was already posted there. Due to his old age, Chughal’s son
Vallabh Das was imprisoned in his father’s place at Surat for agreeing to the contract but not
paying the required ijarah advance. He was beat and lashed everyday with leather straps. Chughal
sent a message to Sarbuland Khan that, “for this reason, I want to burn myself, and tell the local
police (kotwāl) that I do not want to be stopped”. Instead of releasing Vallabh Das, “his
imprisonment was instead made more intense”.380
By the first week of September 1726, Emperor Muhammad Shah received news that
Khushalchand and the silk merchant Ganga Das were “raising money through biware from
inhabitants and peasants”. He ordered Sarbuland Khan to send them both to the Emperor’s court.
It is significant that news about local bankers and their relationships with both representatives of
Mughal authority and local citizens was reaching the Emperor in Delhi. Three days later,
Sarbuland Khan summoned Khushalchand and took a loan of 100,000 rupees from him. There is
no follow-up in the sources on these bankers’ visit to the Emperor, and it is likely that Sarbuland
Khan did not carry out the Emperor’s summons because he was also benefitting from the loans
and payments arranged by Khushalchand and presumably Ganga Das. These loans were used to
pay the leaders of local militias and their soldiers for hire. Upset by the increasing prevalence of
these military mercenaries, Itimad Ali writes on August 27, 1726:
The truth of the leading chiefs of troops (jamāʻat dārān) of Gujarat, who are the seditious
leaders of those living in towns, who have no idea what friendship or bravery is, since
whichever vanguard they join, they abscond from. During civil strife, they display
bravery at taking from the poor and weak, stealing people’s property, and extorting usury.
They are the reason for the destruction of the countryside. Mostly districts and some
villages have been captured by them for which they show expertise and undue
persistence, and in matters of holding jagir-s, waṭandāri (hereditary vested rights), and
ijarah, they are leading. They collect taxes directly and they maintain a monopoly over it
and earn lakhs, and with each instigator, they aid and lead them, and are [therefore] in the
service of the country and people’s ruin. As it has been learned, subsequent to the death
of Hazrat Khuld Makani (Aurangzeb), they do not keep proper accounts with anyone. If
they are truly punished, and their base destroyed, and they are held accountable, this will
become the reason for the public’s good, and the government will also benefit and this
will be a prayer for the people’s welfare, and for other miscreants it will serve as an
example.381

Not only is Itimad Ali nostalgic for a time, at least twenty-five years prior, when Aurangzeb’s
bureaucracy commanded obedience, but his citation of jagir, watan, and ijarah land rights
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suggests that the very forms of these imperial entitlements were undergoing changes in how they
were being managed and what they signified. It signals the growing commodification of
administrative duties, and the negative consequences such individualistic undertakings void of
imperial sanction had on Gujarat and the Empire.
By September 1726, Sarbuland Khan’s administrative efforts were not enough to turn back
the clock on Mughal rule in Gujarat. While the details of his governing style are unclear in Mirati Ahmadi, his biographical entry in Ma’asir-ul Umara suggests that he did not follow any proper
system of recruiting and managing soldiers. In fact, he relied on local commanders to manage the
army, and was known to fall short in paying members of his retinue their due. Shah Nawaz Khan
writes, “as a result of lack of foresight and his lavish extravagance, he spent not only the money
he had received as advance (from Emperor Muhammed Shah), but the revenues of the imperial
estates (khalisa) and of the jāgīrdār-s in the province, and even became indebted to his own
servants”.382 As a result, those in his entourage began to wean off the unreliable nazim for
sustenance, and started practicing a particularly oppressive form of local administration in which
men like Khushalchand were extorted for ready cash. Sarbuland Khan spent all of the money
received from Delhi, and he was not able to raise new revenues from his jagir-s and other revenue
assignments in Gujarat. He too went bankrupt, and on September 14, 1726, he “called the leaders
of his servants one by one and said, If you will leave my service, I do not have the money to pay
for your severance. If you stay in my service, even then I do not have money to pay your salary.
The only solution is that you come with me to Shahjahanabad (Delhi), if you come with me all is
well. Per head riders on horse will get 50 paisa (½ rupee), if you possess two horses then one
rupee, and if you are going by foot 25 paisa (¼ rupee) will be the daily wage. This, however, will
only be paid at Shahjahanabad. Many people agreed to this, and some even said that even if the
daily stipend is not paid, we will still not leave, we will be by the side of the Nauwab (Sarbuland
Khan), we cannot leave him. The newer servants, however, were still thinking about the
proposition.” 383
Two days later, Sarbuland Khan met Khushalchand and asked him for money to pay soldier’s
salaries. In a convoluted manner, the jeweler-banker replied by saying that the moneylenders,
grain merchants, and other businesspersons of the city have wealth, and that if Sarbuland Khan
ordered, he would raise funds from them and hand it over to the asking nazim. On hearing this,
Sarbuland Khan lost his temper, “Am I some enemy, a rebel like Hamid Khan? I am a servant of
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the Emperor’s authority, and I am asking you for a loan! If you please, in exchange for the loan,
you can take precious jewels from the government as collateral, and you may charge up to
twenty-five percent interest on top of what you loan. God willing, when we return the money
back to you, the matter shall be cleared”. 384 On being promised the large interest rate and jewels
as collateral, Khushalchand “was happy with this reply”. He stayed one night at the Bhadra Fort,
and returned home the next morning after loaning Sarbuland Khan 100,000 rupees. The need for
cash during this time was so critical that even Sarbuland Khan’s son Khan Zad Khan gave his
personal jeweled ornaments as collateral to the Ahmedabad moneylenders for ready money. 385
By September 28, 1726, Khushalchand was again summoned to Bhadra Fort in Ahmedabad.
An earlier loan of 60,000 rupees that Sarbuland Khan ordered from the banker was split into six
divisions of 10,000 rupees each among moneylenders in the city, and Khushalchand sent his
personal collector to retrieve the cash. These bankers did not part with their money, and instead
went to Sarbuland Khan and complained. As an objection, Sarbuland Khan summoned
Khushalchand and shouted, “I asked you for the loan, and you, like a looter, why are you raising
it from others (chera biware mi koni)?”.386 He was then slapped two or three times, and his agent
Beas was also lashed. It is likely that Sarbuland Khan did not want financial agents other than
Khushalchand to know how desperate his government was for money. Khushalchand taking
liberties to pool loans might have signaled the precarious financial condition of Sarbuland Khan’s
government to the public, and such rumors threatened the governor’s creditworthiness. Both
Khushalchand and his agent Beas were put in jail, and they were asked to pay several hundred
thousand rupees to be released (lakhs). Sarbuland Khan also stripped Khushalchand of his exalted
title as nagarsheth of the city, and appointed his business rival Ganga Das the silk merchant in his
place.387
After the first week in jail, Khushalchand was lashed with leather straps many times, and was
instructed to bring all of his hidden money, jewels, and other wealth forward. Fearing further
brutality, he summoned members of his banking firm to escort Sarbuland Khan’s officials to his
mansion. All of his personal wealth was confiscated and handed over to Sarbuland Khan. 388
About two weeks later on October 10, 1726, Itimad Ali notes that this time, Sarbuland Khan
“lashed Khushalchand banker with his own hands, and took 200,000 rupees from him”,
emphasizing that all wealth that is discovered in his possession will be confiscated and deposited
384

Ibid., f. 444b
Ibid., f. 446b
386
Ibid., f. 448b and 449a
387
Ibid., f. 448b, 449a, 455a; Ali Muhammed Khan, Mirat-i Ahmadi, pp. 446-47
388
Itimad Ali Khan, Mirat-ul Haqaiq, f. 452b
196
385

to the government.389 On the same day, Itimad Ali notes that “the truth of the governance of this
region is that the soldier’s movement is halted, and the army from all directions were
removed…and others who were old native subaltern officers of the government (jamaʻat daran)
were appointed to go to the districts and within one and a half months, raise the salary of those in
their retinues from the local people directly. No demand was left. Someone was sent to Jhalewar,
another to Modhase, and Girpanj, and someone towards Patan, and yet another to Nadiad and
Petlad, for the salary and needs of the soldiers, this is what has been thought, and the country is
ruined and becoming ruined.”390
Itimad Ali notes that the growing demand for arrears by the government’s soldiers forced
Sarbuland Khan to “shut his eyes towards the public’s welfare”.391 In desperation, he continued
harassing Khushalchand to the point that by October 28, 1726, Khushalchand’s lawyers sent a
complaint to the Emperor’s court that Sarbuland Khan the “Mughal” is torturing their banker
without any rhyme or reason. However, Khushalchand’s rival bankers and traders also came in
front of the Emperor and complained that the jeweler’s wealth earlier assisted Hamid Khan and
his allies ruin Gujarat. Muhammed Shah ordered Sarbuland Khan to investigate the various
claims, and the already partisan nazim prepared a report “with the stamp of the Qazi, and
approval of the intellectuals, nobles, religious elites (Syeds), businesspersons (seth-s), bankers
(sahukar-s), and members of the public” accusing Khushalchand of treachery. He summoned
Khushalchand from jail, and said, “Until now, I thought you were protecting the city, but the
statement of the seth-s and sahukar-s proves that you were doing other than this work. Until
death, you will not be freed from prison.” 392 Khushalchand was sent back to prison, and the diary
does not tell us what happened to him in the ensuing days. He must have been eventually released
because Mirat-i Ahmadi documents his death some twenty-two years later in 1748. Returning to
the second epigraph quoted at the outset of this chapter, it was in these circumstances that Itimad
Ali felt the country being ruined, Gujaratis suffering, and Mughal administration faltering in the
locality.
By January 1727, the Emperor received complaints that Sarbuland Khan had confiscated
jagir-s of old nobles in Gujarat, and that he no longer feared the authority of the Emperor. Those
that were serving in the governor’s retinue were broke and also in need of food. To meet the
demands of his army, he instituted unofficial and overbearing taxes on income, trade, and
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households. He became notorious for erratic dealings with influential and wealthy persons of
Ahmedabad like Khushalchand. Instead of fulfilling the royal mandate of defeating the Marathas,
he eventually granted Kunthaji chauth of most of the districts north of the Mahi River. When the
imperial capital at Delhi received news of this betrayal, he was recalled in 1730. 393 The Ma’asirul Umara records that his various creditors followed him to Delhi. They clamored around his
house to the point he ended up fortifying the main gate. He not only exhausted his own personal
savings, but also undermined his creditworthiness and died a pauper.
In the range of Gujarati and Persian sources examined so far, our main vantage point has been
Mughal. For the details and analysis presented here, we must remember that the growing
influence of various rival factions within the Maratha confederacy was also important. Shahu
Bhonsle’s chief commander and prime minister Baji Rao I (1700-40) desired complete control
over Gujarat, and sent his agent Udaji Pawar to push back against the longer standing influence of
Kunthaji Kadam and Pilaji Gaekwad. Udaji appealed to Sarbuland Khan, who provided a militia
led by Sadruddin Khan to help fight against Pilaji and Kunthaji. Pilaji and Kunthaji had seasoned
troops well versed in guerrilla warfare, and deeply familiar with the Gujarati landscape. They
defeated Udaji and Sadruddin, and were able to retain control of key areas like the forts at Dabhoi
and Pavagadh. 394 Baji Rao was determined, and sent his brother Chimnaji to attack the hill-fort at
Pavagadh. In the final days of December 1729, Kunthaji’s garrison capitulated. Chimnaji then
proceed to Petlad and Cambay, and after extorting 200,000 rupees from Petlad, he attacked
Dholka. We are fortunate to have English sources commenting on the sequence of events there:
The ghanim-s under Chimnaji Raja, it is said, before they left Petlad, got from the town
near 200,000 rupees, whence they moved off Dholka way. They took several carts loaded
with Ahmedabad and Dholka goods to the value, as the loss is reckoned, of about
300,000 rupees, after which they took a tour towards Kapadvanj, but returned
unexpectedly to Dholka, which town they attacked, but meeting with some resistance
they have pillaged the greatest part of it, the loss sustained cannot as yet be known but
must be vastly great…a crore of Rupees…(or) half at least. This to be done, and so near
the Nauwab (Sarbuland Khan), makes it plain that he is far from having at heart the good
or safety of Gujarat. 395

Eventually, Sarbuland Khan entered a formal treaty with Baji Rao on 23 March 1730,
agreeing to cede ten percent (sardeshmukhi) of the entire land revenue and customs of Gujarat,
excepting Surat and the attached districts, together with the chauth from the same places, along
with five percent of the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad. From his viewpoint, the Marathas
393

Ibid., pp. 445-49
See Dighe, V.G. 1944. Peshwa Baji Rao I & Maratha Expansion. Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House,
p. 30.
395
Gense and Banaji, The Gaikwads of Baroda, Vol. 1, p. 10
198
394

were now a tributary chieftaincy in that they were expected to maintain 2,500 mounted cavalry in
keeping the peace in the province. 396 It is significant that this treaty stipulated that the Marathas
should not support local village headmen (desai-s), landlords (zamīdār-s), and others including
tribal groups (bhīl-s) and kolis who might demonstrate disaffection for the Mughal State. By this
point, the representatives of the Mughal State were trying to save what little remained of its
former influence and grandeur, especially since financial backing to propagate reliable authority
was certainly absent.
Sarbuland Khan was recalled from Gujarat in 1730 during one of his annual harvest raids
(mulkgīrī) into Kathiawar and Kachh. During this visit, his troops suffered due to harsh climate
and lack of supplies, and demanded that Sarbuland finally pay arrears due to them. In a desperate
move, Sarbuland Khan imposed illegal fines one last time in 1730 on the citizens of Ahmedabad.
The Hindus were to pay two-thirds of the amount and one-third was to come from the Bohras, an
Ismaili sect within Shia Islam. The Bohras, under the leadership of one Shaikh Abdullah, resisted
the forced collection. After a scuffle inside the mosque where they were seeking refuge,
Sarbuland Khan doubled his levy on the group. This event took place on July 19, 1730, about
three months before the governor finally left Ahmedabad. Mahārāja Abhay Singh of Marwar was
appointed subsequent nazim of Gujarat. Sarbuland Khan and Abhay Singh met briefly on the
battlefield, and Sarbuland Khan was easily defeated. Finally, they came to an agreement in which
Sarbuland Khan would leave for Delhi on receiving 100,000 rupees from Abhay Singh to cover
transportation costs and his unofficial severance pay. Sarbuland Khan did not even have the
money to resign his post in Gujarat with dignity, underscoring the extent of his administrative
mismanagement. Although his earlier attempts at restoring Mughal prestige and power in Gujarat
cannot be ignored, the shrinking financial constraints within which he operated eventually limited
his options as governor. In addition to the Gujarati, Persian, and Maratha sources, the archives in
Rajasthan are home to valuable letters sent by Abhay Singh. Of particular interest is a letter dated
October 19, 1730 to Bhandari Amarsingh, his representative at the royal court in Delhi. It outlines
the rewards and titles that Abhay Singh expected from the Mughal Emperor for ousting Sarbuland
Khan. These included an upgrade of his cavalry, an increase in his personal rank (zāt) to 8,000,
and a raise of his monthly stipend to 700,000 rupees for maintaining his army of 30,000 cavalry
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and 10,000 infantry. He insisted that his title be raised to mahārājādhirāja (great king of kings),
and his son Vakhatsingh be called rājādhirāja (king of kings). 397

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that there was no uniform Mughal policy on merchants,
bankers, or commercial activities in the early eighteenth century. In the years after Aurangzeb’s
death, much of the administrative management of Gujarat depended on the idiosyncratic nature of
the Emperor, and more so, on the governing style and personality of appointed governors and
their deputies. The sources analyzed in this chapter suggest that notions of proper administrative
behavior and financial practices were relative. First and foremost, the growth of deputy
governorships (naib-s) underscores the severe shortage of reliable personnel to run Mughal
administration. Second, even though Gujarat was a coveted province, governors were also aware
that their prestige and power depended on court intrigue and politics at Delhi, and relied on
proxies to govern on their behalf. The long-term effects of frequent and haphazard delegation of
authority did not represent an increasing need to include local powerbrokers in Mughal affairs.
Rather, Mughal administrators were faced with the challenge of simultaneously managing their
assigned province and their position at the royal court. The growing financial crisis only
exacerbated the principal-agent problem inherent in all forms of kingly authority organized
bureaucratically. Once governors and deputies realized that that the Mughals were bankrupt, they
did not retreat but started desperately enlisting private money to salvage their own visions of
public authority. It is during this financial crunch, certainly palpable by the end of Aurangzeb’s
rule as Ganim no Pavado suggests, and even more pronounced thereafter, that we see agents of
the state extorting prominent bankers and merchants for ready money. The practice of imposing
illegal taxes and fines like anth and biware, the trading of village revenue rights for unregulated
cash advances, and desperately seeking large loans from bankers in exchange for personal jewelry
was not integral to Mughal politics in prior centuries. Imperial fortunes changed in the last two
decades of Aurangzeb’s rule due to unsuccessful expansionist campaigns in the Deccan. As a
result, the Mughal State rapidly declined into an administratively haphazard and fiscally unsound
set of short-lived alliances between Mughal officials, private bankers, and other factions like the
Marathas competing for local resources.
Local sources representing diverse viewpoints help us see sequences, events, and
relationships in late-Mughal Gujarat not as preordained, but rather as determined by changing
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priorities and complex motivations of various individuals and groups at hand. While it is likely
that the major characters of this chapter had their professional and personal allegiances, we
cannot be sure that these did not change, transform, or adapt according to new information and
resources. It is in this context that the historian cannot simply pinpoint a single reason for why,
for example, Khushalchand helped rival Mughal governors in sequence and strategically raised
loans from his own banking fraternity. Based on extant evidence, and unfortunately none directly
from Khushalchand himself, we can certainly highlight the important role he played as paymaster
to Mughal militias, as lead moneylender of the collective loans provided by Ahmedabad bankers
to various representations of authority, and as nagarsheth representing his professional fraternity
in the city he called home.
How did the relationship between individuals representing Mughal authority and private
financial agents change from the closing years of Aurangzeb’s rule to that of Sarbuland Khan’s
rule two decades later? Recalling the stories of Kapurchand Bhansali, Jeevan Chughal, and
Khushalchand Jhaveri, we see that financial agents went from being dependent on the Mughal
state for social stability to becoming primary targets in their extortion campaigns. Private wealth
and merchant capital became a conspicuous target for military groups in need of quick resources.
Of course, we should not assume that these financial specialists were exclusively victims. In the
fragmentation of Mughal authority, they also took opportunities to double their money, secure
exceptional favors, and buy into political futures and revenue rights in the area. However, given
that earlier financial specialists shared a more symbiotic relationship with former Emperors, it is
likely that the bankers of early eighteenth-century Gujarat did not anticipate the violent tactics
desperate officials would take to raise money.
The involvement of bankers as guarantors to zamindar-s and locals seeking revenue-farming
rights from Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan indicate a shift in administrative finance. As
explored in Chapter 2, the buying of ijarah rights suggests the growing importance of financiers
in running state operations. Later offshoots of the Marathas, including the Gaekwads of Baroda
and the Holkars of Indore, perfected this style of public authority by not only borrowing heavily
from private financiers to build Mughal successor states, but also by incorporating these financial
specialists as independent administrative contractors in their loosely bureaucratic system of
revenue entitlements. This was in contrast to Mughal practice of emperors appointing officials
based on military prowess. The Mughal system of ranking its bureaucrats according to a military
decimal system, its elaborate protocol of granting titles and honors, and other complex norms of
political comportment contributed to forms of social reproduction that we now identify as
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distinctly ‘Mughal’. However, these also became deadweight of Empire when a self-induced
fiscal crisis demanded new ways of collecting, organizing, and redistributing land rights,
revenues, and associated political appointments.
The Maratha marauders understood this, and developed their own tactics of managing
populations and resources based on a tribute-seeking system characterized by high risk, high
reward, short-term gains, and relatively unstable but temporarily profitable contracts and
alliances. Mughal governors and their deputies, on the other hand, were caught in a web of
imperial paraphernalia including fancy titles and robes of honor, lucrative and symbolic
appointments, and numerical ranks. While dismal finances meant that the economic basis of these
royal markers was eroding, the markers themselves continued to linger in subsequent decades as
organizing principles, and dictated how individuals long associated with Mughal rule would
behave. The language and protocol of Mughal politics distracted successive governors and their
deputies from the task at hand, i.e., preventing the Marathas from seizing their territory in
Gujarat. Administrative negligence and the lack of financial resources were caught in a deadly
spiral, preventing the Mughals from effectively resisting periodic raids by formidable challengers
to their authority. The frustrations of a shrinking imperial order not only exacerbated intraMughal rivalries, but also bred a class of desperate officials who brought unsuspecting local
financiers into the whirlwind of uncertain political futures.
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Appendix 4A: List of Mughal Governors, 1701-1737
1701-05
1706-07
1707-08
1708-10
1712
1713
1713-15
1715-17
1717-19
1719-21
1721-22
1723-24
1725-30
1730-37

Prince Muhammad Azam Shah
Prince Muhammad Bidar Bakht (Abdul Hamid Khan as deputy)
Ibrahim Khan
Ghazi-ud-din Khan Bahadur Firuz Jung (Muhammad Beg as deputy)
Asaf-ud-daulah Asad Khan (through deputies)
Amanat Khan Shahamat Khan
(Muhammad Beg and Sarbuland Khan as deputies)
Daud Khan Pani
Maharaja Ajit Singh of Jodhpur
Khan Dauran (Haider Quli Khan as deputy)
Maharaja Ajit Singh of Jodhpur (Anup Singh Bhandari as deputy)
Haider Quli Khan Muiz-ud-daulah
Nizam-ul Mulk (Hamid Khan as deputy)
Sarbuland Khan Mubariz-ul-Mulk
Maharaja Abhay Singh of Jodhpur (Ratan Singh Bhandari as deputy)

203

Chapter 5: From Roving Bandits to Moneyless States: The Gaekwads of Baroda
and their Small-town Bankers, 1730-1818
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Map of Baroda

“Baroda” by J.G. Bartholomew
Imprint: Imperial gazetteer of India. New edition, published under the authority of His Majesty's
Secretary of State for India in Council. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907-1909. Volume 7, opposite
page 64. This map conveys the disparate territories in yellow that together formed the Gaekwad
dominion by the nineteenth century.
Divisions of Baroda:
1. Kadi in northern Gujarat near Ahmedabad
2. Baroda in central Gujarat
3. Amreli in the Kathiawar peninsula in western Gujarat
4. Navsari in southern Gujarat near Surat
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Important Officials in Gujarat, 1730-1830
List of Mughal Governors, 1730-1758
1730 – 1737

Maharaja Abhay Singh of Jodhpur
(Ratan Singh Bhandari as deputy)
Momin Khan I, Najm-Sani, Najm-ud-daulah
Fida-ud-din and Muftakhir Khan
Jawan Mard Khan Babi (de facto)
Maratha rule at Ahmedabad
Momin Khan II, Nawab of Cambay

1737 – 1743
1743
1743 – 1753
1753 – 1756
1756 – 1758

List of English Residents at Baroda, 1802-1837
11 July 1802 – 1809
1809 – 1809
1810 – 1810
1810 – 1820
1820 – 1821
1821 – 1837

Major A. Walker
Captain J. Rivett Carnac
Colonel A. Walker
Major J. Rivett Carnac
Mr. C. Norris
Mr. J. Williams

Mr. J. Williams was also the first Resident Political Commissioner of Gujarat, in charge of
managing revenue income that formed a part of early colonial land revenue entitlements in
the area. This office existed from 1830-1844.
Colonial Governors of the Bombay Presidency, 1795-1830
1795 – 1811
1811 – 1812
1812 – 1819
1819 – 1827
1827 – 1830

Jonathan Duncan
George Brown
Sir Evan Nepean
Mountstuart Elphinstone
Sir John Malcolm
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By the mid-eighteenth century, Mughal sovereignty remained but a silhouette of its former
glory. Visual evidence, literary texts, and non-Mughal sources confirm that new nodes of power
were being consolidated in the provinces across northern, western, and eastern India. The peculiar
feature of these little polities was that their fledging organization was not based on the kind of
military fiscalism and robust program of land revenue collection that the Mughals had relatively
perfected over the years. Although some of these little kingdoms emerged from within the
Mughal nobility, like the Nizam of Hyderabad (1724-1948), others, like the Gaekwads of Baroda
(1721-1948), were roving bandits who relied on run and gun tactics of periodic tribute seeking in
areas that the Mughals were unable to adequately defend. Once the Gaekwads obtained
significant territories as the foundation of their authority in Gujarat, they had to create institutions
and organize personnel for the regular collection and redistribution of revenues. The Mughal
Empire had a court, providing important groups such as military elites, religious heads, and
merchants an opportunity to partake in cultures of self-fashioning, norms of comportment, and
rituals of exchange that combined to form a superstructure of political and economic organization
and exchange. In contrast, the Gaekwads did not cultivate courtly culture to the same degree, nor
did they have a clear vision of how resources and personnel would be managed as a government
bureaucracy. Instead, the Gaekwads established a haphazard state that was organized around the
contractual hiring of independent military men for defending their territories and raiding nearby
districts to collect irregular land revenue. In other words, they were unable to shed the essential
elements of banditry that were endemic to their very political inception. These military
contractors, referred to as Arab sibandī or mercenaries in the sources, were free agent soldiers for
hire that were banded together by Hindu and Jain paymasters. These businesspersons were local
elites who served as key intermediaries between the Gaekwads who were in dire need of military
help, and the itinerant soldiers who offered their martial services for their daily bread. They also
had other professional interests like banking and moneylending, and had enough capital reserve to
band private militias together for profitable rental hire.
The early Gaekwad state did not have the organizational capacity to raise regular revenues
from its disparate territories in Gujarat, and from the 1770s onward, it began borrowing money
from local bankers and financiers to maintain military contracts with these Arab mercenaries.
Without the services of these military contractors, the state would have disintegrated. Second, the
Gaekwads borrowed money to maintain their share of tribute payments to the Peshwas at Pune
and later to the Bombay Government of the colonial state. These payments were based on treaties
that were signed between these competing groups, marking an important shift from an earlier
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time when military supremacy was the single most important prerequisite for absolute political
control of an area. Now, principles of diplomacy and financial finagling were taking over as the
desired mode of settling disputes, especially those regarding entitlements to land revenue from
the agriculturally rich districts of Gujarat. Third, bankers also took sides and helped adjudicate
internal disputes within the Gaekwad household. These included succession wars to the Gaekwad
gādī, or seat of princely authority, and issues regarding the allocation of jagir lands for personal
maintenance to members of the extended Gaekwad household. In return for the loans that enabled
the Gaekwads to propagate authority as a nascent state, these bankers were promised future land
revenues of certain districts, and their firms even took on the administrative duties of collecting it
from these areas. Between the state and the cultivator, indigenous bankers became the third
important node in the land revenue machinery, and their financial services and rights over
agrarian futures sustained the political economy of the early princely state at Baroda. To clear
debts of the previous year, it became customary for the Gaekwad rājā-s to raise new loans from
prominent banking houses at Baroda at the end of each year. By the 1790s, the Gaekwads were
badly in debt, and the Government of Bombay of the colonial state cited the native state’s poor
finances as a pretext to intervene and restructure their account books with indigenous bankers. In
exchange for their diplomatic advice and financial services, the English drew on the might of the
pen and seized key revenue districts falling within the Gaekwad’s waṭan-jāgīr, or hereditary
territorial domain, piece by piece.
In contrast to how the state and bureaucracy functioned during the high-tide of Mughal rule,
the Marathas and their Gaekwad confederates forged a series of alliances with financial
specialists to raise much needed capital to pay soldiers and settle debts that were negotiated
through principles of diplomacy and written contracts. In return for these loans, the Gaekwad
authority issued varāt-s, or orders for payment as temporary assignments on land revenue of
certain districts (mahāl-s, pargana-s). This was a way to channel future land revenue directly to
those bankers who provided loans to the government. In association with representatives of the
Gaekwad state, these bankers often shared the administrative responsibility of collecting and
accounting for land revenues on the districts that were assigned to them. In this way, the
Gaekwad also relinquished practical administrative authority over its districts. In this chapter, I
suggest that the growing reliance on private finance to consolidate public authority was a distinct
feature of social and political life in western India after 1750. I focus on the early history of the
Gaekwad state by documenting how two important business families were implicated in the
financial aspects of how land rights were managed, how payments to soldiers were organized, and
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how multiple sovereignties such as the post-Mughal, Maratha, and early colonial negotiated
spheres of influence and material resources. I continue the history of the Jhaveri family examined
in previous chapters by focusing on Nathushah Khushalchand and Vakhatchand Khushalchand.
Building on their family tradition of representing Ahmedabad’s businesspersons to the various
political groups that sought control of the city between 1750-1818, the Khushalchand brothers
each served as nagarsheth, or lord mayor, city patron, and head of the merchant guild at
Ahmedabad in succession.
In addition, I focus on the establishment and early evolution of a prominent banking business
at Baroda known as the Haribhakti Firm. Established in 1760 by two brothers Hari and Bhakti,
this family firm became the top moneylender to the Gaekwads of Baroda, and eventually took
over as the official potedār or treasurer of the Gaekwad state. The purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate that unlike during the Mughal Empire when the strength of sovereigns and their
governors determined the nature of political authority and social organization in the locality, the
late eighteenth century was marked by a palpable shift to principles of financial diplomacy to sort
out land revenue rights and the constantly changing, and often overlapping, political jurisdictions
shared by the Peshwa at Pune, the Gaekwads at Baroda, and the early colonial state at Bombay.
Taken together, the Jhaveri and Haribhakti case studies each demonstrate that both old business
families and relatively newer ones had to reorient their trade towards financing the state and
participating in revenue-sharing agreements to earn profits and remain relevant. To provide
context, this chapter begins with the final years of Mughal authority in Gujarat, and then turns to
the early years of Gaekwad rule in the region.

Late Mughal and Early Gaekwad rule in Gujarat, 1730-58
The previous chapter concluded with the appointment of Abhay Singh as the official Mughal
governor of Gujarat after the recalcitrant official Sarbuland Khan was recalled to Delhi. Although
Abhay Singh served for seven years between 1730 and 1737, his formal duties were divided
between managing his watan-jagir lands in the Marwar district of Rajasthan and putting up a
formidable front against the Marathas and their confederates who continued ransacking villages
in Gujarat for wealth and forced tribute. By 1733, Abhay Singh virtually abandoned governing
Gujarat, citing the lack of financial support from Emperor Muhammad Shah’s court at Delhi. His
nāʼib-i nāẓim, or deputy-governor, Ratan Singh Bhandari took this opportunity to serve as the
primary face of Mughal rule in lieu of Abhay Singh. In 1737, Ratan Bhandari was replaced by
Momin Khan. Momin Khan first arrived in Gujarat from Delhi in the retinue of Abhay Singh, and
his successors would later be recognized as the rulers of the princely state of Cambay. Initially,
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Momin Khan was serving as the chief source of Mughal authority at the port of Cambay 100-km
south of Ahmedabad. In the 1730s, Abhay Singh, Ratan Singh, and Momin Khan tried to
resuscitate Mughal authority in and around Ahmedabad, but lacked the financial resources to do
so. On April 10, 1731, Abhay Singh concluded a long letter to Emperor Muhammad Shah at
Delhi regarding the difficulties of protecting Gujarat from Maratha raids, saying that
without money, we cannot manage the affairs of the province even for a single day. Here,
there is no source of income…[and] without money, every effort will be futile…. If [the
Emperor] does not care to support us, we are not prepared to keep the province. What
advantage can one have in Gujarat these days? On the contrary, although we bear all the
expenses from the revenues of Marwar, [the Emperor’s minister Khan Dauran] has
neither done anything for our own jagir-s (in Gujarat) nor for that of the rājādhirāja
(Vakhat Singh, Abhay Singh’s son and the heir-apparent at Marwar).398

It is in this desperate context that these three local representatives of imperial authority seized the
Mughal mint at Ahmedabad and allowed greater proportions of copper alloy to be added to local
coinage to maximize earnings from seigniorage. As a result, Mughal coins lost their reputation for
quality and became less valuable as currency in the region. Abhay Singh also extorted nine lakh
rupees from Gangadas and the other silk merchants of Ahmedabad. As a result, many silk
factories shut down and there was considerable financial loss to local weavers and craftsmen. 399
From the perspective of the Deccan powers, the Maratha authority at Pune led by Shivaji’s
grandson Shahu Bhonsle (1682–1749) conceded tributary rights of Gujarat to Umabai Dabhade as
blood money for the unwarranted murder of her son Trimbakrao, a Maratha lieutenant who was
unceremoniously killed by the Maratha prime minister Baji Rao I during their tussle for the
exclusive right to collect revenues from Gujarat on behalf of the Marathas. 400 As her trusted
deputy, the military commander Damaji Gaekwad (d. 1768) collected revenues on Umabai’s
behalf, and finally established his own fledgling Gaekwad state at Baroda upon her death in 1753.
Still, the hereditary office of the Maratha prime minister, or the peshwa, remained at loggerheads
with the Gaekwads, and after a series of battles, Damaji Gaekwad agreed to a treaty on March 30,
1752 in which he ceded one-half of the revenues from the districts he held in Gujarat, and half of

398

Reu, Bisheshwar Nath. 1939. “Maharaja Abhayasingh of Marwar and the Nizam”. Indian Historical
Records Commission 16: 211-14.
399
Khan, Ali Muhammed. (1761) 1965. Mirat-i Ahmadi, trans. M.F. Lokhandwala. Baroda: Oriental
Institute, pp. 487-90.
400
Baji Rao I secured exclusive Maratha revenue rights over Gujarat through a treaty with the previous
Mughal governor Sarbuland Khan. For further details this intra-Maratha rivalry and the terms of the treaty
with the Mughals, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation, and Dighe, V.G. 1944. Peshwa Bajirao I & Maratha
Expansion. Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House, pp. 32-33.
210

the revenues obtained in future conquests to the Peshwa. 401 The most important of these later
conquests was Damaji Gaekwad’s capture of Ahmedabad on February 28, 1758. In a letter dated
August 8, 1814, Captain J.R. Carnac, then serving as British Resident at Baroda, wrote to the
Bombay Government outlining the terms of the treaty that was likely signed by the Peshwa and
the Gaekwad shortly after seizing Ahmedabad in 1758. “On the division of territory consequent
to the treaty with Damaji Gaikwad, the city of Ahmadabad became subject to the Peshwa's
authority generally, the Gaekwad enjoying an equal participation in the revenues of the town and
in the administration of justice. A place of residence was allowed for the local managers of each
Power under the denomination of haveli, and the charge of one gate (of the city) out of twelve
devolved on the Gaikwad Government.” 402 The Gaekwad siege of Ahmedabad in 1758 marked a
definitive end to Mughal rule in Gujarat, and inaugurated the early stages of Gaekwad princely
rule in Gujarat. While the Gaekwads of Baroda survived until decolonization shortly after India’s
independence in 1947, the remainder of this chapter is focused exclusively on the first sixty years
of Gaekwad rule until 1818. It is during this period that business families get implicated into the
fledgling bureaucracy of the Gaekwad state as moneylenders, treasurers, revenue farmers, and
military paymasters.

The Jhaveris in the Eighteenth Century: Nathushah and Vakhatchand
In the previous chapter, I examined the critical role that Khushalchand Jhaveri (1680-1748)
played in funding rival Mughal governors Hamid Khan and Sarbuland Khan in their bid to
control Ahmedabad and Gujarat in the name of the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah (1719-48).
Sarbuland Khan sent the jeweler-banker Khushalchand to prison in 1727, and he was
subsequently released upon payment of sixty thousand rupees to the needy governor. 403 Shortly
thereafter, the banker departed for Delhi to avoid further exactions and extortion from Sarbuland
Khan. While the sources are reticent on his activities between 1728-31, the Mirat-i Ahmadi
records his return to Ahmedabad in 1732. This time, he arrived with written documentation
supporting his position as nagarsheth of Ahmedabad from the Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah
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and the newly appointed provincial governor of Gujarat Abhay Singh. Dated September 14, 1732,
the imperial parwana or royal letter states:
Khushalchand, grandson of Shantidas, has been appointed as the nagarsheth of
Ahmedabad by His Majesty. He is glorified with the favor of a robe and a pearl earring.
He is ordered to proceed to Ahmedabad, after his arrival, servants should be directed to
help him in his duties. He should attend to the welfare of the people, prosperity of the
city, well-being of the common-folk and manage affairs with such diligence that persons
may devote themselves with satisfaction to their respective work and profession. 404

Immediately after returning, Abhay Singh’s unscrupulous deputy-governor Ratan Singh Bhandari
tried to force new loans from Khushalchand and other members of the business community at
Ahmedabad. Khushalchand tried to resist the imposition of illegal fines (bīware), and was
threatened with further imprisonment and exile by Ratan Singh. As a preventive measure,
Khushalchand “employed several Arabs and seated them for protection at the gate of Jhaveriwada
(his neighborhood), and round about his own house.” 405 The oppressive tactics of Bhandari
continued, and fearing his life, Khushalchand fled the city to Cambay, and then to Junagadh in
the Kathiawar Peninsula. In the subsequent years, the Mughal court at Delhi realized the ongoing
oppressive tactics of raising money by Abhay Singh and his deputy Ratan Singh at Ahmedabad.
This news was conveyed by official reports to Delhi, and through complaints made by various
wealthy and influential Gujarati bankers, merchants, and other businesspersons traveling between
Ahmedabad and Delhi who visted the Mughal court.
By 1737, the imperial court issued a royal order (farmān) appointing Momin Khan the new
governor of Gujarat on account of the “various acts of tyranny, many illegal practices of
extortion, and harassment of the people by the naib-i nazim Ratan Singh Bhandari of the ṣūba of
Ahmedabad, [and the] digging of houses of citizens by him for buried treasure and the acquisition
of secret wealth of residents”.406 Even though they derived political legitimacy from the same
Mughal sovereign, Momin Khan had to fight Ratan Singh for possession of Ahmedabad, and his
siege of the city lasted a grueling nine months. In a game of political strategy, Momin Khan even
enlisted the help of the Emperor’s sworn enemy, Damaji Gaekwad of the Maratha confederacy, in
dislodging Ratan Singh Bhandari from Ahmedabad. This suggests a period of political
uncertainty in which no one clear power could emerge victorious. Military stalemate could only
be overcome by enlisting allies with the lucrative promise of sharing future revenues from the
city. During this period, business continued under difficult circumstances since manufacturers
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and traders had to pay transit dues twice, once to the officials of Bhandari to move goods outside
the Bhadra citadel which was under their firm control, and again to Momin Khan’s officials who
were stationed outside the city walls waiting for an opportunity to takeover.407 After emerging
victorious with the help of Damaji, Momin Khan sent Bhandari back to Marwar. He then honored
his promise and handed over one-half of Ahmedabad to Damaji Gaekwad for his timely and
crucial assistance in winning back the city in the name of the Mughal Emperor. 408 The irony was
that by ceding one-half of the former provincial Mughal capital of Ahmedabad to the Gaekwad as
payment for military assistance in recovering it from another bonafide representative of Mughal
authority, Momin Khan was undermining the territorial and sovereign integrity of the very
political power that he represented and was ostensibly fighting for. 409
Immediately after taking control of Ahmedabad in 1737, Momin Khan and his Maratha
coparceners in the city found themselves in a financial crisis. They did not have money to pay
their officials working in Ahmedabad. As a result, Khushalchand and another wealthy
businessperson named Balidas were imprisoned and forced to pay 100 rupees per day as ransom.
This went on for several days until a civil dispute between the Mughals and Marathas at
Ahmedabad created confusion during which the two wealthy men escaped. Apart from
documenting Khushalchand’s death more than a decade later in 1748, this is the last we hear of
the aged banker in the sources. Khushalchand had three sons, Nathmal Shah (Nathushah), Jethmal
Shah, and Vakhat Shah (Vakhatchand). 410 After Khushalchand’s death, Nathu Shah (1720-1793)
became head of the family and successor to the post of nagarsheth. 411 As chief representative of
the businesspersons of the city, he continued his father’s role of negotiating favorable terms for
the mercantile classes of Ahmedabad. In the aftermath of a complete takeover of Ahmedabad by
the Peshwa Ragunathrao (1734-83) and Damaji Gaekwad in 1756, Nathushah was instrumental in
securing trading rights and other customary privileges for the businesspersons of Ahmedabad. On
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April 7, 1753, “Ali Muhammad Khan, the dīwān (imperially appointed local treasury official),
and other royal officials, such as the ṣadr (chief justice of the province), the qāẓī (judge-mayor of
the city), the bakhshī (military paymaster), and the wāqiʻ nawīs (news writer), all of whom were
now more or less functus officio, accompanied by Nathushah, the nagarsheth, Muhammad Abu
Bakr, the leading Bohra of the city, and other Muslim and Hindu ṣarrāf (bankers,
moneychangers) and merchants, waited upon Raghunathrao in his camp, and had some
discussions about the future management of the civic administration. The next day, the diwan
forwarded to him a statement containing the rules, regulations and procedure relating to the
government of the city and its mahal-s, which had been in existence since the days of Aurangzeb,
along with the balance in the treasury. Raghunathrao issued, thereupon, a written order in Marathi
to his shiristedār to proceed in accordance with these regulations in all matters which were
presented to them for disposal.”412
Between 1775-82, the Marathas engaged the British East India Company in the first AngloMaratha War.413 Thomas Goddard marched from Calcutta across the subcontinent with the full
support of Warren Hastings to negotiate with the ministers at Pune. By January 1780, Goddard
secured the support of Damaji Gaekwad’s third son and the reigning raja of Baroda Fatehsingh
Gaekwad (1751-89) for an exclusive revenue sharing arrangement in Gujarat in which the
Peshwas would be excluded. In return, the head of the nascent Gaekwad State was to assist the
English government of Bombay in providing adequate military contingents to secure the revenue
shares of both parties in Gujarat.414 Advancing from Dabhoi near Baroda to the city walls of
Ahmedabad on February 10, 1780, Goddard took the city by assault. 6,000 Arab soldiers and
2,000 mounted horsemen were ready to defend the Peshwa’s interests against Goddard, and the
impeding conflict caused serious social and economic distress in the city. A delegation headed by
our banker Nathushah, the qazi, and the Mughal diwan approached Goddard’s camp stationed
outside the walls of Ahmedabad and requested him to rethink his plan to take the city by military
force. Nathushah coaxed the English officer by stating that the merchants and bankers of the city
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did not act adversely against former ruling authorities such as the Mughals and Peshwas since
these nodes of political power had afforded them protection. Since these former sovereign powers
ceased to exist, the mercantile groups and other elites of the city were now approaching the
English conquerors to stall further calamities and violence in the city. 415 Relying on Nathushah’s
exalted position as the leader of the business community in Ahmedabad, Goddard quickly issued
a statement assuring them that the English assault on the city would not adversely impact daily
activities of the residents. Written in Persian language with appropriate Mughal-style seals at the
top, and acknowledging the symbolic suzerainty of Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II (1728-1806),
General Goddard remarked:
Amir-ud-daulah, General Goddard Bahadur, Fateh Jung, the servant of Shah Alam,
Badshah Ghazi, year 1194 H. Be it known to Nathushah Nagarsheth, Shaikh Muhammad
Saleh, the Qazi, Mia Mirza Amu, the Badshahi Diwan, and the residents and people of
Ahmedabad, that at present they should dwell in their homes with entire composure of
mind; and they should not have the slightest anxiety or fear in their hearts for any reason
whatsoever; and they should engage themselves in their usual avocations, because no one
shall trouble them or interfere with them in any way. This injunction should be
considered peremptory and should be acted upon. Written on the fifth day of the month of
Safdar in the year 1194 H, corresponding to the 23rd year of the accession. [11 February
1780].416

Goddard hoped to secure the support of the mercantile and business classes because such
relationships would bring greater revenues and prosperity to the English. In an internal dispatch
from his camp at Ahmedabad to William Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, Goddard writes that
“From the ruined and desolate state of the city and the hopes that by proper encouragement, the
trade and manufacturer for which it was one so famous might revive and flourish, I have settled
with Fatehsingh that the English shall establish a factory at Ahmedabad. This cannot fail to
produce great commercial advantages, as there is no doubt but most of the trade will soon pass
through our hands from the superior confidence which the merchants and natives would place in
us to induce them to put themselves under our protection.” 417 Although a subsequent arrangement
concluding the First Anglo-Maratha War called the Treaty of Salbai restored the Peshwa’s share
in the city of Ahmedabad, the critical role that Nathushah played in conveying the position of the
city inhabitants and merchants suggests that rival claimants to the city valued the revenue
generating potential and financial services of private bankers, merchants, moneylenders, and
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other moneyed specialists. They made every effort to appease them and incorporate them into
their own normative visions of public authority in the area.
After Nathushah’s death in 1793, his younger brother Vakhatchand (1740-1814) became
nagarsheth of Ahmedabad, and headed the family business of jewelry and moneylending to
political authorities. Vakhatchand was the youngest of Khushalchand Jhaveri’s three sons, and
continued his father and ancestor’s tradition of working in close cooperation with and near to
sources of political authority in Ahmedabad and the surrounding districts. During the 1790s, the
Gaekwads of Baroda and the English Government of Bombay were the primary sources of public
authority in the region, and Vakhatchand actively participated in revenue sharing and
moneylending agreements with them. The main source for Vakhatchand’s activities during this
period comes from the Gaekwad archive, and the level of detail and intrigue involved in intraGaekwad disputes for power and prestige are enough to keep the historian spinning. For the
purposes of understanding the changing role of financial agents during this period, I focus on one
key episode involving Damaji Gaekwad’s nephew Malharrao Gaekwad. As the only son born to
Damajirao’s brother Khanderao Gaekwad, Malharrao was unlikely to succeed his uncle as head
of the Gaekwad state as he belonged to the politically inferior branch of the family. 418 Through a
series of arrangements with his cousin Govindrao Gaekwad (r. 1793-1800) and Govindrao’s son
and successor to the Baroda throne Anandrao Gaekwad (r. 1800-1819), Malharrao obtained the
jagir of Kadi in 1793. Located north of Ahmedabad, the area was rich in cotton production and
yielded large revenues to those that controlled it (See “Kadi Division”, Baroda Map). He also
received district Nadiad 55-km southeast of Ahmedabad as his hereditary dominion. When these
lands were granted as jagir in 1793, Govindrao estimated that the annual revenue would yield 22
lakh rupees. However, once Anandrao came to govern the state in 1800 and renewed Malharrao’s
jagir-s, his surveyors calculated that the revenues amounted to 50 lakh rupees per annum. As a
result, Malharrao would have to forward a portion of this additional unanticipated revenue surplus
to the Baroda State. In addition, he was also asked to pay arrears for past revenues lost based on
this new estimate.419
In 1800, Brigadier-General Alexander Walker (1764–1831) was sent by the English
Government of Bombay to settle disputes between rival groups within the Maratha confederacy.
Malharrao was not willing to give up his position at Nadiad, nor come to a reasonable agreement
regarding revenues due to the Gaekwad State. In this stalemate, the British colonial government
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saw an opportunity to arbitrate and potentially benefit from the revenues of Malharrao’s key
possessions. Seeing that the Gaekwad already owed money to the English government of Bombay
for past loans and concessions, the colonial interference in Malharrao’s affairs was a strategic
way to recover arrears that Baroda owed. It was in this context that Vakhatchand Khushalchand
became involved in settling pecuniary problems that were endemic to the Gaekwad State at
Baroda. Major Walker embarked on a military campaign to subdue Malharrao and convert his
jagir right to an English jaidad right. The jaidad was a new form of land right that emerged in the
last decade of the eighteenth century, and was an acknowledgement of revenue payable to a third
party. It pertained to a specific area of land, one that was given up by the right holder and often
deposited with a collector until debts were paid. As we shall see, Malharrao was the holder and
the right would be deposited with the banker Vakhatchand until Malharrao could pay arrears to
the Gaekwad State, which would in turn be paid to the Bombay Government. While encamped at
Ahmedabad, Vakhatchand visited the General Walker and requested him to halt any military
offense against Malharrao at Nadiad. Vakhatchand promised to intervene by convincing
Malharrao to accept the diplomatic solution of agreeing to settle past and current revenue arrears.
These terms were conveyed to Malharrao by Alexander Walker in a letter dated March 7, 1802. 420
One month later, Walker deputed Vakhatchand to visit Malharrao at Nadiad and asked him to
obtain information about the financial-diplomatic solution proposed to the revenue problem at
hand.421 After several months of negotiating and suspending military conflict, Malharrao and
Major Walker concluded a revenue sharing agreement in which the banker Vakhatchand stood as
financial guarantor and the key revenue farmer of the English jaidad rights at Nadiad. In a letter
to the Governor of Bombay Jonathan Duncan dated September 18, 1802, Walker writes “I have
the honour to inform you that Malharrao having offered Vakhatchand Khushalchand, a
respectable merchant, as his security for the Company’s revenue in Nadiad, I have accepted his
bond, deeming it one of the most unexceptionable in the country for the payment of this
demand.” 422 Based on this agreement, Vakhatchand was appointed to the collection and
management of the Company’s revenue interests at Nadiad, and further, Malharrao agreed to
allow Vakhatchand to manage his debts to the Gaekwads at Baroda, and in turn, to the English
government. In effect, Vakhatchand become the financial intermediary, the professional banker
and private financier who seized both parties’ assets as the third-party guarantor, and kept the
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remaining balance of revenues after due remittances as his personal profit. While this represents
the last major episode recorded in the archives regarding Vakhatchand Khushalchand, it indicates
an important but subtle shift from the kind of earlier business practices that his family and other
financial specialists were involved in at Gujarat.423 In an earlier period, the agrarian economy was
managed directly by representatives of Mughal authority or by those who recognized its
paramount sovereignty. During this period, Vakhatchand’s ancestor Shantidas Jhaveri shared a
symbiotic relationship with representatives of the Mughal court, providing them with luxury
commodities and loans during exceptional moments of crisis like succession wars. By
Khushalchand’s time, the tide of Mughal rule was receding and desperate provincial governors
extorted him for confiscatory sums. By the late eighteenth century, although agrarian revenues
remained the paramount source of value in the subcontinent, their management was fractured,
increasingly complex, violent, and even inefficient. The overlapping and changing jurisdictions of
control by the Marathas, their insubordinate confederates, former Mughal officials, and the
English officials in Gujarat gave Vakhatchand an opportunity to invest his capital as loans to
needy officials in exchange for exclusive rights to collect land revenue from certain districts.
While the Jhaveri family continued to operate from the vantage point of Mughal authority on the
Delhi-Ahmedabad-Baroda nexus, the Haribhakti banking family analyzed in subsequent sections
developed their financial services and expertise from the vantage point of the Gaekwads and their
overlord the Peshwa on the Baroda-Bombay-Pune nexus.

The Haribhakti Bankers of Baroda
To understand the growing importance of local bankers and financiers in eighteenth-century
Western India, we must turn to the early history of the Baroda-based banking family-firm called
Haribhakti ni Pedhi, or the Firm of Haribhakti. Like the Jhaveri family, the Haribhaktis
consolidated influence and wealth by moneylending to the Marathas and earning profits through
temporary rights to land revenue that were entrusted to them as a form of repayment. Unlike the
Jhaveri family, the Haribhaktis did not have an illustrious history going back to the Mughal
Empire. In many ways, this family is representative of a new kind of family business tied directly
to the rising and falling fortunes of political aspirants in the area during the eighteenth century.
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This family would also go onto play an important role in the financial administration of the
Gaekwads at Baroda in the nineteenth century, and would eventually end up bankrupt and
reduced to fighting the Gaekwads in the colonial courts to unsuccessfully restore its former
power, prestige, and money. While the later history of this family is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, the remainder of this section focuses on how this family firm was established, and its
early financial dealings with the Gaekwads, the colonial state at Bombay, and members of its
banking fraternity. To accomplish this, I rely on unpublished sources from the Haribhakti
Collection of documents housed at the M.S. University of Baroda, documents sourced from one
branch of the Haribhakti family at Baroda, and published primary sources issued by the Baroda
Government. These are written primarily in the Gujarat and Marathi languages. This section is a
broad overview to convince the reader that financial agents were being directly involved in the
management of land revenue, the propagating of political authority, and the financing of state
administration during the wake of Mughal rule. In other words, the Haribhakti Family allows us
to prove that unlike the Mughal Emperors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, rival
political groups after the 1750s were unable to forge a sustainable revenue collection program to
propagate political authority. Instead, they resorted to borrowing excessive sums from private
bankers to fulfill tributary promises to rival powers, and to pay a growing body of freelance
soldiers who threatened the very integrity of any one group’s bid for supreme power.
Some twenty-five kilometers east of Baroda lies a small village called Mandodhar. Currently
situated in the district of Waghodia, Mandodhar was the birthplace of a village trader named
Lakshmidas. While the sources are silent on the specifics of his business, there is a reference to
him selling metal cages of some kind in Waghodia. It is possible that these cages were meant for
keeping domesticated animals in the village. We know even less of his father Gangadas. Given
the agricultural landscape of the region, it would not be unreasonable to assume that Gangadas
was a cultivator. While the details of Lakshmidas are unknown, oral testimonies from erstwhile
family members and references in property deeds from late eighteenth-century Baroda indicate
that he began dividing his time between his ancestral Mandodhar and Baroda city somewhere in
the 1750s. Belonging to the trading community of Baniyas, Lakshmidas was of the Visa Lad
Vaishnav sub-caste, and certainly married within this group. Of the four children born into his
household, we know little about the first son, Narsidas, who died in infancy, and a daughter who
was later married to one Bhukandas. Of greater significance are Lakshmidas’ two other sons,
Bhaktidas and Haribhai. Verifying their precise birth years has proved elusive, but we know that
Bhaktidas was elder to Haribhai and died in Baroda in 1795, one year before his younger brother.
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While Lakshmidas was a person of moderate means, his sons built on their father’s humble
earnings by establishing a sarrafi pedhi, or banking firm, in Baroda in 1762. While we do not
have any primary evidence that speaks directly to the founding of the firm, the earliest document
contained in the personal family collection of the Haribhakti family dates to this period. 424 Their
social standing and growing financial prowess is attested by their own family dynamics. For
example, all three sons of Bhukhandas and his wife were brought up in the home of their maternal
uncle Bhaktidas and Haribhai in Baroda. As the business grew, one nephew, Samal, assisted his
uncle at the Baroda branch of the business while another nephew, Dulabh, moved to Pune to work
with his uncle Haribhai. During this period, Pune had already established itself as an important
center, especially because it served as the de facto capital city for the Marathas. No sources verify
the whereabouts of the third nephew Nandlal, and for now we can assume that he was not
involved in the work of the banking firm. It is important to note that from the outset, this was a
family-firm in its social organization, division of labor, networks of communication, and
eventually, in the transmission and bequeathing of wealth and the firm’s legacy. 425 Appendix C
contains a genealogy of the Haribhakti family.
After the death of both Bhaktidas (d. 1795) and Haribhai (d. 1796), the elder brother
Bhaktidas’ widow, Rattanbai, became the head of the financial organization. She appointed
Dulabh to continue handling affairs at Pune, while Samal maintained the firm’s operations at
Baroda. We know of the firm’s social standing by the various land grants given to it by the rulers
at Baroda. For example, the village Kajapur near the town of Dabhoi, located 25 kilometers
southeast of Baroda, was gifted in perpetuity in the year 1798. In a later 1899 testimony from
Maganbhai Purshottam Haribhakti, the great great-grandson of Bhaktidas, to British Viceroy
George Curzon in Calcutta, we get the family’s own perspective on their long history.
That the said ancestors of your humble Memorialist commenced to act as the bankers of
the then Gaekwads before the beginning of the present century. The ancestors of His
Highness the Gaikwad looked upon this firm as their own bankers and feelings of mutual
confidence and friendship grew very strong between them. The Firm of Haribhakti was
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ever ready with its purse, anxious to lay all its capital at the disposal of the Gaikwad and
had, once actually paid 80 lakhs of Rupees to the Peshwa on behalf of the Gaikwad at a
moment's notice. The members of this famous firm were the staunch adherents of the
Gaikwad in weal and woe, and their loyalty to the Gadi of Baroda often put to several
trials, proved absolutely unshaken through thick and thin. These meritorious services
were duly rewarded by the Gaikwads in an appreciative spirit by the grant of several
ināmi villages, asāmī-s426, cash allowances and the hereditary office of Potedar, with
emoluments appertaining thereunto, was also conferred upon the firm of Haribhakti. By
subsequent sanad-s, these grants were confirmed to the said Haribhakti and his heirs
forever in perpetuity.427

By 1800, Dulabh began misbehaving with his family’s fortunes and declared himself the sole
and direct heir to Haribhai’s wealth and property in Pune. Fortunately for Rattanbai, the support
of royal protocol and customary practice led by the sovereign authority of the Gaekwad held
importance in succession disputes and the matters internal to the business firm. This is especially
significant since it suggests that despite the relative haphazard political organization characteristic
of late eighteenth century Gujarat, private banking firms operating across multiple cities required
the support and recognition of political authorities to continue their trade and remain relevant.
During this dispute, Rattanbai travelled to Pune with Samal and obtained approval from the
Peshwa authority to verify Samal Bhakti as the sole heir to the banking business of the Haribhakti
family firm. To obtain a sanad verifying her adoption, she was required to pay 500,000 rupees as
naẕrānā or monetary offering to the Peshwa. By this period, the company had branch offices in
Baroda, Surat, Bombay, and Ahmedabad, with smaller out-offices and points of contact in
surrounding towns and villages. The firm was even able to obtain a document from the Honorable
East India Company dated January 29, 1803 attesting to the useful services the firm provided to
the British in helping to pay arrears to Arab soldiers who were causing trouble for the fledgling
Baroda State.428
Rattanbai died in 1808, and Samal did not survive his adopted mother by too long. He died at
Baroda in 1809. As Samal and his wife were childless, his widow Acharat adopted a relative,
possibly from her side of the family, by the name of Behechar to continue the family business.
Upon payment of another nazrana, an official decree was obtained from the Gaekwad rulers of
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Baroda. They not only recognized Behechar as the heir to the property of Haribhakti, but also
confirmed him as the chief treasurer and money lender to the Gaekwad polity. This was a position
that his father first held, and one that signified status in a growing political economy where
financial resources such as substantial capital reserves, access to networks of money, and
complex forms of accounting, agrarian futures as ways to repay loans, and money transfers across
cities via bills of exchange were becoming critical resources in an emerging political system
characterized by multiple overlapping sovereignties and weak native rulers. Behechar held this
position until his death on September 4, 1845. The remainder of this section analyzes five
separate evidentiary excerpts from the private papers of the Haribhakti Firm to convey the kind of
financial relationships this business cultivated in the early years of its formation. This evidence is
cursory at best since the archive is incomplete. I am especially interested in recreating this early
history since the later nineteenth-century records focus on the firm’s various litigations against
members of their extended family and against the Gaekwad state. These disputes are overseen,
managed, and eventually adjudicated by the British colonial government, and merit separate study
since they are detailed and lengthy.
One of the earliest documents we have from the archives of the Haribhakti Firm at the M.S.
University is a summary letter written by a gumāshta or an agent of the firm from 1787. This
letter, written in moḍī or the cursive writing style of old Gujarati, has been transcribed as Episode
1 in Appendix D, and is representative of the kinds of documentation available in the Haribhakti
Collection at M.S. University. The records indicate that the main branch of the firm was in
Baroda, the capital of the Gaekwad polity. Letters would be exchanged between satellite offices
of the Haribhakti Firm every three to five days. While the outgoing letters from Baroda to office
in Surat, Ahmedabad, Bombay, and Pune may have been shorter, the return responses from
agents were long and detailed. These letters would contain a summary of accounts and
undertakings, including payments disbursed to certain individuals, questions about how to
proceed with new and existing dealings, and relevant news items or social events pertinent to the
daily operation of business. In this episode, I would like to focus on the going rates of exchange
between various cities in western India. Given the abundance of bills of exchanges contained in
the archive, we can be sure that the business of transmitting funds was a core specialization of the
Haribhakti Firm. During this period, traveling with precious metals and valuables like metallic
currency was impractical due to the distances and risks involved. The Haribhakti Firm would
issue hundī-s, or transferable promissory notes often referred to as bills of exchange, that could be
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cashed within a stipulated time-period. Taking 100 rupees as the initial deposit amount, this letter
provides the going rates for bills drawn at Surat and encashed at the following locations:
98.5 rupees - Surat
95.75 rupees - Ahmedabad
95 rupees - Nasik
97 rupees - Bombay
100 rupees - Ujjain
In other words, 100 rupees paid at Surat for a bill of exchange would be worth anywhere
between 95 to 100 rupees depending on where it was cashed at. These rates reflect the availability
of currency in these respective cities. Two points emerge from this short document. First, the
circulation of information about currency values was done through the firm’s regular internal
correspondence, and was likely a major strategy that the firm developed for amassing profits.
They could charge other smaller taxes and fees to the person requiring the bill of exchange, and
would earn from both the difference in currency exchange and the service fee levied for writing
the hundi. In fact, most hundis end with a stipulation that a small percentage is charged over and
above the main sum to pay for the paper, ink, and scribal service being provided. Second, these
rates allow us to reconstruct a network of mercantile and banking activity prevalent during this
period. It is relevant that only five major cities are mentioned, suggesting that the Haribhakti Firm
might have limited their business and information network to a select few cities in this initial
period.
The second and third letters (Episodes 2, 3) are letters written to the Haribhakti Firm at
Baroda by private individuals in the surrounding area. Written in 1794, the first letter is written
by one Atmaram, and informs Bhaktidas at Baroda that there is public unrest in Sankheda, a small
town 55 km east of Baroda. This unrest is negatively impacting social life, especially business in
the town market. The eminent banker at Baroda is being informed of local happenings, and being
asked to intervene by sending men from his firm to quell chaos. This letter suggests that the
banking firm at Baroda was an important resource for local villages that were under the indirect
control of the Gaekwad. It demonstrates that the village was under a revenue farming agreement
(asāmī), and given the haphazard arrest of local individuals, the petitioner is requesting the
Haribhakti Firm to send resources and his revenue farmers to take control of the situation. It is
likely that Haribhakti held a varat of Sankheda village, and the local cultivators were aware of the
revenue rights that the banking firm possessed and used this to their advantage in seeking redress.
There is a dispute pertaining to Ganpat Rao and he has been kept in prison with the
guards. No one is opening their stores because of the chaos being caused by this. My
business is going down. Send (your) revenue farmers (asamiyo). Desai Mithalal,
Rughanath Desai, Vachiyat, and Kishan Das Dalal - - those four have been surely given
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handcuffs and kept in prison (by Gaekwad officials?). I cannot speak of this in my
Sankheda, I am only telling you. I do not want to speak about it in my own Sankheda,
since I am also from there.

Episode 3 is also written in 1794, and is also a plea by a village leader for help since
government officials of the Gaekwad are trying to extort money from him. Both letters suggest
that beyond their core competency of providing financial services, they also served socialadjudicatory roles that nearby village residents could rely on in times of unrest. The firm’s
influence in the agrarian districts around Baroda becomes clear in the light of such evidence from
the rural-locality.
To the glorious city of Baroda, and to the exalted banker Shri Bhaktidas to whom I send
my salutations and good wishes…I am writing because in my village, some government
officials are sitting on the land and extorting 100 rupees per day from me. We are unable
to resist such unfair treatment from the government officials and request you to intervene
and help.

Turning to Episode 4, Tukoji Patel writes that the Haribhakti Firm, with the approval of the
government, sends orders to prevent the district official Jasood from dispersing the local animals
and taking money from Tukoji. The letter was also written in 1794 and opens with various
salutations and honorific pleasantries to the brothers Hari and Bhakti at Baroda. From it, we can
deduce that the firm shared a close relationship with Govindrao Gaekwad’s administration, and
this was well-known to local village leaders or peasant-elites such as Tukoji Patel, who resided at
a distance from Baroda city. While the precise relationship between the Gaekwad polity, financial
agents, and the farming out of agricultural revenues to non-state actors is addressed in the
subsequent section, this document clearly demonstrates that the Haribhakti Firm was also
involved in matters of collecting and administering land revenue in the 1790s. Locals could send
their complaints and concerns directly to the Haribhakti Firm, and hope that the influence of the
bankers at Baroda would eventually result in action from the political authority of the Gaekwad
himself. Apart from conducting their own private business and trade in bills of exchange,
currency trade, and money lending, the firm also served as a pseudo-ministry for the Gaekwad
government. This is an early letter that attests to the firm’s implication in matters of land revenue
for the state.
To the glorious city of Baroda and to the respected Hari Bhai and respected Bhakti Bhai
from the (fort?) of Kheda I, Tukoji Patel, am writing and please read my regards.
Everything here is fine, and I hope that you will always remain well. Second, the reason I
am writing is that I am requesting you to please send a special order with the
government’s approval on one Jasood of Matar village. He has pushed all of the animals
away, and second, he has taken 12.5 rupees from me which I would like returned. An
earlier letter said that 12.5 rupees should be taken from the land and given to the
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kamavisdar (official in-charge of district). Because of this letter, this Jasood is after my
life now. I am writing to ask that you help get the money back from the district official. If
you can help with this, I will never take the name of this village. If I do not get this
money back, I will not let the other villages rest. Whatever Jasood has said about the
animals, it is in that way that they should be returned to Jasood. However, the truth of the
matter is that what he says belongs to Kheda are not in fact from there.

Finally, Episode 5 is another summary letter written in 1794. The Haribhakti Firm had a
major presence in Surat until the 1830s, and during this earlier period, the agents at Surat would
travel to surrounding areas for business. In one such trip to Nasik located 234 km south- east of
Surat, the agents witness a skirmish between Maratha officers and Mughal nobles. The letter
begins by confirming the receipt of two earlier letters sent by the Baroda firm, and then moves
onto narrating the details of the skirmish. The significance of this letter is that it confirms that
events taking place two or three hundred kilometers away from the branch headquarters in Baroda
also impacted business, and were thus worthy of being known. Finally, the mention of the
scribe’s name suggests that there was also a personal element involved in the internal
correspondence of firms.
To the glorious city of Baroda, to the exalted firm of Haribhakti at Baroda, I am writing
from the branch office of Haribhakti at Surat. Everything here is alright, and we have
received your two previous letters with relevant summaries. Second, I want to inform you
that we have returned safely from our trip to Nasik. Third, there are disputes going on
although we are for the most part safe. One Rajashri Haripanth’s lawyer was at Calcutta,
and he has also come to Nasik along with 50 men. He also has a spy with him, and there
was a fight that broke out in Nasik in which Rajashri Baba and Parashuram lost their
lives. Holkar and some Sidis were able to fight off four Mughal officials. I want to inform
you of these happenings. Otherwise, we are all fine and you need not worry about us. If
there is any other work, please write to us. On this Monday morning of 1851-Fagan the
tenth (corresponding to 1794), written by Raghunath Das.

These episodes also corroborate observations put forward by Christopher Bayly in his
seminal work Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars (1983) and Empire & Information (1999),
especially the argument that the decentralization of the Mughal Empire was accompanied by the
concomitant rise of an intermediate class of specialists like merchants, traders, information
brokers, and the service gentry like scribes and office clerks who situated themselves between
robust agrarian society and various forms of state-sovereignty prevalent during this period. 429
Between 1740 and 1810, these groups became the essence of urban networks and the lynchpin of
newer organizational schemes based on private finance and information. This aspect can be seen
in contrast to the earlier period where bankers like Khushalchand operated independently, but
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were being increasingly extorted and harassed for money by Mughal governors and rebels that
did not think of ways to legitimately integrate them into the politics of agrarian finance and
revenue collection. For the Mughal officials like Sarbuland Khan, maintaining public order and
restoring Mughal authority was of paramount concern. Accessing ready cash was simply a means
for tapping into the elastic military labor market, and not a robust strategy for forging
administration and social integration in the long-run as the Gaekwads attempted to do.

The Haribhakti Firm and Gaekwad Authority
The records in the Haribhakti Collection in conjunction with documents emerging from the
private collection of their direct descendants Gopal and Swati Haribhakti in contemporary times
verify that the banking business was relatively well-established in Baroda by the 1760s. As
examined in the previous section, these early records of the family firm clearly demonstrate the
range of local financial services that this firm began to specialize between the 1750s and early
1780s. This included providing small-sum loans to peasants, verifying the buying and selling of
urban property, and moneylending to residents of Baroda in exchange for their property as
collateral. The evidence for these foundational years of this business are severely limited, and the
fragments we have are disparate and uneven. Therefore, the early history of this family and its
business activities is cursory at best. It is only when the Haribhakti Firm gets involved with the
political and financial activities of the early Gaekwad State that their presence starts getting
documented in more systematic ways in the limited corpus of early evidence about the foundation
of this Mughal successor state. The official evidence preserved as part of the Baroda State
Records is severely limited until 1802, when the Bombay Government of the colonial state gets
involved in settling disputes over land revenue and tribute payments between the Gaekwads at
Baroda, the Peshwa at Pune, and the colonial government at Bombay. In addition, the Bombay
Government plays a crucial role in settling domestic disputes in the Gaekwad household over
royal succession, and in sorting out the financial intricacies associated with demilitarizing Gujarat
which was virtually held hostage by groups of Arab soldiers working as military contractors in
the region.
Although later recollections of the Haribhakti Firm by colonial commentators cite 1785 as the
official year that the family began business relations with the Gaekwad State, the first official
correspondence preserved in the archives dates October 10, 1790. Written in Marathi by the
seventh successor to the Baroda gadi Manajirao Gaekwad to his representative Balaji Govind at
Nasik in modern Maharashtra, the letter instructs Balaji to visit Pune and seek the help of the
Haribhakti Firm in conveying the inability of the Baroda government to pay tribute to the Pune
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court due to unforeseen natural calamities in the agricultural yields from lands falling under the
Gaekwad’s dominion. 430 By this letter, we can be certain that the brothers Hari and Bhakti already
divided their business between Baroda and Pune in the 1780s, and the firm served as the financial
representative and service provider of the Gaekwad State in negotiations at the court of the
Peshwa in Pune. It is also significant that in official correspondence, political authorities refer to
the financial service provider by its pedhi name and not by specific individual. This suggest that
the Haribhakti Firm was recognized as a specialist business akin to a limited liability company
with its own staff and internal norms of conduct and management. Some two years later, on
March 29, 1792, we have a letter from the Haribhakti Firm to Manajirao Gaekwad requesting he
approve the remittance of installments due by the Baroda government to the Peshwa at Pune. 431
Although no specific figures are mentioned, this letter demonstrates that the firm handled all
tribute payments to the Peshwa with the approval of the Gaekwads. Maintaining regular
correspondence with the Baroda government was an essential element of how the Haribhakti
Firm conducted business between two cities 550 kilometers apart. Transferring money was not
the only function of the firm. Two letters addressed to Haribhakti at Pune from Manajirao in the
early months of 1792 instruct the bankers to request Nana Fadnis, the prime minister of the
Peshwa, to instruct their agents at Ahmedabad to stop creating troubles for the Gaekwad’s
representatives in the same city. The Peshwa’s kāmavisdār-s, or revenue farmers, at Ahmedabad,
Petlad, and Dabhoi were harassing local cultivators and residents, making it difficult for the
Gaekwad to collect adequate revenues in their revenue-sharing agreement of these areas.432 While
it is not the aim of this chapter to analyze the details of the revenue-sharing arrangements
between the Baroda and Pune governments, I have included a summary account of the tribute
paid and still owed by the Gaekwad to the Peshwa authority as tribute between 1770-1798 in
Appendix E.
Upon ascending the gadi at Baroda, Govindrao Gaekwad (r. 1793-1800) continued his
predecessors practice of using the Haribhakti Firm for financial services such as borrowing
money to pay tribute to the Peshwa, remitting funds between Baroda and Pune, and
communicating to officials of the Peshwa court as an agent of the Gaekwad. In a letter dated
December 12, 1793, Govindrao Gaekwad writes to his son Kanhojirao Gaekwad that he received
news about 200,000 rupees that Kanhojirao paid to Haribhakti. Govindrao notes the excellent
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services that the firm has been rendering, especially in paying 800,000 rupees to obtain revenue
districts of Surat Atthavisi for the Gaekwads. 433 In 1797, the Pune government recalculated debts
owed by the Gaekwad State, including arrears from 1793-96 that were due as annual tribute and
fees on defaulting to provide 3,000 troops each year. This amounted to 3,982,789 rupees, and the
Gaekwad agreed to pay 1,991,001 of this amount in 1798, and the remaining balance of
1,891,788 in the following year by 1799. For the balance to be paid in the year 1798, Hari Bhakti
agreed to finance a lion’s share by raising 1,651,000 rupees, while other sources composed the
remaining balance of 340,001. In return for financing 83% of the total amount due to the Peshwa,
the Haribhakti Firm received varat-s on several mahal-s falling under the Gaekwad’s territorial
domain in Baroda. Although the specific names of these villages are absent, this correspondence
confirms the idea that bankers received payment on outstanding loans from profits raised from
land revenue rights that were temporarily alienated to revenue farmers. 434 Sometimes, the agents
of these banking firms would serve as the revenue farmers, and in other moments, other
kamavisdar-s would be instructed to repay bankers based on the terms outlined in the varat.
In addition to offering temporary revenue farming contracts to recover loan amounts for
1798, the Haribhakti family firm was granted four villages as inām, or perpetual hereditary gift,
for their critical financial services to the Gaekwad. These were village Goriyad in the district of
Padra, Samra, Samri, and Khajapur. These inami villages generated about 1,200 rupees each per
annum, and enhanced the prestige and asset portfolio of the Haribhakti family at Baroda. 435 The
close relationship that the firm shared with the Gaekwad family is also evidenced by the latter
bestowing the maintenance and exclusive use of the beautiful medieval Navalakhi Vav, currently
located within the Lakshmi Vilas compound, to the Haribhakti firm in 1795. Built by Sultan
Muzaffar Shah in the fifteenth century, this step-well remains one of the most significant
historical monuments in Baroda. The Firm has maintenance records including costs of upkeep
and regular repair to the monument from 1795. 436 From the evidence presented so far, we can
conclude that until the closing years of the eighteenth century, the Haribhakti Firm provided
relatively independent financial services to the Gaekwad, and received both temporary revenue
farming rights (ijarah) over certain villages, and inami rights over others. Usually, the Haribhakti
Firm did not directly farm the revenues, but were given orders to recover the amounts from
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another class of cultivator-revenue farmers called kamavisdar-s who were employed directly by
the Gaekwad State, or more frequently, independently obtained revenue farming rights from the
Gaekwad by paying advance sums akin to rent in annual auctions held by the state. Although we
have limited evidence regarding who these individuals were, the records suggest that they were
akin to Mughal zamīndār-s in that they were elite-peasants, or proprietors of lands that peasants
worked on, and were expected to pay seasonal land revenue taxes to the Gaekwad State. When
bankers like Haribhakti obtained varat-s on village revenues, kamavisdar-s were expected to hand
over stated sums to agents of the banking firm, and keep any remaining balance as their own
private earnings. It is in this context that the Gaekwad did not invest heavily in creating an
elaborate bureaucracy like the Mughals did in centuries prior. Instead, their rule was based on
tribute paying overtures to the Peshwa until c. 1800, revenue farming agreements with local
kamavisdar-s, and financial arrangements with banking firms who could raise loans, remit money
for the Gaekwad, and manage political fiscal-agrarian infrastructures in return for greater direct
stake in land that was productive and profitable.

Settling Debts: The Bombay Government, the Gaekwads, and Baroda Bankers
While the documentation from the collection of banking papers held at the M.S. University of
Baroda speaks directly to the local services that the firm provided including loans to cultivators,
money transfers through bills of exchange or hundi-s between their major branches at Baroda,
Ahmedabad, Surat, Bombay, and Pune, and the land that they either bought or received when
borrowers defaulted on loans, a parallel set of evidence focuses more squarely on their political
activities and relationship to successive rulers of the fledging Gaekwad State. This section draws
our attention to this evidence to suggest that the firm tried to grow its fortunes by gambling on
money lending to the cash-strapped Gaekwad rulers at Baroda. From the perspective of the
lenders, the presence of the Bombay Government to stand witness and even surety for the large
loans made by Haribhakti and the other less prominent bankers at Baroda was thought to be a
foolproof plan in consolidating greater wealth from the future revenues on agrarian districts
earmarked as the source of repayment for the money the lent out. Unfortunately, debts owed to
the Haribhakti Firm grew quickly, and the political intrigue and scheming required by the
banking house to remain the chief moneylender and treasurer to the Baroda State meant that
principles of good finance were set aside, and instead, irresponsible and haphazard accounting
became characteristic of the Haribhakti-Gaekwad relationship during the final years of the 1790s
and the early decades of the 1800s. To understand how and why private finance became so
critical to public authority at Baroda, we must acknowledge that factional fighting within the
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Gaekwad family drained the Gaekwad household of money and energy. Unlike Mughal times
when fratricidal wars for kinship eliminated rivals to the throne, the Gaekwad’s let factional
disputes go unresolved, hindering any one ruler from developing a sustainable long-term vision
for the state. When Govindrao Gaekwad died on September 19, 1800, his son Anandrao became
the ninth Gaekwad ruler. Unfortunately, he was not a capable leader, and various rival parties
took this opportunity to promote their own interests. Resembling the twilight of Mughal rule
when the Sayyid brothers usurped the Emperor’s affairs at Delhi, there were five groups involved
in the struggle for supremacy at Baroda. These were (1) Anandrao’s minister Raoji Appaji, (2)
Anandrao’s younger half-brother Kanhojirao, (3) a cousin Malharrao who held the jagirdar of
Kadi district, (4) a group of Arab soldiers freelancing as military men at Baroda, and (5) the
Bombay Government of the early colonial state.
Anandrao was crowned Maharaja of Baroda in 1800, and immediately after, his minister
Raoji Appaji and Anandrao’s half-brother Kanhojirao approached the Governor of Bombay
Jonathan Duncan for military support in the name of the Gaekwad State. In return, they offered
the pargana-s of Chorasi, Chikhli, and chauth revenue rights of Surat. The Bombay Government
desired these districts for their revenue potential and strategic location, especially the port of
Surat, and were even promised these districts during early negotiations with Anandrao’s father
Govindrao. The court rivalries between the new minister, the half-brother, and the recalcitrant
jagirdar Malharrao gave the Bombay Government an opportunity to send Major Alexander
Walker, a formidable military commander and diplomat, to begin several months of negotiations
for the terms of surrender. It was during these moments that Vakhatchand Khushalchand of the
Jhaveri family analyzed earlier in the chapter agreed to stand surety for Malharrao, but these
efforts were ultimately in vain. In 1802, Walker took Malharrao’s jagir by force, and made him a
pensioner-prisoner of the Bombay Government. For removing Malharrao from politics at Baroda,
Anandrao ceded pargana-s Chorasi and Chikhli, along with the Gaekwad share of the Surat
chauth to the Bombay Government. Costing the Gaekwad 65,000 per month, Anandrao also
agreed to permanently subsidize a force of 2,000 soldiers for the British to help collect their share
of revenues from their holdings in Gujarat. In return, Malharrao’s territories of Kadi, Dehgam,
and Kapadvanj were incorporated into the khalisa of the Gaekwad dominion. Finally, the
Company agreed to help the Gaekwad pay arrears due to the standing Arab mercenaries who both
political parties wanted disbanded. As surety for the loans that the Company would arrange for
this purpose, the Gaekwad offered the revenues of pargana-s Baroda, Kalol, Sinor, Petlad, and
Ahmedabad as collateral. It is in this context that direct English interference catapulted the
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indigenous bankers and political financiers like Haribhakti and his colleagues at Baroda into the
limelight.437
During 1802 settlement, the Company assessed the resources of the Gaekwad State at
3,200,000 rupees, while its annual expenditures totaled 5,500,000 rupees. It was exceeding its
means by 2,700,000 rupees. The chief culprit of rising debts was arrears due to its military force
comprising Arab soldiers. These military men were instrumental to the Gaekwads, especially for
realizing mulkgiri revenues from their remote holdings in the mainland of Gujarat and in the
more distant Kathiawar peninsula. As a result, the English government, at the insistence of Major
Walker, introduced financial finagling in the state whereby quick money would be raised and
loaned to the Gaekwad State so that they could pay outstanding balances and slowly reduce the
number of soldiers on the payroll. On June 4, 1802, Walker arranged the first loan to the
Gaekwad State combining money raised from private bankers at Baroda and a significant amount
advanced by the Bombay Government. 438 The first rupee loans given to the Gaekwad State
through mediation by the English government were as follows:
Haribhakti
Trivedi
Samal Behechar
Mangal Parekh

312,000
312,000
312,000
312,000

Baroda Bankers Total

1,248,000

Bombay Government

1,077,733

GRAND TOTAL

2,325,738

Each year, these bankers headed by the Haribhakti Firm, would make further advances to the
Gaekwad state, and these were backed by the guarantee of the Government of Bombay. These
annual loans to pay arrears of the previous term was just one type of loan that the private bankers
at Baroda made to the Gaekwad State. In addition, they also raised money during other
exceptional moments of financial need. For example, by 1804, the Peshwa at Pune threatened to
seize the Gaekwad lease of the Ahmedabad revenue farm since the Gaekwad had not been paying
their share of tribute for the years prior. In a letter dated March 15, 1804 to the Bombay
Government, General Walker notes that “The Banking Houses of Samal Behechar, Mangal
Parekh, Hari Bhakti and of Parbhudas Seth have agreed to give bills immediately for four lakhs
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and a half of rupees in payment of the balance due to the Peshwa, because the farm of his share of
Ahmadabad, provided that I shall on the part of the Company guarantee to them the recovery
from the Gaekwad Government”. 439
By the early nineteenth century, the Maratha confederacy nominally consisted of five major
chiefs with their own territorial domains. At the center was the Prime Minister’s office at Pune
(Peshwa), and to this office the Gaekwad chief of Baroda, the Scindia chief of Gwalior, the
Holkar chief at Indore, and the Bhonsle chief of Nagpur paid irregular annual tributes based on
agreements. Unfortunately, civil disputes and internal fights for supremacy within each of these
chiefly households led to conflict, and it was the inability of the Peshwa and the Gaekwads to
resolve these disputes that the Bombay Government of the colonial state was lured into the
politics of public authority of the Marathas in western India. Because the Gaekwad agreed to
share revenues from certain mahal-s with the emerging colonial state, Bombay Government
appointed its first English Resident at Baroda to manage these land revenue rights and other
diplomatic relations with the Gaekwad. One key aspect that continued to threaten public authority
at Baroda was the debts the state owed to private bankers over the years, especially its chief
lender the Haribhakti Firm. Baroda’s financiers were hesitant to issue fresh loans to the Gaekwad
State since they were starting to feel insecure about whether this money would ever be repaid.
However, if the Gaekwad was not able to balance its budget and maintain the current system of
borrowing money to pay debts accrued each year, the entire revenue generating machinery of the
agriculturally rich Baroda State, including its revenue sharing agreements with the Peshwa and
the Bombay Government, would fall apart. From the perspective of the Haribhakti Firm,
maintaining existing privileges including the exclusive right to lend the lion’s share of any money
advanced to the state was desirable since the potential for profit on revenue farms granted as
repayment was worth the extreme risk and high transactional costs of providing financial
services.
Although the Haribhakti Firm served as chief moneylender to successive Gaekwad rulers
from 1785 onward, the firm was officially recognized as state treasurer or potedar during the
early years of Anandrao Gaekwad’s reign beginning in 1800. 440 The Gaekwad’s issued a yādī on
March 27, 1807 appointing the Haribhakti Firm, then led by Samal Bhakti, as State Banker. It
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stipulated that revenues of certain mahal-s, which unfortunately have not been specified in this
evidentiary fragment, will be paid to him, and that he shall meet all pay-orders for Government
expenses up to 500,000 rupees during the contractual year without question. In addition, the firm
would remit 1/2 of the banker’s fees levied on Government drafts back to the State, and that past
and current settlements regarding these short-term loans, or pay orders, would be guaranteed by
the Company’s Government. 441 The customary bankers’ fees were 2% on the total payment
amount, although this was subject to change depending on the transaction. For example, if the
government issued an order for 100 rupees, two rupees over and above the sum would be credited
to the Haribhakti Firm, of which one rupee would be subsequently credited to the government
account. Based on the Company’s guarantee, the Haribhakti bankers contributed 25 lakh rupees
to the assistance of the Gaekwad State to clear arrears due as payment to the troops contracted for
service. In return, Samal Bhakti obtained the māmlatdārī of Baroda, which yielded about 1/5th of
the entire revenue of the entire state. 442 For that year, we have some fragments indicating the kind
of payments that the firm made on behalf of the government. These included small expenses for
as little as Rs. 50 for paying maidservants to Rs. 25,000 to be remitted to other financial agents
and bankers serving as official paymasters to the military labor contracted out by the Gaekwad
government.443 During this period, the military contractors referred to as the “Arab Sibandi” in
the sources cost the Baroda 452,112 rupees per month, or over 54 lakh rupees per annum. There
were about 7,000 Arab soldiers that were contracted by the Gaekwad State, and their monthly pay
averaged 65 rupees.444 In addition, the Haribhakti issued payments to members of the extended
Gaekwad household who received annual pensions from the Gaekwad, including 16,000 paid to
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Kanhojirao as one of three instalments of 50,000 to be paid to him as his nemṇūk or military
stipend for the year.445 This military stipend was largely symbolic, since Kanhojirao did not
participate in active martial duty. This should be contrasted with an earlier generation of Mughal
governors and officials in Gujarat who forged administration through military activity.
Let us turn a more critical eye on the relationship between the Gaekwad State, private
military contractors in Baroda, the shiledar mercenaries for hire, and the financier-bankers
involved in remitting raising loans and remitting funds to pay these soldiers. By the early
nineteenth-century, the Arab sibandī or militia at Baroda were a financial burden on the Baroda
State. Until the 1780s, these soldiers were paid regularly, and an early financial solution to reduce
the total force would have been a matter of negotiating terms with their paymasters. These private
military contractors and paymasters tended to be elite Hindu bankers from the Baroda area who
recognized opportunities to earn profits as suppliers of military men. The most prominent of these
paymasters and military contractors were the Behechar brothers Samal Parekh and Mangal
Parekh. Unfortunately, because the Baroda state was not able to manage its finances responsibly,
they began settling accounts with these contractors in installments and at long intervals. The
paymasters benefitted from this arrangement because it invariably led to the renewal of military
contracts with the shiledar-s that they employed, and who they could satisfy temporarily with
smaller payments from their own private capital reserves. The late eighteenth-century military
labor market functioned thus. An ordinary soldier enlisted for two years. Throughout the first
year, he was paid one-third of the full amount due to him, and the remaining two-thirds were to
be paid upon completing his contract at the end of the second year. By pushing off the inevitable
final payment, the Baroda government only exacerbated its financial problems. When the end of a
soldier’s initial tenure arrived, the Gaekwad’s did not have enough money to clear accounts and
responsibly dismiss those soldiers not required for the upcoming year. As a result, they extended
the option of further service to the soldier, and paid only one-half of the total balance due. The
remainder, along with a percentage of the amount agreed to in the new contract, was sanctioned
to be paid at the entire of the third year of service. The shiledar also benefitted from this
arrangement, since he could claim full arrears due to him by not enlisting, or, remain in the
service with promise of further salary.
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From the Baroda Government’s perspective, they needed militias comprising these men to
collect the seasonal mulkgīrī tribute from those areas not immediately under the territorial control
of the state. As a result, the Gaekwad involved Samal and Mangal Parekh, “shroffs who looked
after the Arabs’ interests, and incidentally made fortunes themselves…[by] defraying the charges
of the army and all the expenses of the Government” since no one was willing to provide the
necessary funds to calm the troops. 446 By the early 1800s, the long intervals of payments to these
groups led to the accumulation of large arrears. On July 29, 1802, the English decided to take
control of the muster of the sibandi, and reduce it to one-third its current size within eight months.
The shiledar-s did not submit to their proposed dismissal, and imprisoned Anandrao Gaekwad as
hostage in his palace. The English resorted to their own military to suppress the Arabs, who
quickly agreed to withdraw and leave Baroda upon being paid full arrears due to them. For the
English, Anandrao Gaekwad “identified himself and his State with the servants of the Company
and their interests - territorial, financial, and commercial”.447 Once the shiledar-s were dismissed,
the English agreed to send their own subsidiary forces on mulkgiri expeditions throughout
Gujarat. In the coming months, Major Walker hoped to subdue the various tributaries of the
Gaekwad, especially those in the Kathiawar peninsula, through diplomacy rather than military
force and mulkgiri expeditions. This diplomacy rested on recognizing the elites of these areas as
heads of their own petty states, de jure princes whose crowns were hollowed the moment they
were bestowed by the Bombay Government. These arrangements explain why western India
came to be dotted with several princely states, little nodes of political authority that were not
based on military strength or the control of extensive territories, but rather on consent based on
financial settlements and diplomacy.
The system of potedari continued until 1832 when the head of the Gaekwad State Sayajirao
paid his creditors from his private funds. Until then, the Gaekwad’s relied on ready money and
financial services supplied by the five major bankers at Baroda. In exchange, they recovered their
money from varat-s issued to kamavisdar-s on certain revenue yielding mahal-s falling within the
Gaekwad dominion. The system of lending in Baroda was the lead lending system whereby five
chief bankers, led by Haribhakti, came together to supply loans to the State. For most loans, the
percentage each major firm advanced was divided as follows:

446
447

Haribhakti
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Gaikwads of Baroda, Vol. 5, pp. xiv
Gaikwads of Baroda, Vol. 5, pp. xv
235

Variable percentage of the remaining 5/16 (31.25%) of every loan was advanced by each of the
following:
Ratanji Kandas of Kathiawar
Lala Mangal
Samal Behechar
Although we have limited direct evidence on the nature of the kamavisdar or ijarah right
under the Gaekwad system of land revenue entitlements during its early years, we know that the
power these men wielded was enormous. The tenure of the farm was for limited from one to five
years, and this was a purely commercial-speculative transaction that did not incentivize individual
farmers trying to improve agrarian yields or upkeep the properties that they raised temporary
profits from. Often, they resorted to intense exactions to maximize their return. According to
Elliot, the Gaekwad could not select good revenue farmers because it was not free from
“pecuniary embarrassments”, since “the tendency of straitened times was to give the mahals to
the highest bidders independently of any consideration for their respectability and worth, while
the policy of shiftless or grasping rajas was to take private bribes from the farmers that a low bid
to the State might be accepted, the tenure of the farm renewed, or irregularities overlooked”. 448
Elliot believes that under the Gaekwads, there was no “systematized supervision (of kamavisdars)
at all such as the Mussulman governments maintained. No doubt, an appeal might and
occasionally be made by the rāyat-s to the Sarkar, which met with a hearing; but an embarrassed
or careless government turned a deaf ear to such petitions.” 449
In 1803, the financial debts owed by the Gaekwad government to the bankers amounted to
nearly 56 lakh rupees. By 1808, the sums were reduced by liquidation of certain territories and
advance payments received through revenue farming contracts to 12.5 lakhs. But in 1807, a new
loan was raised from the Baroda bankers for 71.25 lakh rupees. A breakdown of these figures has
been provided in Appendix F. By 1818, the Gaekwad State owed the Haribhakti Firm alone some
10,766,297 rupees, and these figures have been provided in Appendix G. The yearly debts
oscillated between reduction and inflation until 1820 when Mountstuart Elphinstone, the
Governor of Bombay, found that they exceeded a crore rupees. By November 26, 1826, the
Gaekwads owed the five major Baroda banking family firms of Haribhakti, Samal Behechar,
Mairal Narain, Mangal Sakhidas, and Ratanji Kahanji over one crore and thirty-three lakh rupees
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(13,300,000). Of this amount, the lion’s share of 80 lakh rupees (8 million) was owed to the
Haribhakti Firm alone. 450 As repayment for these loans, the new Governor of Bombay Sir John
Malcolm, who served from 1827-30, arranged for the sequestration of a collection of villages
belonging to the Gaekwad. A summary of this proposed settlement is provided in Appendix H. In
this new arrangement, the Haribhakti Firm lost the exclusive right of State Potedar, and the
Gaekwad began dealing directly with his creditors. By 1830, he completely settled his debts with
three creditors Khushalchand Ambaidas, Samal Behechar, and Mangal Parekh using private cash
reserves, and this enabled him to reclaim some of the villages that were initially sequestered by
Malcom. Still, he was not debt free. The firms of Haribhakti, Gopal Rav Mairal, Ratanji
Kahandas, and Ratanji Manekchand received varat-s for revenue-rights from villages in Baroda,
Sinor, Surat Atthavisi, Kadi, Petlad, Visalnagar, Amreli, Dabhoi, Sankheda, and Vijapur mahal-s
to clear debts owed to them.
This arrangement lasted until 1832, when Sayajirao and his creditors in Baroda were both
eager to settle debts once and for all through a lump sum. It is likely that the list of sequestered
mahal-s undermined the political authority and territorial sovereignty of the Gaekwad State, and
settling these debts for good was a strategy on behalf of the Gaekwad to prevent the Bombay
Government from further involvement in the native state’s affairs. The Bombay Government
approved this so long the Gaekwad did not raise fresh loans for the settlement. Therefore,
Sayajirao decided to use his private savings to pay outstanding balances and reclaim the state, and
temporarily subdue financial troubles plaguing the Gaekwad system of entitlements and
disbursements.
The Governor of Bombay was now of opinion that repayment might safely be made, and
that the guaranteed creditors might be allowed to come to terms with the State, and that
the Bombay Government had no need to pry into the matter any further, once it had
assured itself that the creditors were satisfied. And so the long drawn out dispute came to
an end: three of the creditors had before this come to terms, and now on 9 th April 1832
Haribhakti, Gopal Rav Mairal, Ratanji Kahandas, and Ratanji Manekchand declared
themselves to be content and suffered their deeds [varat-s] to be destroyed: no notice was
taken by the Governor of the actual sums paid, though the debt stood nominally at
3,877,659 rupees, and one point only was ascertained, namely, that Sayaji had parted
with 2,500,000 of his own private hoards. 451

In effect, Sayajirao Gaekwad became his own creditor, financing the state and his ‘exalted
position’ of chief or raja through his double-role as Baroda’s newest banker. His activities as
banker to his own State mark a definitive shift to a new era of public authority in which debt
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became an inevitable component of statecraft and sovereignty in India. 452 The Gaekwads of
Baroda continued to contract new debts through the nineteenth-century, and its finances were
never fully settled. The key difference in the period after 1830 was that private bankers began
playing a more diminished role in the financial affairs of the state. The Haribhakti Firm, for
example, was reduced to providing loans and remittance services to residents at Baroda, and
earned some income from leasing residential property in Baroda city. After Behechar Samal
Haribhatki died in 1845, the firm was seized by Baba Naphade, a corrupt agent who took
advantage of succession disputes within the family. From this period on, the Haribhakti Firm was
involved in various litigation with the Gaekwads to recover money and property due to the
organization, and to restore its former position and prestige in Baroda. There are extensive
nineteenth-century records documenting family affairs in and around Baroda, and their study
merits a separate effort.

Tenurial Entitlements under the Gaekwad Rulers of Baroda
This section builds on the broad theory of social change and tenurial entitlements presented in
Chapter 2 to demonstrate how the Gaekwads organized land revenue administration in territories
falling under their hereditary control and political domain. I also draw on evidence from the
Haribhakti Collection to supplement earlier observations in this chapter about how financial
agents were increasingly brought into the politics of land through their various services as
bankers, financiers, lenders, and remitters of money. As put into perspective by F.A.H. Elliot,
“the conquest of Gujarat was purely the result of those military qualities in which the Marathas
excelled, but those qualities were not supplemented by others which might have led to the
prosperous retention of the acquired territories…for instead of being a commanding officer the
Gaikvad became a Raja with sovereign powers, [and] was no longer supported by Maratha
warriors with the will and power to widen boundaries and increase tributes”. 453 As Stewart
Gordon has noted, being a holder of a genuine sanad from a stronger power, or being the most
appropriate ruler by rules of heredity was a defining feature of eighteenth-century kinship in
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central and western India.454 These forms of sovereign legitimacy did not necessarily mean that
these polities were sulf-sufficient, propagated on principles of good governance, or even led by
the most able ruler. Instead, “states of the eighteenth century also needed administrative skills,
[and] groups with a tradition of literacy found profitable employment keeping the books and
collecting taxes [since] legitimacy seems to have been a statement about the ‘fit’ between the
office of king and the actual ruler.”455
By the 1760s, the Gaekwads were no longer supported by military men from the Deccan, and
had to rely on a growing class of mercenaries. 456 The result was that state revenues were almost
exclusively devoted to maintaining these troopers. Unlike the Mughal and early Maratha period,
these salaried soldiers were not interested in widening territorial frontiers and securing new
sources of revenue. By 1800, there were 13,126 available foot soldiers and 3,731 horsemen,
costing the state a monthly 299,642 rupees. These groups were not organized directly under the
State. Rather, prominent bankers in the city became paymasters and leaders of these mercenary
groups. As described earlier, they were Hindu men including the bankers Mangal Parekh and
Samal Behechar who organized troops and hired various bands to any administration or faction
willing to pay. Usually, the Gaekwad had to borrow money from other prominent financiers as
discussed in earlier sections to pay for irregular troops that composed their army. For this system
to work, and to keep new loans coming, the state began relying more exclusively on a strategy of
issuing temporary rights over land revenue futures to financiers and bankers to repay outstanding
loans. These temporary rights called ijarah were issued to revenue farmers called kamavisdar-s
who would be instructed through official pay notices called varat-s to pay the agents of major
banking firms a stipulated sum once crops were sold in rural and urban markets. 457 In the
fledgling Gaekwad State, there were various land rights that stipulated the terms of revenue to be
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Century Eastern Rajasthan.” In Indian Economic & Social History Review 25 (4), pp. 443-73.
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collected by the right holder. Returning to the schema that outlined in Chapter 2, Figure 1, we can
add the following major rights to the matrix of tenurial rights during early Gaekwad rule:
Quadrant I: BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT
sarkārī or khāliṣa – revenues from local lands earmarked for the imperial treasury; crown
lands
posaita or haq – the privilege, fee, perquisite, or grant that can be claimed under established
usage by the officers of government or village officers. This included rights to cultivate a
fixed area of land, and/or contributions by village residents to the official’s salary
Quadrant II: REVENUE FARM (IJĀRAH)
ijarah – temporary revenue farming right earned by advance payment through an auction or
by arrangement with the raja
jaidad – a new form of land rights that emerged in the last decade of the eighteenth century,
an acknowledgement of revenue payable to a third party. It pertained to a specific area of
land, one that was given up by the right holder and often deposited with a collector, often a
banker, until debts were paid
vachānia – proprietorship sold outright or mortgaged by government through village leaders,
or patels, in time of exceptional need (not recognized after 1827)
gherānia – proprietorship sold outright or mortgaged by government through village leaders,
or patels, in time of exceptional need (not recognized after 1827)
Quadrant III: HEREDITARY OCATION (WAṬAN) or
POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT (INĀM)
Held as INĀM
waẓīfa – also spelled vajifā, lands granted to Muslim cultivators, religious heads, and other
pensioners during Mughal rule and continued by the Gaekwad
bāhirkhalī - charitable or religious grants to Brahmins, Bhats, and other groups
Held as WAṬAN
vanṭa – lands exempt from assessment or held at a quit-rent by hereditary fringe groups such
as kolī-s and girāshī-s, the tenure is based on prescription of remote antiquity without any
deeds or grants.
It is important to note that the Gaekwads of Baroda did not prioritize rights of the Quadrant IV
(TRIBUTARY, CHIEFTAINCY) type since their efforts, largely guided by the Bombay
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Government of the colonial state was to demilitarize Gujarat and eliminate tributary relationships
based on strict military subordination. Instead, the ruling regimes favored more diplomatic
revenue-sharing arrangements that were held in constant flux by the growing credit-debt relations
between bankers and financiers, land revenue farmers, government officials, and the Gaekwads
themselves. In this arrangement, military threat was an expensive option that political participants
tried to avoid.
Between 1760 and the 1820s, land tax was collected in one of four methods. The most
common was the (1) bhāgwaṭai, or an apportionment of shares of the crop in kind between the
cultivator and the government. The produce would be collected by the rayat and brought to the
threshing ground where the collector took one-third to one-half of the surplus. The collector
placed their share in a storehouse and sold it on the market accordingly. The collector was a
government official for sarkari lands, and more commonly a kamavisdar who had purchased the
temporary right to be land revenue collector. The (2) halbandī, or plough tax which was levied on
the number of ploughs used, certain quantity of land assumed as the extent over which a plough
or two oxen could pass in the year. This was more common in wilder and hilly parts of the state
were produce might be scanty, or in areas controlled by tribal populations such as in the Nausari
division. The (3) narwā was an undivided village held in coparcenary, and managed by a few of
its key sharers. A zamindar or Patel would sign an agreement making himself responsible for a
yearly lump sum fixed by the government, and this was common in the areas away from Baroda
such as Petlad which was 50-kilometers north of Cambay. The last major method was called (4)
bhāgdārī, and this was akin to narwa where lands were pre-measured and revenue potential was
assessed. The coparceners would be responsible for paying the revenue and they could arrange
their own private terms with the rayat-s. According to Elliot, the early Gaekwads could not
develop a system of land revenue organization based on consistent assessment of area, position,
and quality of lands. Therefore, my contention is that the system evolved into one of agrarian
speculation in which particular land rights were commodified into transferable assets that served
as the key currency by which the cash-starved Gaekwads could procure and repay loans from
private financiers and banking firms at Baroda. In addition, elites in the countryside such as
kamavisdar-s and zamindar-s (Patels) could develop into independent landlords with significant
control over their lands and the peasants that tilled the soil.458
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The longer-term implications of landlordism and agricultural labor in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries has been explored in the various writings of Jan Breman, especially Beyond Patronage and
Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.
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Revenue Farming in Baroda
To understand the position of the revenue-farmer vis-à-vis the Baroda government, we can
briefly examine two individual accounts sent in the years 1786 and 1834 by two revenue farmers
in Sankheda 55-km southeast of Baroda, and Vadanagar 205-km north of Baroda past
Ahmedabad. Before getting into the specifics, it is important to note that revenue-farmers usually
paid the government in four instalments, and any arrears were charged 9% interest. Expenditures
to improve the land, repair public works, or undertake new projects were their own, and these
began to be reimbursed by the government only during Khanderao’s reign beginning in 1856. At
the end of the year, the kamavisdar sent in final accounts to the government, although the
accuracy of these figures is subject to debate since the holder of the temporary revenue farming
right wanted to convey that his personal profit was indeed smaller than estimated. According to
Elliot, the revenue farmer usually manipulated the accounts by exaggerating expenditures rather
than diminishing the numbers related to revenue receipts, since “undue exaction of taxes from the
rayat-s might lead [them] to complain and so reveal the true state of things”. 459 Furthermore, the
following accounts are incomplete, and I have used deductive reasoning based on data for other
years regarding the land revenue of Sankheda and Vadanagar to fill in evidentiary gaps. For
example, in the two-thirds that was credited to the Gaekwad’s account from each respective
village, we have data in other years that suggests all or a significant portion of this amount was
actually conveyed to bankers like Haribhakti as payment for varat-s issued by the Gaekwad as a
mode of repaying loans earlier taken by the Gaekwad. 460

459

Rulers of Baroda, p. 312-13
To illustrate, a varat issued to Haribhakti in 1826 grants the firm approximately 44,642 rupees per year
on village Sankheda. This represents, on average, the Gaekwad share of revenue raised from that village.
This figure has been calculated based on data in Rulers of Baroda, p. 194. See Appendix I.
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Account Sent by Revenue-Farmer in Sankheda, 1786
Costs Incurred
Amount
Karkun Office
800.00
Sibandi
763.00
Rasad
7,000.00
Bribes to Darbar
638.00
Robes of Honor to Banker Mangal Parekh
626.00
Gifts to other elites
30.00
Miscellaneous
32.00
TOTAL
9,889.00
Income Earned
Receipts from Land Tax
Other taxes including customs, tax on trade, liquor,
marriages, etc.
TOTAL

Amount
56,611.50

Remaining Balance
1/3 kept as kamavisdar-s salary
2/3 credited to the Gaekwad, and likely issued out as
varat to a banker

62,923.50
20,974.50
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16,201.00
72,812.50

41,949.00

Account Sent by Revenue-Farmer in Vadanagar, 1834
Costs Incurred
Amount
Charitable items
1,839.00
Darakhdar Office
1,075.00
Bribes to officials
400.00
Administrative costs
1,400.00
Sibandi
2,500.00
Miscellaneous
30.00
TOTAL
7,244.00
Income Earned
Land Tax

Amount
41,062.00

Other taxes including customs, tax on trade, liquor,
marriages, etc.
TOTAL

18,950.00
60,012.00

Remaining Balance
1/3 kept as kamavisdar-s salary
2/3 credited to the Gaekwad, and likely issued out as
varat to a banker

52,768.00
17,589.33
35,178.67

While these official figures are produced by the revenue-farmer themselves, let us turn to two
relevant documents in the Haribhakti Collection to understand how a financial firm managed
credit-debt accounts with the Gaekwad state and revenue-farmers in the countryside. I have been
able to identify references to two early varat-s issued to the firm in the Haribhakti Collection. The
first is dated 1774, and is written on the revenue rights of one Jaitavaada village. The local agent
of the firm writes a summary of the varat-s owed by the Gaekwad Sarkar totaling 12,725 rupees
for one seasonal harvest. This amount is one-fourth of the total annual revenues that the village
generated. 12,725 represents the quarterly harvest portion belonging to the Gaekwad share after
the kamavisdar’s salary was deducted. 461 A second more detailed document is dated 1794 and
written by the kamavisdar Rangu Patel of Bareja village near Surat to the main branch of the
Haribhakti Firm in Baroda. A translation of the relevant section is provided here:
To the exalted great station at Vadodara (Baroda), to the world renowned sovereign king,
the respected firm of Haribhai Bhaktidas, please read the salutations of Rangu Patel
writing from Bareja. Everything is well here, and I am sending a summary letter of recent
dealings that have been handled with care. I have deposited 15,000 rupees, on account of
a varat issued to your firm, in your firm’s branch at Surat (“Surat ni dukāne bhariyā
461

HBC109/K165/1831
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che”). The remaining balance will also soon be deposited…. written on Samvat 1851
Fagan Vad 13, Guruwar. 462

Tax farming based on auctions and as repayment for loans continued in Baroda until 1856
when the ruler Khanderao Gaekwad removed financial intermediaries and began collecting
agricultural revenue directly from peasants. He demanded higher taxes and did not forgive late
payments like earlier collectors had. It is from this period that we see an increase in reports of
peasants plundering villages in neighboring British districts.463 The colonial state responded by
deposing the ruler and placing an adopted minor from the extended Gaekwad family in his place.
The new Gaekwad administration, under the diwanship of T. Madhava Rao, began levying excise
duty on liquor and opium and introduced principles of rural land ownership based on the British
model. The introduction of private property to Baroda’s countryside was unprecedented and
altered relations between the state, financiers, and peasantry. In lieu of lending money to the state
and urbanites, financiers like the Haribhaktis began advancing loans to farmers and urban
dwellers, and kept their new property deeds as collateral. This was a strategic and consequential
move in a political economy where land, and not just the revenues from land, was becoming a
prized commodity.

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that by the 1750s, the Mughals no longer represented the
foremost political authority in Gujarat. In its wake, former members of the local Mughal
bureaucracy, such as Momin Khan of Cambay and members of the Babi family at Junagadh,
became the heads of smaller territorial fiefdoms that they initially possessed as bonafide Mughal
military stipends, or jagir-s. These areas could no longer be controlled through channels of
Mughal patrimonial and bureaucratic authority, and gradually slipped away from the ambit of
Mughal rule starting in the 1730s. Instead, these areas became the territorial basis for former
Mughal jagirdar-s to propagate their own forms of native authority under the now wellrecognized banner of nauwāb, and were further legitimized by their growing independent
diplomatic relations and cooperation with members of the Maratha confederacy based out of
Pune, and later, those military commanders and statesmen representing the early colonial state out
of Bombay. In addition to these new nodes of authority that can be categorized as fallout polities
of the Mughal imperial and local administrative idiom, Gujarat also became home to completely

462

HBC183/K585/1851
See Skaria, Ajay. 1999. Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers and Wildness in western India. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 124-51.
245
463

new forms of political authority that was consolidated by former military commanders from the
Deccan. These persons began their careers as tribute seeking lieutenants of the Peshwa authority,
but overtime distanced themselves from the Maratha svarājya and propagated their own forms of
political and territorial sovereignty in Gujarat. As the initial agents of the Peshwa conducting
regular tribute seeking raids in Gujarat since the early eighteenth-century, these Maratha
lieutenants, organized around major households, secured certain hereditary rights over lands in
western and central India through subsidiary revenue-sharing and tribute paying agreements with
the Peshwa. The most important of these native raja-s was the Gaekwad lineage, twice-removed
lieutenants of the Peshwa who consolidated their influence over Baroda and the surrounding areas
as military commanders fighting in the retinue of the Dabhade clan out of the Deccan.
The peculiar feature of these little polities, especially the Gaekwads of Baroda, was that they
did not develop a robust system for collecting and disbursing profits from land revenue to
members of their nascent bureaucracies. In addition, they did not prioritize the propagating and
sustaining of an in-house military capable of enforcing territorical boundaries and the collecting
of revenue from its various local possessions. As discussed earlier, one explanation for this is that
as fallouts of the Peshwa confederacy, the Gaekwads no longer had direct access to a steady flow
of reliable military personnel from the Deccan, and had to rely on expensive militias for rental
hire to fulfill their combat-oriented requirements. These mercenaries, described as the “Arab
sibandi” in the sources, were given short-term contracts lasting two years, but were not paid
regularly and were often asked to extend their contracts thereby delaying salary payments.
Instead, the Gaekwad began incurring debts to these military groups, and resorted to borrowing
large sums of money from indigenous bankers and financiers to continue their much-needed
relationship with mercenaries for hire. This military labor was essential for the Gaekwads,
especially for collecting revenues from their territories located in the Kathiawar peninsula and
other areas around Baroda such as in Dabhoi and near Rajpipla that were inhabited by heavily
armed groups that were not willing to part with the Gaekwad share of land tax unless its seasonal
collecting was backed by credible threats of violence. In addition to borrowing sums to organize
their haphazard military, the Gaekwads also took loans for financing the day-to-day operations of
the state. All payments that the Gaekwad had to make, big or small, were issued as pay orders to
the major bankers in the city who kept strict accounts of yearly disbursements made on the state’s
behalf. As payment for such services, bankers charged a certain portion, usually about two
percent, above and beyond each transaction as their profit. The Gaekwad also borrowed large
sums to fulfill their own tributary and revenue-sharing obligations to the Peshwa at Pune. In the
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initial years of Gaekwad political formation beginning in the 1760s, we can already see that they
relied on borrowed money to consolidate authority, influence, and political autonomy from their
initial overlord the Peshwas. From its very inception, it was a fledgling state organized around
contractual debts.
Since the 1760s, and more rapidly in the decades of the 1780s and 1790s, Gaekwad debts to
local bankers had grown to unwieldy sums. To further secure loans from indigenous financiers
and maintain access to their sophisticated financial and communicative networks between
Baroda, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bombay, and Pune, the fledgling authority decided that they would
issue the rights to land revenue futures called varat-s to financial agents as a strategy for repaying
loans. In other words, the Gaekwad temporarily ceded their share of village revenues to various
bankers to clear existing debts and continue securing lines of desperately needed credit. The
financial and banking firm of the Haribhakti family, established around 1762, became the chief
moneylenders and financial service providers of the Gaekwad authority. By focusing on internal
firm correspondence and official government records documenting the successive loans that they
provided to the fledgling Baroda state, this chapter has demonstrated the critical role that smalltown bankers like Hari and Bhakti played in helping aspirants to political power financially
sustain their political visions. In the process, the Haribhakti Firm, along with at least four other
Baroda banking firms, grew to become chief moneylenders and treasurers of the Gaekwads. By
the early nineteenth century, it became clear that the Gaekwads of Baroda could not repay vast
debts to these private individuals, and as a result, these financial specialists were no longer
willing to lend money to a state that was clearly not solvent. To resolve this problem, the early
colonial state represented by the Bombay Government found an amazing opportunity to gain
political and territorial control of some major revenue generating pargana-s and commercial ports
of Gujarat as the archetypal third-party arbitrator. In other words, by agreeing to guarantee all
new loans made by local financers to keep the Gaekwads afloat, the English cornered the Baroda
raja-s into not only giving up key territorial possessions, but also de facto rights to manage their
own financial, territorial, and political affairs.
The entry of the Bombay Government represents a major shift from earlier political practices
which were focused heavily on military capability and the threat of credible violence as a
prerequisite to paramount sovereignty. In this former period, groups that could strategically
manage India’s elastic military labor market through regular payment of salary and promise of
greater future rewards were most likely to emerge as significant nodes of public authority. With
the entry of the colonial state, political organization relied chiefly on principles of diplomacy,
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subsidiary alliances, and tribute seeking arrangements that were enforced and backed by the
strength of the English military as an undesired and last resort. By taking advantage of factional
fighting in the Gaekwad household, and by vocalizing their support for the indigenous financers
and bankers who were owed mounting sums by the rulers of Baroda, the colonial government
found a suitable and relatively violence free entry point into the world of tenurial entitlements in
Gujarat. In exchange for helping settle debts and guaranteeing further loans that local bankers
made to the Gaekwad, the Bombay Government secured revenue rights of key districts in Gujarat,
and by the early nineteenth century, even the provincial commercial capital of Ahmedabad. And
while this later history is beyond the scope of this dissertation, this chapter has certainly
demonstrated how the Gaekwads were able to forge a state-like structure by leveraging money
advanced to them by an increasingly important group of local financiers in the area. This marks
an important shift from the fiscally robust administrative apparatus of the Mughal Empire,
especially in its seventeenth-century variant, which did not rely on borrowed money to
consolidate, extend, and preserve its territorial influence and its often parceled but nonetheless
paramount sovereignty in key areas in the northern and western parts of the subcontinent. The
shift to political authority funded by debt allowed groups who were never really interested in
long-term rule, such as the Gaekwads, to consolidate influence and secure steady streams of land
revenue for their private use. It was only because of the colonial state’s intervention in the initial
years of the nineteenth century that successive Gaekwads were admonished and forced to adhere
to some basic principles of sound governance for fear of completely losing existing revenue rights
and the little that remained of their de jure political power.
As far as the Haribhakti Firm is concerned, they made their initial fortunes on the interest
charged on loans made to the Gaekwad, and on fees levied for making payments and transferring
funds across territories on behalf of the state. They served as the Gaekwad’s official
representative at the Pune court into the 1790s. During this period, they maintained active branch
offices at Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat, Bombay, and Pune. The Gaekwad relied on the
communication networks and financial services of the Haribhakti Firm, along with several other
minor firms based out of Baroda, to secure their political position vis-à-vis the Peshwa and the
Bombay governments. As lead lenders to the Gaekwad, the Haribhakti Firm always maintained
the largest percentage of any collective loans advanced by the Baroda bankers to the Gaekwad
household. However, the death of the two namesake brothers who founded the firm in 1796 and
1796, respectively, led to a crisis in how the organization would manage its wealth and political
relations with the Gaekwad, the Peshwa, and the colonial government at Bombay. By the early
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1800s, the debt owed to the Haribhakti Firm and other bankers had grown to several lakh rupees,
leading to financial settlements and new revenue-sharing agreements with the Gaekwad. The
loans that formed a critical part of these new settlements were guaranteed by the financial
apparatus of the Bombay Government of the early colonial state. And while later nineteenthcentury controversies surrounding the Baroda bankers including the Haribhakti Firm is beyond
the scope of the argument advanced in this chapter, the early history of the firm between 17601818 clearly indexes a new moment in South Asian political economy in which the role of private
capital becomes increasingly involved in state building projects of successors to Mughal authority
in Gujarat. This marks a major shift in the nature, significance, and functioning of financial
agents from earlier incarnations as strictly merchants, moneychangers, and providers of luxury
goods to political elites, especially during the high-tide of Mughal rule until 1700. In the
eighteenth century, and especially in the years after 1750, finance and sources of ready money
were at the heart of propagating nascent states. The Gaekwads of Baroda epitomize how fiscally
irresponsible yet politically ambitions groups lured moneyed individuals and banking firms into
investing in their haphazard and unplanned political administrations, and when the time came,
having these financial agents accept temporary land revenue rights, or profits derived from them,
as forms of repayment. In the subsequent and final chapter of this dissertation, I explore some of
the key implications of financial agents being directly included in aspects of eighteenth-century
statecraft and governance as third-party treasurers, revenue farmers, and political financiers.
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Appendix 5A: Jhaveri Family Tree with Khushalchand’s Brothers

This family tree has been compiled based on evidence from the Cintamani Prasasti, along with
data from various Gujarati texts composed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. For
a more complex genealogical tree, but one that omits critical date about the early ancestors of
Shantidas Jhaveri, see Dwijendra Tripathi’s The Dynamics of a Tradition: Kasturbhai Lalbhai
and his Entrepreneurship (1981). New Delhi: Manohar.
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Appendix 5B: Family Tree of Gaekwad Rulers

The roman numerals indicate the order of succession to the head of the Gaekwad State at Baroda.
For a more elaborate family tree of the Gaekwad family, including details about adoptions, see:
Elliot, F.A.H. 1879. The Rulers of Baroda. Baroda: State Press, Appendix I.
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Appendix 5C: Haribhakti Family Tree

This family tree has been compiled based on evidence from various English and Gujarati sources,
especially documents from the Haribhakti Personal Papers and The Guicowar and His Relations
with the British Government (1863) by Lieut. Colonel Wallace, pp. 546-60. I emphasize the
branches of the family that are prominent today (Shailesh Haribhakti, Bombay), and those who
have family records dating back to the late eighteenth century (Arvind Haribhakti, who donated
several thousand papers to the M.S. University of Baroda in the late 1980s, and Gopal & Swati
Haribhakti who provided access to materials from their own personal collection in Baroda).
For a more elaborate family tree, see: http://www.haribhaktirmsct.org/family-tree.php
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Appendix 5D: Selections from the Haribhakti Collection
Selections from the Haribhakti Collection (HBC) at the M.S. University of Baroda
I have transcribed these letters from old Gujarati written in the moḍī, or cursive script. I have
indicated unclear letters or ambiguity in orthography by using ( ). To reach a broader audience, I
have transcribed these documents in the more widely read devanāgarī script.
Episode 1 – Accession No. HBC95/K45/1844
1844 V.S. Jeth Vad 13 (corresponding to 1787 A.D.)
Letter between two firms, HB to send 500/- to Surat. Letter exchanged between two branches of
Haribhakti firm, from Surat to Baroda. This letter is a summary of accounts. It also gives the
going rates for discounts on bills of exchange at Surat, Ahmedabad, Nasik, Mumbai, and Ujjain.
जेठ ्द १३
१।उ

ो लिु आ्ा सुरत

स््जस्त श्री ्डदरा महा शुभ स्थां

े मारगे आपो अषाड़ ्द ३
ो (दाजरािपेशा जी) परी. हरीभाइ भगती ्ाशा अेतां

ला. परी. हरीभाइ भगतीदास जे गोपाल ्ांिजो

जत अही भलारी छे तांमारे कागल लांिअथे आ्े ते ्ांिी समािार जणा्जु शांभारी

उपर पारी. शांभाराम सदाराम ( ) लिु ते तांमो ज्ाप अपे ते (परजेणे) सर्े शकारी

थी (रां णो थी)

े लिजो बीजु अांमो

ांणा अपां छे अे घणी े

िाते उिारी छे ते े पेटे अ्ेज अे घणी अे ्ालते जमे करे छे पण तमे लिु छे जे सुत रु. ३०,००० अमे दा
૯७ ।।। लिे सही करी छे ते अमारी उपर लिशे रू ७૫ हजार पेटे पण ते सुत तांमे लिु
तमारे लिेथी शांभाराम उ अ्ेज मिे गणी छे पांणा सुत आ्ा ्गर जमे ( )
सुत लिु ते छडजे पणु सु
लिजे ते परमणे तमारे

अ्ी

थी मटे सु

थी

े

थी तांमे े तथा मां लिु छे जे

लिु उिाडजे तारे जमे िरि थाशे

मे उिारी अे जमे िरि करे छे तेथी रुि थ िाकेब छे माटे

ज्ाप छड़ जे कर कागल मां ज्ाप लि जे तेरीि सुिां ते परमणु तांमारे

े बीडी

ुकर कागल मिे ज्ाप
जर मां अ्े ते

मे उिारी े शेभाराम उ जमे करी

बीजु दे ् करी े भइ ( ) रू ૫० अमारी लेणु छे ते उप हे तांमे रूपीआ लीिा छे ते लीिा हता तेटला तेरीि
सि
ु ां ज्ाप आपजो जमे िरि करी ( ) जी्लाल शे्कदास लाड्ाडा मिे रहे छे ते ु घरे णु

ी इदडी उ्ा

बांि लािते सके करी े ्डदरा उकलमी ( ) मीदास मोघराज जण २ सथे मकल छे ते मिे टीप छे के थल
मिे टीप छे ते परमणे तपासी लेजो
अेघणी

े

कसद रू ० ।। अपजे ते जी्लाल े जमे मांडजे लसकर मिे

े हीशब छे ते मिे द्ु छे ते ी सु

लिु ते घडी सुतारे ते मिे तेमे रुपा आपाहजो ते

काज दी े ते ( - - missing text - - ) १८४४
्ांिजो अमर भा् छे .

ा ्रिे जठ ्द १३ भुमे उराते ला. दामेदर

९८।। - सुरत मिे

९५ ।।। - श्री अहमदाबाद ी
९५ - श्री ासक ी
९७ - श्री मुबाइ ी
१०० - उजण ी

१०४ - पेतोिाल सरकारी
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थ रू ।।

े जे गोपाल

१०२ ।।। - पेतेिल केरा
१०८ । - िांद्डी छापी

१०६ ।। - िांद्डी केरा
अेणी व्गते भा् छे परभातजी ्ात थी ्ालाजी जणु रू ૫०० मेलेरी मरिा ांद राम ा मांणज थांजी सुरत मेकली छे ते
तम े मेकलशे माटे अ्ेथी ज्प अपजो

Episode 2 – Accession No. HBC102/K91/1851
1851 V.S. (corresponding to 1794 A.D.), written by Atmaram from Sankheda, 55-km east of
Baroda, to Bhaktidas at Baroda regarding public unrest in the village.
स््स्त श्री ्ेडोदरा सुभ स्था े सकल गुणालांकरण अ ेक शुभ उपमा जोग पाद श्री भाइ भजक्तभाइ सांिेडा थी ल.

मआराम आतमाराम ा राम राम ्ाििा आि कुशल भाइ श्री ी कुशलता लि्ी अपा लिा कारण अे जआ हाराज श्री
गणपत रा् ो दां गो छे ते ्ास्ते पाअगा त. िेरिो ले्ा े जा दक
ु ा े तमारी पासे मोकला ते सामा पण थोडु आ्ु े ते
स्ा अपरम दोढसोजी सरकार थी बे आस्ार जआ आ्ा ते साथे कागल आअ्ो जी गीरिर शेठ े केद करी े

शेि्ाअद साथे मोकलजो े ते े घर उपर िोक रािजो अेप्रमाणे अेकपि परीि भगतीभाइ ते स्ाअगाम ा ्ाणीआ
बे( )र बेसाडा हता ते आमेला अ्ो छे इ अे्ली क श दास दलाल ्डोदरे आअ्ो छे ते ी जाअडी े ािी ते ा जमी

का िामोशला जमी लेइ े मुका्ी छे त. गीरिर शेठ ी ्हु त. छोकरी तथा दीकरा ी ्हु अे प्रमाणे गडबड घणी थइ
गाांममा कोइ दक
ु ा माडतु थी अमारो ्ेपार तो पार पड्ा ो उपाअ थआो बालणे सुिड हतु ते ्ास्ते रात दाढो फरताां
हता गाममा दे साई ्छीआत ्ाणीआ (िेड कशो) मारग थाअ ते िारण हतु तेम ठाडु अेथी (-- --) मारगे काम िाले ते

कर्ांु मामलत तमारी तेमा म मा ते लिु ठाकरे अेशा आअउ ते ी तज्ीज कर्ा माांडी अेटले पछ्ाडे थी परबत

था ह्ालदार ्गेर पांिर आ (-- --) ते साथे पि (-- --) हे ते आशामीओ ािी े हजुर मोकलजो े बअरी छोडु रा (-- --)

ते ा जमा लेजो अे प्रमाणे छाड अपा्ी ते् ो हां गामो घणो थओ गाम ा लोक ासी गआ आसामी (-- --) मातो दसाइ
मीठालाल रुघ ाथ दे साइ ्छीआत त (-- --) दलाल अे िार े तो बेडी (-- --) इते बांदीिा ा मा रािी छे

े ाशीग आमा

हरीभाइ दसाइ गओ अे प्रमाणे थअु ते जाणजो मुलक मिे कोइ जमीदार ्छीआत झीलाओ ही े अेकािी मागल तमा
लोक ा कहाथी सांिेडा थआ े कोइ िाली ्ास्त ही के मामलत ि ी े हाथे बाडाड्ी छे तमारा जाणमाां तो अे ्ात हशे
ही अम करता करउ हतु तो कारकु

े कही े आसामी ओ तेडा्ी हती पण हुबड करी े सांिेडामाां ्ात ािीअे सारु

ही शा बाबत थेउ ते कर ो अमे पण गाम मा ो हता आश्ारी गआ हता ही साभली े काम पडतु मुक े आ्ु पडु

आमारे तो सर् ्ातो (-- --)

Episode 3 – Accession No. HBC103/K119/1851
1851 V.S. Kartak Vad 4 (corresponding to 1794 A.D.), written by Ram Sangh Gheda from
Nanderiyu Village, to Bhaktidas at Baroda regarding oppressive tactics of Gaekwad officials.
स््जस्त श्री ्डोदरा माहा शुभ स्था े थी सकल गुणा गुण आसां सुज ्ी्ेक ी छे (-- --) क

ेक शुभ उतम उपमा सहीत

पारि श्री भगती दास भाई (-- --) जी ा राम राम ्ाांििा अि ताजीत छे भाइ श्री ी िश
ु ाली लि्ीअ बी. गरज छे जे

परथम मार थआग माां मारु गाांम मोजे ांदेरीउ छे ते उपर सरकार ा माणस जपती बेठेला छे तेथी (-- --) माां घणाां लागेर
छीअे ते पसी सरकार ा (-- --) ्गेरे आ्ा छे ते पणो अमो े िार पोि दी्स बेसाडी मेला छे
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े रोज रू. १०० पर्ी ा

मेलिा छे ते े ते स््ाग रू. १२५ जमेले रू १२५ ी ीशाां करा्ी सरकार ा माणस साथे जोर जारमी अमेथी थाअे ही
पण दा अमोथी जामा गामो रे थाउ ही अतीसे सरकार ो अिरको अमे थी बेठाय ही गमारुग जु दी् ज बाप

दे ्ा अेमाटे माहाराज श्री े गरज करी े अस््ार े उतार्ा भाई श्री आशमे राि्ा ा हो तो क्रुपा करी अस्ार उतार्ा
अमे तो थोडा अेकमाां गुजरा करी े जारी गामाां बेसी रहा छु बे गामडाां जी्ारातो छे ते उपर केटलीगे हक कत थइ छे
अस्ार पासु मोकली हरा करा्शो तारे बे ्त

े

थक पडशे ी भाग अेक थी पछातो आ्ेद छे जे काइ जरमाां आ्े

ते िरु मेरबा ी रािी अस्बार े तेडा्ी ले्ा बाक गमेअे िरि करो पडे अे्ु थी भाइ शीगी ाता छे जादा का लि्ु
अेज व् ांती शा. १८५१ ा कारतग ्द ४.

Episode 4 – Accession No. HBC149/K1009/1851
1851 V.S. Asad Vad 14 (corresponding to 1794 A.D.), written by Tukoji Pol from Matar village
of Kheda District, to the Haribhakti Firm at baroda regarding mahsūl or land tax.
श्रीमा

स््जस्त श्री बडोदरा शुभ स्था े सकल गुणालांकरण स्ा राज मा राज श्री हरी भाइ ता. राज श्री भगतीदास भाइ अेताां
श्री क ले िेडे थी ला. तुकोजी पटे ल ो राम राम ्ाांिजो जत अही कुशल छे तमारी कुशलता हां मेशा लिजो बी.

लिाकारण अे छे जे तमो श्रीमांत श्री े अरज करी े सरकार ुां ताक द पि ता. जासुद मातर ्ाला उपर मोकला्ो तारे
मातर ्ाले िेडा ा बकरा ता. ढोराां पाछा काढी मुका ता. मोजे सोिडा ा रू १२।। लीिा हताां ते पाछा अपा्ा ते उपर

सरकार ु पि जासुद उपर आ्ु जे रू १२।। मातर ा कमा्ीसदार े आपजो अे परमाणे पाछु पि सरकार ु जासुद उपर
आ्ु तारे जासुद तो अमारी पछ्ाडे थओ छे पण हक ाहक मोजे सोिडा ा रू १२।। मेहेसली ा लीिा ता. िांड बाबत रू
४।। ता. अस्ार ी पा सोपारी ा रू २।। मजमले रू १९।। सोिडा िाला ा लीिा ्ली आज अस्ार िेिे २ मोहोसल

करा ते ा रू २ लीिा मजमले रू २१ ।। हक ाहक कशोअे मुदा् ा लीिा हक ाहक गरीब े दां डा तारे गरीब शुकरे माटे

अेह ो माि अ ाज जो ार तो तमो माटे श्रीमांत श्री े अरज करी े कमा्ीसदार पासेथी रुपआ पाछा अपा्जो अे रुपआ
पाछा अपा्शो तारे गाम ु ाम कदावप लेशे ही े रुपआ पाछा ही अपा्ो तारे गामो े अेक घडी जप्ा दे शे ही बी.
सरकार ा पि मिे जासुद े लिु जे जासुद मत होअ ते परमाणे घोर अपा्जो माटे घोर ी हक कत अे छे जे घोर तो
िेडा ा कही छे

ही जठ
ु ा तेणे लबाडा करी माटे ्डोदरा मिे मातु श्री अांबीकाबाइ छे तेम ी पासे िीलकराम हता ते मरु ा

२ शांकर पासे हता ता. बापाजी रां ग ाथ ता. िेडु बाबुरा् ता. आ ाजी पांत ता. िीलक शांकर ता. गो्ीांद िांडेरा् अे सर्े

कमा्ीसदार मातर हता तेम े श्रीमांटी श्री ा पग उपर हाथ मुका्ी े पूछा्जो जे िेडा ो घोर कही लोको पासे थी लीिो
ते पुछा्जो पछे ते कहे शे तारे जर माां सािु जुठु आ्शे ्डोदरा मिे दे ्िांद छे माटे तमो तेह े सीिा कर्ी घटे ते

करा्जो े मोजे सािडा ा रू २१।। दे ्िांद पासथी तमो लेजो बी. श्रीमांत श्री े अमो पि लिु छे ते तमारी पासे रही े
्ांिा्जो ते रुपआ तमो दे ्िांद पासे थी लेजो बे. अमो तम े कागल व्स्तारी े करु ्रतमा लिीअे छीअे माटे तमो
अिरे अिर ्ाांिीजो जा तमो ्ाांिो तारे हक कत सर्े तमारी जरमाां आ्े माटे ्ीस्तारी े लिीअे छीअे ते जाणजो
अमारे तो सर्े ्ाते भरोसो तमारो छे तम थक अमारे ्ीशे शकारी छे
सरकार ो जासुद मुि ्ि कहे ते मा जो

ही ते जाणजो घणु शु लिीअे आसो ्द १४

Episode 5 – Accession No. HBC181/K579/1851
1851 V.S. Fagan Vad 10 (corresponding to 1794 A.D.), written by an agent Ragunath Das of the
Haribhakti Firm from the Surat branch of the office. Summary letter sent to Baroda providing
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information about a trip taken to Nasik in Maharashtra where agents of the Haribhakti Firm
witnessed a skirmish between Maratha officials and the Mughals.
श्री १।

स््स्त श्री ्ड़ोदरा शभ
ु स्था ो दगजा रािे परी. श्री हरीभाई भगातीदास िरणा श्री ासकथी ली. हरीभाई

भगातीदास ा जेअे गोपाल ्ाांिजो

जत अही भलु छे शेठजी ी भलाइ ा का. २ श्री िरमद करी े मुकाम आ्ा ते ्ाांिी समािार सर्े जाणा्जो

शाांभारी े लिजो बीजु शेठजी अमो फागण ्द ८ ्ार शुकरे ी बपोरे श्री ासक िेम कुशाले पोता छी े अमो दी. ३

मुकाम करी े रशता ी िबर काडी तथा दआराम आत्माराम ी दुका े पांणा पछु तारे कहे जे पेहेली बीकतो हती पांणा
ह्डा तो भमडा

ो घाट उपर मारग िर िोरणा िाले छे माटे कशी िांता थी ते करता ्ाल राजश्री हरीपांथ ताता ो

्क ल श्री कलकते हतो ते पण अिे श्री ासक मिे आ्ा ते ी साथे (रू टा. ३) तथा माणस ५० छे तेपण आपणी सोबतमाां
थआ तारे अमो पण कुि करी े आज दी े श्री दाणोर्ा े थआ छु ते जाणजो

्ारु शेठजी हरीपांथ ताता ो ्क ल श्री कलकते थी आ्ो छे ते ी पासे श्री दग ेथी जासुस आ्ो छे ते ो िबर

कहीजे श्री लशकर मिे फागण ्द ५ े दी्शे लडाइ पडी तेमाां राजश्री बाबा फडककआ तथा फरशराम भाउ मरि ्ाला
तथा हुलकर ता. शीिीआ ी फोजे अे जणा ४ सरदारे हलाां करी तेथी मग
ु ाल े पाछो गउ ४ हठा्ो छे

े हाथी ता. ४ ता ५

आणा छे अे रीते लडाइ पडी छे अे रीते िबर साांभली छे माटे शेठजी े जणा्ा सारु लिु छे तो जाणजो बीजु शेठजी
अमारी िांता करशो ही सर् तमारा दउत परताप थी बालाजी िेम कुशले श्री दग ो पोिाड श ते जाणजो अमो श्री

िरमद करीथी िेपीओ १ दगणो मोकलो छे ते ो पाछो कशो जबाप दी १० थआ पणा आ्ो ही तारे अमो सारी सोबत
थइ तारे अमो जबाप ी ्ाट जो्ा रहा ही े अमो रे ्ा े थआ छु ते जाणजो अमो े िबर आ्ी छे जे पाठी िेम कुशले
सरु त पोहोता छे ते जाणजो बीजु कामकाज लिजो

सा्त १८५१ ाां ्रिे फागण ्द १० ्ार सोम ी परभाते लिु छे . सल. रुघ ाथदास ा जेअे गोपाल ्ाांिजो
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Appendix 5E: Tribute Owed by the Gaekwad to the Peshwa, 1770-1798
Calculated from data in Elliot, F.A.H. 1879. The Rulers of Baroda. Baroda: State Press, Appendix
VI, pp. 274-5.
Figures are in Rupees
* 2 rupees = average daily wage for a foot soldier
1. Tribute owed by successive rulers at Baroda in rupees:
Damaji
Govindrao
Fatehsingh
Manaji
Govindrao

2,625,000
2,337,000
3,887,002
2,337,000
5,453,000

Total
16,639,002
2. As indemnity for not doing military services, the following rulers owed:
Sayajirao
Fatehsingh
Manaji
Govindrao
Extra

675,000
1,112,500
1,350,000
4,750,000
25,000

Total
7,862,500
3. As naẕrānā for succession to the post of Sena Khas Khel (Gadi of Baroda):
Govindrao
Fatehsingh
Manaji
Govindrao
Total

1,750,001
500,000
3,313,001
5,638,001
11,201,003

4. Other Dues
Miscellaneous
To bankers at Pune
For the Babi Mahals

4,274,429
150,000
125,000

Total

4,549,429

____________________________
GRAND TOTAL OWED 40,251,934
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1. Tribute paid by successive rulers at Baroda in rupees:
In 1770 by Damaji
In 1770 by Govindrao
In 1771 by Govindrao
In 1772 by Govindrao
In 1773 by Sayajirao
In 1778 by Fatehsingh
In 1779 by Fatehsingh
In 1782 by Fatehsingh
In 1788 by Fatehsingh
In 1791 by Manaji
In 1795-98 by Govindrao

4,745,136
1,800,000
2,500,000
1,400,000
1,485,844
600,000
1,050,000
400,001
2,879,000
500,001
7,833,212

Miscellaneous payments

4,505,450

Total

29,698,644

2. The following remissions were made by the Peshwa at Pune:
To Fatehsingh
To Govindrao

570,500
6,000,000

Total

6,570,500

____________________________
GRAND TOTAL PAID
36,269,144
BALANCE REMAINING IN 1798 3,982,790
The balance due by Govindrao to the Peshwa after the Settlement of 1798 amounted to 3,982,790.
After this time, the Gaekwad did not pay regular tribute to the Peshwa. There were attempts to
resettle claims, and the Peshwa agreed to a yearly sum in lieu of all detailed receipts. By 1802,
the British East India Company became a third-party arbitrator between the Gaekwad State and
the Peshwa, and soon all direct financial obligations between Baroda and Pune were ended
through diplomacy.
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Appendix 5F: Debt Acquired and Discharged by the Gaekwads, 1803-07
Calculated from data in Desai, Govindbhai and Arthur Clarke. 1923. Gazetteer of the Baroda
state. Bombay: Times Press, pp. 257-59.
Figures are in Rupees
2 rupees = average daily wage for a foot soldier
Date

Reason

Banker/Source

Amount

Dec-1802

Discharge Arab militia

Haribhakti
Samal Behechar
Mangal Sakhidas
Arjunji Nathji Tarvadi

Total
2,248,000

Khushalchand Ambaidas

1,235,000

Sept-1803
Oct-1803
Aug-1803

1803

Repay British for expenses
of Kadi War
Discharge of Arab militia
Discharge Sindhi militia

Samal Behechar
Mangal Sakhidas
Haribhakti
Mangal Sakhidas
Samal Behechar
Khushalchand Ambaidas
Ratanji Kahandas
Vakhatchand Khushalchand
Mairal Narayan

Total
816,750

To pay off arrears of
Dumse-bin-Ali shiledar

Varat-s granted on Kathiawar

Debt due to Dayaram Jhaveri

Varat-s granted on Kathiawar

87,500

Settle commissariat accounts

Samal Behechar
Mairal Narayan

Total
300,000

75,000

GRAND TOTAL
1807

923,600

Discharge of arrears to

Mangal Sakhidas
Samal Behechar
Arjunji Nathji
Parbhudas Sheth
Haribhakti
Mairal Narayan
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5,685,850

Total
7,126,733

Appendix 5G: Gaekwad Debts to the Haribhakti Firm by 1818-19
Calculated based on data in Gaikwads of Baroda, English Documents, Vol. 1: Pilaji and Damaji
Gaikwads (1720-1768), eds. J.H. Gense & D.R. Banaji. Bombay (1936): D.B. Taraporevala Sons
& Co., pp. 339-42.
Figures are in Rupees
I have rounded fractional figures to the nearest rupee.
Reason

Amount

Outstanding Debts at the beginning of 1818
Current year expenses
Expedition against Khosas
To Ratanji Kahandas
To Bankers for loans to pay troops in Malwa
To Sir John Malcolm for advance to pay troops in Malwa
Arrears due to troops for 1817
An old unspecified debt
To Ratanji Manekchand banker for loans made to government in
Kathiawar
To Ratanji Dhakji banker for loans made to government in Kathiawar
Arrears to troops employed in Kathiawar for 5 years
To Bankers for loans on managing Rajpipla
To arrears of troops employed in Rajpipla for 3 years
GRAND TOTAL

1,365,275
1,000,300
200,000
78,016
1,308,344
1,400,000
2,540,709
388,852
1,134,054
260,542
525,000
108,000
457,500
10,766,592
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Appendix 5H: Gaekwad Villages Sequestered to Creditors by 1830
Calculated from data in Elliot, F.A.H. 1879. The Rulers of Baroda. Baroda: State Press, pp. 18396.
Creditor
To Haribhakti, Samal
Behechar, Mangal Sakhidas,
Mairal Narayan, and Ratanji
Kahanji for an old loan of 10
lakhs, and a new loan
To Haribhakti and five others
for a running loan
To Haribhakti and four other
bankers
To Haribhakti

Amount

3,075,301

2,492,001
1,275,001

1,275,001
Ratanji Manekchand

1,235,009

To Haribhakti

1,588,651

GRAND TOTAL

10,940,964

Repayment Source
Varat for 7 years on Baroda,
Sinor, Surat Atthavisi, Kadi,
Petlad, Visalnagar

Private purse of Sayajirao with
12.25% interest
Varat for 7 years on Baroda,
Surat Atthavisi, and Kadi
Varat for 7 years on Amreli,
Dabhoi, Sankheda, and Vijapur.
The average per village per year
= 44,642 rupees.
Varat for 7 years on the
Kathiawar revenues
Omitted in this settlement

(Continued on next page)

261

Mahals Sequestered in 1828
Petlad
Bahiyal
Kadi
Dabhoi & Bahadarpur
Sinor
Amreli
Sianagar
Kathiawar Tribute
Mahi Kantha
Reva Kantha
Other sources
Total

Yearly Amount
506,739
87,454
249,501
96,440
64,287
122,965
3,501
142,654
119,213
79,821
75,150
1,547,725

Mahals Sequestered in 1830
Patan
Visnagar
Vadnagar
Bijapur
Sankheda

Yearly Amount
222,862
54,595
13,517
100,641
17,836

Total
GRAND TOTAL

409,451
1,957,176
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Business Households and Political Authority in India
This dissertation has articulated a perspective on the downfall of the Mughal Empire, and the
mechanisms by which regional tribute-seeking warlords consolidated significant nodes of public
authority in its wake. The focus of this work has been the agriculturally rich and mercantileoriented coastal province of Gujarat in western India during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Evidence from this region has provided an opportunity to analyze how the province
was incorporated into the Mughal imperial idiom in the late sixteenth century, controlled
effectively by successive emperors and provincial governors for a dozen decades, and finally,
dislodged from the Mughal banner due to serious financial crises that imperial officials and local
administrators could not overcome. It is in the details of how the Mughal state bureaucracy
functioned at the provincial level that we come to understand the various alliances, revenue
sharing arrangements, and hyper-local tributary relationships that were critical to the makeup and
sustaining of imperial sovereignty. During the high-tide of Mughal rule, the overall balance
between local power brokers such as provincial governors, deputy-governors, the diwan, jagirdars, mansabdar-s, moneychangers, bankers, and influencial merchants was kept in check by the
rules of the administrative apparatus, the regular functioning of royal mints, and the
institutionally backed and regulated urban and rural markets. In addition, fringe groups, defined
primarly by their geographical distance from Mughal strongholds such as towns and villages in
the Kucch saltmarshes and the Kathiawar peninsula were kept within the Mughal imperial ambit
through tributary exchange that was backed by the credible threat of military reinforcements by
Mughal provincial armies. While there might have been challengers to Mughal sovereignty in the
seventeenth century, the local vernacular sources suggest that the powerful position of the
provincial governor and the authority of the imperial throne mutually constituted the paramount
source of public authority and social organization in Gujarat. As I demonstrate in Chapter 3, this
balance was maintained for the better part of the seventeenth century since the Mughal treasury
was robust with income outweighing disbursements at the provincial and imperial levels. As long
as the Mughal state and its provincial manifestations remained the paramount employer of
military labor and bureaucratic skill, they could harness the lion's share of land revenue tax,
customs and poll duties, luxury goods and valuable jewelry, and the flow of precious metals and
currency. More importantly, they could organize such resource extraction and redistribution
according to their own system of tenurial entilements that in turn structured local political
economy.
Chapter 2 elaborated this legal-administrative framework which the Mughals inherited from
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earlier Turkish-Mongol polities in South Asia, and subsequently propagated in improved forms in
areas that were incorporated into the imperial domain through military conquest. The crux of this
organization was that entitlements to land revenue were schematized according to how
regularized the right was, whether its duration was intended to be permanent or temporary, and
the accompanying range of duties that right holders were expected to perform in exchange for the
privilege of retaining and benefitting from those rights. The underlying premise of my macro
theoretical formulation of historical transition in early modern South Asia is that the subcontinent
has been home to successive soil states, or political orders whose central focus and resource base
has been the extraction of agrarian surplus in the form of land revenue tax. This includes early
polities right from the Mauryan State in the early centuries before the first common era to the
various Islamic polities that controlled the subcontinent beginning in the second millennium.
Especially before the nineteenth century, when the proportion of land far exceeded demographic
factors such as the necessary labor to till it, states had to navigate a delicate balance between
appropriate taxation levels and maintaining regular streams of revenue in the long term. Indian
peasants, either as peasant proprietors or tenant farmers, had considerable say in processes of
state formation, its local propagation, and elements of its dissolution or fall from grace. Our
sources, both imperial and local, suggest that violence, to the degree it was possible, was
consciously avoided, especially against unarmed peasants, since it severely undermined the
revenue paying capacity of productive areas. Although such a normative diagnosis must be taken
with caution, it nevertheless represents an ideal that sovereigns aspired to. It is in this context that
I suggested four major tenurial categories animated social and political life in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and provided the dominant framework, to recall Charles Tilly’s famous
formulation, for aspects of war making, state making, protection, and extraction. The categories,
or typologies of land rights, that operated during the high-tide of the Mughal Empire were
BUREAUCRATIC ASSIGNMENT (I), REVENUE FARM (II), HEREDITARY OCCambridge
University PressATION or POSSESSION BY GRANT/GIFT (III), and TRIBUTARY or
CHIEFTAINCY (IV). Central to my theorization of tenurial rights and tenurial duties in early
modern India was the increasing importance of financial agents as local service providers of
Mughal officials, and as reliable specialists involved with the maintenance and movement of
money and its accompanying technologies such as assaying currency, minting international
bullion into local coin, remitting funds to jagirdar-s across territories, and providing short term
credit to foreign merchants and money advances to local producers. One major theoretical
contribution of this chapter is recognizing that the growing practice and significance of land
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revenue farming in seventeenth and eighteenth-century India needs to be rethought vis-à-vis
longer histories of principal-agent relations within state bureaucracies, and that the gradual
implication of financial agents into the Mughal apparatus of effecting and maintaining the legal
fiction of overlapping and competing regimes of land rights and resource extraction in early
modern South Asia is both a hallmark of its success and also a loophole that was eventually
exploited in the eighteenth century to undermine the very organizational forms within which such
redistributive practices initially derived any meaning.
For the better part of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mughal agrarian
apparatus was robust in that revenues outweighed expenses, and the early emperors could forge
functioning bureaucracies across vast territories. Royal chronicles, provincial land revenue
documents, and even visual evidence in the form of miniature paintings and local imperial
architecture attest to the organizational features of Mughal rule during this period. Chapter 3
focuses on the relationship that elite banking households shared with representatives of Mughal
sovereignty in the late-seventeenth century by analyzing new data from Sanskrit and Gujarati
literary texts, imperial orders in Persian, and an untranslated French formulary on Gujarati
financial agents by the French company merchant Georges Roques. The evidence strongly
suggests that during this period, the Mughal ruling elite, composed of emperors and provincial
officials like governors and their deputies, shared a reciprocal and mutually constitutive
relationship with the prominent local financial specialists of the time. Gujarati businesspersons,
largely comprising men of the Jain and Hindu communities, offered various highly technical
services that were crucial to the regular maintainence of commercial life. These included
activities such as trading local textiles for foreign bullion, assaying imperial coins in circulation
and discounting them in banking transactions according to law, remitting money through private
family and community networks, offering short-term loans to weavers and foreign traders, and
importantly, procuring luxury goods and items of conspicuous consumption for the nobility.
These services brought together foreign merchants, local producers, financial agents, and
representatives of Mughal authority, especially governors or nazim-s, deputy-governors or naib-i
nazim-s, and local treasurers or diwan-s, into a complex web of credit, debt, and socio-political
obligations.
The clearest manifestation of such intricate relationships, as I explored in the discussion of
succession wars after Emperor Shah Jahan's rule ended in 1658, was the role that prominent
bankers played in financing princely retinues and their fratricidal bids for the throne. As a case
study, I analyzed fresh evidence pertaining to the family of Shantidas Jhaveri (c. 1584-1659), a
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Gujarati-Jain jeweler, banker, merchant, moneylender, revenue farmer, and friend of the Mughal
court spanning the tenure of at least three emperors. Shantidas and his descendants are welldocumented in government and local sources well into the nineteenth century, providing my
study a unique longue-duree perspective on the relationship of financial agents and political
authority in early modern India. For the period explored in this chapter, I suggested that Shantidas
Jhaveri's relationship with a fiscally sound Mughal imperial apparatus was cordial until the
1680s, when the long and drawn out expansionist wars into southern India by Emperor
Aurangzeb completely transformed the Mughal state’s need for ready capital and financial
services from private capitalists. This historical circumstance had significant consequences for
those who were in the business of money, since they became primary targets for imperially
sanctioned extortion campaigns that were carried out across various cities and towns in Gujarat. It
also radically altered the normative version of tenurial entitlements, comprising land rights and
accompanying duties, by motivating local Mughal bureaucrats to parcel their territorial
assignments and other forms of land rights to revenue farmers who could pay advance sums, and
to members of rival war groups such as the Marathas from the Deccan who were looking for
more regular sources of tribute from the productive lands of Gujarat. The Mughal’s insatiable
need for ready money was not only geared towards financing standing armies and recruiting
military day laborers in the name of Mughal sovereignty, but was also critical for funding intraMughal rivalries that were oriented towards monopolizing resources at the provincial level. The
crisis of empire, to recall Muzaffar Alam’s evocative phrase, was not so much the Mughal
inability to salvage itself from external military threat, nor was it the sudden burgeoning of
provincial consciousness that manifested as zamindari rebellions that the state could not suppress.
Rather, as the evidence from Gujarat strongly attests, it was the loss of confidence by provincial
governors within the Mughal apparatus who were uncertain about their professional futures as
strict representatives of an imperial authority that was gradually unraveling due to increasing
financial difficulties. As a result, provincial governors became the real movers in the story of
historical transition, especially in how local areas experienced a deteriorating Mughal
administrative apparatus and the concomitant rise of new aspirants to political authority from
both within and beyond the Mughal framework.
As a case study, Chapter 4 focused on the story of rival governors, local bankers, and
financial crisis in late-Mughal Gujarat until 1730. I relied on hitherto examined evidence
including two untranslated Gujarati literary texts, and a richly detailed local source comprising
the Persian diary of a lower-level Mughal bureaucrat called Itimad Ali Khan. The main argument
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advanced in this section was that impoverished Mughal governors began relying on their
precarious positions as representatives of imperial authority to extort local merchants and bankers
for confiscatory sums. In particular, I analyzed the fight for local supremacy between Hamid
Khan, Shujaat Khan, Rustam Ali, and Sarbuland Khan, governors and deputy-governors trying to
half-heartedly salvage local Mughal authority while securing viable territorial bases for their own
autonomous political futures. It is during these various intra-Mughal skirmishes taking place
around Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Surat that I underscored the critical role that Shantidas Jhaveri's
grandson Khushalchand Jhaveri played in financing opposing Mughal military camps. The chief
purpose of raising loans from Khushalchand was to immediately pay Mughal soldiers on the
verge of deserting retinues led by these rival governors. It was also a timely solution for raising
the required funds for hiring irregular military day laborers who were not loyal to any one person,
cause, or authority, but were willing to work for any commander willing to pay regularly and
having the potential to win battles and redistribute local resources.
Despite strong efforts made by the imperial court in Delhi to coordinate administration in its
Gujarat province, the factionalism playing out at the Mughal court in the 1720s was too divisive
and undermined any efforts at sustained rule at the center, periphery, and in between. The
incessant violence and scare tactics by imperial officials against financial agents in the locality
engendered two major shifts. The first was the contraction of merchant-banking wealth and
critical services from the realm of Mughal politics and urban markets. The second was the
opportunity that such intra-Mughal rivalries provided peasant-soldiering elites from the Deccan to
control territory and land revenue from the wealthy areas of Gujarat. As a bankrupt imperial order
began losing control of key territories, both provincial Mughal governors and these roving bandits
from the Deccan took on features of warlordism. They sought power in this volatile political
vacuum through military might, and started becoming new nodes of authority and organizers of
land revenue resources on much smaller scales. The Deccani groups hired soldiers and made
alliances with renegade Mughal governors who were oscillating between preserving some
semblance of Mughal rule through parceling out tribute to such warlords, carving out their own
small and independent fiefdoms and washing their hands of imperial duties, or just abandoning
the province altogether for opportunities elsewhere.
By the mid-eighteenth century, the Mughals lost any semblance of unified political authority
and rule in Gujarat. In its wake, the Gaekwad lineage, emerging out of the Pune-based Maratha
confederacy, began consolidating territory and influence. The ancestors of these peasantsoldiering elites had already set the stage since they were part of former tribute-seeking war
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bands that made early inroads from the Deccan into Gujarat in the opening years of the eighteenth
century. In search of regular tribute and other forms of extortive taxes from areas under the strong
and weak holds of the Mughal domain, these roving groups were highly skilled at guerrilla
combat and developed unique knowledge about the landscape and revenue generating potential of
various districts in Gujarat. Beginning in 1753, Damaji Gaekwad, the key lieutenant of the
Peshwa in Gujarat, established the foundations of independent political authority by agreeing to
cede one-half of all revenues he currently held and would obtain through future military conquest
to the Peshwa at Pune. This was significant, since Damaji Gaekwad continued to recognize
aspects of his overlord’s authority while gradually moving towards setting up the foundation of
his own nascent Mughal successor state. Chapter 5 analyzed this story in detail by focusing on the
changing contours of late-Mughal and early-Gaekwad rule in Gujarat between 1730-58, and the
mechanisms by which the Gaekwads initially consolidated, and then lost, power until 1818. I
suggested that the Gaekwad siege of Ahmedabad in 1758 marked a clear-cut end to Mughal rule
in Gujarat, but represented the beginning of a series of organizational and financial problems that
they could only overcome by converting key elements of statecraft into business opportunities for
local bankers, financiers, military paymasters, free-agent soldiers, revenue farmers, and finally,
early representatives of the colonial state at Bombay.
Chapter 5 also continued the story of the Jhaveri family by focusing on the political and
financial activities of the brothers Nathushah and Vakhatchand. As successive nagarsheth-s of
Ahmedabad, they not only represented the business interests of the city’s elite, but also served as
key spokespersons of local populations to the various groups competing for political control of
mainland Gujarat. I also demonstrated how Vakhatchand moved outside of his primary domain in
Ahmedabad to Nadiad near Baroda to partake in disputes about revenue payments and hereditary
land rights within the extended Gaekwad household. He not only served as a diplomat and chief
communicator between various rival groups vying for control over certain jagir-s, but also offered
his financial services as bank guarantor and revenue-farmer to the revenue-sharing arrangements
that he himself brokered between the Gaekwad raja, members of the Gaekwad household, and
finally, the Bombay Government of the colonial state. The activities of the Jhaveri Brothers
indexes two important aspects related to financial agents in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century. On the one hand, it suggests a decline of merchant capital and the gradual
shrinking of their traditional business as jewelers and specialists in bullion. On the other, it also
indexes certain continuities from earlier periods such as the need for financial services, the
growing importance of revenue farming and tributary arrangements, and the need to raise quick
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capital to pay free-agent military men and secure diplomatic revenue-sharing arrangements.
While Nathushah and Vakhatchand did not partake in financing rival wars like their father
Khushalchand and great great-grandfather Shantidas, they brokered revenue sharing deals
between heads of rival groups in the locality who preferred to keep the vagaries and economic
uncertainties of war and violence at bay.
To further demonstrate the increasing importance of local bankers and financiers in key
elements of statecraft in the late eighteenth century, Chapter 5 also focused on the early history of
the Baroda-based banking firm called Haribhakti ni Pedhi. Established in 1762 by two brothers
Hari and Bhakti, the Haribhakti family became the top moneylender to the fledgling state. The
Gaekwads borrowed large sums to pay their irregular armies and fund tributary payments to the
Peshwas at Pune, and later, to the organizational bureaucracy of the early colonial state. Since
rent-seeking via tribute was no longer the best option for a state that was trying to consolidate
public authority and robust influence over revenue generating territories, the Gaekwads could not
maintain a standing military solely on the promise of sharing booty and spoils of war. Although
this was the organizational tactic during the early years of the Maratha confederacy, the
Gaekwads tried to orient themselves towards paying regular salaries to groups of free-agent
military men that were available in wide numbers in the province. These groups had to be paid
whether military campaigns were in season or not. Therefore, debts to these military personalities
accumulated quickly, and the Gaekwad rulers at Baroda found themselves in a critical position
that only innovations in finance could solve. By the 1790s, Govindrao Gaekwad firmly instituted
a system in which private bankers and financiers became intimately involved in the politics of the
military labor market in very overt and obvious ways. The Gaekwad borrowed heavy sums to pay
existing soldiers and enroll new ones. It was essential to maintain such military men on the
payroll for two reasons. First, they also posed a legitimate threat and could very well overturn and
sabotage Gaekwad authority in the area. Second, their services were especially necessary for the
ruler to obtain revenues from his territorial fiefdoms now comprising his watan-jagir on which a
growing body of militarized peasants and other armed local groups lived, and who were unwilling
to part with revenues and taxes without putting up formidable fights.
Chapter 5 documented the rising debts of the Gaekwad State which amounted to several
million rupees in any given year between 1762-1825. To balance accounts of each previous year,
the Gaekwad resorted to borrowing greater sums from Baroda's major bankers. For example,
Baroda’s yearly revenue between 1812 and 1825 was under seven million rupees, but annual
expenditures exceeded eight million rupees. Each year, the growing difference between state
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income and disbursements was met by taking more loans. By 1825, the Gaekwads owed five
major bankers Haribhakti, Samal Behechar, Mairal Narain, Mangal Sakhidas, and Ratanji
Kahanji over 13,000,000 rupees. Of this amount, more than eight million rupees was owed to the
Haribhakti Firm alone. In exchange for their critical financial services and loans, these bankers
were issued valuable varat-s, that is, orders sanctioned by the Gaekwad head for repayment in the
form of assignments on the land revenues of key districts falling under the ruler’s domain. Often,
these areas were administered by another class of revenue-farmers called kamavisdar-s who
earned temporary farming rights by winning them in auctions. To secure such rights, winners had
to provide an advance rent amount called rasad to the Gaekwad state at the beginning of each
harvest season. Borrowing funds from banking classes to pay soldiers, raising capital through
money advances from speculators of land revenue called ijarah, and neglecting fiscal
responsibility by not establishing a working system of income and disbursements pushed the
Gaekwad into dire financial straits. It is in this context that the colonial government of Bombay
saw an opportunity to diplomatically seize key revenue generating districts and strategic urban
areas falling within the Gaekwad watan-jagir in exchange for recognizing the de jure authority of
the princely domain, and for providing timely financial assistance to clear Gaekwad debts with a
growing body of underpaid and clamoring soldiers at Baroda. It was in this context that by 1818,
the British East India Company subjugated the Maratha confederacy including the Gaekwads, and
their resources in the form of lands that generated considerable revenues were divided between
the East India Company, the Bombay Government, the Maratha-Gaekwad family, and other
smaller estates in western India. The Gaekwad’s share of 8,164 square miles became the Princely
State of Baroda while 10,000 square miles came under colonial jurisdiction. This negotiation was
based on the Company’s calculation of land revenue and income from various levies, not ease of
territorial administration. As a result, Baroda’s new political geography resembled a jigsaw
puzzle in which its four major districts of Kadi, Baroda, Amreli, and Navsari were not contiguous
and scattered across the mainland and the Kathiawar peninsula. The arbitrary borders of these
four regions cut across distinct ecological, cultural, and language-dialect zones in western India,
this geo-political arrangement continued until shorty after India's indepenence from colonial rule
in 1947.
To consolidate influence over various agrarian tracts and urban markets in Gujarat, groups
such as the Gaekwad’s of Baroda had to rely on small militias that would make their rounds to
not only raise taxes from these areas, but also secure them from rival groups such as defected
Mughal governors, local war bands, and other potential claimants. In order secure the allegiance
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of their haphazard military, they increasingly relied on borrowed sums from indigenous bankers
and private financiers. Such businesspersons, including the brothers Hari and Bhakti, the
paymasters Samal Behechar and Mangal Parekh, and other local bankers discussed in Chapter 5,
found an enticing opportunity in involving themselves directly in the politics and economic
futures of a nascent and aspiring state. In the process, however, the Gaekwads became
increasingly indebted to various business households in Gujarat. In addition to providing financial
loans, these bankers also used their networks and personnel to move money, communicate
information, and even help collect land revenue on behalf of the Gaekwad authority. This became
especially prevalent from the 1780s until 1832, when the head of the state Sayajirao Gaekwad
paid his creditors from his private funds. If we view the waning period of the Mughal Empire
from 1680 until 1750 together with the years that new nodes of power consolidated local
authority between 1750-1818, we can suggest that the long-eighteenth century represents a sort of
debt century in which shortage of money radically transformed political possibilities and the
makeup of government personnel. During the high-tide of Mughal rule, merchant-bankers shared
a relatively independent relationship with representatives of political authority whereas by the late
eighteenth century, financial agents recovered from being targets of earlier extortion campaigns
to becoming official coparcers of fledging forms of government and sovereignty. The longer-term
growth of South Asian society based on land ownership, at least in western India, was not a
gradual evolutionary process, but rather trigged by exceptional historical circumstances where
land, and not just the revenues from it, were becoming prized commodities that were given out in
large numbers in exchange for much needed advance capital from bankers and revenue farmers.
This segmented market in land developed because of further subinfeudation and parceling of the
various forms of land rights and duties that were propagated by earlier Islamic polities in the
subcontinent, that were further refined by the Mughal administrative apparatus, and that were
finally coopted as the basis for more haphazard political organization by the Gaekwads of
Baroda.
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation demonstrate that the relationship between
financial specialists, representatives of political authority, and the agrarian economy underwent
significant changes over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During Mughal rule, the state
did not depend on private capital for paying armies, propagating bureaucracies, and runnings its
machinery for harnessing land revenue. As a political formation in relative equilibrium, the
contours of this early modern empire were well defined and not overextended in its capacity to
control populations and territories. The sliding and accommodating spectrum of rights to land
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revenue and resources, ranging from the highly regularized and permanent, to the temporary and
less regularized, kept various social actors invested in the system of revenue entitlements and
accompanying benefits that gave their individual positions and relative power any meaning. The
crux of this was a functioning redistributive system dictated by the rules and regulations of the
Mughal hierarchical administration, and its accompanying practices of ritual-patrimonial norms,
rules of comportment and self-fashinoing, and highly evolved court culture that provided a forum
for constituting interpersonal relationships and playing out empire-wide politics. My study of
Gujarat demonstrates how this normative vision of early modern political life played out in
idiosyncratic ways in the locality, and how it was reshaped during moments of crisis and its
aftermath. It is in this context that I suggest that Mughal successor states, like the Gaekwads of
Baroda, developed into fiscally irresponsible nodes of authority that resorted to private capital to
consolidate authority and propagate an agrarian system that harnessed land revenue and tribute
from local areas. They simply did not have the military might or a sustainable vision for
establishing a robust and long-term redistributive mechanism. While businesspersons before 1700
were key participants in politics of the Mughal royal court, they were not central to financing
bureaucracies and military contingents. This changed between 1750-1790s when local bankers
like the Jhaveri brothers and the Haribhaktis became central to the consolidation and propagation
of political authority, land revenue administration, and enterprises of state building premised on
the regular borrowing of money, and the capital raising and speculative practices of land revenue
farming through auction.
While peasant oppression, religious intolerance, and colonialism continue to be touted as
major reasons for why the Mughal Empire did not survive in any robust form beyond 1707, the
analysis presented here suggests that a less partial answer lies in the changing politics of finance
which duly undermined existing entitlements to land and its revenues, and created real anxieties
about political futures. Financial capital was implicated in the changing political order of this
period through its central importance in funding military salaries and backing revenue-farming
contracts of portfolio-capitalists that Chris Bayly and Sanjay Subrahmanyam drew our attention
to several years ago. I believe that this changing face of state and society during the long
eighteenth century is best understood by tracing the social networks and political relatioships
between business households, financial capital, and public authority in india between 1650-1818.
Much like this dissertation, such analysis should combine evidence produced by state
bureaucracies, such as that of the Mughals, Gaekwads, and early colonial state, with a range of
local and vernacular language sources that shed light on local power relations, political economy,
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and customary practices as it underwent significant transformations in the eighteenth century. It is
significant to note that both the Jhaveris and the Haribhaktis remain active in various industries
and business enterprises in modern India. And while a discussion of their subsequent trajectories
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is beyond the scope of this dissertation, their very
survival as key business households into contemporary times suggests that while various forms of
Indian political authority have waxed and waned in the early modern and modern periods,
business families have demonstrated a remarkable resilience in preserving personal resources,
professional prospects, and their most valuable asset, i.e. knowledge through lineage. The inner
workings of how these families adapted to colonial and post-colonial law, society, and markets
represents fruitful grounds for a future study.
This dissertation has identified the need for finance as the chief organizing principle of local
life in eighteenth-century Gujarat, a situation that was exceptional enough to tip the overall fiscal
balance of the Mughal Empire and engender radical shifts in the makeup of political authority in
the subcontinent. The longer-term perspective of land rights and duties associated with possessing
such rights articulated in Chapter 2 allows us to also step away from the tendency to view land
and territory as teleology of empire. In other historical contexts, there have been a considerable
number of wielding polities such as the Mauryan Empire and the Mongols led by Timur. Like
these, eighteenth-century South Asia represents a patchwork quilt of various overlapping,
competing, allied, and separate authority exercising groups that were held in relative equilibrium
by war, revenue sharing arrangements, and diplomatic agreements. At the center of these
dispensations was the subtle but critical role that financiers started playing as providers of the
necessary advance capital to secure political and economic futures. It is firmly in the post 1750s
that we see the beginnings of financial capital being slowly entwined with state building projects,
government capacity, and the propagation of local political authority. This continues unabated
into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, a fuller exploration of which merits separate
research.
The hallmark of this study is a reliance on hitherto unexplored sources in various Indian and
European languages. Give that these materials were produced well before the era of regularized
print, they also comprise a range of documentary genres, literary styles, and written dialects.
Recovering aspects of social history from materials dictated by literary conventions than strictly
documentary ones has involved reading with and against the grain, and more importantly,
triangulating data across repositories and source genres. One of biggest challenges has been
recovering terminologies and languages of finance from a wide range of materials that were not
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self-consciously highlighting its importance. An important strategy that I developed in this work
is to deemphasize statistical and numerical values, which are partial and inconsistent by nature, in
favor of highlighting episodes and moments that shed critical light on financial relationships.
This micro-historical approach allowed me to hone in on overlooked details with the premise that
hyper-local happenings shed light on the mentalities and structures dictating social possibilities
and the contours of historical change. An element that I hope to dwell on in future work is why
wealthy bankers in eighteenth-century India put up with unnecessary fines and extortion? If
money commanded soldiers and protection, why did not Indian bankers and other financial agents
takeover as the most importance source of power in the subcontinent? This would also be
appropriate grounds to conduct comparative analyses with scholarship on early modern European
states where many wealthy bankers become central figures in socio-political life, creating their
own landed estates and dictating political futures in more explicit ways. As a preliminary
suggestion, I suggest that since South Asia comprises a relatively large territorial space, financial
agents were more concerned with preserving and growing their wealth within local and
manageable limits. To the extent that they could obtain infrastructural support and significant
concessions from ruling authorities, they were content with focusing on their own highly
specialized businesses. It was only when significant institutional voids were felt after the 1750s
that these financial agents became more entangled in constituting that very organizational
apparatus that they so heavily relied on for commercial activities in earlier times.
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Glossary
amīr – noble (pl. umarāʻ)
anth – monetary advance; interest rate on loans; fee for cashing a bill of exchange
Arthaśāstra – Sanskrit treatise on political diplomacy, statecraft, and warfare (c. 350-275 BCE)
asāmī – type of land tenure belonging to a non-proprietary cultivator such as a revenue-farmer
(renter)
ashrafī – Mughal gold coin
‘āmil – Mughal revenue collector at the local level
ācārya – official preceptor in religious matters
āchar-i mirch – pickled peppers
āmil – revenue collector, usually the head of a district or pargana
āmir – administrator; high official; one who commands
bāhirkhalī – charitable or religious grants to Brahmins, Bhats, and other groups
bakhshī – military paymaster
bhāgdārī – coparceners of a village responsible for paying a pre-assessed land revenue to the
Gaekwad government
bhāgwaṭai – an apportionment of shares of the crop in kind between the cultivator and the
government
bī-taqṣīr – without fault
bīware – fee, fine, tax, or raising amount or sum of money
bhīl – generic term for tribal populations
brahmadeya – grants to Brahmins
chalani – Mughal coins minted in years prior with debased weights (contrast with sikka or new
rupees)
chaudhurī – semi-hereditary official concerned with Mughal revenue collection
chaukasī – assayer
chauth – regular tax or tribute; annual tax levied by Marathas at 25 percent on estimated revenues
or produce
crore – ten million; 10,000,000
dango – civil unrest; dispute; riot
dar-o-bast – entire revenue districts
dastūr – fixed cash revenues on zabtī lands
daulat – hereditary or pseudo-hereditary dominion or assignment
daulat-i khudādād – state granted by God
derāsar – Jain temple
desai – local village headman
devadāna – endowment to Hindu deities
devanāgarī – Indic script for languages including Sanskrit, Marathi, Hindustani, and related
vernaculars like Gujarati
dīwān – imperially appointed treasury official of the province
farmān – royal order from the Mughal court
faujdār – garrison commander
faujdāri – the office or post of garrison commander
gādī – seat of authority; head of princely state
ganim, ghanīm – plunderer, enemy, marauders; referring to the Marathas in Persian, Gujarati, and
English sources
girāshī – caste groups or individuals living by piracy
gumāshta – agent; officer employed by bankers to receive money, and by merchants to carry on
business in places other than where they reside (agent of a principal)
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halbandī – tax which was levied on the number of ploughs used over a tract of land
haq – the privilege, fee, perquisite, or grant claimable under established usage by the officers of
Gaekwad government and village officers
haveli – mansion; place of residence for local political power holders in Ahmedabad in the
eighteenth century
hundī – transferable promissory note; financial instrument; bill of exchange
ijārah – privilege or income of variable amount sold or let for a fixed sum; a farm; revenue
farming right acquired through advance purchase (See Chapter 2); temporary exploitation of
a holding upon payment of an advance akin to rent
ijārahdār – holder of an ijārah right; revenue farmer; kāmavisdār (Maratha-Marathi)
ijārah istamrārī – permanent revenue farms that can become hereditary vested rights of the
zamīndārī type
inām – land rights, often perpetual and hereditary, bestowed by political authorities to specialist
groups and communities as (tax-free) gift
ināmi – village (land revenues) granted as gift by the Gaekwad as repayment for loans and
financial services
iqṭāʻ – land granted to army officials of the Islamic Empires for limited periods in lieu of a
regular wage; fiscal rights of the state over kharāj lands that were conveyed to a grantee
while the property right remained with the kharāj payer
jāgīr – bureaucratic assignment of land revenue for establishing and supporting officers and
servants
jāgīrdār – holder of a jāgīr assignment
jaidad – acknowledgement of revenue payable; specification of land held, given by the holder
and deposited with the collector
jamāʻat dārān – leader of troops; head of local militias
jhaveri – jeweler (also spelled jawahari)
jhaveriwāda – jeweler’s neighborhood in the walled city of Ahmedabad; location of Shantidas’
residence
jina – spiritual victors in the Jain tradition
jinalaya – Jain temple
jizya – poll tax; pilgrimage tax; community head tax levied by Mughal State on non-Muslims;
capitation tax paid by non-Muslim subjects of Empire
kacheri – local government office building
kamāvīs – Revenue rights belonging to head revenue-officer of a district, often entrusted with
policing duties in some areas in western India
kāmavisdār – revenue farmer; ijārahdār (Mughal-Persian)
khāliṣa – revenues from local lands earmarked for the Mughal imperial treasury; crown lands
khandani – protection money
kharāj – land tax levied on malk property
khazāna – treasury (noun); not current, or older minted coins (adjective)
khuṭba – public Islamic sermon
kolī – nomadic forest dwelling tribes; local bandits
kotwāl – chief local police officer
lakh – a hundred thousand; 100,000
madad-i ma‘āsh – land granted in (perpetual) aid of a person or community the under royal seal
(See Chapter 2)
mahājan – banker, businessperson, merchant, and/or trader
maḥāl – province; district
mahārājā – great king, a title taken by local (Hindu) rulers
mahārājādhirāja – great king of kings, a title taken by local (Hindu) rulers
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maḥmūdī – Mughal silver coin equal to about eight and a half pence English in 1890s
mahsūl – revenue; land tax; public income from any source such as land, customs, excise
malakh khurī – grasshoppers
māl-i zamīn – regular land tax paid to the Mughal State; surety to secure a revenue farming right
in western India
malk – private property
māmlat – right granted as head revenue and native police officer of a district, invested as a
revenue officer with the duties of realizing the collections
māmlatdārī – office, duty, or official right to collection or farm of revenues of an administrative
area
manṣab – the numerical rank of a government official in the Mughal Empire
manṣabdār – ranking member of the Mughal bureaucracy; governed and commanded armies
maʻrifat – through the acquaintance of; middleman
maund – approximately, one maund (mun) = 40 seer = 40 kg
mehwasi – local soldiers falling under the kolī community group
miḥrāb – prayer alter in a mosque
milāwā – drinking money or amount paid above official salaries to hired soldiers
mīr-i ātish – head of artillery
miyān – Mister, usually in the Indo-Islamic context
moḍī – cursive script used to write Gujarati and Marathi languages, especially in correspondence
and accounting
mulkgīrī – annual military raids during harvest season to seize food and fodder, often undertaken
by Mughal provincial governor in lands falling under the jurisdiction of tributary
chieftaincies or other outlying territories
muqaddam – a village headman appointed to go between Mughal revenue officials and local
inhabitants
muqatā – term for revenue farm in southeastern Rajasthan, held by the muqatī. There were two
types, upati muqatā (greater information about potential agrarian revenues), and muqatā (less
information, more speculative).
muqṭiʻ – holder of iqṭāʻ right
mustā’jir – holder of a revenue farm right
mutāṣaddī – port-official
nagarsheth – local title referring to city patron and chief of caste/community-based merchant
guild
nāʼib – deputy
nāʼib-i nāẓim – gubernatorial deputy
narwā – an undivided village held in coparcenary
nauāb or nauwāb – pl. of nāʼib; as a singular noun, used as title for a vicegerent or deputy; also
refers to hereditary chiefdoms held by former Mughal officials in the eighteenth century (e.g.
Nauwāb of Cambay; Nauwāb of Junagadh; Nauwāb of Awadh)
nāyak – leader, a chief in general; also the head of a small body of soldiers
nāẓim – governor of a Mughal province
naẕrānā – offering from inferior to superior; way to mark hierarchy, real and symbolic authority
nemṇūk – salary, stipend, allowance, pension, or fixed payment in money or kind from a specified
source, granted for past or present services, or as equivalent for allowances formerly
received.
pān – Aromatic betel leaf chewed with the betel nut and other fragrant spices; mouth freshener
pārekh – a person who deals with money and payments on a large scale; banker
pargana –Mughal sub-district; division of a province
parwāna – written order or commission; grant, letter under seal from any main power; permit;
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license; warrant
pāṭilkī – name for zamīndārī rights in Maharashtra
paṭṭa – document type for managing revenue farms in Rajasthan and Gujarat
pāy-bāqī – lands were those in the imperial reserve awaiting assignment to jāgīrdār-s
peshkash – offering of cash or valuables that indexes a subordinate position of the person giving
peshwa – (hereditary) prime minster of the Maratha confederacy, developed into its own
independent source of authority by the 1750s
praśasti – praise poem or eulogy emerging out of the Sanskrit-Indic tradition
potedār – treasurer
qabāla – any contract, especially of bargain and sale
qabūliyat – acceptance or agreement to revenue terms as outlined in the paṭṭa
qabż – an advance payment akin to rent to secure an official position in the local revenue
administration of the Mughal Empire; an advance payment
qānūngo – official responsible for registering and expounding the laws of the Mughal Empire
qaṣbātī – rustic villagers; local bandits
qaṭāye‘ – hereditary grants of crown lands with full rights of disposal by sale, gift, or inheritance
made by the caliphs to their supporters
qāẓī – judge; judge-mayor of a city
rājā – local (Hindu) king
rājādhirāja – king of kings, a title taken by local (Hindu) rulers
rās – lyrical poem in Gujarati language
rasad – rent portion or cash advance necessary to win an ijārah revenue right
rāyat – cultivator; peasant (Persian: raʻīyat)
rupee – principal silver alloy coin. In 1700, the purchasing power of one rupee was 10 kg of
wheat.
ryal – English-Scottish gold coin, traded in India by East India Company officials
ṣadr – chief justice
ṣadr-us ṣudūr – chief justice at the imperial-wide level
sāh – banker
saftah – bill of exchange
sahūkār – banker
sanad –order granted by government
saraṇjām – assignment of revenue for the support of troops and maintenance of forts
sardeshmukhi – ten percent tax levied by Marathas on land revenue earmarked for the Mughals
sarkār – Mughal district
sarkārī – land belonging to the government
saropā – robe of honor; ritually exchanged to mark hierarchies and establish alliances
ṣarrāf – bankers and financiers who served as moneylenders, currency changers, issuers of credit
and bills of exchange, and intermediaries increasingly integrated as landed gentry into the
fiscal-administrative apparatus of emerging polities in the eighteenth century; generic term
for banker, moneychanger; as adjective: ṣarrāfi (Anglicized as “shroff”)
seth – businessperson; rich person
shikastah – Persian cursive script used for bureaucratic documentation
shiledār – a horse-soldier who provides his own horse and arms
shiristedār – Maratha record keeper, in charge of public records and official documents, head of
provincial registrars and accountants.
sibandī – irregular soldiery; militia or imperfectly disciplined troops maintained for the garrisons
of forts and guards in towns and villages, and for revenue and police duties, charges in the
revenue accounts for the expense of such troops.
sikka – rupee of full weight (contrast with chalani)
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ṣirāf, shroff – banker; moneychanger
śrāvaka – Jain layperson, or worldly householder
ṣūba – Mughal province
ṣūbadār – governor of a Mughal province
surkhā – black-dotted red seed that was used in weighing. The seed was known as rati, and 96
ratis = 1 tola.
svarājya – Maratha self-rule, conceived of contra Mughal rule in the eighteenth century
Svetambara – one of the two main branches of Jainism, the other being Digambara.
ta‘ahhud – pledge given by a prospective Mughal official about the amount they would assess or
collect
tapa gaccha – Monastic order of Svetambara Jainism
thānadār – head police inspector of a pargana or district
ʻushr – tithe levied on qaṭāye‘ grants
vanṭa – lands exempt from assessment or held at a quit-rent by hereditary groups, the tenure is
based on prescription of remote antiquity without any deeds or grants
varāt – an order for payment as an assignment on the revenue of land
waqf – Islamic religious endowment; falling in Q3 in scheme of tenurial entitlements from
Chapter 2
wāqiʻ nawīs – news writer; intelligencer
waṣīyat-nāma – last-will; testament of inheritance
waṭan or vatan – hereditary vested rights belonging to local rājā-s
waṭandāri – the practice of holding hereditary vested land rights
waṭan-jāgīr – hereditary land rights attached to an office or dignity of Mughal administration
wazīr – prime minister, grand vizier of the Mughal Empire
waẓīfa – also spelled vajifā, lands granted to Muslim cultivators, religious heads, and other
pensioners during Mughal rule and continued by the Gaekwad
wazn-kash – master of weighing at each Mughal mint
yādī – official letter issued by the Maratha chiefs, often conveying appointments or executive
orders
zabtī – core areas of Mughal administration composed of Delhi, Allahabad, Awadh, Agra, Lahore
and Multan
żamān – suretyship, guaranteeship, security, bail.
zamīndār – holder of a (hereditary) land revenue right, belonged to a rural class standing above
the peasantry
zāt – numerical rank of a Mughal official that indicated the size of his retinue
zubdat-al aqrān – leading person; best among peers; title given to Shantidas Jhaveri by Shah
Jahan

279

Works Cited
Primary
Dutch
Prakash, Om. 1984. The Dutch Factories in India, 1617-1623: A Collection of Dutch East India
Company Documents Pertaining to India. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
———. 2007. The Dutch Factories in India, 1624-1627: A Collection of Dutch East India
Company Documents Pertaining to India. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
English
Briggs, Henry George. 1849. The Cities of Gujarashtra: Their Topography and History
Illustrated in the Journal of a Recent Tour: Bombay: Times Press.
Desai, Govindbhai and Arthur Clarke. 1923. Gazetteer of the Baroda state. Bombay: Times
Press.
Elliot, F.A.H. 1879. The Rulers of Baroda. Baroda: State Press.
———. 1883. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Baroda. Vol. VII. Bombay: Government
Central Press.
Fawcett, Charles. 1936. The English Factories in India (New Series, Vol. 1): The Western
Presidency, 1670-1677. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1954. The English Factories in India (New Series, Vol. 3): Bombay, Surat, and Malabar
Coast, 1678-1684. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Foster, William. 1896-1902. Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the
East: Transcribed from the Original Correspondence Series of the India Office Records,
1602-1617, 6 vols. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.
———. 1899. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul: As Narrated in
his Journal and Correspondence, 1615-1619, 2 vols. London: Hakluyt Society.
———. 1906-1927. The English Factories in India, 1618-1669: A Calendar of Documents in the
India Office and British Museum, 13 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1921. Early Travels in India, 1583-1619. London: Oxford University Press.
———. 1926. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-19 (Revised and updated).
London: Oxford University Press.
Gense, J.H. and D.R. Banaji, eds. 1936-1945. The Gaikwads of Baroda: English documents, 10
vols. Bombay: D.B. Taraporevala Sons & Co.
Malcolm, John. 1823. A Memoir of Central India, Including Malwa, and Adjoining Provinces, 2
vols. London: Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen.
Manucci, Niccolao. (1699-1709) 1907. Storia do Mogor, trans. W. Irvine. 4 vols. London.
Wallace, Lieut. Colonel R. 1863. The Guicowar and His Relations with the British Government.
Bombay: Education Society's Press.
Wilson, H. H. 1855. A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms and of useful words occurring in
official documents relating to the administration of the government of British India from the
Arabic, Persian, Hindustani, Sanskrit, Hindi…and other languages. London: WH Allen and
Company.
French
Bernier, François. 1891. Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656-1668, trans. Irving Brock.
Westminster: Constable.
Martin, François. (1664-1670) 1990. Francois Martin Mémoires: Travels to Africa, Persia, and
India, trans. Aniruddha Ray. Calcutta: Subarnarekha.
280

———. 1983. India in the 17th Century: Memoirs of Francois Martin, 1670-1694, trans. Lotika
Varadarajan. 2 vols. Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
Ray, Indrani. 1999. The French East India Company and the Trade of the Indian Ocean: A
Collection of Essays. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
Roques, Georges. (1676-1691) 1996. La Manière de Négocier aux Indes: La Compagnie de Indes
et L’art du Commerce, ed. Valérie Bérinstain. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose.
Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste. (1676) 1889. Travels in India, trans. V. Ball, 2 vols. London:
Macmillan & Co.
Thévenot, Jean de. (1665-1684) 1687. The Travels of Monsieur de Thevenot into the Levant in
Three Parts: Turkey, Persia, and the East-Indies, trans. A. Lovell. London: H. Clark.
German
Mandelslo, John Albert. (1638-1640) 1669. The Travels of John Albert de Mandelslo from
Persian into the East Indies, trans. John Davies. London: J. Starkey and T. Basset.
Gujarati
Bhatt, Shamal. (1725) 1946. Rustam no Saloko, ed. Harivallabh Bhayani. Bombay: Gujarati
Forbes Sabha.
Haribhakti Collection, c. 1762−1908. S.C. Misra Archives, Department of History, Maharaja
Sayajirao University of Baroda (MS University). Abbreviation “HBC” for in text citations.
Haribhakti Private Papers, c. 1762-1908. Private Collection of Gopal Haribhakti and Swati
Haribhakti, Baroda. Abbreviation “HPP” for in text citations.
Jani, Vishwanath. (1706) 1946. Ganim no Pavado, ed. Harivallabh Bhayani. Bombay: Gujarati
Forbes Sabha.
Prasadat, Jeevaraj Shantinath. (1859) 1913. “Punyaprakash Ras” (Commonly known as Sheth
Shri Shantidas ane Vakhatchand no Ras). In Jaina Aitihasik Ras Mala, ed. Mohanlal
Dalilchand Desai. Mumbai: Shri Adhyatmagyana Prasarak, pp. 1-102.
Suri, Tilaksagar. (1666) 1926. “Rajasagar Suri Nirwan Ras”. In Jaina Aitihasik Gurjar Kavya
Sanchaya, ed. Muni Jinavijayaji (Gujarati). Bhavnagar: Jain Atmanand Sabha, pp. 45-67.
Persian
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